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ISSN (Print) 0096-3402 - ISSN (Online) 1938-3282
Published by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

[1 journal]

Katharine Hayhoe: Preaching climate to the unconverted
- Pages: 1 - 9
  Abstract: Climate scientist Katharine Hayhoe is an evangelical Christian and makes no secret of that. In this interview, she describes how both her scientific expertise and her faith inform her efforts to explain climate change to the general public and especially to climate skeptics. She emphasizes the importance of responding to common questions and explicitly addressing misconceptions, and of starting climate conversations with a discussion of shared values—which, for Christians, means talking about the commandment to love one’s neighbors. Hayhoe talks about what it’s like to be a climate scientist whose work is under attack, and how her negative experiences with Rush Limbaugh and Newt Gingrich are symptomatic of a culture in which opinions and gut feelings often take precedence over facts.
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:57-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213485947|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/1
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Attracting a crowd: What societal verification means for arms control: The response from the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization
- Authors: Zerbo; L.
  Pages: 10 - 13
  Abstract: The idea that ordinary people might contribute to verification of arms control treaties is not new; abstract discussions of the concept date back decades. But powerful and portable electronic devices have spread so widely in recent years that societal verification now seems an imminent reality. Motivated individuals might, for instance, collect treaty-relevant data through onboard sensors that smartphones can carry and then transmit the information to multilateral verification bodies or, as is already happening, share it online with global communities that subject it to crowdsourced analysis. But will societal verification generate enthusiasm in the developed and developing worlds alike? What legal protections must be established for participants? And will information gathered through societal verification ultimately prove useful and trustworthy? Three authors explore these emerging questions: from Burkina Faso and representing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, Lassina Zerbo; from the United States, research fellow Nima Gerami (2013); and from Malaysia, nuclear engineer Jamal Khaer Ibrahim (2013).
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:57-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213485932|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/10
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Attracting a crowd: What societal verification means for arms control: The US response
- Authors: Gerami; N.
  Pages: 14 - 18
  Abstract: The idea that ordinary people might contribute to verification of arms control treaties is not new; abstract discussions of the concept date back decades. But powerful and portable electronic devices have spread so widely in recent years that societal verification now seems an imminent reality. Motivated individuals might, for instance, collect treaty-relevant data through onboard sensors that smartphones can carry and then transmit the information to multilateral verification bodies or, as is already happening, share it online with global communities that subject it to crowdsourced analysis. But will societal verification generate enthusiasm in the developed and developing worlds alike? What legal protections must be established for participants? And will information gathered through societal verification ultimately prove useful and trustworthy? Three authors explore these emerging questions: from Burkina Faso and representing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, Lassina Zerbo (2013); from the United States, research fellow Nima Gerami; and from Malaysia, nuclear engineer Jamal Khaer Ibrahim (2013).
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:58-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213485943|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/14
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Attracting a crowd: What societal verification means for arms control: The Malaysian response
- Authors: Ibrahim; J. K.
  Pages: 19 - 22
  Abstract: The idea that ordinary people might contribute to verification of arms control treaties is not new; abstract discussions of the concept date back decades. But powerful and portable electronic devices have spread so widely in recent years that societal verification now seems an imminent reality. Motivated individuals might, for instance, collect treaty-relevant data through onboard sensors that smartphones can carry and then transmit the information to multilateral verification bodies or, as is already happening, share it online with global communities that subject it to crowdsourced analysis. But will societal verification generate enthusiasm in the developed and developing worlds alike? What legal protections must be established for participants? And will information gathered through societal verification ultimately prove useful and trustworthy? Three authors explore these emerging questions: from Burkina Faso and representing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, Lassina Zerbo (2013); from the United States, research fellow Nima Gerami (2013); and from Malaysia, nuclear engineer Jamal Khaer Ibrahim.
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:58-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213485935|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/19
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Targeted: A case study in Iranian illicit missile procurement
- Authors: Salisbury, D; Lowrie, D.
  Pages: 23 - 30
  Abstract: While diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue, it is clear that the private sector can and does play a role in slowing sanctioned programs in Iran. This is certainly the case with the country’s ballistic missile program, which is highly dependent upon imports of high-specification materials and components from the international marketplace. Activities relating to Iran’s ballistic missile program have been prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 since June 2010. However, Iran has continued to undertake research and testing activities focused on the development of liquid-fueled missiles. Iran’s illicit efforts to obtain missile-grade oscillators—components used in guidance systems—have targeted Rakon UK, the British arm of a New Zealand-owned company. The company has made significant efforts to prevent its products from ending up in programs of concern. Undertaking activities that go beyond basic compliance practices has allowed Rakon UK to mitigate risks more holistically. The insights gained from Rakon UK’s experience, in conjunction with information from a number of other sources, can help shed light on the methods that proliferators use—and, more generally, on the role that the private sector can play in combating proliferation.
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:58-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213485948|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/23
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Beyond compliance: Integrating nonproliferation into corporate sustainability
- Authors: Kurzrok, A; Hund, G.
  Pages: 31 - 42
  Abstract: Proliferators continue to seek dual-use commodities that can be exploited to create weapons of mass destruction, and the private sector has a critical role to play in guarding against this threat. Corporate sustainability, which helps firms and outside stakeholders monitor the impacts of business operations, has emerged as a framework for engagement with industry on its nonproliferation responsibilities. However, the existing literature has not considered how to integrate nonproliferation into the current infrastructure of corporate sustainability, particularly into voluntary reporting standards or socially responsible investment analysis. These tools are essential market mechanisms that incentivize superior behavior on other challenges such as environmentally responsible management, respect for human rights, and fair labor practices. The authors outline the history of corporate sustainability and argue that nonproliferation should be considered a sustainability issue. They propose a nonproliferation pledge and a series of nonproliferation indicators as potential first steps that could build awareness and distinguish between firms based on how successful they are at meeting nonproliferation goals.
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:58-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213485946|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/31
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Climate change: Corporate sustainability in the supply chain
- Authors: Smith; T. M.
  Pages: 43 - 52
  Abstract: Traditionally, corporate sustainability efforts have focused on the direct impacts of a company’s waste or the emissions associated with its operations, buildings, and vehicles. However, the majority of the US economy’s climate, water, and pollution impacts are the result of complex supply chains, strung together to deliver value-added products and services. To mitigate these indirect impacts (by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, for example) and adapt to new risks, leading companies must engage with upstream suppliers and embed sustainability as a joint objective. Companies failing to do so may suffer damage to their reputations and operations. In a changing climate, increasingly frequent and severe weather events are making supply networks more vulnerable to disruptions and unanticipated costs. Investors and other stakeholders are responding by pressuring companies to disclose and quantify emissions and other supply chain environmental impacts. Despite significant progress made by some corporations in reducing their emissions and their exposure to potential hazards hidden in upstream operations, sustainability must be a society-wide effort.
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:58-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213487310|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/43
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Industry self-governance: A new way to manage dangerous technologies
- Authors: Maurer, S. M; von Engelhardt, S.
  Pages: 53 - 62
  Abstract: Advanced technologies for making chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons can be purchased from hundreds of companies around the world. But negotiating treaties to regulate this trade would take years—and even then, many governments lack the will or resources to enforce them. Security experts often suggest that the United States could avoid these difficulties by encouraging industry to govern itself. Recent experience in the artificial DNA industry shows that this approach can yield large dividends. At the same time, officials need practical guidance about when private standards are possible and what government can do to promote them. The authors argue that private security standards work particularly well for industries in which manufacturers face massive fixed-cost investments, sell to large buyers, and face risk from intelligent adversaries. This profile fits most high-technology industries that security experts care about. The authors also discuss strategies that governments can use to promote, influence, and learn from private initiatives to regulate dangerous technologies.
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:58-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213486126|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/53
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Three Mile Island: The driver of US nuclear power's decline?
- Authors: Hultman, N; Koomey, J.
  Pages: 63 - 70
  Abstract: It is tempting to attribute variations in support for nuclear power to prominent accidents such as Three Mile Island in the United States or Fukushima in Japan. To illuminate how such attribution can be problematic, the authors discuss the historical context of the Three Mile Island accident in the United States. They point out that the US nuclear industry faced major challenges even before the 1979 accident: Forty percent of all US reactor cancellations between 1960 and 2010, they write, occurred before the accident in Pennsylvania. While safety concerns were undoubtedly a driver of public aversion to new nuclear construction in the United States, the nuclear industry already faced substantial economic and competitiveness obstacles, much like the nuclear industry worldwide before Fukushima.
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:58-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213485949|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/63
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)
Russian nuclear forces, 2013
- Authors: Kristensen, H. M; Norris, R. S.
  Pages: 71 - 81
  Abstract: Russia is in the middle of modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era ballistic missiles with fewer improved missiles. In a decade, almost all Soviet-era weapons will be gone, leaving a smaller but still effective force that will be more mobile than what it replaced. As of early 2013, Russia has a stockpile of approximately 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,800 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage, along with 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. There is some uncertainty in these estimates because Russia does not disclose how many nuclear weapons it has and the United States has stopped releasing data supplied by Russia under strategic arms reduction agreements. The authors use public statements made by Russian officials, newspaper articles, observations from commercial satellite images, private conversations with government officials, and analysis of Russian nuclear forces over many years to provide the best available unclassified estimate of Russian nuclear forces.
  PubDate: 2013-05-01T01:21:58-07:00
  DOI: 10.1177/0096340213486145|hwp:resource-id:spbos;69/3/71
  Issue No: Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013)