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    - ENGINEERING (1120 journals)
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ENGINEERING (1120 journals)            First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Matériaux & Techniques     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Mathematical Problems in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Mathematics of Control, Signals, and Systems (MCSS)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Mauerwerk     Hybrid Journal  
Measurement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Measurement Science Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Meccanica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Mechatronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Medical and Biological Engineering and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Medical Engineering & Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Membrane Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Membrane Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Memetic Computing     Hybrid Journal  
Metal Powder Report     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Metallurgist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Metaphysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metascience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metrologia     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Microelectronic Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Microelectronics International     Hybrid Journal  
Microelectronics Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Microelectronics Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Microfluidics and Nanofluidics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Micromachines     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
MNASSA : Monthly Notes of the Astronomical Society of South Africa     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Modelling and Simulation in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Modern Applied Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Molecular BioSystems     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Molecular Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Molecular Pharmaceutics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
MRS Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
MRS Online Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Multiagent and Grid Systems     Hybrid Journal  
Multidimensional Systems and Signal Processing     Hybrid Journal  
NANO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Nano Letters     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 40)
Nano Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Nano Reviews     Open Access   (Followers: 15)
Nanopages     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nanoscale and Microscale Thermophysical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Nanoscale Systems : Mathematical Modeling, Theory and Applications     Open Access  
Nanotechnologies in Russia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nanotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Nanotechnology Magazine, IEEE     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Nanotechnology Reviews     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Natural Hazards     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 179)
Nature Nanotechnology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 44)
Naval Engineers Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
NDT & E International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Nexo Revista Científica     Open Access  
Nigerian Journal of Technological Research     Full-text available via subscription  
Nigerian Journal of Technology     Full-text available via subscription  
NIR news     Full-text available via subscription  
Nonlinear Dynamics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Nonlinear Engineering : Modeling and Application     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nonlinearity     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Nova Scientia     Open Access  
NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nuclear Engineering and Design     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Numerical Algorithms     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part A: Applications: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part B: Fundamentals: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Ocean Science Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Oil and Gas Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Online Journal for Global Engineering Education     Open Access  
Open Journal of Fluid Dynamics     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Open Journal of Safety Science and Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Operations Research Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Optical Communications and Networking, IEEE/OSA Journal of     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Optimization and Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Opto-Electronics Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
OR Spectrum     Hybrid Journal  
Organic Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ozone Science & Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Papers In Regional Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Particle & Particle Systems Characterization     Hybrid Journal  
Particulate Science and Technology: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Perspectives on Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Pesquisa Operacional     Open Access  
Pest Management Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Petroleum Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Phase Transitions: A Multinational Journal     Hybrid Journal  
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Physica B: Condensed Matter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Physica C: Superconductivity     Hybrid Journal  
Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Physics of Fluids     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Planning News     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Plasma Devices and Operations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Plasma Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Plasmonics     Hybrid Journal  
Platinum Metals Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Polar Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Polar Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Polímeros: Ciência e Tecnologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Polish Maritime Research     Open Access  
Polymer Engineering & Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Polymer International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Polymer Science Series A     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)

  First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Journal Cover Process Safety Progress
   [4 followers]  Follow    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
     ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
     Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1602 journals]   [SJR: 0.366]   [H-I: 20]
  • Lessons learned from case studies of hazardous waste/chemical reactivity
    • Authors: Brenton L. Cox; Andrew R. Carpenter, Russell A. Ogle
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: The treatment of hazardous waste poses some unique chemical reactivity hazard management challenges. Hazardous waste in the United States is regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, typically due to potential environmental and health hazards. However, hazardous waste can also have chemical reactivity hazards associated with storage, handling, or mixing with other materials. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has been active in communicating chemical reactivity hazards to the regulated community and has identified numerous sources for additional information. The Center for Chemical Process Safety has also been very active in providing advisory materials and monographs on the safe management of chemical reactivity hazards. Other federal government agencies, such as the Chemical Safety Board and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, have also taken up the call for increased awareness of the hazards of unintentional chemical reactions. Despite these efforts, history of incidents indicates that reactive chemical hazards associated with hazardous waste still go overlooked. In this article, we review hazardous waste incidents through case studies and public sector reports through the lens of chemical reactivity hazard management. In each incident, inadvertent heating resulted in an unintended chemical reaction, and sufficient information existed or could have been obtained to identify the hazards. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-25T00:15:15.901277-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11698
  • Novel ways to present process safety concepts
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      PubDate: 2014-07-25T00:15:02.140104-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11697
  • Understanding hazards, consequences, LOPA, SILs, PFD, and RRFs as related
           to risk and hazard assessment
    • Authors: Roberto Fernández Blanco
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: This article is intended for any engineer, supervisor, or manager who does not specialize in process safety engineering. It presents the concept of layers of protection analysis, safety integrity level (SIL) and its relationship to probability of failure on demand (PFD) and the related risk reduction factors (RRFs). Novel SIL/PFD/RRF graphics are presented to help the reader understand the concepts involved. An example using a safety instrument function for a gas‐fired boiler is also used to help the reader understand the concepts. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-25T00:14:58.763434-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11700
  • Impact of DDT on FPSO explosion risk assessment
    • Authors: Olav Roald Hansen; Remi Martini, Jaewoong Choi, Yonghee Ryu
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: In recent explosion accidents on onshore petrochemical facilities, it has been concluded that a deflagration‐to‐detonation‐transition (DDT) took place, both with Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and gasoline vapor. DDT has also been observed in a number of large‐scale experiments. DDT leads to very high pressures (16–20 barg) and flame speeds (1,600–2,000 m/s) even outside congested regions and has a significant impact on the severity of the near‐field and far‐field explosion loads. It has not been generally accepted that DDT may be a threat at offshore petrochemical facilities and prediction tools have not been available. Thus, the potential effect of DDT is seldom considered. For Floating production, storage and offloading vessels (FPSOs), and even more Floating liquified natural gas vessels (FLNGs), due to larger dimensions and inventories, operators should be concerned that major explosion scenarios can lead to DDT phenomena. Recently, a DDT prediction parameter was implemented in the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model FLACS, and with model adjustments it is possible to calculate DDT and effect on explosion loads with good precision. A CFD‐based FPSO explosion study is presented evaluating DDT potential and impact. DDT will mainly be a concern for large cloud sizes, often larger than commonly considered for design accidental loads for an FPSO (10−4/year). Mitigation by separation walls is also evaluated. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-04T06:35:08.019603-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11694
  • What have we really learned? Twenty five years after Piper Alpha
    • Authors: Michael P. Broadribb
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Twenty five years ago, a major disaster in the North Sea took the lives of 165 persons on board the Piper Alpha oil production platform as well as 2 people from the rescue crew. To this day, the incident represents the worst offshore oil industry disaster ever and has become an industry‐changing watershed event. The subsequent Public Inquiry report made a number of recommendations that were related to inherently safer design (ISD), including the mandatory use of a systematic fire and explosion analysis, analysis of smoke and gas ingress to living quarters, and the requirement for a temporary (safe) refuge area capable of surviving the initial fire/explosion. Other recommendations addressed analysis of the vulnerability of safety critical equipment/elements, and evacuation, escape, and rescue in the event of major incidents. Implementation of the above recommendations aimed to reduce the residual risk of the design through the use of an ISD approach. The residual risk then had to be managed by a safety management system (SMS), which is another inquiry recommendation that comprises many of the elements of process safety. Finally, the inquiry recommended developing a Safety Case to describe and justify the design, the inherent hazards and residual risk, and the SMS. This Safety Case is now the basis for periodic audits. Over the past 25 years this author has had the opportunity to visit offshore production platforms and drilling rigs and to review new offshore projects in many regions of the world. This article addresses both the strengths and weaknesses observed, and a number of common themes involving management systems, human factors, process safety and integrity management at such facilities. Comparisons will be drawn to the evidence aimed at preventing future major incidents that the author and others presented at the Piper Alpha Inquiry, and to the Inquiry recommendations. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-27T22:30:24.687964-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11691
  • Properly calculate vessel and piping wall temperatures during depressuring
           and relief
    • Authors: Georges A. Melhem; David Gaydos
      Abstract: Determining if and when a vessel and/or piping component is going to fail under fire exposure and/or from cold temperature embrittlement is an important factor in consequence analysis and risk assessment. This article describes detailed methods for establishing the conditions for vessel/piping failure and whether the material of construction for vessels and piping is properly selected for fire exposure and/or cold depressuring/relief. Several case studies are used to illustrate important concepts dealing with how wall temperatures should be calculated for single and multiphase systems in order to establish if a vessel and/or a piping component is going to fail. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-17T04:05:43.420927-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11689
  • Organizational change management for process safety
    • Authors: John Wincek; Luís Sávio Sousa, Molly R. Myers, Henry Ozog
      Abstract: It has long been acknowledged that when not properly evaluated and controlled, changes to physical equipment in a facility can lead to serious incidents with potentially severe consequences. Management of change (MOC) systems, replete with a variety of electronic systems, flow charts, and checklists, have been developed by a number of reliable organizations throughout the world to manage these physical changes. It is less commonly recognized that other types of changes such as changes in job responsibilities, loss of key personnel, or even changes in shift hours can have an adverse impact on process safety. These and other nonphysical changes, collectively referred to as Organizational Changes, can lead to serious incidents with potentially severe consequences. Due to their focus on managing physical changes, most MOC systems have overlooked or only superficially address organizational change management (OCM) and the impact of organizational changes that affect process safety. Organizational change is an unavoidable aspect of doing business. There is a large variety of changes which fit under this umbrella of organizational change. Any of these types of changes could result in catastrophic consequences if the changes are not successfully administered. Effective OCM procedures must include a system for managing potential modifications to a variety of organizational aspects. The Center for Chemical Process Safety recently published a new guideline book covering OCM. This presentation will highlight some of the key concerns related to OCM which are covered in this new publication and which should be included in a successful OCM program. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-17T04:03:57.766038-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11688
  • The treatment of domino effects in process hazard analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Domino effects produce hazard scenarios that involve escalating consequences as a chain of linked events propagates throughout and beyond the process where they originate. Such scenarios have been the subject of accident survey studies and quantitative risk analyses but their identification in process hazard analysis (PHA) has received less attention. This article discusses the nature and types of domino effects and a procedure is provided to address them in PHA. The role of separate domino effects studies is described, insights into domino effects that can assist PHA practitioners are provided, and some pitfalls in addressing domino effects are identified. The identification of domino effects in PHA is illustrated using an actual accident that occurred in a refinery. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-12T03:45:49.020131-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11687
  • Safety instrumented systems in lieu of pressure relief valves
    • Authors: Dustin J. Smith
      Abstract: There are two aspects to risk assessments: safety issues and regulatory issues. Usually the two are aligned, but not always. This article explains ASME B&PVC Section VIII (Sec VIII) [American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code: Section VIII, Division I. s.l.] requirements along with other industry guidance for using Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) in lieu of pressure relief devices (e.g., pressure relief valves or rupture disks). For most pressure vessels in petrochemical installations in the United States, the Sec VIII requirements are regulatory requirements. A designer that is implementing facility changes from a corporate risk assessment (e.g., Layer of Protection Analysis or Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)) would do well to also meet the minimum regulatory requirements for overpressure in Sec VIII. Typical risk assessments allow the designer to consider both the likelihood and consequences of an overpressure scenario in determining if additional mitigation is required. Whereas, Sec VIII does not allow any credible overpressure scenarios (solely based on likelihood) unless there is adequate capacity provided by a relief device. This article discusses the detailed typical risk analysis compared to the requirements of Sec VIII overpressure protection by system design. The SIS reliability rating or determination of said rating (e.g., SIL‐3 Systems) is outside the scope of this article. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-06T23:28:47.827247-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11681
  • Simplified methods of using probit analysis in consequence analysis
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: Ensuring personnel can safely shelter during a chemical release is critical. The probit function is useful in determining maximum safe sheltering time. Probits provide a link between probability of expected response and the exposure of a population to a specific event. Probit analysis can provide an estimate of the percentage of sheltered occupants with potential for adverse response to a chemical release. Probits can be used to estimate duration of exposure for probability of nuisance‐level response, loss of consciousness, or fatal exposures. Dispersion modeling tools provide data on predicted effects in response to long‐term exposure (typically 1 h). However, these tools do not define the maximum allowable exposure time for building occupants before loss of consciousness or fatalities are seen. This article provides methodology for estimating critical exposure duration. This article provides a methodology with existing MS Excel formulas in measuring probits to arrive at probability of response to a toxic release. While data on probit values for some chemicals is readily available, there is minimal guidance in the open literature on developing estimates of probit constants where they do not currently exist or are not published. This article presents a methodology for estimating probit constants based on toxicological data. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-03T22:00:14.225948-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11686
  • Competency requirements for process safety auditors
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Auditing is a critical aspect of a process safety program which ensures the program is designed appropriately and implemented properly. The competency of process safety auditors is essential for quality audits. The nature of process safety auditing is described to clarify the responsibilities of auditors. Suitable criteria for selecting process safety auditors to ensure their competency are identified and discussed. Criteria for lead auditors, team auditors, and audit teams are addressed. Also, performance metrics that can be used to judge the performance of process safety auditors are described. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-26T09:26:11.827654-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11684
  • Are unconfined hydrogen vapor cloud explosions credible'
    • Authors: James Kelly Thomas; Craig Eastwood, Martin Goodrich
      Abstract: Owner/operators of chemical processing and petroleum refining sites often ask whether unconfined hydrogen vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) can actually occur. This question normally arises during the course of a consequence‐based facility siting study (FSS) or a quantitative risk assessment (QRA). While it is generally recognized that a hydrogen release within a process enclosure could lead to an explosion, the potential for an external hydrogen release to cause a VCE is not as widely recognized and is often questioned. This uncertainty appears to stem from the impression that a hydrogen release always ignites quickly and near the point of release such that a flammable cloud does not have time to develop prior to ignition and/or that a hydrogen release never produces a flammable cloud of any significant volume due to its positive buoyancy. Unfortunately, neither impression is correct. Hydrogen releases are actually susceptible to delayed ignition, and hydrogen releases can form significant flammable gas clouds near grade level. Unconfined hydrogen VCEs can and do occur. Furthermore, given the potential for rapid flame acceleration associated with hydrogen, the consequences of a hydrogen VCE can be severe. Consideration of such events in FSS and QRAs is, therefore, warranted. Prior accidental hydrogen VCEs are reviewed to establish that such events do occur. Selected hydrogen VCE tests are also discussed to establish the potential severity of such events. Moosemiller and Galindo [10th Global Congress on Process Safety, 2014 Annual AIChE Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March 30–April 2, 2014] reviewed the ignition characteristics of hydrogen relative to the potential for a delayed ignition, and only the conclusions from that article are presented here. Example dispersions, using both simplified dispersion and computational fluid dynamics methods, are presented to illustrate the flammable gas volumes that can be created by hydrogen release scenarios. Blast load predictions are presented to illustrate the range of loads that could result from a hydrogen VCE due to such a release. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-26T09:26:10.911382-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11685
  • Security risk assessment and protection in the chemical and process
    • Authors: Genserik Reniers; Paul Lerberghe, Coen Gulijk
      Abstract: This article describes a security risk assessment and protection methodology that was developed for use in the chemical and process industries in Belgium. The method employs a risk‐based approach according to design principles for object‐oriented protection, using so‐called Typicals. The approach is beneficial for workers in the chemical industry because of the familiarity with safety models and concepts in this particular industry. The model combines the rings‐of‐protection approach with generic security practices including management and procedures, security technology (e.g., CCTV, fences, and access control), and human interactions (proactive as well as reactive). The method is illustrated in a case‐study where a practical protection plan was developed for an existing chemical company. This article demonstrates that the method is useful for similar chemical and process industrial activities far beyond the Belgian borders, as well as for cross‐industrial security protection. In summary, this article offers an insight into how the chemical sector might protect itself on the one hand and an insight into how security risk management may be practiced on the other hand. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-23T23:45:30.66163-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11683
  • The importance of defining the purpose, scope, and objectives for process
           hazard analysis studies
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: The preparation of a statement of purpose, scope, and objectives (PSO) is essential to ensure that process hazard analysis studies are focused and complete. A PSO statement defines what must be addressed but also constrains studies to appropriate content. PSO statements help to ensure studies are conducted effectively and efficiently. This article describes the content of a PSO statement and provides guidance on its preparation and use. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-18T23:49:36.632423-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11682
  • Prediction of methane's flammability using chemical equilibrium
    • Authors: Jianguo Du; Honghao Ma, Zhongwei Qu, Luqing Wang
      Abstract: This article illustrates a method to predict flammability of mixtures containing methane, oxygen, and other inert gases like nitrogen and carbon dioxide based on chemical equilibrium. Calculated adiabatic flame temperature (CAFT) is used as a parameter to determine whether a fuel mixture is combustible or not. Our calculated results are obtained with initial conditions of 1 atm and 298 K. Compared with experimental data reported in the literature, we find that 1,450 K is an appropriate threshold of flammability. Mixtures with adiabatic flame temperatures higher than this value are considered flammable while those lower are judged as nonflammable. Using this criterion, it is convenient for us to predict the flammable zone and prevent the existence of flammable mixtures to ensure security. Showing the CAFT of fuel mixtures with various concentrations in a triangular flammability diagram, we can easily find out the influence of inert gases, oxygen, and soot formation on the mixture's flammability, respectively. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-08T23:50:08.586618-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11679
  • Process safety management
    • PubDate: 2014-04-29T05:53:57.936796-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11678
  • Cyber-physical systems opportunities in the chemical industry: A security
           and emergency management example
    • Authors: Richard Squire; Houbing Song
      Abstract: The manuscript defines and discusses the products of a successful cyber-physical system in the chemical industry using two examples. The first is the ability to make the correct decision quickly regarding an unforecasted large sale of a product. The second is the automatic availability of critically needed information, accessible anywhere in the world which provides endless possibilities for the chemical industry. Concerns and some resolutions are also discussed. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-04-07T01:43:41.504197-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11676
  • Handbook of liquified natural gas—A review (2014)
    • Authors: John L. Woodward
      PubDate: 2014-03-26T07:55:28.642033-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11674
  • Explosion limits of industrial spirit and their affecting by temperature
    • Authors: Petr Lepik; Miroslav Mynarz, Jiri Serafin, Ales Bernatik
      Abstract: The article deals with the determination of industrial spirit's explosion limits and their affecting by temperature. It describes the determination of explosion limits and the influence of temperature by correlation equations available in professional literature, as well as the validation of these data by means of experiments in explosion autoclave and explosion chamber. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-03-17T23:19:41.603236-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11675
  • Influence of liquid and vapourized solvents on explosibility of
           pharmaceutical excipient dusts
    • Authors: Md Nur Hossain; Paul Amyotte, Meftah Abuswer, Ashok Dastidar, Faisal Khan, Rolf Eckhoff, Yuan Chunmiao
      Abstract: Hybrid mixtures of a combustible dust and flammable gas are found in many industrial processes. Such fuel systems are often encountered in the pharmaceutical industry when excipient (nonpharmaceutically active ingredient) powders undergo transfer in either a dry or solvent prewetted state into an environment possibly containing a flammable gas. The research described in this article simulated the conditions of the above scenarios with microcrystalline cellulose and lactose as excipients, and methanol, ethanol, and isopropanol as solvents. Standardized dust explosibility test equipment (Siwek 20-L explosion chamber, MIKE 3 apparatus, and BAM oven) and ASTM test protocols were used to determine the following explosibility parameters: maximum explosion pressure (Pmax), volume-normalized maximum rate of pressure rise (KSt), minimum explosible concentration (MEC), minimum ignition energy (MIE), and minimum ignition temperature (MIT). The experimental results demonstrate the significant enhancements in explosion likelihood and explosion severity brought about by solvent admixture in either mode. The extent of solvent influence was found to be specific to the given excipient and method of solvent addition. Solvent burning velocity considerations help to account for some of the experimental observations but for others, a more rigorous evaluation of solvent and excipient physical property data is needed. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-03-13T22:29:25.072605-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11673
  • The black swan revisited
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      First page: 109
      PubDate: 2014-04-16T06:27:51.435675-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11677
  • Quality assurance and quality control of pressure relief systems
    • Authors: Subhash S. Kale
      First page: 136
      Abstract: Pressure relief systems are important for the safe operation of refineries and chemical plants. They are generally considered to be the last line of defense against abnormal operation which could lead to serious accidents, resulting in loss of life and property. To ensure that the system provides proper protection for the range of potential process deviations, it is important to properly size the pressure relief systems considering all the possible applicable overpressure scenarios. Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) are important work processes which help to ensure that relief systems are properly designed and documented. This article discusses best practices regarding QA and QC protocols for pressure relief systems. Definitions are given for the terminology used for the QA/QC process of pressure relief system studies. A sample workflow of a typical pressure relief system analysis is also provided. Different steps of the pressure relief analysis process are briefly discussed, and sample work instructions are given for each step. An example set of documentation required for a pressure relief system study, as well as a recommended sequence of documents therein, are described. Work instructions are given for the QA/QC process in the different sections of the studies—system information, overpressure contingency analysis, relief rate calculation and relief device sizing, deficiency identification, and final documentation. Lastly, some common mistakes which have been observed during the QA/QC of numerous studies of pressure relief systems from commercial refineries and chemical plants are reviewed. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-26T23:36:28.684336-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11614
  • Zero‐energy determination: Confirmation of vessel and pipeline
           de‐energized state through noninvasive techniques with strain gauges
    • Authors: William Pittman; Taufik Ridha, Subramanya Nayak, Victor Carreto, M. Sam Mannan
      First page: 195
      Abstract: The objective of this research is to identify ways to reliably detect residual material and the associated energy through noninvasive methods using a portable, field‐deployable system in order to prevent loss of containment and injury to workers. Leaking valves, defective pressure gauges, and blocked bleeders may cause residual liquid or gas to remain in process equipment, sometimes holding equipment at elevated pressures or allowing a toxic or flammable atmosphere to remain in spite of efforts to clear the equipment. This creates the potential for serious injury to workers when they open, enter, or begin to work on equipment unaware of the hazardous energy still present. The term, “zero energy,” has been used within the context of this research to refer to “a state characterized by the complete absence of hazardous energy.” Hazardous energy is defined as “energy that could cause injury due to the unintended motion, energizing, startup, or release of such stored or residual energy in machinery, equipment, piping, pipelines, or process systems”‐LEG_ohsc_p15.pdf. This research examines a method to determine if a vessel has achieved zero energy, denoted by internal pressure equal to ambient pressure with no residual liquid present, using strain gauges. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 195–199, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-26T23:35:54.293912-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11612
  • Safety & Health News
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      First page: 200
      PubDate: 2014-05-05T23:34:41.939589-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11680
  • Black swans, white swans, and 50 shades of grey: Remembering the lessons
           learned from catastrophic process safety incidents
    • Authors: John F. Murphy; James Conner
      First page: 110
      Abstract: Last year at the 8th Global Congress for Process Safety, we presented a paper entitled, “Beware of the Black Swan: The Limitations of Risk Analysis for Predicting the Extreme Impact of Rare Process Safety Incidents.” The paper discussed the difficulties of predicting black swan events—rare but catastrophic occurrences which continue to happen in the chemical processing industries despite the focus that has been brought to process safety over the past 30–40 years. Once black swan events occur, after investigations and development of lessons learned, they become white swans. By white swans, we mean these type of events become more predictable and as we do hazard identification and risk analysis we become cognizant of the similar potential scenarios in new plants and plant modifications—at least for a while. This article discusses how white swans slowly become greyer as time goes on if the lessons learned from black swan events are not kept fresh. Examples of black swans that become white swans and then become grey as time goes on will be discussed. Ideas of how to keep the white swans from becoming grey with time, including the key role of Management, will also be discussed. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 110–114, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-06T23:00:19.839913-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11651
  • Keeping the memory alive, preventing memory loss that contributes to
           process safety events
    • Authors: Barry Throness
      First page: 115
      Abstract: Recurring process safety events (PSEs) are a real concern to the energy industry. Contributing causes to these events are quite often very similar. It appears as though the learnings from past events are not retained in the memories of the workforce, setting the stage for accidents to repeat. Even with best practices available to prevent such recurring accidents, these events continue to happen again and again. It seems as if something is missing, in order to effectively use the knowledge gained from so many past disasters and near misses, to prevent further PSEs. It was desired to develop a tool to aid ConocoPhillips Canada (CPC) in preventing memory loss that is contributing to PSEs. Some of the world's worst process safety accidents were reviewed to gather common learnings, and investigation reports of CPC past PSEs were analyzed to determine how prevalent the issue of memory loss is within the company. Best practices to prevent such memory loss were researched and found to be readily available, and yet for some reason, memory loss issues are very widespread. The cognitive sciences were looked to for an answer on how memories are developed and effectively retained. The field of education was researched, to determine how leading educators effectively teach learning to achieve high levels of memory retention. Through this the taxonomy table, a tool that has been used by educators to enhance teaching and learning for many years, was discovered. Then, effective safety communication methods that target memory retention were explored. All researched information was finally tied together, into a learning curriculum, consisting of various activities. These activities were constructed to advance the learning process toward an objective that had been carefully developed using the taxonomy table guidelines. This objective was “for the workers to integrate past process safety learnings to prevent future process safety events.” © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 115–123, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-23T23:55:29.554418-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11635
  • Case studies in process safety: Lessons learned from
           software‐related accidents
    • Authors: Terry L. Hardy
      First page: 124
      Abstract: Software and automation can play a significant role with respect to safety in the chemical process and energy production industries. Because computing systems are increasingly used to control critical functions, software may directly contribute to an accident. On the other hand, software can also be used as part of the hazard control strategy to reduce risks, and computing systems can provide valuable information to help make safety decisions. The importance of including software as part of an organization's efforts to analyze and manage hazards and risks seems clear, but for many organizations software is not effectively incorporated into process safety efforts. This article reviews lessons learned from accidents and incidents to illustrate the potential for a software‐related accident even when process safety management tools and techniques are used. This discussion is intended to provide insights to help improve process safety and software safety efforts. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 124–130, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-30T06:29:29.465428-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11638
  • Characteristics of companies with great process safety performance
    • Authors: Jack McCavit; Scott Berger, Louisa Nara
      First page: 131
      Abstract: The Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS's) Vision 20/20 describes the characteristics of companies with great process safety performance in the future. This work is extremely important to the process industries and other industries that handle toxic, flammable, and explosive materials because it establishes targets to which companies will aspire for years to come. In developing the vision, it was also recognized that there are issues beyond the scope of individual companies that need to be addressed to enable improved process safety performance. Therefore, in Vision 20/20 there are activities that go well beyond any individual company, indeed beyond the industries. The purpose of this article is to share CCPS's Vision 20/20, begin the process of engaging the broader community in the vision and the steps to achieve it and provide an opportunity for companies to begin comparing their current characteristics to the vision. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 131–135, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-06T22:58:21.079987-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11647
  • Development of a protocol for determining confined space occupant load
    • Authors: Peg Wilson; Qingsheng Wang
      First page: 143
      Abstract: Working in confined spaces such as storage tanks always poses significant challenges for all workers even with the existing Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard (29 CFR 1910.146). In the process industries, confined space operation requires its own set of safety considerations. One of the biggest challenges is how to determine the proper occupant load of a hazardous confined space. It is an issue that needs to be addressed to ensure the emergency preparedness and safety of workers who enter confined spaces. Occupant load can be determined through a number of different variables, including exit size, distance to opening, internal structures, and ratings of hazards involved with the confined space. No current field‐ready calculation tool could take into account these variables when determining a confined space occupant load. In this work, an easy to use field worksheet was developed that would quickly determine the occupant load of a given confined space. The worksheet could be combined with a predetermined rescue plan and appropriate safety equipment to make sure occupants are well prepared and will be evacuated in a safe manner. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 143–147, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-07-30T20:04:36.460468-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11619
  • Using assessments to improve process safety culture
    • Authors: Russell A. Ogle; Delmar “Trey” Morrison, Sean J. Dee
      First page: 148
      Abstract: Deficiencies in conduct of operations and operational discipline can lead to a decline in the quality of an organization's process safety culture and an increase in the likelihood of process safety incidents. A process safety assessment is one tool especially suited for identifying and correcting organizational safety culture deficiencies. Both AIChE/CCPS and API offer recent guidance documents on how to conduct effective assessments of process safety management systems. This article first introduces some basic concepts from game theory and applies them to the methodology of process safety assessments. A conceptual framework for the implementation of the process safety assessment process with balanced positive and corrective actions will be described. Assessment guidelines typically focus on the negative outcomes—correcting deficiencies. This article argues that the assessment process must also use the positive outcomes—the compliance successes—to provide positive reinforcement to the process safety culture. Implementing this strategy is consistent with pragmatic management practices and is supported by empirical studies in behavioral science. Finally, this article discusses how these ideas fit within the framework of AIChE/CCPS and API guidance documents. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 148–151, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-09-13T21:50:29.963628-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11629
  • A guide to the legal framework of the PSM standard for engineers
    • Authors: Christopher Cunio; Georges Melhem
      First page: 152
      Abstract: Compliance with the Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard is challenging for even the most sophisticated operators because of the broad scope and highly technical nature of the 14 PSM elements. This article provides guidance on how to comply with the three elements most frequently cited by OSHA—process safety information, process hazards analysis, and mechanical integrity—and the consequences of a failure to do so. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 152–155, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-30T06:28:32.101812-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11636
  • RAGAGEP 101
    • Authors: Lisa A. Long; James R. Lay, Michael L. Marshall, Jeffrey J. Wanko
      First page: 156
      Abstract: Recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEPs) play an important role in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Process Safety Management standard (29 CFR 1910.119). Since 2007, OSHA issued numerous RAGAGEP‐related citations under the Petroleum Refinery Process Safety Management and PSM Covered Chemical Facility National Emphasis Programs. Even though the PSM standard became effective over 20 years ago, noncompliance with PSM's RAGAGEP requirements remains an issue. This article reviews RAGAGEP basics from OSHA's perspective, using examples from national emphasis program inspections to illustrate common RAGAGEP compliance problems. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 156–161, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-06T22:58:14.601691-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11637
  • Management discipline: Defining a process safety strategy
    • Authors: Jerry J. Forest
      First page: 162
      Abstract: We often associate operational discipline with conduct of operations and define discipline as the tools to achieve repeatable results. While discipline in operations is primarily focused on the operator, engineers, and management contribute to the success in achieving consistent results. A Plan‐Do‐Check‐Act model, or Deming Cycle, can be used to represent the relationship among operational, engineering, and management disciplines. The management discipline part of the cycle involves making decisions (act) based on the output of the operations, and planning for success. This article describes a modified strategic business analysis (SBA) planning tool that managers can apply to process safety in order to achieve a desired vision and objective. Too often we are reactive to incidents and create activity lists from year to year in order to achieve objectives and goals. The process safety SBA tool is a structured approach of data analysis. It helps us to understand the company's internal and external environment in order to set strategic alternatives that will bring a company from its present state to the desired future state. By planning for and following a strategy, consistency in operations is achieved and repeatable results can be obtained. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 162–165, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-29T20:50:25.075985-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11642
  • Evaluation of safety performance in process industries
    • Authors: Yu-Jung Liu; Jin-Luh Chen, Shyh-Yueh Cheng, Ming-Tsai Hsu, Chen-Hua Wang
      First page: 166
      Abstract: By considering literature review, the management mechanisms of Taiwan Occupational Safety and Health Management System, and local regulations, the study proposes dimensions for the analysis of overall safety performance in the semiconductor industry, establishes three principal factors and 25 safety performance dimensions, and develops a questionnaire on safety performance. Three Taiwan semiconductor plants were selected as the subject for the quantitative analysis of the questionnaire and the current safety performance of the semiconductor industry was thoroughly investigated. The study extensively discusses a case study of three semiconductor plants showing highly significant differences in their “technical factor,” “organizational factor,” and “human factor” through an analysis of variance of safety performance. From the analysis, it was determined that 22 safety performance dimensions, with the exceptions of “self‐inspection,” “emergency response,” and “safety audit,” demonstrate significant differences. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 166–171, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-30T06:57:34.396216-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11644
  • So we all have been implementing process safety metrics—what
    • Authors: Shakeel Kadri; Glen Peters, James VanOmmeren, Kenneth Fegley, Martin Dennehy, Alvin Mateo
      First page: 172
      Abstract: Industry over the last two to three years has put a lot of effort into implementing Process Safety Metrics. This is a good practice but, now that we have metrics data, how are we utilizing them to improve process safety performance' Air Products has been monitoring process safety performance for the last five years using combined Center for Chemical Process Safety and American Petroleum Institute RP 754 metrics. This article will highlight the approach we have applied, both through our lagging and leading indicators, to drive our process safety performance improvement programs. It will review the programs we initiated, leading indicators we identified, and how it also helped to improve our process safety culture. This article will also look at the importance of measuring severity and its impact in driving leadership behaviors. We will also discuss future opportunities to improve process safety performance via metrics analysis and follow‐up initiatives. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 172–178, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-08T03:07:59.394473-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11645
  • The use of risk matrices and risk graphs for SIL determination
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      First page: 179
      Abstract: Risk matrices and risk graphs are used to determine safety integrity levels for safety instrumented functions. Their simplicity makes them appealing but various difficulties militate against their use for this purpose. These difficulties include the accommodation of hazardous events, allocation of risk tolerance criteria for calibration, and consideration of overall facility risk. Layers of protection analysis and other more quantitative methods are better able to handle these issues. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 179–182, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-09-17T10:22:19.471135-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11627
  • Snares to LOPA action items
    • Authors: Glenn Rozmus; Dustin J. Smith, Dick A. Baum
      First page: 183
      Abstract: Greater numbers of action items are being generated from the Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) process as it becomes increasingly utilized as a method for risk evaluation. The quantity and type of action items result from the combination of initiating events, conditional modifiers, and prescribed guidelines. The quality of the inputs determines whether the action items will actually provide any additional safety benefit. This article is not a procedure for performing a LOPA analysis but presents issues to be aware of when generating a list of initiating events, evaluation of the initiating event severities, and the influence of conditional modifiers. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 183–185, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-29T20:50:28.562218-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11643
  • Safety controls, alarms, and interlocks as IPLs
    • Authors: Angela E. Summers
      First page: 186
      Abstract: Layers of Protection Analysis evaluates the sequence of events that first initiate and then propagate to a hazardous event. This semiquantitative risk assessment technique can expose the role that automation plays in causing initiating events and in responding to the resulting abnormal operation. Automation that is specifically designed to achieve or maintain a safe state of a process in response to a hazardous event is now referred to as safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI). Guidelines for Initiating Events and Independent Protection Layers addresses four basic types of SCAI: safety controls, safety alarms, safety interlocks, and safety instrumented systems. This article discusses the design, operation, maintenance, and testing practices necessary for SCAI to be considered as independent protection layers (IPL). It also provides guidance on claiming multiple layers of protection in the basic process control system. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 186–194, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-11T22:43:46.757792-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11646
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