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Journal Cover Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.359]   [H-I: 28]   [6 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1583 journals]
  • Pressure relief valve inspection interval
    • Authors: Thiago Trotta; Charles Kashou, Nancy Faulk
      Abstract: Determining the correct interval for pressure relief valve inspection, testing, and maintenance remains a major challenge for facilities covered by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Process Safety Management Standard. To this end, guidance is provided by API Standard 510, Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: In-Service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration, by API Recommended Practice 576, Inspection of Pressure-relieving Devices, by API Standard 520, Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices, Part II-Installation, and by NB-23, National Board Inspection Code—Part 2 Inspection. Furthermore, ASME BPVC, Sections I and VIII, provide general guidelines for the repair of pressure relief valves.However, the testing and inspection interval listed, up to ten years, is the maximum time span between shop inspections and overhaul. Further direction is often requested for determining the proper interval for valves in typical process services, especially in cases of PRV chattering. Recent API STD 520 Part II guidance on performing engineering analyses for PRV installations, based on service and specific installation, is included here.In this paper, a decision-making approach to determining these intervals based on a combined understanding of risk-based inspection, quality assurance, engineering analyses, and facility experience is presented. The approach provides process operators and managers with additional assistance in making this determination. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-04-20T04:02:00.195582-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11892
       
  • Dynamic safety risk modeling of process systems using bayesian network
    • Authors: Esmaeil Zarei; Ali Azadeh, Mostafa Mirzaei Aliabadi, Iraj Mohammadfam
      Abstract: Process complex systems in particular oil and gas plants due to dealing with hazardous materials at severe process conditions are much prone to catastrophic accidents. In this context, safety risk analysis is a crucial tool to develop effective strategies to prevent accident and provide mitigative measures. Dynamic risk analysis (DRA) is one of the most practical approaches for risk analysis that helps provide safer operations of complex process systems. The present work is aimed at demonstrating the application of an integrated DRA approach to comprehensive quantitative modeling and analysis of the both aspects of risk, that is, probability and consequence assessments. In this approach, first, the worst case scenario is identified and then a robust tool is developed for dynamic accident scenario modeling and risk assessment by means of Bayesian Network. This approach is applied to risk analysis of a flammable liquid storage system at a gas refinery. The work provides valuable information on the identification and comprehensive analysis of worst case accident scenarios, their main consequences, critical basic events, and minimal cut sets which lead to accident scenarios and also for dynamic updating of probabilities and risk. The obtained results are more appropriate and rigorous to developing preventive and mitigative strategies for potential accident scenarios and thus increase the safety level in the complex process systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-04-12T01:40:52.94895-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11889
       
  • Pipeline risk assessment using artificial intelligence: A case from the
           colombian oil network
    • Authors: Alexander Guzman Urbina; Atsushi Aoyama
      Abstract: Currently, in order to make decisions regarding the safety of pipelines, the risk values and risk targets are becoming relevant points for discussion. However, the challenge is the reliability of the models employed to get the risk data. Such models usually involve a large number of variables and deal with high amounts of uncertainty. Therefore, there is a strong need for a powerful tool to cope with that uncertainty, and one of the best tools dealing with uncertainty is the implementation of artificial intelligence methods using fuzzy logic.Hence, this study aims to present an artificial intelligence inference system that minimizes the uncertainty of traditional approaches of risk assessment in pipelines. Also, in order to show the applicability of the model developed, this study presents a case from the Colombian oil transportation network. Besides that, this study presents an uncertainty analysis for the risk values, comparing the results of the inference system with traditional approach. The results show that the inference system performs better since the magnitude of the average error and its standard deviation are less than the traditional approach. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-04-09T02:00:27.561449-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11890
       
  • A new insight into the accident investigation: A case study of Tianjin
           Port fire and explosion in China
    • Authors: Zhou Aitao; Fan Lingpeng
      Abstract: By figuring out the cause and learning the lessons, accident investigation serves to avoid the like accidents effectively. Incident Management is one of the twelve key factors among China's process safety management system (PSMS), while accident investigation is central to Incident Management. This paper selected “Tianjin Port 8.12 fire and explosion accident” (“Tianjin 8.12 Accident”) as an investigation case. Three core components: cause analysis, affixing the responsibility and corrective suggestions, were unfolded. Problems were analyzed from process safety and accident development point of view. A process analysis approach, which is based on event sequence-barrier failed, was employed for accident investigation. Affixing responsibility process based on failed analysis was used for accident investigating and affixing. In order to give corrective suggestions, safety information-based corrective suggestions are proposed by starting from systematic and interconnected perspective and combining with finding failed behaviors and an in-depth analysis of the causes behind the behaviors. Subsequently, an integral accident investigation approach, which consists of cause analysis based on event sequence-barrier failed, affixing responsibility process based on failed analysis and systematic corrective measures based on safety information, can effectively render scientific theoretical guidance to investigation and analysis of an accident. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-04-08T07:56:58.241613-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11891
       
  • The physics and Metaphysics of the sensitivity of calorimetric instruments
           and human senses
    • Authors: Dilip K. Das
      Abstract: The onset temperature for a reaction detected by an apparatus in an experimental study is an overestimated value compared with the actual value existing within large batches. Models are used to estimate the “actual value” for large batches. The onset temperature is dependent on the Phi-factor (thermal inertia), adiabaticity, and detection sensitivity of the calorimeter. It is therefore advisable to penalize the detected onset temperature by an arbitrary number, such as 50°C for Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC), to arrive at the recommended (Adjusted) onset decomposition or reaction temperature for the purpose of setting control parameters in operations.The influence of Phi-factor and detection- sensitivity of the Heat-Wait-Search mode in the ARC on the detected onset temperature is discussed. A parallel is drawn between the instrumental sensitivity in the phenomenal world and the mental sensitivity in the noumenal world. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T08:03:14.763256-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11871
       
  • New model for predicting thermal radiation from flares and high pressure
           jet fires for hydrogen and syngas
    • Authors: Derek Miller
      Abstract: Current flare and jet fire models used in the process industry are primarily based on hydrocarbon gases and have been found not to be particularly effective for low luminosity gases such as hydrogen and syngas mixtures. This article presents a new model for such gases, for low to high pressure releases in both vertical and horizontal orientations. The model, which predicts flame geometry and thermal radiation, allowing for jet momentum, buoyancy, wind and flame radiant fraction, is based on extension of established models, with the addition of several new correlations. Validation against existing published data and new previously unpublished test data collected at both pilot and full scale is presented. This article provides the complete set of equations for the model. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-03-13T02:11:13.628487-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11867
       
  • Method for CFD facilitated pressure rise calculation due to deflagration
           in heat recovery steam generator
    • Authors: Wei Zhou; Manuel Cardenas, David Moyeda
      Abstract: For combined cycle operations, especially during startup and shutdown, safety concerns have always been the top priority. Residual fuels can escape to and accumulate in the downstream heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) if appropriate purge is not taken, which may cause deflagration, an explosion at subsonic condition, during startup when heat source exists. Residual fuel deflagration will lead to pressure rise and therefore, structural and or tube damages depending on the level of pressure increase. Therefore, a careful study of the residual fuel distribution in HRSG and the pressure rise due to possible deflagration is wanted.Historically, thermodynamics relationships and chemical equilibrium calculations are used to estimate the pressure rise. These approaches either assume that all fuel energy is converted into heat, or make assumptions on the amount of fuel in chemical equilibrium that contributes to the pressure rise. These assumptions tend to overestimate the pressure rise. With the development of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation, a more accurate prediction of the fuel concentration in HRSG during transient startup and/or shutdown process is possible. The local fuel concentrations can now be calculated and therefore, how much fuel that are within the explosion limits and contribute to the pressure rise can be detected readily.This article presents the transient CFD modeling results of residual fuel concentration in a typical HRSG configuration during a gas turbine/combined cycle startup failure process. The article then refines the adiabatic mixing model with the predicted local fuel concentrations to provide a better estimation of the pressure rise due to deflagration. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-03-09T01:46:35.814418-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11887
       
  • Process safety education and training academic education as a foundation
           for other process safety initiatives on education
    • Authors: Geert Boogaerts; Jan Degrève, Geert Vercruysse
      Abstract: Commitment to process safety is fundamental to the process industry. Governance, promotion, and participation in academic and related educational programs are testament to the industry's commitment and stakeholder reach. Process safety education and training is a very broad topic. Industry-academic collaboration is essential when developing high level education and training on process safety. This article looks at the development of educational and training programmes for students in Advanced Master programmes in the European master network and for experienced industry workers. The Advanced Master Safety Engineering developed at the University has a proven track record in realizing the intended learning outcomes along with a high level of academic and professional orientation as well as international orientation. The results related to the learning outcomes are very satisfying, which implies that there is a good relationship between the intended learning outcomes, the programme and the evaluation tests. The associated Advanced Master Class on process safety has a very satisfying overall trainee satisfaction (Level 1) and learning gains (Level 2) evaluation in the Kirkpatrick's Model. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-03-01T03:55:36.363538-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11885
       
  • Introduction to functional safety assessments of safety controls, alarms,
           and interlocks: How efficient are your functional safety projects?
    • Authors: Eloise Roche; Monica Hochleitner, Angela Summers
      Abstract: The return on investment (ROI) for safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI) can be significantly impacted by human error, which can occur during any lifecycle activity and be committed by competent workers. Design, installation, testing, maintenance, and operational practices are often repeated throughout a site, lowering the ROI with each flawed installation. A functional safety assessment (FSA) is a tool used to identify and correct defects before a simple human error allows an incident to propagate in spite of the capital spent on the installed SCAI equipment.Significant efficiency can be gained when FSAs are periodically conducted during the SCAI lifecycle, so that critical information is gathered when needed. This article will discuss the internationally endorsed five-stage approach to FSA. The purpose and content of each FSA stage is reviewed and execution timing is suggested that focuses project resources to maximize FSA benefit to project cost and schedule. Finally, a case study illustrates how lack of effective and timely FSA contributed to the occurrence of a costly and catastrophic loss event. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-03-01T03:55:34.665064-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11886
       
  • Instructions to Authors
    • PubDate: 2017-02-27T23:31:44.992698-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11888
       
  • Why DDT is the only way to explain some vapor cloud explosions
    • Authors: D.M. Johnson; V.H.Y. Tam
      Abstract: The possibility that Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) occurs in vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) in industrial accidents has generally only been recognized for very reactive fuels such as hydrogen and ethylene. Assessment of the explosion hazards and risks associated with less reactive fuels such as propane and other alkanes has generally been based around the assumption that, in practice, only a deflagration can occur. This has the benefit that the magnitude of the maximum hazard to surrounding areas is defined by the physical parameters of any congested process region and not by the extent of the vapor cloud, as would be the case if there was a sustained detonation. However, following the Buncefield incident in the UK in 2005, a considerable amount of effort was expended in explaining the major VCE that occurred. This initially involved gathering and interpreting the evidence from the incident but then extended to experimental and theoretical research over two phases and lasting five years. Further research since showed that DDT can be achieved within dense vegetation and regions of pipework with a relatively small extent (of the order of a few meters). The results from this project will be summarized, indicating why the only explanation that is consistent with all of the evidence is a DDT soon after ignition of the cloud, with a sustained detonation then propagating through the majority of the cloud. Reference will be made to other incidents where similar evidence was observed. Awareness of the significance of such evidence will be important in the investigation of future VCEs. In addition, the possibility of DDT needs to be recognized in the methodologies used to assess VCE hazards. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-24T02:20:44.786149-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11874
       
  • Using social network theory to analyze the effectiveness of environment,
           safety and health management for two petrochemical companies
    • Authors: Jao-Jia Horng; Kuang-Yu Liao, Shun-Yeng Wang
      Abstract: The social network analysis theory was used to explore two domestic petrochemical companies on their environmental, safety, and health (ESH) management system and operation effectiveness. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses by NodeXL and statistical tools were applied through the survey questionnaires to observe the results of social network among two management systems. From the background information of those individuals, parameters and network diagrams, we could identify three kinds of specialized network personnel: Central persons, marginal men and information agents, in order to understand the organization work, and information flows and influence patterns. Two companies showed differences in their International Standard Organization (ISO) based management systems and actual functioning systems. The centrality parameter indicated that some managers lack network connections to others and some members' knowledge could not be adequately used owing to the faults in organization structures. These problems would lower the effectiveness of management systems. Our analysis also showed positive correlations between the trustworthiness among members as well as the recognition networks. This study showed that the network analysis could be a good reference for the high-level managers to understand their ESH system, to evaluate the organization efficiency and to analyze their future development and operation needs. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-02-22T01:00:34.587723-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11865
       
  • Atmospheric tank failures: Mechanisms and an unexpected case study
    • Authors: Michael S. Schmidt
      Abstract: The literature on catastrophic failures of low-pressure tanks focuses on the ignition of explosive mixtures in the vapor space of those tanks, and rightly so, because most catastrophic failures of atmospheric tanks involve explosions of such mixtures. Moreover, there is a general sense in the industry that other than explosions of flammable mixtures, the only other hazard associated with low-pressure tanks is the occasional dramatic implosion of a vessel that is inadequately protected against vacuum.In fact, there are a number of mechanisms that can lead to the catastrophic failure of a low-pressure tank that have nothing to do with combustion or unprotected vacuum. Under certain circumstances, even a tank equipped with an atmospheric vent and containing nothing other than salt water can explode, with disastrous impacts.This article reviews the mechanisms for catastrophic failure of low pressure tanks, both implosion and explosion, and serves as a reminder for experienced process safety practitioners and as a tutorial for new process safety practitioners of what to look for during a hazard review. It also includes a case study of an atmospheric caustic tank explosion that resulted from a previously unreported mechanism that involved neither combustion nor vacuum. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:52.316894-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11881
       
  • A technique to control major hazards of the coal gasification process
           developed from critical events and safety barriers
    • Authors: Feng Sun; Wei Xu, Guangjian Wang, Bing Sun
      Abstract: Many coal gasification related accidents happened in China recently. Investigations of the accidents show that the performance of safety barriers and the risk influence factors contributing to it plays an important role. Lack of attention on the performance of safety barriers and associated risk influence factors hinder the thorough understanding of these accidents and, therefore, needs to be addressed by providing a new analysis methodology. Herein, we developed an approach from critical events and safety barriers to control the major hazards during the coal gasification process. The method consists of process hazard identification based on critical events, barrier performance evaluation based on barrier diagrams, and quantification of risk influence factors based on Bayesian network. The application of the method indicates that it is suitable for controlling major hazards of the coal gasification process as well as other chemical processes. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:42.185681-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11880
       
  • Modeling and validation of dispersion following an instantaneous vapor or
           two-phase release from a pressurized vessel
    • Authors: Henk W.M. Witlox; Mike Harper, David Webber
      Abstract: This article presents a new model for the initial dispersion phase of energetic instantaneous expansion following a catastrophic vessel rupture. This model has been implemented as a new sub-model in the Phast dispersion model and is based on more sound physical principles than the old Phast sub-model. It allows for both vapor and two-phase releases. In the case of two-phase releases, droplets are assumed to expand radially, potentially leading to time-varying droplet rainout and the formation of a spreading evaporating liquid pool. For ground-level vapor or two-phase releases the correctness of the numerical predictions is confirmed against an analytical solution. The model has been validated against previously published experimental data for pressurized releases with and without rainout. This includes ground-level releases for nitrogen vapor and flashing liquid propylene, and elevated flashing liquid releases for Freon 11, Freon 12, propane and butane. Overall the old model tends to under-predict the cloud radius and cloud speed versus time, while the new model more closely agrees with small-scale experimental data. Therefore the new model produces smaller concentrations and doses, and is less conservative. For two-phase releases the new model predicts an increased amount of rainout, which is more in line with the experimental data. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:38.916611-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11876
       
  • Auditing management systems for safety controls, alarms, and interlocks:
           How effective are your instrumented protective systems?
    • Authors: Monica Hochleitner; Eloise Roche
      Abstract: Functional safety audits evaluate the performance of the management systems and procedures required to keep safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI) working effectively. Organizations invest thousands, sometimes millions, of dollars installing automation systems in safety applications to minimize the risk of their enterprise. Return on investment in SCAI systems, and the achieved degree of risk reduction, can be negatively impacted by human error, such as inadequate installation, testing, maintenance, or operation of the automation systems. Administrative controls and organizational discipline are needed to identify and correct these errors. This article will provide an introduction to the purpose, key content, and planning of a functional safety audit. The case studies presented will illustrate how safety system effectiveness could have been improved if a detailed audit of the implemented SCAI had been conducted and the findings addressed in a timely fashion. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:32.656454-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11875
       
  • One company's observations on the implementation of LOPA
    • Authors: Anne Bertelsmann
      Abstract: Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has gained popularity as a semi-quantitative risk assessment tool, but often unexpected difficulties are encountered when rolling out LOPA. This article discusses the practical aspects of LOPA implementation in Marathon Petroleum Company LP's Refining Organization (MPC Refining). Specifically, it shows how scenarios are selected from a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and how they are organized for conducting LOPA efficiently, and it discusses whether to conduct LOPA concurrently or after the HAZOP. The article also compares the [cause consequence] or [consequence cause] methodology and addresses the implications of combining multiple causes in a single scenario.Another key aspect of LOPA implementation is the set of numerical values used for frequencies, modifiers and risk-reduction factors. The article shows how numerical values should be tied to the risk matrix and how internal consistency is achieved through the use of standardized values and restrictions on the use of frequency modifiers. It discusses potential solutions for cases where the LOPA outcome does not meet the risk target. Finally, the article shows how the use of application standards can supplement LOPA by defining minimum protections and providing standard LOPA scenarios. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:29.452056-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11873
       
  • Chinese process safety management core elements and control measures
    • Authors: Aitao Zhou; Lingpeng Fan, Mingfei Ma, Bo Tao
      Abstract: With the popularization and application of chemical process safety management (PSM) systems in the chemical industry, the use of such systems in China has become the focus of a large volume of research. In this article, 12 elements included in the current Chinese PSM system are divided into four stages from a structural point of view. This division will be helpful in the follow-up analysis. After a careful analysis of the evaluation results for one PSM pilot study in Nanjing, some correlations have been found between the results of the elemental evaluation. Small- and medium-sized chemical plants make up a large proportion of Chinese chemical plants and many chemical accidents take place in these plants, so a simplified PSM system in practical operation need to be found. Based on a previous PSM structural analysis, the secondary elements of the PSM system can be removed. This allows researchers to avoid the traditional method of analyzing PSM elements individually. In the concrete analysis process, a theoretical analysis of the correlation degree between elements can be combined with the results of accident investigations. The simplified Chinese PSM system consists of four core elements: Process safety information, process hazard analysis, training, and emergency management. Based on the current applications of these four core elements in China, a consideration of correlations between these elements is used to make several suggestions for improving China's PSM systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-01-22T11:20:24.826483-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11878
       
  • Issue Information-TOC
    • Pages: 1 - 1
      PubDate: 2017-02-27T23:31:46.047825-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11843
       
  • Smartphones and process safety
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      Pages: 3 - 3
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:40.051872-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11883
       
  • Smartphone use in process safety
    • Authors: Deborah Pano; Christina Baulch
      Pages: 4 - 9
      Abstract: Every development in technology brings the opportunity to build a safer future, in process safety and beyond. In the age of smartphones, this opportunity comes in the form of safety applications, education, and communication through social media. Because the majority of those in the workforce own smartphones, these devices may act as valuable tools for engineers, and are a possible medium for sending alerts and notifications. Because we live in the age of information, applications have been developed specifically to cater to the unmet needs of engineers. Technology has allowed us to have the information we need in the palm of our hand at a moment's notice, and access to this information will lead us to a safer tomorrow. Note that in some facilities, cell phones may be monitored or even prohibited. Always abide by the facility's rules to ensure everyone's safety, particularly in relation to cell phone use. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 4–9, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-08T01:21:10.970195-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11884
       
  • Practical Leadership Skills for Safety Professionals and Project
           Engineers, A Review (2016) By Gary L. Winn, PhD, CRC Press, Taylor &
           Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL 33487, 330 pages, $67.46, ISBN-9781498758222
           (Hardback)
    • Authors: John Murphy
      Pages: 109 - 109
      PubDate: 2017-01-17T03:37:16.666582-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11872
       
  • Safety & health news spring 2017
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      Pages: 110 - 114
      PubDate: 2017-02-09T00:50:25.164063-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11879
       
  • Erratum: Dangerously close: The CSB's investigation into the fatal fire
           and explosion in west, Texas
    • Pages: 115 - 115
      PubDate: 2017-02-07T02:16:39.510015-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11882
       
  • Layer of protection analysis as a multifunctional team problem solving
           tool
    • Authors: Edward Cialkowski
      Abstract: Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has been widely adopted as a method of organizing and quantifying hazard rates. Frequently, an initial LOPA may indicate that a risk target has not been met and that a scenario requires additional layers of protection. Unlike Fault Tree Analysis, the inherent simplicity of the LOPA format makes it conducive for use directly as a problem solving tool in a team environment to close risk gaps. Teams at Air Products with representatives from operations, process controls, process design and process safety, have effectively used the LOPA format in problem-solving sessions to identify and improve components of the analysis involving human error, controls architecture, and inherently safer process designs. This multifunctional team approach has resulted in broader ownership of the safety analysis by the full team of stakeholders, and this has ultimately led to more cost effective solutions. The benefits of multifunctional team review are illustrated with a case study example. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-12-29T00:35:23.835587-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11870
       
  • Think facility, act on integrity
    • Authors: Robert F. Wasileski
      Abstract: The Chemical Processing Industry (CPI) has witnessed growth in Mechanical Integrity (MI) programs, which have evolved from standards-based compliance, to continuous improvement programs, and on to risk-based programs. For instance, operators (i.e., manufacturers) have redesigned corporate standards, plant-level procedures and field practices to keep pace with incident learnings and recommended practices, such as those espoused by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Furthermore, the property insurance industry has duly taken note of this MI evolution, giving rise to a significantly greater focus on MI programs during insurance surveys and inspections. Meanwhile, incident investigators remain in demand as incidents with MI-related causes continue to occur in the CPI. This apparent disconnect naturally raises questions in regards to subjects such as “risk based inspection (RBI),” “reliability centered maintenance (RCM),” “industry best practice,” and “inspection, testing and preventive maintenance (ITPM).”MI programs play a considerably important role in the process safety lifecycle of equipment. The engineering design phase of a project may be on the order of just days, up to several years for a complete plant. Procurement and construction typically follow a similar timeline proportionate with the engineering design phase. However, once a facility becomes fully operational, the time devoted toward operation and maintenance will normally far out-weigh the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) period, and may last for many decades. As such, the process safety equipment lifecycle (PSEL) may be largely governed by the MI program.The PSEL is explained in this article, with an examination of the central elements which should be embraced by a comprehensive MI program. While the article demonstrates the breadth and depth of MI, it aptly proposes a practical approach toward the management system that forms the foundation of a robust MI program. The proposed framework leverages the Onion Skin diagram in the context of the equipment lifecycle to create an intuitive approach to MI management. This management system framework is comprehensive, sound, and practical for implementation at facilities of most any size. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-12-26T10:35:24.993338-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11869
       
  • Hazards inherent to control systems: Case studies and lessons learned
    • Authors: Brenton L. Cox; Stephen W. Garner, Andrew R. Carpenter, Mark T. Fecke
      Abstract: Control systems are an integral part of almost all chemical processes, regardless of size or complexity. As the demands for performance and safety increase, control systems will only proliferate. With automation comes the ability to develop more complex and interrelated processes, and to respond more rapidly to disturbances. However, increased reliance on control systems, both discrete and continuous, requires increased diligence with respect to their development and testing, as well as the implementation of independent layers of protection.A control system that provides optimal product for typical feed conditions may behave poorly during abnormal conditions, such as idling or turnarounds. Similarly, independent control systems charged with safety instrumented functions may not be called upon to act until they become necessary to prevent or mitigate an emergency situation. To recognize and mitigate hazards associated with control systems, process design and process hazard assessment teams may need to consider these and other potential issues.Presented here is a brief overview of the hazards associated with control systems. Finally, case studies are used to highlight the need for considering the potential hazards associated with control systems, from the design stage, through startup, operation, and turnarounds. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-12-02T04:11:03.706557-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11868
       
  • Temporarily Withdrawn
    • Abstract: This article has been temporarily withdrawn. It was erroneously published prior to the license agreement process being completed.
      PubDate: 2016-10-18T23:30:20.03365-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11863
       
  • Bayesian network and bow tie to analyze the risk of fire and explosion of
           pipelines
    • Authors: Zerouali Bilal; Kara Mohammed, Hamaidi Brahim
      Abstract: As accidents were and still one of the main reasons standing behind the increasing rates of casualties such as death, injuries, and evacuations, the constant improvement of safety measures especially in the field of hydrocarbons remains a major concern. Therefore, in the work in hand, we attempt to shed the light on the ways of developing a method for the evaluation of risks of fire and explosions of pipelines. The causes of the latter and consequences are, in one hand, analyzed by means of fault tree and bow tie methods. On the other hand, a quantitative analysis implementing the Bayesian networks is used to estimate the probability of occurrence of the adverse event. Moreover, 72 basic events were found to be of the primary causes provoking the occurrence of undesirable events. However, some experts often find it difficult to precisely determine the probabilities of occurrence of basic events of the tree. For the purpose of evaluating the occurrence of each basic event, we used the fuzzy logic. Hence, at the end of the study, we were able to develop a model that could help us evaluate the risks accompanied the fires and pipelines explosion as well as the consequences. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-10-14T08:25:49.809962-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11860
       
  • Advanced analysis to supplement HAZOP/LOPA for effective process design
    • Authors: William R. Banick; Cindy Wei
      Abstract: The HAZOP and LOPA methods are commonly used for qualitative hazard identification and semi-quantitative assessment of risk in the process industries. Integration of HAZOP and LOPA techniques into a single study has provided the practical advantage of utilizing the same team of subject matter experts to complete evaluation of hazard scenarios, identify needs for further risk reduction, recommend specific safeguards required and confirm resulting residual risk is acceptable. While practical and efficient, the one-step comprehensive integrated HAZOP/LOPA method can have pitfalls. In particular, use of LOPA alone to confirm risk acceptability can lead to complex solutions to meet order-of-magnitude threshold requirements for risk reduction and restrictive requirements for independent protection layers (IPLs). Quantitative methods are sometimes required beyond HAZOP/LOPA to obtain a more precise evaluation of identified hazards and benefits of the associated safeguards. This article presents a risk assessment approach incorporating advanced analysis, including human factors task, fault tree and cost-benefit analysis, following HAZOP/LOPA analysis. To illustrate this approach, an example is shown on the selection of appropriate engineering design options for cyclic regeneration of dense phase ethylene treaters, which have unique safety concerns. Using advanced analysis, a cost effective design solution is developed and is shown to reduce risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-28T04:56:17.589372-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11855
       
  • A network based approach to envisage potential accidents in offshore
           process facilities
    • Authors: Al-Amin Baksh; Rouzbeh Abbassi, Vikram Garaniya, Faisal Khan
      Abstract: Envisaging potential accidents in large scale offshore process facilities such as Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) is complex and could be best characterized through evolving scenarios. In the present work, a new methodology is developed to incorporate evolving scenarios in a single model and predicts the likelihood of accident. The methodology comprises; (a) evolving scenario identification, (b) accident consequence framework development, (c) accident scenario likelihood estimation, and (d) ranking of the scenarios. Resulting events in the present work are modeled using a Bayesian network approach, which represents accident scenarios as cause-consequences networks. The methodology developed in this article is compared with case studies of ammonia and Liquefied Natural Gas from chemical and offshore process facility, respectively. The proposed method is able to differentiate the consequence of specific events and predict probabilities for such events along with continual updating of consequence probabilities of fire and explosion scenarios taking into account. The developed methodology can be used to envisage evolving scenarios that occur in the offshore oil and gas process industry; however, with further modification it can be applied to different sections of marine industry to predict the likelihood of such accidents. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-28T04:56:08.703581-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11854
       
  • Temporarily Withdrawn
    • Abstract: This article has been temporarily withdrawn. It was erroneously published prior to the license agreement process being completed.
      PubDate: 2016-09-16T04:06:31.821829-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11852
       
  • Application of a liquid nitrogen direct jet system to the extinguishment
           of oil pool fires in open space
    • Authors: Bobo Shi; Fubao Zhou
      Abstract: Liquid fuel fires occurring during industrial processes are serious safety concerns around the world due to their devastating impact on lives, the environment and property. In this study, a liquid nitrogen delivery system was set up to extinguish the oil pool fires in open space. Effects of liquid nitrogen flow rate, pipe diameter, and liquid nitrogen release distance on the suppression process were analyzed according to the mass loss, burning rate and temperature variations. When liquid nitrogen release distance was 0.50 m and pipe diameter was 0.04 m, fire extinguishing time was the shortest 1.6 s and the temperature decrease rate above the liquid fuel surface reached 275°C/s. Fuel surface cooling and blow off process were revealed through the experiments as two kinds of fire extinguishing mechanisms. Based on the flame images captured by high speed camera, the flame expansion phenomenon might occur early in liquid nitrogen injection, especially the situation of the higher flow rate of liquid nitrogen. Three approaches (ground fixed system, moving transportation, and directional transportation of liquid nitrogen) are provided for fire extinguishment of large scale fires. The results obtained provide important reference for the conduct of fire extinguishment for fires. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-08-16T02:36:38.239568-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11840
       
  • The eye opener: Preparing for and performing facility siting to best
           communicate with upper management
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: Upon completion of a facility siting study, a major step in the critical path for implementation is acceptance from upper management on the remediation plan. Communicating with upper management occurs at the end of several steps which can be strategically mapped in order to maximize upper management's understanding of the needs of a site's remediation requirements.Using an example chemical plant, this paper will detail the process of initiating a facility siting study, provide a novel approach to prioritizing building remediation requirements, and discuss how the resulting information can best be framed and communicated to upper management. In addition to discussing strategies for effective communication with upper management on proposed facility siting strategies, the paper also details an online system that could be used for keeping facility siting data evergreen after the study is completed. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-17T23:25:41.39118-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11835
       
  • Experimental investigation of the innovative foaming device using gas as
           the sole power for firefighting
    • Authors: Zhilin Xi
      Abstract: Foam is used as an efficient means of firefighting. The innovative foaming device using gas as the sole power is designed to replace the previous foam generating system using two or three power sources, and appropriate size of the new foaming device can be made to control dust and fire in households or companies based on the actual need. The results of the experimental investigation on the new device in three cases are as follows: in the first case, the minimum working pressure is 0.4 MPa and the working flow range is: 8.0858 m3/h ≤ qa ≤ 48.45 m3/h and qL ≤ 0.4532 m3/h. In the second case, the maximum working time of the new foaming device is 109 s and the minimum working pressure of the storage tank II is 0.26 Mpa. In the third case, the maximum working time of the new device is 205 s and the minimum working pressure values of the storage tanks I and II are 0.26 Mpa and 0.3 Mpa respectively. The fire extinguishing experiment is explained in this article, and the results show that the foam generated by the new foaming device is more effective and efficient than the ABC powder fire extinguisher. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-15T05:31:12.815552-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11834
       
  • Parametric generation of explosion scenarios for quantitative risk
           assessment of gas explosion in offshore plants
    • Authors: YeongAe Heo; Inwon Lee
      Abstract: In this study, probabilistic risk assessment has been carried out for the prediction of gas explosion loads due to hydrocarbon leaks and subsequent explosions in the topside of offshore platforms. In the initial phase of the risk assessment, the effect of various scenario parameters on the annual probability of gas explosion was quantified via a MATLAB code. For calculating the gas explosion frequency, the hydrocarbon leak frequencies and the ignition probabilities were derived from the HCR (HydroCarbon Release) database from the Health & Safety Executive (HSE, UK), and the IP (Ignition Probability) report from UKOOA (UK Offshore Operators Association), respectively. The MATLAB code has the algorithm to cope with the varying design practice in either Front End Engineering Design phase or detailed design phase. User-definable parameter setup and spreadsheet data input provide the user with the flexibility in selecting relevant level of elaboration for such design parameters as the leak size distribution, the hydrocarbon composition, etc. These features of the code enable controlling the number of explosion scenarios without any parameter range remaining unaccounted for. The present MATLAB code has been applied to generate hydrocarbon leak scenarios and corresponding explosion probability for the topside process modules of a specific oil Floating Production, Storage and Offloading. Varying the number of cases for each parameter leads to the variation of the number of explosion scenarios selected, which are either 48 or 24 in the particular case. For each explosion scenario, the gas leak and explosion simulation was carried out using the FLame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) commercial S/W package, giving rise to the annual probability of exceedance for the explosion overpressure. Discussion of the influence of explosion scenario selection method on the change of the overpressure exceedance curves is made. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-04T06:21:04.534931-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11832
       
  • Used, classic, or antique; solving the enigma of disciplined adherence to
           standards for existing equipment
    • Authors: Jack McCavit; Todd Aukerman, Jeff Fox, Rukyah Hennessey
      Pages: 10 - 13
      Abstract: What do you consider when buying a used car' Do you have minimum safety requirements for your used car' Similarly, do you have minimum safety requirements for existing equipment in your plant' One of the CCPS Vision 20/20 Industry Tenets is Disciplined Adherence to Standards. In this tenet, Vision 20/20 puts special emphasis on application of standards for existing equipment. Companies with great process safety performance recognize that having minimum standards for existing equipment is as important as having them for new projects. However, identifying and applying relevant standards to equipment that may have been installed decades ago can be challenging. This article will describe how to establish minimum standards for existing equipment and will provide a suggested approach for the implementation of these internal or common industry standards. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 10–13, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-09-16T04:06:29.64825-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11851
       
  • Process safety: A wicked problem'
    • Authors: James Moseman
      Pages: 14 - 17
      Abstract: The nature of process accidents is discussed, and the relevant definition of Horst Rittel's social phenomenon, “wicked problems,” is examined. Existing accident models are reviewed for inclusion of social drivers thought to dominate process accidents. A suggested method, new to process safety and termed morphological analysis, is offered to uncover unacknowledged drivers. Give the purported fit of process safety as a wicked problem, an assessment of the US Chemical Safety Board's “Most Wanted” is made doubting its potential reduction in accidents. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 14–17, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-04-15T04:15:39.086593-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11826
       
  • RAGAGEP considerations for relief and flare systems
    • Authors: Georges A. Melhem; Casey Houston
      Pages: 18 - 23
      Abstract: Recent emphasis on Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) increased the scope of relief systems risk factors that require evaluation to develop complete and compliant Pressure Relief and Flare Systems documentation. Failure to comply with RAGAGEP ((d)(3)(ii)) is the most cited element of the Process Safety Management requirements.This paper discusses how RAGAGEP considerations now require evaluation and proper documentation of risk factors that are often overlooked including but not limited to: dispersion analysis, thermal radiation, noise, vibration risk, reaction forces and structural supports, metal cold temperatures due to expansion cooling and two phase flow, hot temperatures due to fire exposure and/or runaway reactions, PRV stability, chemical reaction systems, and loss of high pressure/low pressure interface.Important RAGAGEP considerations for these additional risk factors are highlighted and discussed. Recommendations are provided on how to best address these factors in the evaluation and documentation of design basis. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 18–23, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-08-11T05:00:37.871146-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11839
       
  • Expanded Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW4) for determining chemical
           compatibility, past, present, and future
    • Authors: James Farr; Dave Gorman, Dan Sliva, Al Hielscher, Trong Nguyen, George Baran, Brenton Drake, Emory Ford, Dave Frurip, Kirk Mulligan, John W. Ryan, Dalina Viveros
      Pages: 24 - 29
      Abstract: Chemical compatibility is a key consideration throughout the chemical industry wherever two or more chemicals have the potential to mix, either inadvertently or by design. One of the most comprehensive tools available for determining chemical compatibility, the NOAA Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW), has gained significant traction since the release of the third version (CRW3) in 2012. In 3 years, this free software has been downloaded >200,000 times and has become the chemical compatibility tool of choice at many organizations. As a result of an ongoing partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), The Dow Chemical Company, The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Materials Technology Institute (MTI) and other industrial/academic/government volunteers, a fourth version of the CRW (CRW4) has been developed. The expanded capabilities of this new version include a materials of construction section, improved import/exporting/data sharing capabilities, additional reactive groups to aid in determining compatibility decisions, several user interface enhancements, along with the correction of minor issues found in the CRW3. This article will describe past development, the new features included in the CRW4, followed by a brief discussion of future development plans for the software tool. Such developments should solidify this tool's position as the gold standard within the chemical industry for determining chemical hazards. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 24–29, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-07-17T23:25:33.181123-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11833
       
  • Revisions to FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-14, Fire
           Protection for Chemical Plants
    • Authors: Matthew Daelhousen; Henry L. Febo, Benjamin Ditch
      Pages: 30 - 37
      Abstract: For nearly two centuries, businesses around the world have relied on FM Global and its property loss prevention data sheets to reduce risk at their facilities. Data Sheet 7-14, Fire Protection for Chemical Plants, addresses fire and explosion hazards at chemical manufacturing plants and similar processing facilities, particularly those associated with ignitable liquid, flammable gas, and liquefied flammable gas where a release could result in a fire of long duration. In 2014, FM Global assigned a team of engineers to update the data sheet, which had not undergone a major revision in over 15 years.A primary focus of the revision was to reduce reliance on prescriptive guidelines when designing fire protection systems at chemical plants. Renewed emphasis was placed on identifying potential fire/explosion scenarios, and designing fire protection systems appropriate for the anticipated loss scenario. Additionally, safeguards to minimize the volume of the potential liquid or gas release were developed, such as accidental release control systems, siting guidance, and other passive methods to mitigate damage in the event of a release. This new guidance is based on a mixture of scientific research, loss history, and engineering experience. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 30–37, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-11-10T01:16:29.714121-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11864
       
  • Beyond HAZOP and LOPA: Four different company approaches
    • Authors: Jerry Wayne Chastain; Paul Delanoy, Chris Devlin, Thomas Mueller, Karen Study
      Pages: 38 - 53
      Abstract: For operations where application of standards, regulations, and/or Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices may not be sufficient to address a particular company's risk, several options exist. For qualitative assessment of process hazards, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) and What-If reviews are two of the most common petrochemical industry methods used. Up to 80% of a company's process hazard analysis (PHA) may consist of HAZOP and What-If reviews (Nolan, Application of HAZOP and What-If Safety Reviews to the Petroleum, Petrochemical and Chemical Industries, William Andrew Publishing/Noyes, 1994, p. 1). After the PHA, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is commonly used throughout industry to evaluate the required safety integrity level for instrumented protection layers in a semiquantitative manner (Dowell, International Conference and Workshop on Risk Analysis in Process Safety, CCPS/AIChE, 1997). HAZOP, What-If, and LOPA are all straightforward methods and are relatively easy to perform. However, much like a hammer, they are not always the best or most appropriate tool for a given job. At times, more advanced methodologies such as Fault Tree Analysis, Quantitative Risk Assessment, Event Tree, Failure Mode, and Effects Analysis and Human Reliability Analysis are necessary to properly assess risk. However, these more advanced tools come with a price. They are often more expensive, time consuming, and require a higher level of expertise. The decision to use these higher level methodologies is not taken lightly and different companies use different criteria for determining when to take this next step. This article will present approaches by four companies, BASF, Celanese, The Dow Chemical Company, and Eastman Chemical Company. Each company will outline criteria used to determine when to go beyond HAZOP, What-If, and LOPA and will present examples where more advanced techniques were used. The intent of this article is to provide readers with real world examples that demonstrate the appropriate application of the “right” tool and to illustrate what criteria can be used to make informed decisions regarding selection of a PHA methodology. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 38–53, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-06-21T06:15:32.067724-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11831
       
  • Suppression of overpressure during a vapor cloud explosion — A new
           approach
    • Authors: Norbert Baron; Chris R. Buchwald
      Pages: 54 - 61
      Abstract: In this article, a new concept is presented with the intent to suppress the generation of damaging overpressures during a vapor cloud explosion via triggering ignitions at additional locations within the vapor cloud immediately after the primary ignition has occurred. The resulting lower explosion overpressures would then be less damaging to buildings and their occupants. The results of early experimental work support the hypothesis underlying this new concept. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 54–61, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-11-07T05:47:55.642361-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11807
       
  • Simultaneous Operation (SIMOP) Review: An Important Hazard Analysis Tool
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: 62 - 66
      Abstract: Simultaneous operations (SIMOPs) occur within process facilities when two or more activities occur at the same time and place. They may involve risks that are not identified when each activity is considered by itself. A SIMOP review identifies possible interactions between activities that may adversely impact people, property, or the environment. SIMOP reviews are an important adjunct to the performance of process hazard analyses such as hazard and operability studies. A number of major process industry accidents have involved SIMOPs. Several examples are described. A procedure for conducting a SIMOP review and an example are provided. The development of a plan to address the performance of SIMOPs using the results of SIMOP reviews is discussed and plan contents are identified. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 62–66, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-11-11T00:35:32.188863-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11866
       
  • The effect of an obstacle on methane-air explosions in a spherical vessel
           connected to a pipeline
    • Authors: Qingqing Zuo; Zhirong Wang, Yaya Zhen, Shangfeng Zhang, Yiqing Cui, Juncheng Jiang
      Pages: 67 - 73
      Abstract: A series of experiments are carried out to reveal the effect of an obstacle on the explosion intensity of a methane-air mixture in a spherical vessel connected to a pipeline. Results show that obstacle presence, blockage ratio, and position play significant roles in explosion intensity. The oscillation amplitude of pressure both in the vessel and at the pipeline terminus weakens when an obstacle exists in the pipeline. The effects of the blockage ratio on explosion intensity are different when obstacle position changes. Explosive intensity decreases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is set at the intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline and in the middle section of the pipeline. Moreover, when the blockage ratio is ∼56%, the minimum explosion intensity is obtained when the obstacle is set at the middle section of the pipeline. Explosion intensity increases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus. The most dangerous case is when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus, especially when the blockage ratio is 75% or greater. The maximum pressure and the rate of pressure increase at the point of intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline are higher than at the middle section. The conclusions provide an important reference for designing explosion venting safety systems and explosion-resistant designs. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 67–73, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-03-31T06:25:59.078642-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11823
       
  • Interrelations between process safety management elements
    • Authors: Hanida Abdul Aziz; Azmi Mohd Shariff, Risza Rusli
      Pages: 74 - 80
      Abstract: OSHA PSM standard has been established with 14 elements that define the management principles to control process hazards and protect the workplace. One of the key factors to the success of Process Safety Management (PSM) implementation is that each element comes as a component in an integrated PSM program. Although various kind of integrated safety management systems have been introduced, direct integration system between PSM elements was not extensively studied due to vague concept on interrelation between PSM elements. This also hampers efforts in designing and developing integrated system for PSM. In this study, the interrelation of critical PSM elements was analyzed based on objectives and information functional of the elements stipulated in OSHA PSM regulations. From the conducted analysis, all the critical elements are interrelated at least with other seven PSM elements. Among the elements, Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity were identified to have the highest interrelations comprising of 12 interrelated PSM elements. The developed PSM matrix has systematically showed the interrelation of critical PSM elements that useful for the development of Integrated PSM system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 74–80, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:49.613016-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11824
       
  • Lower explosion limit/minimum explosible concentration testing for hybrid
           mixtures in the Godbert-Greenwald furnace
    • Authors: Emmanuel Kwasi Addai; Dieter Gabel, Ulrich Krause
      Pages: 81 - 94
      Abstract: Experimental investigations of the lower explosion limits (LEL) of three-component hybrid mixtures of six combustible dusts, three gases, and four solvents were performed in the modified Godbert-Greenwald furnace. The test protocol was in accordance with European standard EN 50281-2-1 which is originally used to determine the minimum ignition temperature of dusts. Modification was done on the equipment to test for the explosion limits for dusts, gases, solvents, and hybrid mixtures. In order to prove the validity of our experimental procedure, the LEL for pure gases were initially tested and the results were compared with values found in literature obtained from the standard procedure which show very good agreement. The experimental results demonstrated a significant decrease of the explosion limits of gas, solvent, or dust and an increase in the likelihood of explosion when a small amount of dust was mixed with gas or solvent and vice versa. For example, the minimum explosible concentration (MEC) of high density polyethylene (HDPE) of 174 g/m3 decreased to 130 g/m3 upon addition of methane the concentration of which itself was below the LEL. The MEC of HDPE further decreased to 65 g/m3 when a nonexplosible concentration of hexane was added. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 81–94, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:31.061074-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11825
       
  • Risk assessment on chemical plants by the method of safety checklist
           analysis
    • Authors: Zhang Xiaoliang; Shen Qian, Zhao Daoliang, Zhang Zhikai, He Rui, Song Huijuan
      Pages: 95 - 101
      Abstract: In this article, 46 chemical plants were investigated and assessed by Safety Department of Shanghai Institute of Technology in China. The safety management and technology ability and level were evaluated by the method of Safety Checklist Analysis (SCA) under the perspective of Safety Specialty Engineer. The risk levels of the overall of 46 plants were got. The SCA assessment presents the visible and invisible risks of the plants quantitatively and plainly. The results show that a majority of the plants have not fully implemented either on the good safety management or the reliable safety practice technology. The level of the overall risk indicate that about 35% of the plants reach the level of A (Scores ≥90), and others both lower than A, even 2 plants in the level of E, with total disregard for their health, safety, and well-being. Otherwise, 23 items were surveyed and judged one by one in safety assessment by SCA, and put forward suggestions for rectify and reform, which helps the plants recognize the reality of the situation and make better in the future. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 95–101, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-04-20T04:18:03.998042-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11827
       
  • Learning from incidents at a Norwegian and a Polish refinery
    • Authors: Kirsti Russell Vastveit; Monika Orszak, Ove Njå, Andrzej Kraslawski
      Pages: 102 - 108
      Abstract: Today companies are expected to learn from incidents in the form of accidents and near misses to improve safety at their facilities. In this article, we examine how two refineries located in Poland and Norway work to learn from incidents. We address the nature of their classification systems and how they select incidents for particularly thorough analysis or investigation, methods for analysis of less severe and severe incidents as well as participation in activities, the nature of follow up activities at the refineries and who these are directed at, as well as learning among contractors who carry out maintenance and projects at the refineries. For each of the stages of incident treatment, we consider the similarities and differences between the refineries and how the practices that are used may affect learning. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 102–108, 2017
      PubDate: 2016-03-21T01:46:01.5195-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11822
       
 
 
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