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Journal Cover Psychology in Russia: State of the Art
  [SJR: 0.225]   [H-I: 4]   [5 followers]  Follow
    
  Free journal Free journal
   ISSN (Print) 2074-6857
   Published by Russian Psychological Society Homepage  [2 journals]
  • Kotov A. A. (2017). A computational model of consciousness for artificial
           emotional agents. Psychology in Russia: State of the Art, 10 (3), 57-73.
    • Abstract: Background. The structure of consciousness has long been a cornerstone problem in the cognitive sciences. Recently it took on applied significance in the design of computer agents and mobile robots. This problem can thus be examined from perspectives of phi­losophy, neuropsychology, and computer modeling. Objective. In the present paper, we address the problem of the computational model of consciousness by designing computer agents aimed at simulating “speech understand­ing” and irony. Further, we look for a “minimal architecture” that is able to mimic the effects of consciousness in computing systems. Method. For the base architecture, we used a software agent, which was programmed to operate with scripts (productions or inferences), to process incoming texts (or events) by extracting their semantic representations, and to select relevant reactions. Results. It is shown that the agent can simulate speech irony by replacing a direct aggressive behavior with a positive sarcastic utterance. This is achieved by balancing be­tween several scripts available to the agent. We suggest that the extension of this scheme may serve as a minimal architecture of consciousness, wherein the agent distinguishes own representations and potential cognitive representations of other agents. Within this architecture, there are two stages of processing. First, the agent activates several scripts by placing their if-statements or actions (inferences) within a processing scope. Second, the agent differentiates the scripts depending on their activation by another script. This multilevel scheme allows the agent to simulate imaginary situations, one’s own imagi­nary actions, and imaginary actions of other agents, i.e. the agent demonstrates features considered essential for conscious agents in the philosophy of mind and cognitive psy­chology. Conclusion. Our computer systems for understanding speech and simulation of irony can serve as a basis for further modeling of the effects of consciousness.

      PubDate: Sun, 08 Oct 2017 15:39:44 +030
       
  • Dubynin I. A., Shishkin S. L. (2017). Feeling of agency versus judgment of
           agency in passive movements with various delays from the stimulus.
           Psychology in Russia: State of the Art, 10 (3), 40-56.
    • Abstract: Background. The sense of agency (SoA) provides us with the experience of be­ing a physical agent with free will. On a phenomenological basis, SoA can be di­vided into sensory components (feeling of agency, FoA) and more cognitive com­ponents (judgment of agency, JoA). Both these components can be independently measured. Objective and Method. A new method was developed to test the possibility of preserving SoA and its components in the atypical conditions of passive movements. Parameters of the participant’s movement in response to a visual stimulus (reaction time, speed, and amplitude) were measured and used to control a servo that simu­lated the movement (executed passive movements). The scores on the psychometric scale of the agency and the event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded for variable movement delays relative to the stimulus onset. Results. It was found that the FoA was not present under passive movement con­ditions. At the same time, participants associated these movements with their own activity (JoA), even when their delay after the stimulus onset was too short to be ac­tively reproduced. The somatosensory ERPs’ amplitude decreased for the expected movements, demonstrating an inverse relationship with the agency scores. The lowest amplitude was observed when movements were actuated by another hand. The results can be explained using a predictive forward model, since the FoA was not observed in the absence of active movements. On the other hand, the ERPs’ data and the presence of JoA with various delays between the stimulus and movement support the postdic­tive model of agency, where the leading role is assigned to prejudice and contextual knowledge related to the action. Conclusion. It seems that the “context pressure” of the situation, demanding a mandatory response to the stimulus, forms a cognitive prediction of movements without firm sensory representation.

      PubDate: Sun, 08 Oct 2017 15:06:36 +030
       
 
 
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