Authors:Avishai Benish, David Levi-Faur Pages: 7 - 16 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 7-16, September 2020. The preface presents the main themes of this special issue. It starts by presenting the argument that the welfare state and the regulatory state are not dichotomies, arguing that both regulation and fiscal transfers for social purposes are increasing, particularly after the financial crisis of 2007, the climate crisis, and the COVID-19 crisis. Then it moves to introduce the articles that compose this special issue, their arguments, and their theoretical and empirical contributions. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:20Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220949216 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Avishai Benish, David Levi-Faur Pages: 17 - 29 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 17-29, September 2020. This article provides an historical and theoretical account of the emerging regulatory welfare state, which is greatly understudied in contemporary regulatory and welfare research. We analyze the interplay between the welfare state and the regulatory state in an age in which regulation is expanding through liberalization, privatization, and the new public management of social services. We then provide a multi faceted framework for understanding the regulatory welfare state and discuss its implications in terms of 1) the normative social goals of the state; 2) the ways in which social policy is delivered through institutions; and 3) the implications of the framework for individuals’ rights and duties. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:21Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220949230 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:John Braithwaite Pages: 30 - 49 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 30-49, September 2020. Regulation, welfare, and markets grow interdependently, shaping, reinforcing, and supporting each other: markets allow for the expansion of welfare states, and welfare states create demand for regulatory state services that help to solve perceived welfare problems. Crises can drive this path dependency because they create opportunities for growth in markets, regulation, and welfare institutions. The momentum toward interdependent risk of ecological crises, economic crises, and security crises is formidable, but regulatory-welfare-market path dependencies might be mustered to counter it. This article proposes a meta governance of path dependence, emphasizing multiple interactions in the regulation-welfare-market system and suggesting that meta governance can steer path-dependent regulation, welfare, and markets in the governance of crises. I discuss whether patterns of path dependence explain why regulation, welfare, and markets interdependently persist and grow. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:23Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220949193 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Hanan Haber Pages: 50 - 67 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 50-67, September 2020. What does the state do to prevent consumers from losing access to basic services in the market due to financial hardship, and under what conditions will this occur' Bringing together the literature on regulatory governance and the welfare state, this article compares regulatory regimes that prevent loss of access to services in the UK, Sweden, and Israel in housing credit, electricity, and water, as well as to the electricity and housing credit sectors in the EU, from the early 1990s to the 2010s. The article finds that regulation to address this issue was introduced in all but the Swedish cases. This highlights the significance of the welfare state context in addressing these issues through regulation, as more residual welfare regimes are associated with more social protection through regulation. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:20Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220954399 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Miriam Hartlapp Pages: 68 - 83 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 68-83, September 2020. This article constructs an index that translates the substance of policy documents into numeric values across three dimensions of regulation—a qualitative assessment of policy substance, its potential impact, and enforcement of regulation—which aims to capture the strength of social objectives in the economy. It draws on theories of economic regulation and literature on the welfare state to develop a general understanding of social objectives. The use of the index is illustrated through public procurement regulation in two European countries (France and Germany) and shows an overall increase in the strength of social objectives. It also highlights systematic differences in country priorities in the regulation of their economy. The index demonstrates that social regulation can be measured and compared in a meaningful way within and across countries. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:26Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220952060 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Caroline De La Porte, Trine P. Larsen, Dorota Szelewa Pages: 84 - 103 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 84-103, September 2020. This article examines the implementation of the European Union’s (EU) work-life balance directive in Denmark and Poland through examining the earmarking of paid parental leave. This enables us to assess whether the EU could be emerging as a gender equalizing regulatory welfare state (RWS). Our analysis points to tensions arising when regulatory decisions are made at a higher level of governance but require implementation and funding at lower levels of governance. In both countries, there are similar parental leave schemes ex-ante, and major actors had similar initial stances on parental leave, favoring stagnation. Yet the plans to implement show how the actors’ positions changed, and the likely result is extended parental leave, with payment (known as double expansion) and more gender-equal participation (degenderization) in parental leave. Although in two different institutional settings, the similar outcome suggests that these changes are due to the European Union acting as an emerging RWS, which influences Member States’ regulatory instruments with fiscal elements. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:22Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220956910 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Philipp Trein Pages: 104 - 120 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 104-120, September 2020. This article is an empirical analysis of how social regulation is integrated into the welfare state. I compare health, migration, and unemployment policy reforms in Australia, Austria, Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States from 1980 to 2014. Results show that the timing of reform events is similar among countries for health and unemployment policy but differs among countries for migration policy. For migration and unemployment policy, the integration of regulation and welfare is more likely to entail conditionality compared to health policy. In other words, in these two policy fields, it is more common that claimants receive financial support upon compliance with social regulations. Liberal or Continental European welfare regimes are especially inclined to integration. I conclude that integrating regulation and welfare entails a double goal: “bossing” citizens by making them take up available jobs while expelling migrants and refugees for minor offenses; and protecting citizens from risks, such as noncommunicable diseases. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:29Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220953758 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Wei Li, Bao Yang Pages: 121 - 137 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 121-137, September 2020. Inspired by the concept of the regulatory welfare state, this article identifies four primary modes of governance in regulating contract processes and contract implementation (market-based, hierarchical, professional, and relational), and compares contract governance modes in Shanghai and Chongqing. We find that the governments in these two localities prioritize and integrate the hierarchical and relational modes, relying less on the market-based and professional modes of governance. The emphasis on the hierarchical-relational mode advances the values and mechanisms of trust, adaptation, and alignment with top-down priorities, but may hinder public and legal accountability. We argue that the dynamics of political context and market condition affect the formation and effectiveness of hybrid modes of contract governance, and we advise that regulators in different countries should factor in such dynamics when designing contract governance modes in the regulation of social services. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:18Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220957286 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Tanja Klenk Pages: 138 - 152 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 138-152, September 2020. Regulation of long-term care service provision is a case of hybrid accountabilities. How do inspectors who are responsible for the implementation of regulations handle the uncertainties arising from hybrid accountabilities' While the prevailing scholarly consensus is that hybridity creates tensions that have a negative impact on the quality of regulation, this article shows that different accountabilities can reinforce each other. However, situations in which inspectors can develop a positive stance toward hybridity and integrate competing logics are rare. Hybrid professionalism among inspectors requires training, education, and resources as well as a joint regulatory culture with inspectees—preconditions that are hardly present in recent institutional settings of long-term care regulation. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:27Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220956587 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Lihi Lahat Pages: 153 - 173 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 153-173, September 2020. Many welfare states have increased their regulatory role, but little attention has been given to historical changes in the regulatory role of government ministries. This study embraces a mezzo perspective and explores the regulatory role of the Welfare Ministry of Israel in the field of personal social services, asking the following questions: 1) What are the changes in regulatory expectations versus practices over the last five decades' and 2) How can we explain these changes and their outcomes' The study is based on the qualitative analysis of comptroller reports and other resources. It reveals a growing gap between society’s expectations of the Ministry as a regulator and the Ministry’s capacities over five decades. Notably, it points to the variety of regulatory spaces that have appeared in a regulatory welfare state. The Israeli case is relevant for other countries that have experienced processes of outsourcing and privatization in the welfare state and whose ministries had to change their role. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:24Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220959310 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Renate Reiter Pages: 174 - 188 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 174-188, September 2020. The article analyzes the design and development of health services in Germany and France—two countries with similar welfare states but with striking differences in their national regulatory styles. Using these comparative cases, I show how the interplay of long-term institutional factors and short-term political factors shaped the establishment and development of these regulatory welfare states’ (RWS) social services. Specifically, I argue that the discovery of service quality in the 1990s had the potential to accelerate RWS development. In Germany, characterized by a corporatist state tradition and a cooperative regulatory style, the political debate on quality (either as a parameter of competition or as a concept for the professional consolidation of service production) had a greater influence on the design of the national quality regulation system (goals, instruments, processes, institutions) than in France, which is characterized by a state-centered Napoleonic tradition and a directive regulatory style. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:26Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220962407 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Lilach Litor, Gila Menahem, Hadara Bar-Mor Pages: 189 - 205 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 189-205, September 2020. This study investigates the mechanisms that courts apply to expose private social service suppliers to constitutional duties. In doing so, we suggest two variants of welfare regimes: the regulatory constitutional welfare state and the regulatory constitutional neoliberal welfare state. We outline how constitutional rights, including social rights, are applied to private entities, and the tests that courts use in doing so. We then analyze the transformation of traditional jurisprudence in Israel since the 1990s, and we discuss developments in British jurisprudence, which embraces a neoliberal approach. We end with an analysis of the differences between British and Israeli jurisprudence to highlight our theoretical framework’s contribution to comparative research. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:28Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220964385 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Linda Voigt, Reimut Zohlnhöfer Pages: 206 - 222 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 206-222, September 2020. Political parties and party competition have been important factors in the expansion and retrenchment of the fiscal welfare state, but researchers have argued that regulatory welfare is not part of political debate among parties. We explore this claim theoretically, and then empirically examine it in the case of employment protection legislation (EPL) in twenty-one established democracies since 1985. EPL is a mature and potentially salient instrument of the regulatory welfare state that has experienced substantial retrenchment. We test three prominent mechanisms of how electoral competition conditions partisan effects: the composition of Left parties’ electorates, the strength of pro-EPL parties, and the emphasis put on social justice by pro-EPL parties. We find that the partisan politics of EPL is conditioned by electoral competition under only very specific circumstances, namely when blame sharing becomes possible in coalitions between EPL supporters. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:24Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220964388 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Işik D. Özel, Salvador Parrado Pages: 223 - 242 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 223-242, September 2020. The expansion of social welfare regimes in middle-income countries (MICs) has become a global trend that has involved the adaption of robust social assistance programs aiming to alleviate poverty and diminish inequalities. We analyze conditional cash transfers in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, identifying the types of regulatory regimes that exist in each, namely “loose decentralism” in Brazil, “strict centralism” in Mexico, and “subcontracted dirigisme” in Turkey. We argue that regulatory design is key to understanding how the newly flourishing welfare regimes can control political manipulation, and that where manipulation occurs, social assistance programs can deviate from their initial objectives and endanger the welfare of the poor and hazard trust in the government and political institutions. However, when social welfare regimes work in line with their objectives and eschew political discretion, regulatory welfare states can enhance trust in and legitimacy of political institutions. Our analysis indicates that a centrally regulated social assistance governance nurtured by local knowledge is key to avoiding political manipulation and to alleviating poverty, major issues in MICs. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:19Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220965884 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:John Lapidus Pages: 243 - 257 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 243-257, September 2020. The Swedish welfare model is gradually losing its former characteristics. Notable is the extensive privatization of provision and the emerging privatization of funding, primarily through new and half-private services in health care, education, and elderly care. The clearest example of this trend is the rise of private health insurance, which is now signed by every tenth person of working age. This article points out different types of regulations that have provoked the rise of private health insurance, and discusses types of regulations that could potentially slow privatization. Further, this article analyzes three official welfare investigation reports. These reports avoid the decisive regulations they are supposed to discuss, and sometimes go against directives to do so. I argue that regulations for private health insurance have occurred without much debate, while every potential regulation against private health insurance is very much disputed by industry interests and many of the political parties. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:23Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220964426 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Sora Lee, Valerie Braithwaite Pages: 258 - 275 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 258-275, September 2020. The regulatory welfare state illuminates path dependencies and tendencies to mutual growth in markets, welfare, and regulation. This article uses two specific welfare-to-work programs, one in Korea and one in Australia, to illustrate the institutional interconnections that are in play within the regulatory welfare state. Governance of these programs is hampered by lack of discursive capacity to identify where problems exist and how they can be fixed. When faced with new programs, implementers look to higher authorities to make sense of and to solve the problems on the ground, but authorities are blinded by old institutional categories that pit market mentalities against welfare mentalities with regulation as an ideological tool, rather than an integral part of solutions. Transparency and cross-boundary listening are necessary to create the bridging capital to make these programs work and reconnect democratically elected governments with their citizens. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:26Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220965439 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Tobias Schulze-Cleven Pages: 276 - 294 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 276-294, September 2020. Governments around the world have turned to higher education to sustain economic development and social welfare. This article uses the concept of the regulatory welfare state (RWS) to examine how state authorities in the United States and Germany have sought to spur structural changes in the education sector. I argue that policy-makers in both countries have pursued the goal of organizing competition among universities by combining fiscal and regulatory policies that strengthen universities’ self-reliance, rivalry, and decentralized decision-making. The analysis shows that understanding cross-national patterns of institutional transformation requires putting countries’ evolving regimes of state-university relations into historical perspective, and that states’ shifting governance strategies are important drivers of higher education’s contemporary reimagination. It also clarifies how regulatory approaches to welfare provision have fostered the re-composition of public infrastructures, raising pressing questions about the quality and scope of the welfare that regulatory approaches promote. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:27Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220965891 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Avishai Benish Pages: 295 - 310 Abstract: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 691, Issue 1, Page 295-310, September 2020. The delivery of public services increasingly operates under hybrid accountability regimes, but we have much to learn about how these regimes interrelate. I develop a framework for systematic analysis of hybrid public, market, and professional accountability arrangements, looking at the compatibility of their content, steering mechanisms, and relationships. The analysis is informed and illustrated by empirical studies on accountability in welfare state services, which offer evidence on hybrid accountability arrangements. The article concludes by discussing the interplay between accountability regimes and the conditions in which they undermine or reinforce each other. I argue that compatibility between regimes depends on the content of accountability rather than on the accountability mechanisms, and I highlight the importance of the trust between the parties entering into accountability relations and the proximity of their institutional logics. Citation: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science PubDate: 2020-11-23T03:51:20Z DOI: 10.1177/0002716220965905 Issue No:Vol. 691, No. 1 (2020)
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