JournalTOCs

Process Safety Progress

[3 followers] Follow
Full-text available via subscription

Subscription journal
ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
Published by John Wiley and Sons

[1587 journals]

Safety & Health News
- Authors: John F. Murphy
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  PubDate: 2013-05-07T07:04:49.215474-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11607
Human error analysis of the macondo well blowout
- Authors: Patrick Smith; Haley Kincannon, Ryan Lehnert, Qingsheng Wang, Michael Larrañaga
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: The Macondo well blowout resulted in 11 fatalities and caused the largest nonintentional oil spill in history. The situation stemmed from a series of human errors through all stages of the project leading up to the blowout and subsequent explosion. These errors include faulty interpretation of signals indicating problems with well and safety system integrity, inappropriate modifications to safety systems, inadequate design of critical systems, failure to provide redundancy in the design stage, failure to adhere to administrative controls for the safe operation, failure to follow the American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practices 75 on drilling mud circulation, and others. Twenty five specific errors have been identified and classified into eight categories. The results show that the majority of the errors are latent errors and caused by poor leadership in the organization or management. In order to resolve these issues it is necessary to create a safety culture in which safety is paramount in operations and facilities. There are many lessons learned from this incident, but the most important lesson is that safety must be a way of life, beginning in the design stage and carrying through the project life cycle. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-05-07T07:04:46.738867-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11604
PRS‐Brochure
- Pages: n/a - n/a
  PubDate: 2013-05-06T02:26:18.581217-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11592
Bow‐tie diagrams in downstream hazard identification and risk assessment
- Authors: Yaneira E. Saud; Kumar (Chris) Israni, Jeremy Goddard
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Bow‐tie diagrams are emerging as a very useful tool to depict and maintain an up‐to‐date, real‐time, working risk management system embedded in daily operations. They are a proven concept in the worldwide offshore industry. These diagrams provide a pictorial representation of the risk assessment process. This article introduces the bow‐tie concept to the downstream and chemical process industries in the United States. The authors believe that bow‐tie diagrams can be a resourceful method in the safety and risk practitioner's toolkit to improve performance of the hazard identification and risk assessment process and to demonstrate that major hazards are identified and managed to as low as reasonably practicable. Because of their graphical nature, the biggest advantage of bow‐tie diagrams is the ease to understanding of risk management by upper management and operations groups. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-05-04T11:39:03.647773-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11576
Using critical flame temperature for estimating lower flammable limits of a mixture
- Authors: Tingguang Ma
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Based on the thermal balance between quenching and heating potentials of each component (fuel/oxygen/diluent), a method of computing flame temperature is proposed. This method can be used to find the critical flame temperature at lower flammable limits or estimate the lower flammable limits with an assumed critical flame temperature. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-05-04T11:38:50.403508-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11603
One company's near miss program–successes, learning, and improvements
- Authors: Shakeel Kadri; Glen Peters, James VanOmmeren
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Process safety events (or near misses and incidents) are key indicators of a company's process safety performance. The goal in reporting and evaluating near misses is to improve operators’ hazards awareness by recognizing unsafe conditions and acting on less‐severe Tier 3 near miss events before they escalate into more severe Tier 1 and Tier 2 type process safety incidents. Near miss analysis can also be used to identify themes and trends that a company should focus on to improve process safety risk management at their facilities. Air Products and Chemicals has been reviewing process safety near miss events for many decades but has developed and fine‐tuned a detailed and systematic near miss program within the last five years. The current program is modeled after American Petroleum Institute and Center for Chemical Process Safety guidelines with specific provisions for unique hazardous materials that Air Products handles. This article describes the global management program that must deal with the challenges of approximately 1,500 plus process safety near miss entries per year; worldwide operations in more than 40 countries; many different business units; and very diverse hazardous materials, systems, and services provided globally. The breadth of the near miss program, from technician to executive, and the depth of the program, from initial design to plant decommissioning, are presented. Near miss program learning and improvements are described that have enabled Air Products to efficiently analyze near misses, identify improvements in our process safety management program, as well as functional work processes, and effectively communicate global leadership improvement messages addressing near miss themes and trends to help support our Process Safety performance continuous improvement goals.
  PubDate: 2013-04-30T18:52:23.108294-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11534
Keep a sense of vulnerability: For safety's sake
- Authors: Roy E. Sanders
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Excellent safety performance is our goal. But safety is not bankable. Long periods of time without significant incidents may in some cases create an unwarranted sense of complacency and relaxation of discipline. We must encourage a healthy respect for process industries chemicals, equipment, processes, procedures, and all the things we do for process safety management. Continuous incident‐free operations may result in a slackening up of our well‐established practices and procedures. Perhaps, incident‐free safety performance tolerates a wink and a nod at proven methods allowing questionable shortcuts to flourish. This article offers some suggestions on raising the awareness by sharing focused examples of past mistakes and some catastrophic blunders. A number of resources are listed that identify easy‐to‐use, thought provoking case histories. Some are available at no cost. If employees share a sense of vulnerability within their process, there will probably be less deviation from time tested protective operations and maintenance activities. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-30T07:45:03.205397-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11587
Herrig brothers propane tank explosion
- Pages: n/a - n/a
  PubDate: 2013-04-28T23:04:51.671345-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11579
Quantitative safety analysis of a laboratory‐scale bioreactor for hydrogen sulfide biotreatment using fault tree analysis
- Authors: Mohamed A. Zytoon; Ahmed H. El‐Shazly, Madbuli H. Noweir, Abdulrahim A. Al‐Zahrani
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Numerous research activities are conducted all over the world to study biological treatment of H2S in laboratory‐scale bioreactors. Important hazards associated with these bioreactor systems include the escape of H2S gas and leakage of chemical/biological liquids, which have severe adverse effects on the involved labors, equipment, and materials. The objective of this article is to present a quantitative safety analysis of a laboratory‐scale continuous bioreactor system for H2S gas biotreatment using the fault tree analysis approach. Three unwanted top events were determined as the most hazardous events, being H2S leakage inside the laboratory, H2S leakage to outdoor from bioreactor outlet, and leakage of liquid chemical/biological solutions. The minimal cut sets and the probability of the occurrence of each top event were determined. The importance of cut sets and basic events were calculated, and priorities for control measures were determined. The analysis allows better decision on priority of control measures, and maintenance or replacement schemes of the system components in an endeavor to minimize the probability of failure or hazard occurrence. The presented analysis proves the usefulness of fault tree analysis in making quantitative risk assessment and safety analysis, which are important elements in laboratory safety management system. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-28T23:04:20.976112-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11600
Modeling of underground hydrogen pipelines
- Authors: Elizabeth Lutostansky; Leonard Creitz, Seungho Jung, Joan Schork, David Worthington, Yongfu Xu
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Hydrogen is a critical component in the production of cleaner fuels. Underground pipelines provide a safe, reliable supply of hydrogen to refineries and the petroleum industry. Proper assessment of the risks associated with underground hydrogen pipelines requires an accurate model of the jet fire consequence. This article will describe experimental and modeling work undertaken in order to define the appropriate methodology for utilizing DNV's PHAST software tool to represent the hydrogen jet fire from the rupture of underground hydrogen pipelines. Two experiments were conducted to measure the flow and radiation from an intentionally ignited rupture of a 6 in. diameter, 60 barg hydrogen pipeline buried 1 m underground. Adjustments to PHAST modeling parameters were required in order to obtain agreement between the measured and predicted radiation and flame length values. The modeling assumptions and parameter adjustments include: Velocity modification to account for interaction of the flow out of the two ends of the ruptured pipe and to model the subsequent discharge from the crater. Specification of the fraction of heat radiated. Specification of the angle of the release. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-28T23:04:05.897661-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11572
The ALARP principle in process safety
- Authors: Paul Baybutt
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: The principle that the risks for a facility should be reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) increasingly is embraced around the world. This article describes how the principle can be used to establish both individual and group risk tolerance criteria that are needed for risk analysis studies using techniques such as Layers of Protection Analysis. The consideration of uncertainties in risk estimates in the ALARP context and the use of the precautionary principle are also described, and the use of cost–benefit analysis in applying the ALARP principle is discussed. Other related principles used in risk management are described. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:04:03.472081-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11599
Process safety educational determinants
- Authors: Paul R. Amyotte
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: As with any undergraduate engineering course, the selection of topics to include in a process safety course can benefit from a structured decision‐making approach. Suggestions are offered in this article on the importance of considering the following entities/resources as educational determinants: accreditation bodies, professional practice regulatory bodies, technical societies, process safety and other literature, industry, and factors unique to a given institution. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:03:56.497991-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11598
Process safety leadership: Becoming street smart on process safety
- Authors: Dawn Wurst; John Cornelisen
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: It is well known in business improvement circles that good management does not necessarily equal good leadership. This applies to process safety management (PSM) as well. Effectively leading the translation of PSM to action for all whom it affects takes several concurrent actions beyond what is written in PSM regulations. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:03:46.688576-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11595
The safety and chemical engineering education committee—broadening the reach of chemical engineering process safety education
- Authors: Thomas O. Spicer; Ronald J. Willey, Daniel A. Crowl, Wendy Smades
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: The Safety and Chemical Engineering Education (SAChE) program, initiated in 1992, is a cooperative effort between the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and engineering schools to provide teaching materials and programs that bring elements of process safety into the education of undergraduate and graduate students studying chemical and biochemical products and processes. The SAChE Committee is comprised of representatives from academe and industry in addition to AIChE and CCPS staff with the objective of developing and distributing teaching materials on chemical process safety. In addition to providing a brief history of SAChE, this article summarizes the current major efforts of the Committee including SAChE Products (materials suitable for classroom adaptation distributed through its web site http://www.sache.org), SAChE Faculty Workshops (to introduce faculty to the practice of chemical process safety in an industrial setting), and SAChE Student Safety Certificate Program (materials suitable for self‐study currently available through the AIChE eLearning web site http://aiche.learn.com). © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:03:28.213642-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11594
Letter
- Authors: Amy E. Theis
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:02:28.800211-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11593
Inherently safer design concepts applied to laboratories
- Authors: Amy E. Theis; Charles F. Askonas
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Several types of experiments are performed in laboratories at Fauske & Associates, LLC (FAI). Test equipment includes calorimeters to characterize reactive chemical systems and multiple instruments to characterize both combustible dust and gas/vapor explosions. It is a challenge to ensure that each project is completed safely, since a variety of chemicals are used and tested under extreme conditions. It is vital to ensure the safety of people, property, and the environment at all times. This requires first identifying the hazards (including rigorous review of material safety data sheets) and then implementing adequate engineering and administrative controls as necessary. This article will document best practices including management commitment, predicting and eliminating hazards during extreme test conditions, and implementing inherently safer design concepts to laboratory testing. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:02:27.521598-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11590
Supporting materials for teaching process safety
- Authors: Joseph F. Louvar
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: This article contains supporting materials and information that can be added to any safety course to improve the effectiveness of teaching in a university course or in an industrial seminar. These materials are primarily selected from a huge source of available materials by Safety and Chemical Engineering Education Committee (SAChE) and the U.S. Chemical Safety Board. The selection process is based on my own industrial and teaching experiences: (a) materials that I know emphasized the industrially important safety concepts and (b) materials and information that give the students and young professionals a positive safety culture; that is, the long lasting interest, knowledge, and motivation to prevent process accidents and injuries. The concepts described and stressed in this article include (a) motivation or reasons for studying process safety, (b) laboratory safety (including requirements for wearing safety glasses), (c) reactive chemicals, (d) boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions (BLEVEs), (e) hazards of dusts, (f) confined space entry, (g) nitrogen asphyxiation, (h) safety reviews and introduction to PSM, (i) Piper Alpha and details of PSM, and (j) continuing education. This article also identifies the source of existing and readily available process safety course lecture materials: the core materials that are enhanced with the supporting materials and information described in this article. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:01:09.123973-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11586
Investigation of an explosion in a gasoline purification plant
- Authors: Trygve Skjold; Kees Wingerden
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: An explosion in an atmospheric storage tank initiated additional tank explosions and a pool fire at a tank facility in Norway. The tank farm had been operated as a purification plant for a petroleum product called coker gasoline. The process entailed extraction of malodorous sulfur containing components, in particular thiols (mercaptans). After several tanker loads of coker gasoline had been treated with a solution of sodium hydroxide and water, the efficiency of the sweetening process declined as precipitated waste accumulated in the tanks and the alkaline solution became increasingly saturated with impurities. The approach adopted for handling the accumulated waste included the addition of hydrochloric acid to neutralize the spent caustic. The explosion occurred when about 80% of the scheduled amount of acid had been added to the solution in the tank. There were no fatalities in the accident, but at least two people received medical treatment for injuries sustained during the course of events. The investigation concluded that the accident was caused by a chemical explosion in the tank. Several factors point toward thiols as the predominant constituents in the fuel–air mixture, but vapors from other volatile substances may also have played a decisive role. The ignition source was most likely a hot surface, resulting from adsorption of volatile organic compounds on activated carbon in the air filter and subsequent self‐heating and glowing combustion in the carbon bed. The article summarizes the main results from the accident investigation and lists various measures that can be taken to prevent similar accidents in the future. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:00:56.078311-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11584
Quality problems as process safety warning signs
- Authors: John W. Herber
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Many companies collect and report process safety incidents. Some companies also collect process safety near misses. These safety near misses are sometimes quality deviations; for example, a process parameter that exceeds the safe operating limit, a critical safety system that is activated, or a minor release of hazardous material occurs. The intent of this article is to show how a quality incident can also be a process safety near‐miss and what should be done to recognize its potential severity. Many of the causes of quality problems may be subtle, such as the fouling of cooling surfaces or a control valve that responds slowly. If these issues continue unchecked, the conditions will continue to persist and a more serious event occurs. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:00:52.677285-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11583
A simple and cost effective method for determination of the self‐accelerating decomposition temperature
- Authors: Hans K. Fauske
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: This article describes a simple cost effective alternative to the United Nations tests for determining the Self Accelerating Decomposition Temperature (SADT) for transporting reactive chemicals. The proposed method uses simple calorimetry results together with well known heat loss models. Some detailed results and analysis are included that show (a) the proposed method gives essentially identical results as the United Nations H.1, H.2, and H.3 results, (b) the proposed method is not sensitive to the shape of the reactant, and (c) the proposed method can be easily used to determine results as a function of various conditions. This alternative method provides correct SADT of the substance as packaged for transport, and is, therefore, consistent with suggestions by the United Nations “Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.” © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:00:50.518585-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11580
Linking LOPA and value engineering
- Authors: Kristin D. Norton; Senem Surmeli, Steven T. Maher
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: While safety instrumented systems (SISs) can be an essential element of process facility design to minimize the potential for process incidents, in some cases they can also be over‐applied in the design phases of capital projects where the safety instrumented functions (SIFs) associated with the SIS are defined before the process hazards have been fully characterized. This approach may provide one mechanism for achieving a robust process control system design; however, the application of SIS also brings increased costs associated not only with the robust equipment needed to meet safety integrity level (SIL) requirements but also with the ongoing maintenance, testing, and procedures required throughout the SIS lifecycle. In order to balance the important safety benefits associated with the SIS with the increased capital costs it is critical to have a specific and comprehensive basis for decision‐making. This article will illustrate the value engineering benefits of using the combined Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) methodology to comprehensively evaluate a design and provide a decision‐making platform for determining whether protection for process hazards should be implemented using a SIF, a basic process control system (BPCS) feature, or alternate safeguard categories (e.g., relief valves, alarms, etc.) to ensure an adequate level of reliability without compromising safety. When the HAZOP/LOPA Study is performed following the value engineering session, the HAZOP/LOPA Study provides a critical cross‐check to ensure safeguards are adequate and that changes made during the value engineering study do not introduce additional hazards. In contrast, when the HAZOP/LOPA Study is performed prior to the value engineering session, it provides a basis for decision making to remove SIFs or switch the function to the BPCS when the risk was determined to be low by the team (as defined by specific operating company criteria). © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:00:45.88399-05:0
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11556
Management of change—enabler or inhibitor?
- Authors: Brian D. Kelly
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Management of change (MOC) is one of the more fundamental elements of process safety management (PSM) and one which is common to all PSM frameworks. It is also an activity that breeds frustration and difficulty in many organizations, and this may impede its effectiveness. To address, this concern it is necessary to fully understand the purpose and benefits of MOC, and the efforts required to make it work. This article highlights some of the principal barriers to an effective MOC initiative and suggests ways to streamline it so that it provides optimum benefit. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-23T23:00:40.39609-05:0
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11589
Safety Management: Near Miss Identification, Recognition, and Investigation (2012) By Ron C, McKinnon, CRC Press, Boca Ration, FL, 197 pages, $99.95, ISBN: 978‐1‐4398–7946‐7
- Authors: Stanley S. Grossel
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  PubDate: 2013-04-03T05:59:55.344153-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11582
Risk assessment of a propane storage sphere: Maintain or decommission?
- Authors: Andrew R. Carpenter; Russell A. Ogle, Juan Carlos Ramirez
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: The authors were asked to assist a utility with a risk management decision. Specifically, the utility was considering whether they should maintain or decommission an 800,000 gallon propane storage sphere. The 30‐year old sphere was the fuel storage vessel for a propane standby system. One of their major concerns was the shrinking buffer zone around their facility. Although the facility was originally located in a remote rural area, residential development had begun to encroach upon the facility's buffer zone. The original analysis was based on a consideration of the offsite consequences for a worst‐case scenario. This was done at the request of the client as it reflected their degree of risk acceptance. The consequences of two hazard scenarios were analyzed: an unconfined vapor cloud explosion and a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE). To support this analysis, the mechanical integrity of the sphere was evaluated deterministically by considering the pressure vessel design documents, the limited nondestructive test and evaluation data available, and published data on typical corrosion rates. Additional factors incorporated into the analysis were the capabilities of the existing fire protection system, the facility security system, and the propane unloading station for tank car deliveries. Finally, the economics of maintaining the sphere versus decommissioning it were explored. Ultimately, the utility decided to decommission the sphere. In this article, we conduct a retrospective study using a risk‐based approach. We identify a set of hazard scenarios for the propane storage sphere, calculate the leak frequency for each scenario, compute the associated source term, and evaluate the consequences. The results are compared with the original consequence analysis and other published hazard studies. The implications for risk management are discussed. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-03T05:59:53.371818-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11581
Responding to december 2012 editorial – urgent message to universities
- Pages: n/a - n/a
  PubDate: 2013-04-03T05:59:51.928941-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11578
Normalization of process safety lagging metrics
- Authors: Mengtian Wang; Ray A. Mentzer, Xiaodan Gao, Joshua Richardson, M. Sam Mannan
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: This article explores new process safety metrics for measuring process safety performance in the chemical processing industry. While Process Safety Management enables an operation to optimize their process safety programs and organizational risks, there is an emerging need to evaluate process safety implementation across an organization through measurement of key indicators. Lagging metrics utilize process safety incidents as the numerator and divide it by an appropriate process‐related denominator or “normalization factor.” Currently, work hours is used extensively as a normalization factor to evaluate safety performance in the process industries. However, this lagging metric does not directly reflect process safety information and may not accurately reflect the safety performance of the process. Modified denominators are explored in this study and compared with the existing time‐based denominator to validate the effectiveness and applicability of the new metrics. Each proposed normalization factor was validated using available industry data. A statistical unitization method has been used to convert incident rates of different ranges for the convenience of comparison. Results show that some proposed process‐related metrics have potential as alternatives, used along with the time‐based metric, to evaluate process safety performance within organizations. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-03T05:59:48.783953-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11574
Challenges with the use of CFD for major accident dispersion modeling
- Authors: Joris Plasmans; Ludovic Donnat, Eric Carvalho, Tristan Debelle, Bertrand Marechal, Françoise Baillou
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: This article summarizes the first part of a benchmark exercise comparing seven different commercial three dimensional codes used for dispersion modeling in the context of major accident risk assessments. The aim of this first stage was twofold: First, the project intended to better understand the potential magnitude of the variation in results for a relatively simple study case. The benchmark case confirmed that, just as with integral models, the use of different codes can cause significant variation in the dispersion results. Second, the study wanted to identify the key assumptions which had a predominant influence on the uncertainty of the results, with the intention of providing clear guidance in engineering specifications for the definition of the scope of work of a computational fluid dynamics dispersion study. This article summarizes the key drivers identified, to date, for the variation in results, and the work shows this variation can be reduced to an acceptable margin by clearly specifying these key assumptions. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-03-15T10:21:44.987691-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11571
Is our apparatus foolproof?
- Authors: Milos Ferjencik; Vojtech Pelikan, Simon Cousy
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Technicians in laboratories and factories need the instruments and equipment which they use to be reliable, available, maintainable, and safe. In addition, sometimes an apparatus is also required to be foolproof. This article deals with the question of how the concept of foolproofness may be defined and tested. To clarify its meaning, the term “foolproofness” is compared with a similar concept—that of inherent safety. The article proposes a criterion describing acceptable foolproofness of an instrument, and a procedure which may be used to test whether the apparatus is acceptably foolproof. An example illustrates how the procedure to examine foolproofness may be applied. Selected parts of a case study show that the procedure is applicable to the analysis of scientific apparatus under development, and that it is able to provide the designer with reasonable results. It helps reveal the areas where the design of apparatus could be improved. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-03-15T10:21:30.42499-05:0
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11573
Propagation of a vapor cloud detonation from a congested area into an uncongested area: Demonstration test and impact on blast load prediction
- Authors: J. Kelly Thomas; Martin L. Goodrich, Robert J. Duran
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: A test was conducted which demonstrates that a detonation wave, once formed due to a deflagration to detonation transition (DDT) within a congested region, will propagate as a detonation from the congested region into an uncongested region. This is the expected behavior based on the general behavior of detonation waves as well as other tests reported in literature. The impact of a detonation wave propagating beyond the congested volume in which it is initiated on the resulting blast load was evaluated parametrically. As would be expected, the impact on the blast load is large for flammable clouds which extend well beyond the congested volume. The test rig was 16.5 m (54 ft) long with the first 9.1 m (30 ft) of the rig length comprised of a congested section 3.7 m (12 ft) in width and 1.8 m (6 ft) high. The congestion was made up of a regular array of vertical circular tubes [6 cm (2.375 in.) diameter, pitch‐to‐diameter ratio of 4.1, area and volume blockage ratios of 23% and 4.2%, respectively]. The last 7.3 m (24 ft) of the test rig length was completely uncongested. The test rig was configured without any confinement (i.e., no wall or roof sections). A near‐stoichiometric ethylene‐air mixture completely filled both the congested and uncongested portions of the test rig. Prior testing with a similar rig configuration had shown that this flammable mixture would undergo a DDT within the congested portion of the rig. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-03-13T03:15:16.394632-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11567
Explosibility of a urea dust sample
- Authors: J. Kelly Thomas; David C. Kirby, John E. Going
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: The standard dust explosibility test is performed in a 20‐L vessel with either one or two 5 kJ pyrotechnic igniters. The dust is deemed to be explosible if the ratio of the maximum deflagration pressure to the initial pressure exceeds some threshold value. This type of test is widely accepted and used. However, marginal dusts may be “over driven” in the 20‐L standard test and yield a “false positive” result (i.e., indicate that the dust is explosible), even when such a dust is not capable of forming a dust cloud through which a flame would actually propagate any significant distance. This can be avoided by testing such dusts in a larger vessel, where the flame must propagate over a more reasonable distance in order to develop a maximum pressure sufficient to classify the dust as explosible. This article reports on urea dust testing where this type of result was obtained, but the approach taken in this work is applicable to other dusts as well. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-03-13T03:14:12.007174-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11565
Why Hazard evaluation and inherently safer reviews are important to chemical engineering undergraduates
- Pages: n/a - n/a
  PubDate: 2013-03-06T09:49:49.495547-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11577
Pilot testing of fire sprinkler system in extremely corrosive industrial duct environments
- Authors: Paul Su; William W. Doerr, J.C. Harrington, David B. Fuller, Jon M. Barna
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Due to the extremely corrosive environments inside many exhaust ducts fabricated from combustible materials, the mechanical integrity of fire sprinkler system components is often prematurely compromised, leaving the system unable to protect against fires originating within these ducts [FM Global Loss Prevention Data Sheet, 7–78, Industrial Exhaust System, 2011; Understanding the Hazard, Fire in Industrial Exhaust Systems, FM Global, Johnston, RI, 2006]. Pilot testing of a new fire sprinkler system was conducted to protect the fiber‐reinforced plastic duct at a nitric/hydrofluoric (HF/HNO3) mixed acid pickling operation. Based on previous laboratory and field tests [Su and Doerr, Process Saf Prog 29 (2010) 70–78], this fire sprinkler system was composed of corrosion resistant sprinkler nozzles, a linear heat detector, flexible mounting connections, sprinkler piping, and controls. Pilot testing results have led to development and recommendation of a new fire protection system capable of protecting combustible exhaust ducts from fire in extremely corrosive environments. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-03-06T09:49:44.129916-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11575
An Experimental Investigation of Evaporation Rates for Different Volatile Organic Compounds
- Authors: Frédéric Heymes; Laurent Aprin, Aurélia Bony, Serge Forestier, Stefano Cirocchi, Gilles Dusserre
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Experiments were performed in order to measure evaporation rates of four different volatile organic compounds (VOC; 2‐propanol, 1‐hexene, acetone, propanal) and water. Evaporation mass flow rates and liquid temperatures where recorded. Different correlations were tested versus the experimental. Exponents and constant were recalculated to fit the experimental data. This new correlation was tested on an additional VOC experimentation (ethanol) and the accuracy of the correlation was satisfying. The correlation robustness was investigated versus temperature and wind velocity. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T22:07:29.608123-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11566
Correlating Process Safety Leading Indicators with Performance
- Authors: Jerry J. Forest; Kurt Kessler
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: By definition, process safety leading indicators are predictive in nature and therefore should have a direct correlation with actual process safety incidents. This article will present Six Sigma methodologies to map the process and analyze measurements, identify leading indicators and determine where statistical correlations exist among leading indicators and actual incidents, as well as how to differentiate normal variation from an actual shift from baseline performance. The methods presented are process mapping, statistical andgraphical analysis, chi‐square test, and control charting. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T22:07:27.518112-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11562
Investigating Process Safety Near Misses to Improve Performance
- Authors: Greg Nesmith; Jack T. Keating, Luiz A. Zacharias
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: The identification, reporting, investigation, and subsequent elimination of the causes of process safety near miss (PSNM) events and the improvement of corresponding management systems will reduce or eliminate causes of process safety incidents before they occur. This article will focus on how The Dow Chemical Company is implementing a PSNM program at a global level. In addition, there will be several case studies demonstrating how the PSNM program has driven sustained improvements in facility management systems and unit operations. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:57.353805-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11563
On the Validation of Safeguards for Process Hazards Analysis
- Authors: Paul Baybutt
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: An article presented at the 8th Global Congress on process safety addressed the need to validate the adequacy of safeguards in order for them to be credited in process hazard analysis (PHA). Validation of safeguards is critical for process safety but its inclusion within PHA would cause a serious distraction from identifying hazard scenarios, which is the key objective of PHA. Furthermore, safeguard validation needs to be performed by qualified personnel with a different skill set than PHA team members using validation methods that are much different than PHA. Consequently, validation of safeguards, and other aspects of process safety that support PHA, should be performed before commencing PHA. The PHA team can then focus on the qualification ofsafeguards for specific hazard scenarios during the PHA. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:47.957652-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11560
Paradigm Shift in the Regulatory Application of Safety Management Systems to Offshore Facilities
- Authors: Steven T. Maher; George D. Long, Ramine S. Cromartie, Ian S. Sutton, Mark R. Steinhilber
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: The April 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and release from the Macondo Well resulted in a re‐examination of the existing regulatory framework, significant modifications to the structure and function of key regulatory agencies, and the application of new safety management system (SMS) requirements to offshore facilities in United States waters. Late‐2010 witnessed the evolution of both prescriptive and performance‐based regulations designed to address the direct and underlying causes of this tragedy. The objective of this article is to briefly review these new regulatory requirements and illustrate how they are related to the application of other SMSs, for both offshore and onshore facilities. The common themes, objectives, and overlaps of specific onshore and offshore SMS elements was examined, and tips on how these overlaps can be used to more effectively (and sensibly) implement these programs is discussed. This article also outlined successful SMS programs that are being applied by various state agencies to onshore and offshore coastal facilities, and derived lessons‐learned from these programs that may assist in the implementation of related federal programs. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:45.364026-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11558
Risk Tolerance Criteria and the IEC 61511/ISA 84 Standard on Safety Instrumented Systems
- Authors: Paul Baybutt
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: The determination of safety integrity levels (SILs) for safety instrumented functions requires the comparison of calculated risk with risk tolerance criteria. The IEC 61511/ISA 84 standard on safety instrumented systems specifies the use of risk tolerance criteria for hazardous events but does not provide any guidance on the type or form of criteria that should be used. Industry guidance on appropriate risk tolerance criteria for SIL determination is also lacking. This article discusses the type and form of criteria that should be employed and their use in SIL determination is described. ©2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:38.583231-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11554
The importance of leadership and management in process safety
- Authors: Charles King
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: Process safety management (PSM) is often presented as technically complex, requiring a large staff of engineers and specialists with an array of tools and techniques that appear to grow in intricacy and sophistication year by year. Large companies are generally well positioned to operate in this arena—they have the resources to afford a staff of professionals and invest in system development, research specific problem areas, and construct elaborate PSM programs. Smaller enterprises can have similar risks, yet seldom have the internal resources and expertise to match the PSM efforts of the majors. The role of management can be over‐simplified to employing the right expertise to take care of process safety. It is proposed that PSM is not, in fact, a technical issue but one of management and leadership. Keeping a plant safe is managerially complex, demanding strong leadership and attention from senior site management. Technically, it is fairly simple and well within the capacity of any organization that deals with hazardous materials. This article examines the key elements of PSM from both the technical and managerial perspectives. The importance of leadership is discussed and its impact on safety examined. A 12‐step guide to safely managing process hazards is outlined, which acknowledges the need for and role of process safety expertise while placing emphasis on the role of senior management: provide the leadership, oversight, and organizational culture for success. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013.
  PubDate: 2013-01-30T02:30:00.069269-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11548
From SEMP to SEMS to SEMS II
- Authors: Ian Sutton
  Pages: 1 - 2
  Abstract: This article describes the new offshore safety management rule that is often referred to as SEMS II. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-28T23:04:16.772377-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11602
Tutorial on combustible dust
- Authors: Timothy J. Myers; Alfonso F. Ibarreta
  Pages: 1 - 9
  Abstract: This article provides an overview of combustible dust. A summary of recent combustible dust incidents and the variety of types of materials that can represent a combustible dust hazard when present in a particulate form are provided. Fundamentals of combustible dust are covered, comparing and contrasting combustible dust to flammable gases and vapors. Test methods used to characterize the hazards of combustible dust are reviewed. Relevant standards and regulations are described. Finally, guidance on the primary methods to prevent and mitigate combustible dust incidents is summarized. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-04-28T23:04:15.07079-05:0
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11596
Editorial – Practice Emergency Response Exercises Beforehand
- Pages: 1 - 1
  PubDate: 2013-02-25T08:52:55.376732-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11569
A Focus on Fire Fundamentals Including Emergency Response Training at the National Fire Agency in Taiwan
- Authors: Ronald J. Willey; Jack Huan‐Chang Hsiao, Roy E. Sanders, Arcady Kossoy, Chi‐Min Shu
  Pages: 2 - 7
  Abstract: This article reflects on process safety fundamentals of fires and explosions for the benefit of new professionals entering the field. It provides a brief review of fire fundamentals such as the fire triangle and the respect that must be paid to the unknown ignition source. Various control methods are reviewed at the elementary level, including the reminder that the ignition source is always free. After a review of fire fundamentals, an emergency response training exercise is presented for a burning propane fire witnessed at a training facility in Taiwan. The National Fire Agency of Taiwan has built the third largest emergency response‐training center in the world. The 270 acres facility is located in central Taiwan near Taichung, Taiwan. The site has 49 separate emergency response training scenarios. Scenario pads include training for fire attack on mock‐ups of chemical storage facilities, tanker trucks, power transformers, passenger airliners, and shipping vessels. Overall, this article serves as a reminder of the safe guards used in fire safety and the importance of training beforehand in the event of an emergency. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 2–7, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:42:06.281379-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11570
Social HAZOP at an Oil Refinery
- Authors: S.F. Ávila; F.L.P. Pessoa, J.C.S. Andrade
  Pages: 17 - 21
  Abstract: Several tools are used in the maintenance of process safety at industry [e.g., Preliminary Risk Analysis (PRA) and Hazards Operation Assessment (HAZOP)]. Each tool or technique can prevent that hazards becoming accidents through project improvements and managerial decisions. The project of equipment and process of chemical industries include technical specifications that work better if human behavior in operation has a pattern without great variations. The HAZOP study indicates top human errors in the control process activities, only identifies common human error of slip (it does not discuss), memory mistake, rules and, consequently, the wrong decision. The Social HAZOP (SH) discusses cognitive processing and the commitment level of the operator in task execution. The SH includes these activities: building of team to investigate human error, identification of critical situations at process with integration with social/human aspects, establish social nodes, analysis of social/human factors, choose items after comparison of standards and subjective measurements, analysis of deviations from social and human processes, recommendations of the SH. An exercise of SH application was done involving level control at separation equipment in a refinery. The recommendations suggest actions in different levels (strategic, tactic, routine, and emergency) and different types (policies, team, managerial aspects, leadership, human and social aspects, stress process at job, risk management, and root cause). © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 17–21, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:34.675624-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11552
Technical Aspects of Storage Tank Loss Prevention
- Authors: Szu‐Ying Huang; M. Sam Mannan
  Pages: 28 - 36
  Abstract: Storage tanks are the most common chemical containing vessels within the process industries. There have been many accidents associated within storage tank (material deficiency, structure design failures, operation error etc.) or among storage areas throughout the history. Both human error and natural disasters can result in devastating incidents for tanks that are usually kept outdoors under weather influences, as well as the tank bodies and accessories are poorly designed, abused, or are not effectively inspected and maintained. There are potential hazards which must be assessed carefully before construction, during operation, and after shutdown of any storage areas including hazardous or flammable chemicals. This article offers an overview of the tank and tank farm with significant incident causes about aboveground tank design failures, operation problems, and maintenance issues, with the relating discussion about the implementation of process safety management and regulations. Also, some innovative storage unit technologies including groundings, roof design, safer filling procedures, and tank fire mitigation systems are introduced to give a proper information session to help industry understand the tank hazards and implement adequate actions to prevent incidents and losses. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 28–36, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:28.079817-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11550
Ignition Characteristics for Methane‐Air Mixtures atVarious Initial Temperatures
- Authors: Qi Zhang; Wei Li
  Pages: 37 - 41
  Abstract: This study was aimed at determining the effects of initial temperature on minimum ignition energy (MIE) and combustion parameters of methane‐air mixtures. A series experiments were carried out with an ignition energy measurement system and two combustion vessels (5 L and 20 L). The results described in this article include: (a) the MIE of methane‐air mixtures reached their lowest values at a concentration of 8.5%, instead of 9.5% stoichiometric concentration, (b) the MIE of methane‐air mixtures decreases as initial temperature increases, (c) the combustion temperature and maximum rate of combustion temperature rise of methane‐air mixtures decrease as initial temperature increases, and (d) the combustion pressure of methane‐air mixtures decreases as initial temperature increases. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 37–41, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:53.893004-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11561
How to Communicate to Create a Safety Culture and Improve PSM Results
- Authors: Joseph F. Louvar
  Pages: 57 - 58
  Abstract: Almost all articles that promote the reduction or elimination of process accidents include process safety management and the importance of communication and a positive safety culture. However, they do not clearly describe how to communicate effectively to create this culture. The objective of this article is to focus on how to communicate and create a positive safety culture to achieve the desired process safety management results; that is, to reduce or eliminate process accidents. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 57–58, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-01-30T06:53:28.241314-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11555
Implementation Issues of PSM in a Fertilizer Plant: An Operations Engineer's Point of View
- Authors: M. Imran Rashid; Naveed Ramzan, Tanveer Iqbal, Saima Yasin, Sana Yousaf
  Pages: 59 - 65
  Abstract: In this article, guidelines are provided for implementation of the elements of process safety management (PSM) such as management of change (MOC), process hazard analysis (PHA), incident investigation, emergency planning, and response. The role of mechanical integrity, operating procedures, compliance audits, pre‐start‐up safety review, contractors, training, work permits, and process safety information for implementation of the PSM in a fertilizer plant are discussed. Implementation of MOC is an important step for the adoption of PSM standards and a necessary condition for internal and external audits of the plant. There are many issues linked with implementation of PHA like plant modifications, shut downs, and production losses as well as the behaviour of the design engineer whenever modifications are required. Consequence analysis, an evaluation of an incident in terms of its effects on environment, equipment, and people is of great help. Incident reporting for a company can be improved by ensuring confidentiality and not exposing the reporting person. Improvement in the operating procedures and preserving mechanical integrity of the process plant are necessary conditions for the implementation of the standards. Internal and external audits of the company are the most important part of the PSM implementation. In general, the PSM implementation requires much effort and time but pays off well if implemented fully. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 59–65, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-01-30T00:38:29.693587-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11553
Management of Critical Alarms: Connecting the Dots
- Authors: Stephen Gill
  Pages: 66 - 71
  Abstract: In the aftermath of some high profile national security incidents, investigations starting with the catastrophe or near miss and working backward have shown a clear series of events or warning signs which if recognised may have allowed the incident to be prevented. The security services have subsequently been criticised for being “unable to connect the dots” and intervene appropriately. Similarly, investigations into process safety incidents that work backward from the loss of containment or other more serious outcome often show a clear series of events or warning signs which if recognised and acted upon may have prevented the incident. In the build‐up to both security and process safety events; however, the pattern that is so clear after the fact is often obscured or perhaps unrecognisable due to the other activities that are happening and all of the extraneous information that is available at the same time. In process safety, control room alarms often fall into the category of important information that is visible after the fact but missed or obscured leading up to the event. There are two broad approaches for improving the effectiveness of alarms. The first is to reduce the extraneous information for the operator by reducing the total number of alarms or addressing the rate at which alarms come in during a plant upset. The second approach is to improve the visibility of the alarm and ensure clear expectations for response for the most important or critical alarms. This article focuses on the latter and outlines principles for improving the effectiveness of “critical alarms,” defined here as those where the alarm and the expected operator response are considered to be a “layer of protection” against a major accident hazard scenario. These principles include aspects of the process design, ergonomics and the human machine interface, training, safety culture, and auditing. In an operating company, responsibility for these elements and the associated work processes are often “owned” by different parts of the organisation. It is therefore important that the management systems and organisational structure provide strong linkages to ensure the different work processes or departments mesh effectively to deliver a robust alarm system and associated operating discipline. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 66–71, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-01-30T00:35:19.035599-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11549
Replacement of HCFC‐22 Refrigerants with Ammonia: A Challenge for Hockey Arenas in Quebec
- Authors: J.‐P. Lacoursière; C. Dumas
  Pages: 78 - 83
  Abstract: The Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer is an international treaty designed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the use of a number of substances responsible for ozone depletion. The protocol was adopted in 1987 and covers among other substances, HCFC‐22 used as refrigerants. The Canadian governments (federal and provincials) have put in place legislations to phase out and prohibit the use, production, and importation of HCFC‐22 substances and equipment using HCFC‐22 as refrigerant. Refrigeration systems are used in over 500 hockey arenas in the province of Quebec and 400 of them have to be modified to use a more ozone friendly refrigerant, that is, ammonia. Therefore, the risk associated with these sites is a major concern for the population due to their close proximity. The article presents approaches that are used to reduce the risk to an acceptable level for the neighbors and users. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 78–83, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-01-30T00:38:33.873958-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11559
The PSV That Did Not Fail—Misconceptions About PSVs
- Authors: Emmanuelle Hagey
  Pages: 84 - 89
  Abstract: Pressure relief devices generally represent the last line of defense for a pressure vessel in a chemical plant during abnormal situations. The article title comes from the numerous times the author heard that “a pressure safety device had failed” when the person making this statement was in essence thinking that “the pressure safety device had opened.” The use of the term “failure” conveys the impression that something was wrong about this safety device, when in fact it had done exactly what it was supposed to do. And although the consequences of the device activation may cause an undesirable event such as plant shutdown, it is not a relief system failure. Some misconceptions are so widely spread among plant engineers that it is very hard (especially for young engineers) to challenge and deviate from that common “knowledge.” It is not the goal of this article to provide in‐depth design considerations for pressure safety devices. The objective of this article is to present some key points that “every plant engineer should know” about the pressure safety valve lifecycle, from design to installation and maintenance. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 84–89, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:42.540026-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11557
Major Industrial Accidents in Korea: The Characteristics and Implication of Statistics 1996–2011
- Authors: In Jae Shin
  Pages: 90 - 95
  Abstract: This article describes characteristics of major industrial accidents that occurred in the Republic of Korea from 1996 to 2011. The cases of major industrial accidents have been collected since 1996 after promulgation of process safety management (PSM) regulations. Accident analysis can help to evaluate current compliance to PSM regulations and can help to find effective ways to decrease the number of major industrial accidents that occur. The author analyzed the accident reports. Among 147 cases analyzed, 50% were explosions, 36% were fires, 13% were chemical releases, and 2% were asphyxiations. The most common cause of accidents is “the violation or failure of safety work permit (hot work)” which was 36% of all accidents. 27% of accidents happened during operation. The most common equipment involved accidents where tanks (17%), pipelines (16%), and reactors (15%). The analysis indicates that (i) the number of major industrial accidents has decreased with the introduction of PSM regulations and its enforcement systems and (ii) human failure is a major issue that needs to be addressed. These findings may help to develop a national strategy for PSM in Korea as well as other countries. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 90–95, 2013
  PubDate: 2013-01-30T00:35:21.219263-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11551
Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions, Fires, and Toxic Releases, 2nd Edition (2012) By CCPS, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, 232 pages, $115.00, ISBN; 978-0-470-64367
- Authors: Stanley S. Grossel
  Pages: 102 - 102
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:58.53664-05:0
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11564
Safety & Health News
- Authors: John F. Murphy
  Pages: 103 - 105
  PubDate: 2013-02-08T22:07:31.198671-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11568
Are your credits worthy'
- Authors: James R. Lay; Lisa A. Long, Michael L. Marshall, Jeffrey J. Wanko
  Pages: 8 - 11
  Abstract: Chemical and petrochemical manufacturing processes have potential for high consequence, low frequency events. Process safety management programs should identify and eliminate or control the conditions leading to the catastrophic hazards associated with these events. In recent years, industry has increasingly turned to quantitative or semiquantitative risk assessment tools to prioritize and manage the hazards they have identified. Risk assessment, whether qualitative, quantitative, or semiquantitative, is a powerful tool when used properly; however, companies must ensure that the safeguards for which they take credit are robust enough to truly manage hazards. This article discusses possible inconsistencies in process hazard analysis (PHA) claims. If a PHA claims credit for a good mechanical integrity (MI) program, what happens when that MI program has numerous deficiencies or violations' When a PHA bases a failure scenario frequency on industry historical experience, how does the site know that this experience is actually applicable to their processes' When a safeguard is challenged, is it available on‐demand' What are the consequences if a claimed safeguard does not perform as designed/credited' © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 8–11, 2013
  PubDate: 2012-12-08T04:47:01.084146-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11546
Inherently safer technology implementation— risk reduction and risk shifting
- Authors: Iclal Atay; Paul Komosinsky
  Pages: 12 - 16
  Abstract: On March 25, 2008, the State of New Jersey adopted rules requiring facilities regulated under the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) Program to perform Inherently Safer Technology (IST) reviews. From August 2008 through January 2010, 85 active facilities performed IST reviews and submitted their findings to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. (The IST review reports are on file in the Department's Bureau of Release Prevention and are available for review by the public, except for those that are confidential). This article will analyze the risk reduction measures that resulted from the IST reviews including an evaluation of the risk reduction to the surrounding community to determine whether facilities derived any positive benefit and whether there was the potential for shifting the risks to another location. This analysis was conducted by tabulating the IST measures listed by facilities as implemented or scheduled by type of IST. Also, the IST review reports were studied to determine if any risk shifting occurred. This analysis showed that, although the rules did not require implementation of any IST measures, 45 facilities chose to implement some IST measures. A total of 205 IST measures were implemented. Two facilities eliminated the use of the hazardous substance that subjected them to the TCPA program without shifting the risk. This analysis demonstrates that facilities can make decisions to implement IST risk reduction measures in a regulatory system in which implementation is not required and that IST review is a valuable risk management tool that can positively affect facilities and the surrounding communities. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 12–16, 2013
  PubDate: 2012-11-28T22:46:28.266785-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11547
Operational group for process safety
- Authors: Maria Clara Barros e Silva Saraiva; Rosemeire Abreu
  Pages: 22 - 24
  Abstract: In order to create a process safety culture, the engineers at Braskem's Utility Unit decided to organize a group that comprised operators and engineers to develop a preventive strategy for accidents and mishaps. This work was developed in a utility center integrated to Braskem Basic Petrochemical 1 Site in Brazil. The center produces clarified water, demineralized water, steam in different levels of pressure, compressed air, and electric energy to a petrochemical complex, including a 1,250,000 ton per year olefins site. As the process evolved, a large range of knowledge among engineers and operators was found. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 22–24, 2013
  PubDate: 2012-11-27T23:01:25.862973-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11545
Relief design for laboratories and pilot plants
- Authors: Jennifer F. Mize
  Pages: 25 - 27
  Abstract: Relief designs for laboratories and pilot plants present unique challenges to the relief designer. For example, the relief designer must consider the need for operational flexibility while designing a relief system that provides protection for current and future modes of operation. Therefore, small‐scale relief designs must address a wider range of potential overpressure scenarios due to the variations in chemistry that are routinely conducted within the laboratory or pilot unit. The small scale of laboratory and pilot plant operations present a significant challenge to the relief designer in selecting and designing effective relief systems. This article gives information for designing laboratory and pilot plant relief systems including: identification of relief scenarios, sizing calculation methods, relief devices, effluent discharge designs, and other protective system considerations. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 25–27, 2013.
  PubDate: 2012-10-05T06:17:05.879249-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11521
A thermal theory for flammability diagrams guiding purge and inertion of a flammable mixture
- Authors: Tingguang Ma
  Pages: 42 - 48
  Abstract: Recently, a thermal method was proposed to recheck the concept of flammability by manipulating the competition between heating and quenching. This method is further explored here to reconstruct flammability diagrams, explaining the contribution of each component toward flammability change for a mixture. Based on the assumption that a diluent will not change the flame temperature at the flammability limits, these isothermal processes lead to a conservative estimation of the flammable zone. Although rough near the inertion point, the theoretical flammability envelop has the potential to guide future purging and diluting operations. It will be a powerful tool for both educational purposes and practical utilities. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 42–48, 2013
  PubDate: 2012-11-27T23:01:41.502811-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11543
Is the safe performance of flame gaps in flameproof electrical apparatus deteriorated by rusting and mechanical damage' Part 1: Group IIA gases
- Authors: Rolf K. Eckhoff; Bjorn J. Arntzen, Harald E.Z. Opsvik, Arild Grov, Fredrik Solheim
  Pages: 49 - 56
  Abstract: Electrical apparatus in industry for use in the presence of explosive gases must be specially designed to prevent the apparatus from igniting the gas. In the case of flameproof enclosures, any holes and gaps in the enclosure wall must be sufficiently long and narrow to prevent transmission of a possible gas explosion inside the enclosure to an external explosive cloud. Furthermore, there are tight requirements to the maximum permissible gap surface roughness. This article describes an experimental study of the influence of mechanical and corrosive damage of flame gap surfaces on gap performance for IIA gases in air, using propane as test gas. It was found that, contrary to common presumptions, gap surfaces can suffer considerable damage without this causing any reduction of gap performance. In some cases, significant mechanical surface damage in fact improves gap performance. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 49–56, 2013
  PubDate: 2012-11-27T23:01:58.596369-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11542
The Connection of peak alarm rates to plant incidents and what you can do to minimize
- Authors: Dustin Beebe; Steve Ferrer, Darwin Logerot
  Pages: 72 - 77
  Abstract: Even after several years of trying, many plants still struggle with controlling alarm floods. Static rationalization can reduce your average number of alarms but without controlling the alarm floods, there is no help for the operator when he needs it the most. This session will cover the justification for alarm management from the safety and environmental as well as economic perspective. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 72–77, 2013
  PubDate: 2012-11-27T23:02:10.265476-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11539
Investigation and actions after an internal air compressor filter fire
- Authors: Paul M. McAllister; John L. Dyche, Russell C. Graves
  Pages: 96 - 101
  Abstract: In November 2005, an internal fire occurred in a filter downstream of a dual headed diaphragm compressor. Subsequent investigation revealed that the compressor diaphragms had been punctured after failure of a check valve allowed debris to impact the diaphragms. The puncture extended through three separate diaphragms allowing compressor oil to be pumped into the air stream on the process side. The compressor continued to operate, oil collected in a downstream filter, and ignition occurred resulting in an internal fire. Discoloration of the filter housing indicated a temperature in excess of 700°F occurred in this filter housing. Fortunately, there was no loss of containment and the fire was extinguished without operator intervention. This article reviews the investigation into the causes of the equipment failure, how the ignition may have occurred, and the actions taken to prevent future incidents. Implementation of improved shutdown systems, more frequent maintenance, and changes to reduce possible causes of the fire were implemented, and the compressors have operated without another incident since 2005. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 96–101, 2013
  PubDate: 2012-11-28T22:46:42.242707-05:
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.11544
Safety improvements in a Methanation reactor
- Authors: Mike Walton; Tony Southerton, Paul Sharp
  Pages: n/a - n/a
  Abstract: A 35‐year‐old Methanator vessel required replacement due to High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA). The opportunity was taken to upgrade the over temperature protection system to meet the requirements of IEC 61511. An additional Layer of Protection was added to reduce demand on the High Temperature Trip system. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009
  PubDate: 2009-05-06T00:00:00-05:00
  DOI: 10.1002/prs.10325