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ENGINEERING (1180 journals)            First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Journal of Urban Planning and Development     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 32)
Journal of Urban Regeneration & Renewal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Journal of Vibration and Acoustics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 47)
Journal of Visualization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Volcanology and Seismology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology-Mater. Sci. Ed.     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Zhejiang University SCIENCE A     Hybrid Journal  
Journal on Chain and Network Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Jurnal Teknik ITS     Open Access  
Jurnal Teknologi     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Karaelmas Science and Engineering Journal     Open Access  
Kerntechnik     Full-text available via subscription  
KKU Engineering Journal     Open Access  
Kleio     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Landscape and Ecological Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Langmuir     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 44)
Latin American Journal of Computing     Open Access  
Leadership and Management in Engineering     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Learning Technologies, IEEE Transactions on     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Lighting Research and Technology     Hybrid Journal  
Logic and Analysis     Hybrid Journal  
Logica Universalis     Hybrid Journal  
Lubrication Science     Hybrid Journal  
Machines     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Machining Science and Technology: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Macromolecular Reaction Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Magazine of Concrete Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Magnetics Letters, IEEE     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Management and Production Engineering Review     Open Access  
Manufacturing Engineer     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Manufacturing Research and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Marine Technology Society Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
MATEC Web of Conferences     Open Access  
Matériaux & Techniques     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Mathematical Problems in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Mathematics of Control, Signals, and Systems (MCSS)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Mauerwerk     Hybrid Journal  
Measurement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Measurement Science Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Meccanica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Mechatronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Medical and Biological Engineering and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Medical Engineering & Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Membrane Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Membrane Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Memetic Computing     Hybrid Journal  
Metabolic Engineering Communications     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Metal Powder Report     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Metallurgist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Metaphysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metascience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metrologia     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Microelectronic Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Microelectronics International     Hybrid Journal  
Microelectronics Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Microelectronics Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Microfluidics and Nanofluidics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Micromachines     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Modelling and Simulation in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Modern Applied Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Modern Information Technologies in the Sphere of Security and Defence     Open Access  
Molecular BioSystems     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Molecular Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Molecular Pharmaceutics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
MRS Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
MRS Online Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Multidimensional Systems and Signal Processing     Hybrid Journal  
NANO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Nano Letters     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 55)
Nano Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Nano Reviews     Open Access   (Followers: 15)
Nano-Micro Letters     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Nanopages     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nanoscale and Microscale Thermophysical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Nanoscale Systems : Mathematical Modeling, Theory and Applications     Open Access  
Nanoscience and Nanoengineering     Open Access  
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology Research     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Nanotechnologies in Russia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nanotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Nanotechnology Magazine, IEEE     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
Nanotechnology Reviews     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Natural Hazards     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 168)
Nature Nanotechnology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 53)
Naval Engineers Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
NDT & E International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Nexo Revista Científica     Open Access  
Nigerian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Nigerian Journal of Technological Research     Full-text available via subscription  
Nigerian Journal of Technology     Full-text available via subscription  
NIR news     Full-text available via subscription  
Noise Mapping     Open Access  
Nonlinear Dynamics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Nonlinear Engineering : Modeling and Application     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nonlinearity     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Nordic Journal of Science and Technology     Open Access  
Nova Scientia     Open Access  
NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nuclear Engineering and Design     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)

  First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Journal Cover   Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.387]   [H-I: 22]   [6 followers]  Follow
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1597 journals]
  • A lesson learned by attending 37 years of loss prevention symposia
    • Authors: Thomas H. Pratt
      Abstract: In responding to the request to give a paper at the 50th Loss Prevention Symposium, this article gives a brief synopsis of my career, and how attending the annual LPS meetings over the last 37 years has tremendously supported my professional work. It relates how a theoretical physical chemist was transformed into a consultant having an expertise in electrostatic ignitions of fires and explosions. Of all the reasons, one could have for attending an LPS, networking is singled out, emphasized, and supported by examples. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-27T05:36:11.152792-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11800
  • PSM auditing: Thinking beyond compliance
    • Authors: Stephen Gill
      Abstract: The process safety management (PSM) rule requires a “compliance audit” at least every 3 years. This description implies that the purpose of the audit is to ensure that legal requirements are met. Thoughtful companies recognize that meeting the minimum legal requirements may not be sufficient, and also audit for conformance with their internal company standards and procedures. However, in audit programs designed to check compliance with either legal or legal + internal requirements, there is an implicit assumption that conformance will result in an acceptable process safety performance. In other words, if all of the “inputs” are right (i.e., there is compliance with the standards and procedures), then process safety is being managed effectively—and the desired “outputs” will follow. This assumption may not be valid! In reality, managing process safety requires the meshing or connecting of several related work processes or activities in order to effectively deliver the desired results. Checking each activity for compliance with standards does not necessarily ensure that the sum of the connected activities is delivering what was intended. Take, for example, the identification and control of major risk scenarios. The PSM intention is that risk scenarios are identified in either the initial Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) or subsequent revalidation, sufficient controls are provided to meet the corporate risk criteria, the controls are maintained throughout the operating life, the operating, technical, and management teams are trained in and understand the scenarios and the scenarios are well documented in the operating procedures. Compliance auditing typically checks that all of the individual activities are “compliant” (PHA conducted on time and actions closed, trip system testing completed per schedule, training records complete, operating procedures updated on time, etc.). Such an approach does not typically track that the content is carried consistently through the collection of processes, and that the knowledge and controls for the identified scenarios are in place and robust. This article proposes an audit approach which checks both that the organization is compliant with the prescribed activities and procedures, and that the activities and procedures are effectively delivering the intended results. The main focus is on applying this approach to the aspects of PSM that address specific risk scenarios and their associated controls. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-26T06:13:07.041016-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11797
  • Cracking the code of process safety culture with organizational network
    • Authors: Keith O. Hunter; Elliot M. Wolf
      Abstract: Organizations in the chemical process industry invest considerable amounts of time and resources managing change and implementing best practices to maintain safe operations and achieve operational objectives. Consequently, most executives and senior managers responsible for performance rely on formal organizational structure to achieve these objectives. However, front line employees responsible for ensuring safe operation of hazardous chemical processes are often influenced more by the informal than the formal organization in their daily activities. The dynamics of informal networks among workers are critical determinants of strong operational discipline (OD), process safety culture, and business performance. Yet, organizational social networks are often overlooked or not well understood by management. We discuss how organizational network analysis may improve our understanding of process safety culture. We also share results from our exploratory study that used a novel survey instrument to measure OD at the individual level in conjunction with a social network survey indicating interaction for the exchange of job task information and process safety advice, respectively. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-23T02:31:49.695466-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11793
  • Analysis of effects of detonation of explosive substances on humans from
           characteristic curves explosive mass–distance from the origin of the
    • Abstract: The serious consequences of explosions justify the efforts in prevention. The inherent danger of the phenomenon and the possibility of causing other concatenated accidents (domino effect) can increase the damage. To assess the damage and plan the emergency, it is necessary to determine the possible scope of dangerous magnitudes of the explosion (high pressure, mechanical impulse, and range of the fragments). It is important to consider that the peak overpressure of explosive detonation is relatively high and impulse width short near the source. Both parameters (overpressure and impulse) decrease with the distance but the decrease is not uniform, so that the ratio of contributions of overpressure and impulse to damage of receptors differ. In this work, the TNT equivalence method has been selected to determine the overpressure and impulse of the wave when detonation of high explosives occurs outdoors and the most recognized PROBIT functions to estimate the consequences of such accidents on humans. Combining both methodologies for each type of damage, graphical relationships of the primary parameters were obtained. Previously existing relationships have been parameterized to facilitate its implementation in software and to provide intuitive information to use it in studies of risk analysis of these accidents. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:55:35.601145-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11794
  • Why are major accidents still occurring?
    • Authors: Elisio Carvalho Silva
      Abstract: The loss of technological knowledge is an important contributing factor to a major accident occurs. This article analyzed several major accident reports to corroborate to this premise. The more an organization moves further away from a known technology, the risk of an accident occurring considerably increases. This work discusses three ways in which technological knowledge can be lost: (1) new technology; (2) loss of knowledge due to inadequate training, procedures, and information; and (3) the failure to incorporate new knowledge (e.g., the lessons learned). For each means of technological knowledge loss, this article refers to an important major accident and shows how it contributed to the accident. It also addresses the types of failures and the concept of independent protection layers to help explain how to reduce the possibility of a major accident occurs. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:55:07.775901-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11795
  • Dependent, independent, and pseudo‐independent protection layers in
           risk analysis
    • Authors: Hui Jin; Angela Summers
      Abstract: Risk analysis is an important tool to provide support for various risk management decisions in hazardous industries. For the last decade, the semiquantitative Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has been the dominating risk analysis technique in the US process industry. One basic assumption in LOPA is that all the protection layers are independent from each other and from the initiating cause; otherwise, no risk reduction credit should be taken in the LOPA. However, many processes do have protection layers, which are dependent to some extent. For these systems, assuming independency may be too optimistic, whereas disregarding the partial risk reduction afforded from a partially dependent protection layer is pessimistic. This article considers processes with dependent protection layers (with a shared component), independent protection layers, and pseudo‐independent protection layers (subject to common cause failure). A long distance gas pipeline system is used as an example. Using reduced Event Trees for incident scenario modeling, Fault Trees for protection layers, and solving them in a coupled calculation, this article shows how protection layer dependencies are treated in risk analysis to obtain the overall risk reduction without being too optimistic or pessimistic. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:54:51.497428-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11796
  • Chemical Process Safety, 4th Edition, Learning from Case Histories (2015)
           By Roy E. Sanders, Butterworth‐Heinemann (Elsevier), Kidlington,
           Oxford, UK and Waltham, MA, 486 pages, $100, ISBN:
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:54:27.936958-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11798
  • Evacuation simulation of confined spaces in petrochemical facilities
    • Authors: Zhen Wang; Peg Wilson, Qingsheng Wang
      Abstract: With the growth of the petrochemical industry, confined space evacuation has been a major safety issue due to the potential fatalities and injuries caused by inadequate emergency response. In this work, two existing software, BuildingEXODUS and FDS+Evac, were used to simulate the required safe egress time (RSET) in different evacuation environments. Vertical and horizontal storage tanks were constructed using these two simulation software. Then, different parameters such as occupant load, with and without internal obstruction, and exit size were studied in different simulation scenarios. The simulation results from the software have shown good agreement with those from field experiments. It was found that the RSET of a vertical storage tank is nearly half of that of a horizontal storage tank. The work has demonstrated that the fire safety software could be used to simulate evacuations from confined spaces in petrochemical facilities. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-05T08:00:27.737301-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11792
  • Risk assessment for fire and explosion accidents of steel oil tanks using
           improved AHP based on FTA
    • Authors: Miao Zhang; Wenhua Song, Zhen Chen, Ji Wang
      Abstract: The fire and explosion accidents of steel oil tanks is an extreme threat for crude oil storage, and they are considerably difficult to extinguish and easy to spread. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) are often used for the risk assessment of such accidents. The probabilities of basic events are very different to obtain. For example, the failure probabilities of most components in industrial are related to their service time, work environment, operating, and some probabilities of human factors are more difficult to establish. So, there are no sufficient data for FTA to make accurate quantitative assessments, whereas the AHP relies on expert judgment and scoring, which have great subjectivity. Both the structural importance of the basic events for FTA and the weight of the index layer for the AHP significantly affect the top event. A new approach is proposed to improve the AHP method. The judgment matrices of AHP are developed based on the basic events, structural importance of FTA, and the expert scoring of AHP. In addition, the new method reconciles the differences of FTA and AHP by combining the weighting factors, and has been tested and validated by applying for fire and explosion accidents of different types of steel oil tanks. Finally, the risk of boilover fire in tank park and its influencing factors are discussed. The results provide valuable information for the decision maker to improve the safety performance and to set up an effective firefighting strategy. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-10-31T04:50:08.254596-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11780
  • Winter 2015 safety & health news
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2015-10-30T04:08:01.478948-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11791
  • Lending industrial experience through reactive hazard examples in
           university safety instruction
    • Authors: David J. Dixon; Henry T. Kohlbrand
      Abstract: Past serious reactive chemical accidents have had a profound impact on the chemical industry and the approaches taken toward process safety. Much of this knowledge has been picked up and presented as a part of the chemical engineering educational curriculum. However, the T2 Laboratories Inc., runaway reaction incident in 2007 provided the catalyst to spur AIChE and ABET to formally introduce a “process safety” education requirement into the accreditation program criteria. One of the areas that must become an integral part of the education of future chemical engineers is the understanding and recognition of reactive hazards. University professors have a key role in this education, and while some have had exposure to reactive hazards through industry experiences, it makes sense to invite industrial professionals to lend their expertise to the classroom. In this article, we describe a section on reactive hazards that has been developed and presented in the senior design classes in the Chemical and Biological Engineering Department at the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology. This section has been developed and presented jointly by university faculty and an engineer from industry. Hands‐on exercises and homework examples were developed to provide students with opportunities to apply important principles. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-10-29T04:52:04.383694-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11785
  • The explosion in Tianjin, China, august 12, 2015
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey; John Murphy, Arthur Baulch
      PubDate: 2015-10-29T04:47:45.382065-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11790
  • Three decades after Bhopal: What we have learned about effectively
           managing process safety risks
    • Authors: Bruce K. Vaughen
      Abstract: While no industrial chemical incident has had the magnitude for loss of life that occurred in 1984 at Bhopal, process safety incidents continue to occur today often resulting in serious injuries, fatalities, environmental harm, property damage, and business interruption. Over the last three decades, we have learned that these three interrelated foundations are essential for effective process safety programs: (1) process safety culture and leadership, (2) operational discipline, and (3) process safety systems. If any one of these foundations is weak, process safety incidents will occur and the organization's process safety performance will be poor. This article explores how the process safety systems are essential barriers when reducing risks, applying the layer of protection model and the bow tie barrier analysis model into a novel visual tool that can be used to identify both the foundational gaps and the process safety systems which failed. Although the Bhopal incident is used as the case study, the objective of this article is to provide a tool for others to use when summarizing their investigations in a way that helps them visually depict the investigation's findings and helps them prioritize and address weaknesses in one or more of their process safety program foundations. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-10-29T04:47:31.307724-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11786
  • Facts related to August 12, 2015 explosion accident in Tianjin, China
    • Authors: Ping Huang; Jingyuan Zhang
      Abstract: This article presents facts related to the explosion accident that occurred on August 12, 2015, in Tianjin, China. A summary, losses, analysis on explosion substances, and management deficiencies about the accident are described. The science and plausible reasoning about explosion substances is especially noted. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-10-24T01:42:32.358628-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11789
  • Elements and molecules
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2015-10-19T23:36:46.511074-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11787
  • Tianjin port explosions
    • Authors: Byron Sun
      PubDate: 2015-10-19T23:36:26.396306-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11788
  • Human factors considerations: Midstream process safety integration
    • Authors: Denise M. Brooks
      Abstract: Midstream oil and gas companies are coming into their own. For example, according to Deloitte (2014), “Midstream energy companies’ share of overall market value in the oil and gas industry has already risen, nearly tripling over the last six years.” Midstream operators are becoming the stars of the energy industry, investing $26 billion on new pipelines and facilities in 2012—a drastic increase from the seven billion spent just 6 years earlier [Larsson, Midstream investment in pipeline management solutions, Oil and Gas Monitor, Schneider Electric, 2014]. Particularly in the United States due to the success of shale and the increasing possibilities for exportation along with recent accidents and fatalities, more scrutiny is being given to both process safety and the humans in the myriad of midstream systems. In the petroleum industry, midstream activities are often taken for granted. Midstream, the conduit between upstream (retrieval of crude oil) and downstream (the processing of petroleum products), is deceivingly complex and risk‐laden. The process safety issues are many and often the integration of those issues with the elements of crude oil storage and transportation is elusive. “Even the best designed, engineered, maintained, and operated pipelines and modes of transportation can be vulnerable to human failures and organizational complexity” [Smith and Volf, Oil Gas Financ J (2013)]. Human Factors (HFs) is a scientific tool that integrates humans (and their capabilities and limitations) into highly complex processes and systems. This discussion describes how the integration of HFs with process safety in crude oil storage, pipeline management, and transportation preserves human safety, organizational credibility, public goodwill, and infrastructure confidence along with investment maximization and preservation. Each aspect and phase of midstream activities share commonalities with the others and yet each has its own unique aspects and challenges. This article describes HFs integration with process safety in the midstream environment. Issues and considerations common to most facets of midstream enterprises are addressed. In addition, unique components of each of the midstream factors such as pipelines, transportation—rail, ship, and truck—and logistics and technology are discussed from a HFs perspective. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-10-07T02:14:15.414194-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11779
  • Discharge of CO2 from large‐diameter orifices: Experimental data and
           data review
    • Authors: Henk W. M. Witlox; Jock Brown, Hamish Holt, Keith Armstong, Daniel Allason
      Abstract: The CO2PIPETRANS Joint Industry Project included a large‐diameter CO2 release experimental program involving eight dense phase CO2 experiments at the DNV GL Spadeadam test site. The releases were through 1″, 2″, 4″, and 6″ orifice diameters. Measurements included pressure and temperature at several locations in the supply reservoir, feed lines, and discharge pipe, while direct flow rate measurements were carried out for the 1″ releases only. Flow rates for the larger releases were estimated by calculation. This article describes the experiments and presents the results of a high‐level data review of these experiments. As part of the data review, a method was derived to estimate the time‐varying flow rate analytically from derived pressure and temperature measurements in the reservoir. Pressure, temperature, and derived flow rate measurements were analyzed for the subsequent stages of flow in the experiments. The data review concluded that while the data will be very valuable for model validation, the quality of the data measurements for the large‐scale diameter experiments is not as high as the previous smaller‐scale diameter BP and Shell tests due to difficulties making such accurate measurements at the large scale required. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-10-07T02:13:58.604144-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11784
  • Process design and engineering: A missing process safety element
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      PubDate: 2015-09-22T04:32:34.355832-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11781
  • Chemical interaction matrices
    • Authors: Michelle R. Murphy; Surendra K. Singh
      Abstract: Despite the promulgation of the “PSM Standard” by OSHA in 1992, chemical accidents continue to occur at an alarming rate. As part of the process safety information element of the standard, OSHA requires reactivity data on the chemicals in the process. One piece of this reactivity data is a chemical interaction matrix. Several software programs provide simple approaches to generating these interaction charts for common materials using assigned reactive groups. If your process involves materials not included, you are left to determine the reactivity and incompatibilities on your own. This paper will explain a process for assigning reactive groups using chemical classification and structural analysis. This process can be used for less commonly understood materials such as additives, lubricants, mixtures, products, etc. that may come into contact with process chemicals. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-18T04:32:18.683219-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11783
  • CSB investigation of Chevron Richmond refinery pipe rupture and fire
    • Authors: Lauren Grim; Dan Tillema, Steve Cutchen, Mark Wingard, Amanda Johnson
      Abstract: The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigated a pipe rupture of a high temperature light gas oil line at the Chevron Richmond Refinery in Richmond, CA. The CSB found technical, regulatory, and Chevron organizational factors causal to the incident. This article is a summary of the technical and organizational analysis presented in the CSB final investigation report on the Chevron Richmond Refinery incident. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:53:49.249527-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11766
  • The meaning and importance of process safety competency
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Process safety competency is subject to regulation in some jurisdictions, such as in the United Kingdom by the Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE) under the Control of Major Accident Hazard regulations. Process safety competency is one of 20 elements in the risk‐based process safety (RBPS) management system developed by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). However, competency as used in this RBPS element is not the same as the competency regulated by the UK HSE. The RBPS competency element addresses managing a knowledge base of process information and not competency as defined by other CCPS publications which use the term with a similar meaning to the UK HSE. This makes for a confusing situation for companies interested in improving their management of process safety competency. The scope of the RBPS element should be revised to address true competency. Currently, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Process Safety Management Standard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Risk Management Program rule do not address competency. However, both regulators are considering revisions to these regulations, including the incorporation of additional elements from the CCPS RBPS management system that are not currently in the regulations. One of these elements is process safety competency, as defined in the CCPS RBPS management system. This action would result in an inadequate treatment of competency. If a competency element is incorporated into the regulations, it should address true competency. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:51:19.698347-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11767
  • Designing risk matrices to avoid risk ranking reversal errors
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Risk matrices are used in process safety to rate and rank risks of hazardous events to help with decision making on risk reduction for processes. For example, commonly they are used in process hazard analysis to rate the risks of hazard scenarios. Flaws in their theoretical framework and mathematical inconsistencies in their use have been identified in the risk analysis literature. These flaws pose potentially serious problems for the application of risk matrices in process safety. One of the most significant flaws is the potential for risk ranking reversals wherein an incorrect assignment of a higher risk event to a lower risk level and a lower risk event to a higher risk level may occur. This article discusses the nature of the problem and describes how it can be addressed for risk matrices used in process safety. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:51:01.253331-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11768
  • Modeling liquid fuel cascades with OpenFOAM
    • Authors: Marco Macchi; Jennifer X. Wen, Konstantin Volkov, Ali Heidari, Yongmann M. Chung
      Abstract: Evaporating liquid cascades resulting from gasoline and liquefied natural gas tanks overfilling or rupture of elevated pipes create a source of flammable vapor cloud. Such phenomena were responsible for the formation of the large fuel vapor cloud, the ignition of which resulted in the large scale explosion, in Buncefield [Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, Explosion Mechanism Advisory Group Report, 2007] on December 11, 2005 at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, an oil storage facility located by Hemel Hempstead in Hertfordshire, England. Despite its significance, there lacks adequate models treating the underlying physics of this phenomenon. The present study numerically analyses fuel cascades which are considered as a droplet‐laden system. Consideration is given to vapor production inside the cascade due to droplets evaporation and breakup. The solver used here is a modification of the sprayFoam solver which is present in the open source computational fluid dynamics (CFD) toolbox OpenFOAM® [OpenFOAM 2.3.0, Available at]. The fuel droplets evaporate during their motion and create a cloud of flammable vapor. In order to capture the characteristics of the hazardous phenomena, the CFD model needs to address the underlying physics with adequate submodels. In the present study, the multiphase flow is simulated with a combined Eulerian‐Lagrangian approach. The governing equations of the gas phase represent the conservation equations of mass, momentum, and energy including the source terms arising from the interaction with the droplets. The Reynolds Averaged Navier–Stokes simulation approach was used for its computational efficiency. The Large‐Eddy Simulation would be more robust in handling the interaction of the droplets with the flow but it would require more computational resource. The particulate phase is simulated through a Lagrangian deterministic or stochastic tracking models to provide particle trajectories and particle concentration. Particular emphasis is given to the effect of impingement of droplets to account for the effect of splashing in the impact region. The study involves developing robust and accurate modeling approaches for the instabilities and aerodynamic breakup in the cascade which contribute to the formation of the cloud, air entrainment, and fuel impingement on deflector plates. Suitable submodels have been implemented in OpenFOAM® to facilitate the study. The predictions are compared with the experimental measurements and CFD predictions previously conducted by Atkinson and Coldrick [Research Report 908, 2012] from the Health and Safety Laboratory, an agency of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The present predictions are found to better capture the interaction between the droplets and the gas phase. Improved agreement with the experimental measurements in the gasoline fuel cascades has also been achieved. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:50:38.429979-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11777
  • Experimental and numerical study of premixed methane/air flame propagating
           in various L/D closed ducts
    • Authors: Peng Chen; Yanchao Li, Shilong Guo, Jing Ji
      Abstract: The article aims at explaining the effects of L/D (the ratio of length to diameter) on premixed methane/air flame propagation in the closed duct, which is based essentially on the experimental and numerical methods. High‐speed camera, pressure transducer, and large eddy simulation model are used to study the flame shape changes and pressure build‐up in the closed ducts with various L/D. The results demonstrate that the premixed flame propagation undergoes four typical stages, namely spherical flame, finger‐shaped flame, flat flame, and tulip flame. The pressure growth rate and the flame tip speed reach the maximum value simultaneously when the flame lateral sides touch the sidewalls in the closed duct. The dynamic synchronization of the flame tip speed and the pressure growth rate indicates the tulip flame is a purely hydrodynamic phenomenon resulting from the interaction of the flame front and the pressure wave. Particularly, the maximum flame tip speed increases linearly with increasing L/D. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:50:22.27212-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11778
  • Efficiency prediction of control room operators based on human reliability
           analysis and dynamic decision‐making style in the process industry
    • Authors: Esmaeil Zarei; Iraj Mohammadfam, Mostafa Mirzaei Aliabadi, Ali Jamshidi, Fakhradin Ghasemi
      Abstract: Process industries have a potential for the occurrence of major accidents. These accidents can have severe adverse effects on human health and the environment and they can cause extensive damage to equipment and buildings. During major process upsets, central control rooms are among the most stressful workplaces in the world. Therefore, Human Reliability Analysis and Dynamic Decision‐Making Styles (DDMSs) play an important role in safety management in these industries. This study employs the intelligent Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System model associated with two questionnaires along with Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method to analyze the Human Reliability Influencing Factors (HRIFs) and DDMSs of the control room operators and to determine the efficiency of operators as well as their dominant and efficient decision‐making styles. Nine influencing factors on human reliability and five DDMSs are evaluated and the correlation between the HRIFs is investigated. Efficiency of the operators, according to the HRIFs, is determined and they are ranked. Next, the most dominant and efficient of the DDMSs among the operators was identified. Finally, an intelligent algorithm for determining the efficiency of a control room's operators is developed. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:49:26.900589-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11782
  • Calculating facility siting study leak sizes‐one size does not fit
    • Authors: Gary Allen Fitzgerald
      Abstract: Consequence‐based Facility Siting Studies (FSSs) typically require the user assume a credible leak size to use in the evaluation of potential releases, which is often up to a 2 inch diameter leak. Many facilities tend to be less complex in comparison to large refineries or petrochemical plants, leading operators at the less complex facilities to ask why they should assume the same leak sizes as more complex facilities. Other facilities have unique processes with safety systems and factors they would like to quantify in a consequence‐based FSS. A unique approach developed by ABS Consulting and first presented in 2011 is called the Maximum Design Leak (MDL) approach (Fitzgerald et al., 2011 Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center International Symposium, October 25, 2011). This approach calculates frequency‐based leak sizes and then applies the leak size that exceeds a frequency criterion (events/year) in a consequence‐based FSS instead of assuming a given leak size as credible. This avoids having to establish risk criteria in terms of fatalities/year and having to model a large number of scenarios yet takes advantage of many features in a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). This article presents three case studies as examples of how the MDL has been applied and illustrates the advantages of calculating leak sizes specific to scenarios being evaluated for low complexity and low risk facilities. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-10T05:40:09.865199-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11764
  • Lessons learned from an incident at a cryogenic gas processing facility
    • Authors: Adrian Pierorazio
      Abstract: In September 2009, a fatal incident occurred in a cryogenic gas processing plant. The investigation of the incident indicated a number of potential issues that may have contributed to or caused the event. These issues include hot work procedures, electrostatic discharge, electrical conduit sealing, convective “breathing” due to multiple vents, equipment age, maintenance, and worker training. The investigation concluded that the fuel for this event was provided by small leaks from the product pipes inside of the cold box; the oxygen was provided by convective “breathing” that occurred due to the presence of two vents from the cold box and the erosion of the flapper valves that were intended to seal these vents; and ignition occurred due to stray currents that resulted from poor hot work procedures, and locating the return lead far from the work location. This article provides an overview of the process and facility, a timeline of events, a summary of the investigative process, and a discussion of the lessons learned from this event. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-08T08:08:34.231781-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11763
  • Amiss, a miss, a near miss
    • Authors: John C. Wincek
      Abstract: Catastrophic incidents, while common in the world, are rare events to any single facility or even company. Were anyone to count catastrophic incidents to measure Process Safety performance, it is likely the facility would be gone before they counted to two. We look instead to Near Miss incidents as one measure of Process Safety performance. We count them and measure their frequency. We implement corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence. We look beyond the specific incident to apply the lessons in other areas. Most importantly, we look for faults in our management systems that permitted the near miss to occur. Defining near misses, identifying their occurrence, and fully learning the lessons they can teach us can be a difficult undertaking. Simple communication of these incidents can be problematic. And, learning lessons from an incident occurring at another facility can challenge even the broadest‐minded people. This article will describe the learning process that has evolved at one specialty chemical company. It will include definitions of specific types of near misses, how data are gathered and communicated, and information on the number and type of incidents occurring. The reader will gain ideas on how to classify and collect data on specific near miss incidents, and ways to communicate the information throughout a company. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-08T08:08:32.352189-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11757
  • The impact of Eastman's aniline plant explosion on process safety
    • Authors: Peter N. Lodal
      Abstract: A single presentation covering one person's first‐hand experience with a significant process safety incident, delivered at the beginning of OSHA's PSM regulation still provides contemporary lessons, even though the actual incident occurred more than 50 years ago. Lessons include: (a) stopping operations unilaterally or getting expert help when readings are unexpected or unusual, (b) establishment of a testing regimen that covers a broad range of conditions, especially those that can be achieved under abnormal circumstances (e.g., fire), and (c) the impact of “restore to original condition” maintenance activities that otherwise might not be analyzed if treated as a replacement‐in‐kind only. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:06:44.963512-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11760
  • The organic peroxides instability rating research based on adiabatic
           calorimetric approaches and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process for inherent
           safety evaluation
    • Authors: Lei Ni; Juncheng Jiang, Zhirong Wang, Jun Yao, Yuan Song, Yuan Yu
      Abstract: This article proposes a new method of instability classification of organic peroxides (ICOP) for assessing the risk of decomposition reaction of organic peroxides, based on the adiabatic calorimetric approaches and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP). Tonset is set as instability possibility index. Maximal power density, adiabatic temperature rise, maximum pressure rate, and maximum pressure are set as instability severity index (ISI) with proper weightings by FAHP. Instability possibility index and ISI are converted into ICOP based on risk matrix. The organic peroxides instability can, therefore, be quantified and divided into four levels, acceptable, moderate risk, highly dangerous, and seriously dangerous. Thermal decomposition of di‐tert‐butyl peroxide 25 mass % and tert‐butyl hydroperoxide 68.4 mass % are tested with Vent Sizing Package 2 and Phi‐Tech 1 which has the function of Accelerating Rate Calorimeter, respectively. Thermal decompositions of other organic peroxides are presented from citation. The instability rating results of these organic peroxides are presented to illustrate the validity of the method. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:05:57.659127-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11754
  • Impacts of process safety time on layer of protection analysis
    • Authors: Geoffrey Barnard; William Creel
      Abstract: The ability of an Independent Protection Layer (IPL) to achieve a given level of risk reduction is dependent upon its fulfillment of several core attributes. A key provision for any IPL to be considered effective and functionally adequate is its capability to respond to a process demand quickly enough to stop the propagation of the hazard scenario it was designed to prevent. While this seems obvious and reasonable, the estimation of Process Safety Time and the specification of IPL Response Times are more complex, and often deferred or overlooked altogether. What is Process Safety Time? How is it determined? When? And by whom? This article examines the relationship between Process Safety Time and IPL Response Times, essential variables for the justification of IPL effectiveness, and their impacts on the success of Layer of Protection Analysis. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:05:36.985744-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11759
  • 1996 amines plant explosion
    • Authors: Jerry Forest
      Abstract: Process safety management systems should be in place to ensure repeatability in operations. A good system consists of higher level procedures that describe what to do. At the plant level, the management system describes who does the activity and how it is done. Following procedures leads to predictability in operations. In 1996, Celanese had established a rigorous management system that consisted of 21 elements of process safety. However, before the elements could be fully implanted globally, failure to rigorously apply several elements led to an explosion in our Cangrejera facility resulting in two fatalities. This article discusses the management system failures of conduct of operations elements, safe operating limits, standard operating procedures and training, and critical safety equipment management and how each failed due to a common weakness of management systems. An overview of the Celanese Process Safety Lessons Learned program is presented as our way of embedding knowledge of this and other incidents in our culture to prevent similar incidents in the future. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:05:16.359278-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11765
  • Good till the last drop: How much is too much valve leakage?
    • Authors: Karen Study; Peter Allan, Adam Cozat, Kees Meliefste, Eloise Roche, Tim Wagner
      Abstract: Validating the effectiveness of safety instrumented systems (SISs) is an integral and vitally important part of maintaining protection layers and preventing a hazardous condition. However, deciding on the basis for what constitutes “sufficiently safe” can be difficult. For example, when considering valves used as the final element in SISs, many in industry are basing the Maximum Allowable Leakage Rate (MALR) on the valve tightness specification instead of the hazardous condition that is being prevented when these valves are closed. This article will review a pilot conducted at The Dow Chemical Company to compare using the valve tightness class as a basis for MALR versus a safety‐based calculated MALR. Economics and safety aspects are evaluated and the general types of safety based calculations used are reviewed. Key questions answered include: (1) what exactly is the requirement for estimating MALR, (2) how is MALR calculated using a safety basis, (3) are there differences in cost when basing MALR on valve tightness class versus a safety based calculation, (4) are time efficiencies realized when basing MALR on the safety case versus on the valve tightness class, and (5) which is usually more conservative, a valve tightness class‐based MALR or a safety‐based MALR? © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-04T01:55:25.481046-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11756
  • The evolution of process safety standards and legislation following
           landmark events—what have we learnt?
    • Authors: Trish Kerin
      Abstract: While modern process safety can be dated back to E.I. duPont in the early 1800s with the building of black powder plants including separation distances, and blast zones, the management of process safety has come a long way. Despite this, however, we have continued to see many catastrophic incidents occur, across a range of industries. There have been significant learning opportunities from the catastrophes, but are we actually applying the learnings? Exploring the past 40 years history shows a number of landmark process safety events. These events have not only changed our state of knowledge for managing process safety but have also resulted in standards and legislative change in multiple jurisdictions. This article explores the significant learnings that came out of the various landmark process safety events and the impact these changes have had on how process safety is managed today. Incidents considered as case studies in this article include the following: Flixborough UK (1974), Seveso Italy (1976), Bhopal India (1984), Piper Alpha UK (1988), Longford Australia (1998), Texas City Refinery USA (2005), Montara Australia (2009), Macondo USA (2010), and Pike River New Zealand (2010). © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-03T04:00:32.061132-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11762
  • Methods and data sources for identifying members of a regulated community
    • Authors: William C. Pittman; Zhe Han, Brian Z. Harding, Jiaojun Jiang, Camilo Rosas, Alba Pineda, M. Sam Mannan
      Abstract: The Ammonium Nitrate explosion that shook West, Texas in April 2013 revealed deficiencies in the current regulatory enforcement system used for chemical safety and security in the United States. This cannot be said to be a failure of existing regulations. Rather, it is a failure in enforcement as federal regulators either had not inspected the site in decades—as with OSHA—or had not been aware of its existence at all, as with Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Regulations cannot be effective if they are not enforced and cannot be enforced unless the regulator knows who the members of the regulated community are. Methods for identifying the regulated community and moving past the voluntary reporting and compliance system currently in place have become topics of acute interest and paramount importance. This article discusses existing data sources at federal, state, and local levels that could be exploited immediately to help DHS and other regulators identify regulated facilities and begin more concerted outreach programs. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-07-23T10:20:54.843851-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11742
  • Dow learnings and actions from the deepwater horizon accident
    • Authors: John Champion; Kenan Stevick, Karen Study, Sheila Van Geffen
      Abstract: The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion on April 20, 2010, killed 11 workers, injured 16 others, and resulted in an offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that is considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry. As with all major incidents in industry, there are lessons to learn from systemic failures that resulted in the tragic loss of life, insult to the environment, and the equipment loss. Many companies, including The Dow Chemical Company, followed the subsequent investigation closely to determine which lessons could be leveraged to strengthen internal programs. Risk identification and management systems in Dow's Process and Occupational Safety programs are robust. Dow management systems are intended to meet or exceed Industry Standards with respect to design, operation, and layers of protection. The prevention of large scale accidents like Deepwater Horizon depends on an acute awareness of worst‐case scenarios and an unfailing vigilance to ensure that essential protection layers are not compromised. Dow management system reviews in 2011 on the same management systems involved in this incident identified opportunities for improvement and/or action plans in several areas. This article will focus on three programs that resulted from those management system reviews. The three programs are: a targeted High‐Consequence Emergency Response Drill program, a High Potential Process Safety Near Miss Program, and technology‐specific Process Safety Cardinal Rules. For each of the three programs, a description of the content of the program and how it was implemented at the company level is provided. Specific examples of how these programs were implemented at a facility level are included. Each of these programs play a key role in preventing a catastrophic event and have been a part of Dow's continuing process safety performance improvement over the last several years. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-07-15T02:25:02.179286-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11752
  • Probabilistic modeling of business interruption and reputational losses
           for process facilities
    • Authors: Seyed Javad Hashemi; Salim Ahmed, Faisal Khan
      Abstract: This article presents probabilistic models to estimate business losses due to abnormal situations in process facilities. The main elements of business loss are identified as business interruption loss and reputational loss. The business interruption insurance approach is used to model business interruption loss. The subelements of business interruption loss are modeled based on expert knowledge using Program Evaluation Review Technique, which are then integrated using the Monte Carlo simulation approach. The reputational loss is considered as Weibull distributed, and the parameters are estimated by applying a scenario‐based approach. Copula functions are then used to develop the distribution of the aggregate loss, considering the correlation between business interruption and reputational losses. The application of the loss models is demonstrated using a distillation column case study. The models presented here provide a mechanism to monitor process facility's business performance, with associated uncertainties, and to make swift operational and safety decisions. This will help to improve process facilities safety performance and optimal allocation of resources where they are needed the most. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-07-07T09:00:17.367213-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11753
  • A method for barrier‐based incident investigation
    • Authors: Robin Pitblado; Tony Potts, Mark Fisher, Stuart Greenfield
      Abstract: Incident investigation is a formal requirement for high hazard facilities with the aim to learn from each incident and to prevent future recurrences. There are many published investigation methods, with most driving to the management system root cause and some applying newer barrier‐based methods. However, these methods either do not link tightly to the facility risk assessment or are very difficult to apply, and lessons from incidents that might reveal weaknesses, especially relating to major accidents, can be missed. This article describes a novel method for incident investigation (Barrier‐based Systematic Cause Analysis Technique) that combines the ideas of barrier‐based risk assessment with a well‐established systems‐based root cause analysis method (Systematic Cause Analysis Technique). The method described is efficient and can be applied by properly trained supervisors, and this potentially allows every incident or near‐miss event to be assessed in a consistent risk‐based format. The method clearly establishes links back to the facility risk assessment and thus identifies risk pathways that are potentially too optimistic (i.e., the risk is higher than predicted), and this can be due to initial optimism or degradation of safety barriers (human or hardware). © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-27T04:22:16.988811-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11738
  • Using alarms as a layer of protection
    • Authors: Todd Stauffer; Peter Clarke
      Abstract: Alarms and operator response to them are one of the first layers of protection used in preventing a plant upset from escalating to an incident. This article discusses how to evaluate the risk reduction (or the probability of failure on demand) of this layer when it is considered as part of a layer of protection analysis. It examines key factors such as time to respond, operator training, human factors, alarm system performance, and the reliability of the hardware used to annunciate the alarm. Recommendations will be drawn from the ISA‐18.2 standard “Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries.” Analogy will be drawn with techniques used to analyze safety instrumented functions. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-12T04:31:16.446023-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11739
  • Suppression effect of explosion in linked spherical vessels and pipelines
           impacted by wire‐mesh structure
    • Authors: Shangfeng Zhang; Zhirong Wang, Qingqing Zuo, Juncheng Jiang, Changde Cheng
      Abstract: A series of experiments are conducted to study suppression effect of multilayer wire‐mesh structure on methane‐air mixture explosion in linked vessels. Explosion suppression effect is analyzed for explosion suppression structures with different layers and meshes. The most reasonable multilayer wire‐mesh structure is obtained. The multilayer wire‐mesh has a greater impact on explosion intensity in the big vessel than that in the small vessel. The combination of different layer number and mesh number has different explosion suppression effect on explosion. Mesh number has little effect on explosion pressure in both vessels when the layers are few. When the layers are more, the explosion pressure in both vessels is greatly impacted by mesh number. Under the condition of the same mesh number, the more the layers are, the better the explosion suppression effect. 5 and 7 are the critical explosion suppression layer number for 40‐mesh and 60‐mesh wire‐mesh structure, respectively. Compared with 5‐layer 40‐mesh wire‐mesh structure, the effect of 7‐layer 60‐mesh wire‐mesh structure on explosion suppression is better. So, in actual explosion protection design, the optional explosion suppression structure should be decided by taking into account of the comprehensive effect of layer number and mesh number. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-09T00:57:38.081836-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11728
  • CFD‐based simulation study on producer gas explosion in an
           electrostatic precipitation
    • Authors: Kai Yang; Qiang Li, Zhijiang Ding, Lichun Xiao
      Abstract: Gas explosion is one of the most serious problems in the operation of electrostatic precipitation (ESP) which is applied to purify producer gas. Simulation study on the producer gas explosion in ESP has been conducted with computational fluid dynamic method. Producer gas explosion was studied experimentally in a closed rectangular vessel to validate simulation results. Numerical results were proved to be reliable and reasonable which could meet the engineering needs. The factors of flame propagation and pressure variation have also been analyzed. Furthermore, the effects of those explosion parameters such as premixed oxygen concentration, operating conditions, and local gas clouds with high oxygen content were discussed. The results show that maximum explosion pressure rises sharply with the premixed oxygen concentration increasing. Meanwhile, maximum explosion pressure increases with the operating pressure boosting, but decreases while the operating temperature elevates. Explosion pressure of local gas cloud with high oxygen content is a linear function of its volume. For this model, the critical diameter of gas clouds is 1.2 m with the oxygen concentration of 20%. The volumetric ratio of gas clouds in this model is 0.04. This study gives a reference for the optimization of oxygen monitoring‐feedback system response, and can provide theoretical guidance for the design of explosion protection. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-04-27T10:33:16.975691-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11743
  • Maintenance of fire sprinkler systems based on the dynamic assessment of
           its condition
    • Abstract: Safety is one of the major concerns of process safety engineers in most industrial facilities all over the world. To this scope, some events play an important role once the effect of their consequences can be assumed as totally undesirable. One of these events refers to the occurrence of a fire. Such event can result in catastrophic consequences for life, equipment, and continuity of activities or even leading to environmental damage. A fire protection equipment with low reliability means that this equipment are often unavailable and thus the risk of a fire increases. Maintenance of fire protection equipment is very important because this kind of systems is mostly in a dormant mode, which gives uncertainty about their operability when demanded in a real situation of fire. This article outlines the importance of tests, inspection, and maintenance operations in the context of a fire sprinkler system and proposes a methodology based on international standards and supported by test/inspection reports to correct the frequency of these actions according to the level of degradation of the components and regarding safety purposes. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-04-25T03:11:16.621317-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11740
  • Analysis of a blast due to inadvertant mixing of ammonium sulfate and
           sodium hyplochlorite
    • Authors: Graeme W. Norval
      Abstract: Ammonium sulfate and sodium hypochlorite are common industrial chemicals, often used together in water treatment. The consequences of mixing hypochlorite (chlorine) solution with ammonia solutions are well understood within the chlorine industry; detonable chloramines are produced. This knowledge is not well known in other industries; fortunately, few locations have both chemicals on site. These products were inadvertently mixed, resulting in an explosion, at a water treatment facility in Kitchener, Ontario on April 2, 2014. The chemistry of the incident is presented and discussed. Facilities that handle both chemicals, such as the water treatment industry need to have heightened sense of understanding of this particular reactive chemical hazard. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-03-25T23:41:55.473893-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11741
  • ASTM E2931: A new standard for the limiting oxygen concentration of
           combustible dusts
    • Authors: Ashok Ghose Dastidar
      Abstract: The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) has a standard on explosion protection systems, NFPA 69, which provides guidelines on effective inerting to prevent explosions. The standard specifies that for inerting to be effective the oxygen concentration must be kept below the Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC). It then goes on to specify that the ASTM International standard E2079 be used to establish the LOC. The shortcoming of this approach is that ASTM E2079 only applies to combustible gases and vapors and not combustible dusts. As a result of this deficiency ASTM International has just introduced a new standard, ASTM E2931, Standard Test Method for Limiting Oxygen (Oxidant) Concentration of Combustible Dust Clouds. This paper discusses the nuances of this standard and compares experimental results between the 20‐L chamber and the 1‐m3 chamber. Differences in the test results between the vessels and between test methods may have safety ramifications to the end user of the data. The large variation present in the repeatability and reproducibility of the LOC means that the current common practice of using a 2% safety margin for particle inerting (the least stringent of the inerting methods) may be insufficient to ensure dust cloud explosion mitigation. It is possible that additional study and improved laboratory proficiency as the test standard matures will bring down these repeatability and reproducibility errors. Additionally, if LOCs are reported in Safety Data Sheets without accompanying information regarding the test method or test vessel size used, the mitigation strategy may not provide adequate protection. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-02-11T23:58:11.161522-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11731
  • Process safety in the classroom: The current state of chemical engineering
           programs at US universities
    • Authors: Sean J. Dee; Brenton L. Cox, Russell A. Ogle
      Abstract: The role of process safety in the undergraduate and graduate curriculum is a critical component of preparing chemical engineers for their future careers. In 2011, the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) amended the requirements for Chemical, Biochemical, Biomolecular, and similarly named Engineering Programs. The change added a clause, indicating that the curriculum of said programs should not only include the engineering application of chemistry, physics, and/or biology to the design, analysis and control of processes, but also the hazards associated with those processes. Departments were then compelled to adjust their curricula to meet the new requirement which would go into effect during the 2012–2013 Accreditation evaluations. Herein, we present findings related to the major milestones and challenges associated with updating the chemical engineering curriculum to include process safety components at both the undergraduate and graduate level. First, a survey of publicly available information regarding curriculum requirements, course syllabi, and program developments at US universities will be discussed. Next, insights from evaluating the challenges associated with adding new content to an already overloaded curriculum will be discussed. Lastly, recommendations for continued improvement in the process safety education provided to undergraduate and graduate students will be presented. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-02-11T23:57:22.142132-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11732
  • Infiltration hazards for building siting studies
    • Authors: Jeffrey D. Marx; Benjamin R. Ishii
      Abstract: Facility siting studies have been a requirement for many years, specifically for facilities that must comply with OSHA's PSM program. Facility siting is frequently interpreted as performing a building siting study which adheres to the guidance given in API RP 752. Many of the siting studies conducted for large facilities over the past few decades have focused on explosion overpressure impacts to occupied buildings, with more simplistic evaluations for fire and toxic gas impacts. Toxic gas impact analyses often only evaluate the potential exposure of a building location, to a specific gas concentration, and do not evaluate the level of infiltration into the building where occupants may be impacted. Infiltration of flammable gases has largely been ignored in most building siting studies. Despite this oversight, this hazard is one which should be addressed when following the guidance found within API RP 752. Through the use of dispersion modeling and infiltration analyses, the hazards associated with flammable or toxic gas infiltration can be incorporated into a building siting study. This article outlines the process of conducting a building siting study in accordance with API RP 752, with specific emphasis on the consequence analysis for infiltration analyses. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-01-29T23:55:40.05562-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11726
  • Safety improvements in a Methanation reactor
    • Authors: Mike Walton; Tony Southerton, Paul Sharp
      Abstract: A 35‐year‐old Methanator vessel required replacement due to High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA). The opportunity was taken to upgrade the over temperature protection system to meet the requirements of IEC 61511. An additional Layer of Protection was added to reduce demand on the High Temperature Trip system. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009
      PubDate: 2009-05-06T00:00:00-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.10325
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