for Journals by Title or ISSN
for Articles by Keywords
  Subjects -> ENGINEERING (Total: 2118 journals)
    - CHEMICAL ENGINEERING (179 journals)
    - CIVIL ENGINEERING (159 journals)
    - ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (89 journals)
    - ENGINEERING (1163 journals)
    - HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING (54 journals)
    - INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING (54 journals)
    - MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (79 journals)

ENGINEERING (1163 journals)            First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Journal of X-Ray Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Zhejiang University SCIENCE A     Hybrid Journal  
Journal on Chain and Network Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Jurnal Teknik ITS     Open Access  
Jurnal Teknologi     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Karaelmas Science and Engineering Journal     Open Access  
Kleio     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Landscape and Ecological Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Langmuir     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 39)
Leadership and Management in Engineering     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Learning Technologies, IEEE Transactions on     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Lighting Research and Technology     Hybrid Journal  
Logic and Analysis     Hybrid Journal  
Logica Universalis     Hybrid Journal  
Lubrication Science     Hybrid Journal  
Machines     Open Access  
Machining Science and Technology: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Macromolecular Reaction Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Magazine of Concrete Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Magdeburger Journal zur Sicherheitsforschung     Open Access  
Magnetics Letters, IEEE     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Management and Production Engineering Review     Open Access  
Management Science and Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Manufacturing Engineer     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Manufacturing Research and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Marine Technology Society Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
MATEC Web of Conferences     Open Access  
Matériaux & Techniques     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Mathematical Problems in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Mathematics of Control, Signals, and Systems (MCSS)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Mauerwerk     Hybrid Journal  
Measurement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Measurement Science Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Meccanica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Mechatronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Medical and Biological Engineering and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Medical Engineering & Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Membrane Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Membrane Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Memetic Computing     Hybrid Journal  
Metal Powder Report     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Metallurgist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Metaphysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metascience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metrologia     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Microelectronic Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Microelectronics International     Hybrid Journal  
Microelectronics Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Microelectronics Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Microfluidics and Nanofluidics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Micromachines     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
MNASSA : Monthly Notes of the Astronomical Society of South Africa     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Modelling and Simulation in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Modern Applied Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Molecular BioSystems     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Molecular Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Molecular Pharmaceutics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
MRS Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
MRS Online Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Multiagent and Grid Systems     Hybrid Journal  
Multidimensional Systems and Signal Processing     Hybrid Journal  
NANO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Nano Letters     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 52)
Nano Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Nano Reviews     Open Access   (Followers: 17)
Nanopages     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nanoscale and Microscale Thermophysical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Nanoscale Systems : Mathematical Modeling, Theory and Applications     Open Access  
Nanoscience and Nanoengineering     Open Access  
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Nanotechnologies in Russia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nanotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Nanotechnology Magazine, IEEE     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
Nanotechnology Reviews     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Natural Hazards     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 325)
Nature Nanotechnology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 50)
Naval Engineers Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
NDT & E International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Nexo Revista Científica     Open Access  
Nigerian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Nigerian Journal of Technological Research     Full-text available via subscription  
Nigerian Journal of Technology     Full-text available via subscription  
NIR news     Full-text available via subscription  
Nonlinear Dynamics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Nonlinear Engineering : Modeling and Application     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nonlinearity     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Nordic Journal of Science and Technology     Open Access  
Nova Scientia     Open Access  
NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nuclear Engineering and Design     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Numerical Algorithms     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part A: Applications: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part B: Fundamentals: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Ocean Science Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Oil and Gas Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Online Journal for Global Engineering Education     Open Access  
Open Journal of Antennas and Propagation     Open Access  
Open Journal of Applied Sciences     Open Access  

  First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Journal Cover   Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.387]   [H-I: 22]   [6 followers]  Follow
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1607 journals]
  • Analysis of a blast due to inadvertant mixing of ammonium sulfate and
           sodium hyplochlorite
    • Authors: Graeme W. Norval
      Abstract: Ammonium sulfate and sodium hypochlorite are common industrial chemicals, often used together in water treatment. The consequences of mixing hypochlorite (chlorine) solution with ammonia solutions are well understood within the chlorine industry; detonable chloramines are produced. This knowledge is not well known in other industries; fortunately, few locations have both chemicals on site. These products were inadvertently mixed, resulting in an explosion, at a water treatment facility in Kitchener, Ontario on April 2, 2014. The chemistry of the incident is presented and discussed. Facilities that handle both chemicals, such as the water treatment industry need to have heightened sense of understanding of this particular reactive chemical hazard. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-03-25T23:41:55.473893-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11741
  • Risks associated with the production of biogas in Europe
    • Authors: Petr Trávníček; Luboš Kotek
      Abstract: This article discusses issues of risk in the production of biogas from primarily farm wastes. Biogas production is becoming widespread in Europe, and the number of accidents in these plants, both large‐scale and small, is increasing. Recent accident experience is summarized here. Compared with the petrochemical industry, damage levels in biogas production are low, but nonetheless worthy of increased application of modern safety and risk methodology. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-03-16T00:54:53.283187-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11734
  • Comment related to December 2014 PSP Bhopal articles
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      PubDate: 2015-02-17T23:51:36.68693-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11736
  • Erratum
    • PubDate: 2015-02-17T23:51:25.493583-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11729
  • When innocence is lost
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      PubDate: 2015-02-13T23:45:18.475766-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11730
  • ASTM E2931: A new standard for the limiting oxygen concentration of
           combustible dusts
    • Authors: Ashok Ghose Dastidar
      Abstract: The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) has a standard on explosion protection systems, NFPA 69, which provides guidelines on effective inerting to prevent explosions. The standard specifies that for inerting to be effective the oxygen concentration must be kept below the Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC). It then goes on to specify that the ASTM International standard E2079 be used to establish the LOC. The shortcoming of this approach is that ASTM E2079 only applies to combustible gases and vapors and not combustible dusts. As a result of this deficiency ASTM International has just introduced a new standard, ASTM E2931, Standard Test Method for Limiting Oxygen (Oxidant) Concentration of Combustible Dust Clouds. This paper discusses the nuances of this standard and compares experimental results between the 20‐L chamber and the 1‐m3 chamber. Differences in the test results between the vessels and between test methods may have safety ramifications to the end user of the data. The large variation present in the repeatability and reproducibility of the LOC means that the current common practice of using a 2% safety margin for particle inerting (the least stringent of the inerting methods) may be insufficient to ensure dust cloud explosion mitigation. It is possible that additional study and improved laboratory proficiency as the test standard matures will bring down these repeatability and reproducibility errors. Additionally, if LOCs are reported in Safety Data Sheets without accompanying information regarding the test method or test vessel size used, the mitigation strategy may not provide adequate protection. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-02-11T23:58:11.161522-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11731
  • Process safety in the classroom: The current state of chemical engineering
           programs at US universities
    • Authors: Sean J. Dee; Brenton L. Cox, Russell A. Ogle
      Abstract: The role of process safety in the undergraduate and graduate curriculum is a critical component of preparing chemical engineers for their future careers. In 2011, the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) amended the requirements for Chemical, Biochemical, Biomolecular, and similarly named Engineering Programs. The change added a clause, indicating that the curriculum of said programs should not only include the engineering application of chemistry, physics, and/or biology to the design, analysis and control of processes, but also the hazards associated with those processes. Departments were then compelled to adjust their curricula to meet the new requirement which would go into effect during the 2012–2013 Accreditation evaluations. Herein, we present findings related to the major milestones and challenges associated with updating the chemical engineering curriculum to include process safety components at both the undergraduate and graduate level. First, a survey of publicly available information regarding curriculum requirements, course syllabi, and program developments at US universities will be discussed. Next, insights from evaluating the challenges associated with adding new content to an already overloaded curriculum will be discussed. Lastly, recommendations for continued improvement in the process safety education provided to undergraduate and graduate students will be presented. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-02-11T23:57:22.142132-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11732
  • Spring 2015 safety and health news
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2015-02-11T23:56:47.222659-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11733
  • Infiltration hazards for building siting studies
    • Authors: Jeffrey D. Marx; Benjamin R. Ishii
      Abstract: Facility siting studies have been a requirement for many years, specifically for facilities that must comply with OSHA's PSM program. Facility siting is frequently interpreted as performing a building siting study which adheres to the guidance given in API RP 752. Many of the siting studies conducted for large facilities over the past few decades have focused on explosion overpressure impacts to occupied buildings, with more simplistic evaluations for fire and toxic gas impacts. Toxic gas impact analyses often only evaluate the potential exposure of a building location, to a specific gas concentration, and do not evaluate the level of infiltration into the building where occupants may be impacted. Infiltration of flammable gases has largely been ignored in most building siting studies. Despite this oversight, this hazard is one which should be addressed when following the guidance found within API RP 752. Through the use of dispersion modeling and infiltration analyses, the hazards associated with flammable or toxic gas infiltration can be incorporated into a building siting study. This article outlines the process of conducting a building siting study in accordance with API RP 752, with specific emphasis on the consequence analysis for infiltration analyses. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-01-29T23:55:40.05562-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11726
  • Lac‐Mégantic accident: What we learned
    • Authors: Jean‐Paul Lacoursière; Paul‐André Dastous, Stéphanie Lacoursière
      Pages: 2 - 15
      Abstract: A tragic train derailment in Lac‐Megantic, a small Quebec community caused 47 fatalities, the destruction of part of the town and huge cleaning costs. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has conducted an in‐depth investigation of the causes of Lac‐Mégantic accident and has formulated recommendations. The catastrophic consequences of the Lac‐Mégantic accident and the known increase over the last several years in rail transportation of Class 3 hazardous materials has made it clear, the need to review the existing regulations and industry practices to such transportation. Canada Transport Safety Board, U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, Transport Canada, U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration, and U.S. Federal Railroad Administration are working closely to upgrade rail transport regulations to prevent similar incidents from occurring. The tragedy in Lac‐Mégantic was not caused by one single person, action, or organization. Many factors played a role, and addressing the safety issues will take a concerted effort from regulators, railways, the Association of American Railroads, shippers, tank car manufacturers, and refiners in Canada and the United States. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 2–15, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-02-26T07:57:21.718615-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11737
  • The role of sequential automation in improving process safety
    • Authors: David A. Huffman
      Abstract: Generally, process safety automation has been considered to be the responsibility of a specialized safety system and that remains true for Safety Integrity Level safety automation requirements. But, what if the basic automation of the process could be constructed in such a way that it significantly improved the ability to maintain the process within acceptable operating limits and not reach the conditions that would trigger a response from the safety system? All processes operate based on procedures, usually written. Batch‐based processes more and more run on automated procedures. But, even continuous processes constantly use procedures. Among these are equipment and unit startup and shutdown procedures, product or grade change procedures, spare equipment in and out of service procedures, quality control procedures, alarm response procedures, and many more. Frequently, there can be significant benefits to automating a high percentage of these procedures. Safety is one of those benefits and can be derived from opportunities ranging from consistent and mistake proof operations to simply removing the need for an operator to be exposed to potential process or physical hazards. Additionally, significant impacts can be realized on alarm management based on procedural control. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-12-30T23:28:20.667534-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11727
  • Chemical explosion isolation applied to small mills
    • Authors: Jérôme R. Taveau; Thomas M. Farrell
      Abstract: Mills are used in many branches of the process industries (food, chemical, pharmaceutical, and energy). According to accident statistics, this type of equipment is also among the most likely places for a dust deflagration to occur: fine dust is continuously produced and suspended mechanical sparks or hot particles can be created during the milling operation, ignite an explosible atmosphere within the mill, or travel with the process flow into downstream equipment. Protection of both the mill and the interconnected equipment needs to be addressed for an effective explosion protection strategy. Since mills generally exhibit a fairly strong design, they are expected to withstand a dust explosion without any additional overpressure protection (in this case, high strength pipes need to be employed with). On the other hand, explosion isolation must be considered carefully, as a dust explosion can propagate through pipes and reach other equipment. The fact that reduced explosion pressure in a mill is typically an order of magnitude higher than in a vented enclosure poses some challenges to isolation techniques, and particularly chemical isolation barriers. An experimental investigation was carried out to verify the effectiveness of a chemical explosion isolation barrier applied to a small unvented vessel (representing a mill) equipped with long pipes. Dust was injected inside the pipes to promote flame propagation and create challenging conditions for the isolation barrier. Application limits, specifically focusing on installation distances, were studied. The effect of chemical isolation upon downstream pipe pressure development was also investigated. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-12-14T23:32:15.073988-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11706
  • FSN‐based cosimulation for fault propagation analysis in nuclear
           power plants
    • Authors: Hossam A. Gabbar; Emmanuel K. Boafo
      Abstract: The safety of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is an important issue that is of concern to all including; regulators, operators, and the general public. Assuring the safety of a NPP is a primary objective by all stakeholders. In the wake of accidents in NPPs recorded in the past such as Chernobyl, TMI, and recently in Fukushima, the need to review existing safety system design and operation as well as performing safety verification of these systems as a means of preventing such accidents in the future is necessary. In this study, we present a framework for achieving safety verification of a NPP with emphasis on using cosimulation with reduced error for real time fault propagation analysis based on Fault Semantic Network in which a multiphysics model is mapped unto fault/risk models, and safety/protection systems of NPPs in order to achieve safety verification based on highest risks and previous accidents. A statistical method is used to reduce errors between simulation results and real time data which is illustrated with a case study from literature. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-12-08T23:31:39.743507-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11725
  • Walk the Line
    • Authors: Jerry J. Forest
      Abstract: Analysis of incident and event sharing data from sources such as the American Fuels and Petrochemical Manufacturers process safety portal indicate that a large number of process safety incidents have control of energy causes. The most fundamental responsibility of the process plant operator is to control the energy between any two points in the process. Failure to control this energy due to improper line‐up can lead to inadvertent mixing, challenges to safe operating limits, and loss of primary containment (LOPC). This article discusses a variety of practical conduct of operations topics that help the process operator bring consistency to operation in order to minimize line‐up errors and the process safety incidents that result from them. The concepts are: setting and reinforcing the expectation for energy control and establishing operational discipline (OD) and operational readiness. The OD topics discussed are: improved communication through shift notes, shift instructions, and operator evaluation, returning equipment to operation from maintenance, line labeling, and commissioning and process safety start‐up review activities. A brief case study is presented that discusses results from these activities—collectively called Walk the Line. Walk the line represents a culture change for operations where understanding of energy control each time a change is made in the process eliminates LOPC incidents. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-12-06T00:03:44.42194-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11724
  • Dispersion of heavy gases – Experimental results and numerical
    • Authors: Christian Rauchegger; Susan Bayley, Volkmar Schröder, Dominique Thévenin
      Abstract: The hazardous potential of accidental heavy gas releases, especially those involving flammable and toxic gases, is widely known. In order to predict the area in which these gases are in hazardous concentrations, an estimation of the dispersion of these gases must be carried out. While the hazardous area for flammable heavy gases is determined by the lower flammability limit (ca. >1 vol%), the release of toxic heavy gases can result in a much larger hazardous area. Toxic gases, even in very low concentrations (ca.
      PubDate: 2014-11-20T23:45:22.005299-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11723
  • A risk‐based methodology to estimate shutdown interval considering
           system availability
    • Authors: Abdul Hameed; Faisal Khan, Salim Ahmed
      Abstract: This article presents a risk‐based methodology to estimate shutdown inspection and maintenance interval considering system availability. Most inspection and maintenance activities are performed when the plant/unit is in the operational state. However, some inspection and maintenance activities require the plant to be in a nonoperational or shutdown state. In most cases, operating companies adopt a shutdown schedule based on the original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) suggested recommended periods. However, this may not be the best strategy as OEM recommended duration is general and may not reflect the current state of operation. The proposed methodology is unique in the sense that it identifies a shutdown interval by identifying the critical equipment in terms of risk considering availability and safety of the operating unit. It optimizes process plant shutdown interval to minimize the risk (in dollar terms). The Markov process is used to establish the state diagram to calculate system availability. The proposed methodology is comprised of three steps namely, risk‐based equipment selection, shutdown availability modeling of a complex system using the Markov process, and risk‐based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval modeling. It can be applied to process plants such as those for liquefied natural gas processing, petrochemicals, and refineries. The key elements for the success of the proposed methodology are the plant‐specific data and identification of critical equipment. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-11-08T06:46:22.676594-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11722
  • Guidelines for integrating management systems and metrics to improve
           process safety performance
    • Authors: Bruce K. Vaughen; Anthony Downes, Jeff Fox, David Belonger
      Abstract: An approach to help a company reduce duplication of its management efforts as it improves its process safety performance is described in the CCPS book “Guidelines for Integrating Management Systems and Metrics to Improve Process Safety,” scheduled to be published in 2015. This article provides an overview for the book, describing how a company can identify and prioritize its process safety‐related risks across its separate safety, health, environmental, quality, and security groups (SHEQ&S), helping ensure that decisions made at any level in the company, whether corporate, regional, or local, do not increase its overall risk. An example showing some metrics affecting process safety performance across the SHEQ&S groups is provided to help the reader apply this approach to their organization. The Guideline addresses the risk reduction efforts and complex interaction between these groups, focusing on process safety‐related metrics that cross the different SHEQ&S group boundaries. This book combines the Plan, Do, Check, Act management life cycle approach, the Bow Tie barrier analysis risk reduction approach, the Risk‐Based Process Safety concepts and applies recent advances for identifying and implementing process safety‐related metrics. The bottom line: A company can improve its overall process safety performance using process safety‐related metrics in an integrated SHEQ&S management system. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-11-05T23:40:00.570644-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11720
  • Assessment of the likelihood of exceeding the flare capacity of multiple
           LNG processing trains
    • Authors: Ricardo A. Lopez; Yaneira Saud, Najmeh Vaez
      Abstract: Flare systems are typically designed to meet recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice for foreseeable vent and relief scenarios. API 521 [American Petroleum Institute, ANSI/API Standard 521 Guide for Pressure‐Relieving and Depressuring Systems: Petroleum Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries, Fifth Edition, American Petroleum Institute, 2007] allows for multitrain units to be protected by the same flare system. Therefore, these systems must be reliable, available, auditable, and maintainable. However, any designer's concern should be the possibility of a common‐cause failure (CCF) that impairs several safeguards or causes a plant‐wide failure. A shutdown incident can result in flare relief demands that are higher than the designed capacity. CCF is defined as a failure of more than one device, function, or system due to the same cause. Examples of common causes are errors in design, installation, maintenance, or operation of redundant components. To ensure that the designed flare capacity for a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility is appropriate, it is necessary to assess the frequency of relieving combinations that have the potential of exceeding flare capacity during a shutdown which is the result from a CCF. A common practice for this purpose is to perform probabilistic risk assessment using fault tree analysis (FTA) techniques during the front‐end engineering design stage. However, CCFs are rarely or not commonly considered in the analysis. CCFs might have a significant impact on the final calculations, resulting in probabilities of overloading the flare system by one or more orders of magnitude greater, with the potential of not meeting the project's tolerability threshold. The analysis starts with the identification of CCF scenarios resulting in relief loads from one and multiple trains. Following the identification of these scenarios, the frequency of such events is quantified and compared with each facility's tolerability threshold. Historical data from published sources were used to calculate the likelihood for both CCFs and their impacts. A FTA was used to illustrate the various outcomes that may arise from a CCF producing simultaneous reliefs. The scope of each analysis included a facility in multitrain operation with common infrastructure and supporting utility systems. A one train (initial startup case) analysis was done for a baseline comparison, and different scenarios were then analyzed for potential flare overload (e.g., gas compressors from two or more trains failing to stop on demand once blowdown has started, coupled with feed gas valves failing to close). Finally, the probability of exceeding the flare capacity and the associated consequences were compared against the project's qualitative risk assessment matrix to determine if the probability of flare exceedance was tolerable. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-10-28T23:47:02.702207-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11719
  • The pool fire case for pressure relief: Radiation exposure limited by fuel
    • Authors: Debby Sielegar; Freeman Self
      Abstract: In design of pressure relief systems, a pool fire is one of the most typical relief cases. The first step in the fire relief calculation is determining the heat flux input from the fire and methods include the simple to the very complex, covering a myriad of factors and configurations. This article illustrates one method where the heat input is limited by the fuel supply. This method complements one traditional method where the heat input is limited by the equipment exposed area. The scope of the article is limited to the calculation of the heat release, and does not discuss the behavior of the fluid in subject equipment, the relief rate or relief device sizing. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-10-18T05:06:04.672771-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11715
  • Design intent for hazard and operability studies
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study undoubtedly is the most commonly used process hazard analysis method in the world today. It is based on considering deviations from the design intent for a process to identify hazard and operability scenarios. Often, HAZOP Study practitioners generate deviations using a short checklist of process parameters. This practice likely results in missed scenarios. A full consideration of design intent is needed to ensure that scenarios are identified as completely as possible. This situation probably arises because of a lack of understanding of the HAZOP Study and the scope of design intent. This article describes the meaning and use of design intent to encourage HAZOP Study practitioners to address it fully during studies. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-10-18T05:06:00.383176-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11718
  • Laboratory investigation into fractal characteristics of methane explosion
    • Authors: Baisheng Nie; Cheng Wang, Junqing Meng, Fei Xue, Linchao Dai
      Abstract: This article presents the results of an experimental study which aims to examine flame propagation pattern occurring during methane explosion under different gas concentrations. Five methane‐to‐air volume concentration ratios are tested, namely 8, 9.5, 9.7, 10, and 11%. Flame images are captured with high‐speed camera and examined with fractal analysis of triple‐prismatic surface area. The experimental results suggest that the closer the methane concentration is to the optimal equivalence ratio, the greater the maximum fractal dimension of the explosion. It is shown that the maximum fractal dimension occurs at a methane concentration of 9.5% when the methane concentration moves closer to the optimal equivalence ratio and the explosion is most intense. The fractal dimension and its rate of change serve directly as indicators of the explosion intensity, the gradient of intensity, and the propagation pattern of the entire flame. These results shed light on the dynamic characteristics of flame propagation occurring in methane explosion. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-10-08T23:45:45.831978-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11713
  • Risk assessment challenges to 20:20 vision
    • Authors: Angela Summers
      Abstract: Decision makers need reproducible, believable results to support investment decisions. A wide variety of hazard identification and risk analysis methods are available to support process safety decisions. All methods require knowledge in the fundamentals of process design and experience in the process operation under consideration. Every method has uncertainty and no method yields any better reflection of the risk than the level of engagement that the analyst or team has in the assessment. Traditional approaches work well on processes with a long history of operation, but are difficult to apply in the rapidly evolving environment of modern manufacturing. This article discusses the challenges that the risk analysis process is facing in today's work environment. These challenges include understanding that the calculations are only a model for process safety events that harm people, events with low calculated likelihood can still occur, and management systems with metrics are critical to sustain the performance of the identified protection layers. These challenges are met by adapting current tools and work processes for recording process data to also collect data on abnormal operation and protection layer failure. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-10-07T22:46:17.223411-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11712
  • How a plant simulator can improve industrial safety
    • Authors: Salman Nazir; Davide Manca
      Abstract: Keeping the systems and processes safe is of paramount importance for all industries around the world. Process industry is a socio‐complex system constituted of dynamic chemical processes, sophisticated computer algorithms, modern human machine interfaces, and teams of operators working at different locations. The decisions of the operators directly or indirectly influence the safety and production of chemical processes. The article presents and discusses a solution for immersive training of industrial operators that allows experiencing the multifaceted scenarios of (real) plant operations. This tool, called Plant Simulator (PS), combines a process simulator and an accident simulator to simulate dynamically both normal and abnormal/accident scenarios. These simulators are the engines that work behind the curtains of an Immersive Virtual Environment and make possible the realism of the simulated operations in the plant. The article explains the features of PS and discusses two case studies that show the potential improvements achievable in processes safety. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-10-06T23:13:11.945081-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11714
  • Update: EPA actions—chemical safety and security Executive Order
    • Authors: Kim Jennings; Craig Matthiessen
      Abstract: On August 1, 2013, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13650 designed to improve the safety and security of chemical facilities and reduce the risks of hazardous chemicals to workers and communities. The Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security EO, triggered by incidents such as the devastating explosion at a fertilizer plant in West, Texas in April, 2013, directed the Federal Government to: Improve operational coordination with state and local partners; Enhance Federal agency coordination and information sharing; Modernize policies, regulations, and standards; and Work with stakeholders to identify best practices. Considerable work was devoted to these issues over a 10‐month period and on June 6, 2014, the final report, “Executive Order 13650: Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security – A Shared Commitment. Report for the President” was released to the public. The report highlights current activities to improve chemical safety and security and provides a plan for moving forward in five thematic areas: Strengthening community planning and preparedness; Enhancing Federal operations and coordination; Improving data management; Modernizing policies and regulations; and Incorporating stakeholder feedback and developing best practices. This article provides a brief update on current and future activities at the US Environmental Protection Agency under this EO Report to the President. Published 2014. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA. Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-09-23T09:31:07.2905-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11707
  • Effects of the primary explosion site and bulk cloud in VCE prediction: A
           comparison with historical accidents
    • Authors: Carl Regis Bauwens; Sergey B. Dorofeev
      Abstract: A model for predicting vapor cloud explosion blast loads is described extending a previously developed model. The model considers the contribution of a Primary Explosion Site (PES) as well as the bulk effect of the total flammable cloud. The model results are then compared with historical accidents and other commonly used models considering a single PES. Four historical events are examined: the Flixborough accident of 1974, the Texas City accident of 2005, the Phillips 66 accident of 1989, and the Buncefield incident of 2005. It is found that the combined model produced pressure and impulse values consistent with the damage observed. If the contribution of the total cloud is not considered, the far field pressure, which included overpressures up to 0.35 bar, was underpredicted and impulse was significantly underpredicted. The other methods, produced, in general, significantly lower overpressures and impulses when compared with the damage indicators seen in the explosion accidents. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-09-11T00:28:51.815176-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11703
  • Complex explosion development in mines: Case study—2010 upper big
           branch mine explosion
    • Authors: Scott G. Davis; Derek Engel, Kees van Wingerden
      Abstract: On April 5th, 2010, a methane explosion occurred within the Upper Big Branch mine south of Charleston, WV. Twenty‐nine men lost their lives as a result of a flammable concentration of methane that built up in the enclosed space and ignited, resulting in a methane explosion that transitioned into a coal dust explosion. This study used the FLACS computational fluid dynamics solver to conduct a detailed explosion analysis to evaluate the complex overpressure development throughout the mine as a result of the flammable cloud ignition. As a result of the accident investigation, unique explosion patterns were found in the mine where certain “blast indicators” within the mine shafts were deformed in such a manner that was inconsistent with the likely flow of the expanding blast wave. The FLACS analysis will analyze the explosion dynamics and shed light on the damage observations made after the blast. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-09-03T01:07:17.656309-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11710
  • Setting multinational risk tolerance criteria
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Companies that operate in multiple locations around the world face the challenge of developing consistent risk tolerance criteria across their operations in various locations. However, the views of local stakeholders on the tolerability of the risks can vary significantly from one location to another. Indeed, the actual risks that people are exposed to and currently tolerate can vary significantly depending on local factors. The challenges in developing consistent criteria for such multiple locations are described and addressed in this article. Regulators in several countries have developed numerical risk tolerance criteria and require that facilities meet them. The procedures used in the development of such criteria are described and form the basis for a method that is suggested for setting consistent criteria across national boundaries. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-30T04:08:58.967397-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11708
  • Auditing IPLs—Using safety critical functions manuals
    • Authors: Alex J. Sellers; Michael S. Schmidt
      Abstract: The three criteria for an independent layer of protection (IPL) are effectiveness, independence, and auditability. The effectiveness and independence of an IPL typically are evaluated as part of a Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), and normally are confirmed by the time the LOPA is finalized. Auditability, on the other hand, is typically not addressed during the LOPA, and frequently is not addressed until someone is charged with the task of actually auditing the IPL, assuming that even occurs. For a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) with a Safety Integrity Level to be installed in a Safety Instrumented System (SIS), the requirements for auditing are listed in the standards such as IEC 61511 and ANSI/ISA S84 and the relevant information is contained in a Safety Requirements Specification (SRS). However, an SRS for an SIS does not address IPLs that are not SIFs: administrative functions, noninstrumented functions, and nonrated control functions, even though they are also critical to assuring sufficient risk reduction for specific hazards. The auditability, and hence the auditing, of IPLs not installed in an SIS too often becomes an afterthought. A Safety Critical Functions Manual (SCFM) can pick up where the SRS leaves off. It defines requirements for testing, maintenance, and training for IPLs not included in the SIS. The very act of creating an SCFM forces the issue of auditability to be addressed, and defines the items that need to be audited. While an SCFM could manifest itself in different ways, it generally can be expected to include datasheets which address the operation, testing, maintenance, and training requirements for each safety critical function. Although it would be analogous to an SRS, an SCFM typically would be simpler. The article includes a discussion of an approach to SCFMs that has been successful at a number of different organizations for documenting and maintaining those safety critical IPLs that are not already covered by one of the SIS standards. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-27T09:07:04.622776-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11709
  • Real‐time risk assessment and decision support
    • Authors: Andy Bolsover
      Abstract: Managers and operators of major hazard facilities make complex decisions as a part of their daily work activity. These decisions are made against the background potential for a major accident. Such decisions may be required to account for daily changes in a large number of factors including plant condition and performance, operational status, knowledge and experience of personnel, interactions with other activities, and the effectiveness of processes. The information involved in the decision comes from multiple sources and may be difficult to assess. Technical risk assessments provide a useful picture of major accident risk but some widely accepted approaches suffer from some significant problems which limit their value as tools for operational decision making. The article describes investigations into an approach that addresses how these difficulties may be addressed in day‐to‐day assessments. It describes a method and tool in which risks can be monitored in real‐time and so enable safer decision making. The method is applicable to the assessment of a wide range of major accident hazard scenarios. The article will describe how the tool addresses problems in some alternative approaches. A significant feature of the approach is its ability to identify the most probable causes of risk. The speed of the assessment points to its potential use in real‐time detection and control systems. The method employs a Bayesian net to perform the risk assessment. Bayesian nets have been used to aid decision making in many different situations and industries, but have received relatively little attention as risk assessment and decision tools in major hazard industries. The article will include a description of the benefits offered by this technology as well as a view of its limitations. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-21T08:25:35.266686-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11702
  • Enterprise PSM development, implementation, and auditing
    • Authors: David A. Moore; Michael J. Hazzan, David M. Heller, Martin R. Rose
      Abstract: Process safety management (PSM) system auditing is evolving into a more business critical function and is receiving far more attention than previously as PSM evolves. The expectation for success in PSM is high and auditing is a key opportunity to validate the process and improve performance. Most auditing processes address the PSM system from an incomplete approach without consideration of the actual design of the management system or goals of the organization. Auditing can be more effective if synchronized to organizational design and goals. PSM management systems and the audit process that review them need to be defined from the fundamentals, including the following considerations: What management model will be used? Which elements will the process comprise? Is the program regulatory driven or performance driven? Are there multiple performance objectives to be met? What key performance indicators (KPIs) will be used to measure performance? With that foundation, the auditing process can be defined to assure compliance to the required system. Many companies are only now facing the rationalization of global PSM performance. This article will outline an approach for defining corporate objectives, understanding options available, defining a PSM program, defining performance objectives and KPIs, designing an audit program, and then executing the audit process. This is a necessity to ensure that the enterprise‐wide process is defined and managed for responsible management of process hazards [9th Global Congress on Process Safety, San Antonio, TX, April 29–May 1, 2013]. © 2014 The
      Authors . Process Safety Progress published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-08T07:31:10.666548-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11690
  • Examining the use of blast resistant modules within API 753 zones 1 and 2
    • Authors: David B. Skelton
      Abstract: On March 23, 2005, a vapor cloud explosion at a Texas City oil refinery injured more than 180 people and claimed 15 lives. The deaths were a result of a blast pressure wave striking contractor trailers located near the explosion fuel source. Accident investigation determined the trailers were sited inappropriately close to relief device outlets which contributed heavily to the loss of lives. As a result, API Recommended Practice (RP) 753 [API RP 753, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings, First Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, 2007] was drafted in 2007. API RP 753 provides guidance to reduce the risk of injury as a result of fire, explosion, or toxic release for inhabitants of portable buildings located in the proximity of refineries, petrochemical and chemical operations, natural gas liquids, extraction plants, and other industries. This article outlines a conceptual methodology to evaluate blast resistant modules for use in potentially hazardous locations. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-08T02:41:35.943625-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11695
  • Effectiveness of improvised gas absorption techniques for emergency
           responders at releases of toxic gases
    • Authors: Hannes Kern; Matthias Taferner, Harald Raupenstrauch
      Abstract: During accidental releases of toxic gases emergency responders use different measures to eliminate the threat of a toxic gas cloud. Case studies from incidents in Vienna or in Trieben in Austria showed the need for studies on the effectiveness of such measures. An Trieben in 2009 IBC tank with 1,000 l of nitric acid (53%) was flipped over by a forklift and cracked open in the top area. The content was fully released and lead to serious corrosion effects on storage racks combined with the production of critical amounts of nitrous fumes. A storage and chemical handling area of several hundred square meters was filled by nitrous fumes with concentrations of up to 100 ppm. Emergency responders used an improvised gas absorption system to clear the area of toxic fumes. Outside the sealed area concentrations of nitrous fumes well below the AEGL‐2 (4h) value for nitrous dioxide where measured. In the course of the analyses of the response, the effectiveness of improvised gas absorption techniques was investigated. For the investigations, chlorine and ammonia in combination with a mobile exhauster, (10,000 m3/h) commonly used by emergency responders in Austria were used. Different methods of gas absorption were investigated and tested on their practical relevance. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-06T02:48:47.832513-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11705
  • Domino effect in a catastrophic solid oxidizer fire
    • Authors: Russell A. Ogle; Juan C. Ramirez, Todd M. Hetrick
      Abstract: This case study examines a succession of three separate fires which occurred in a period of 4 days at an agricultural chemical manufacturing facility. The facility was located in a small chemical park. The succession of fires illustrates the concept of the domino effect: the first fire caused the second fire, and the second fire caused the third. The final fire was responsible for the total destruction of two businesses and the interruption of a third business. Each fire involved the solid oxidizer sodium chlorate. Despite having manufactured agricultural chemicals for over 25 years, the owner and management of the facility had lost their sense of vulnerability to the hazards of sodium chlorate. The fundamental root cause of these fires was the facility owner's inadequate control of the hazards of sodium chlorate. Workers at the facility had little comprehension of the ability of sodium chlorate to cause organic materials to spontaneously ignite. Housekeeping at the facility was poor. And finally, too large of a quantity of sodium chlorate was stored inside the facility, and this large inventory of solid oxidizer was placed adjacent to combustible materials. Simple procedural safeguards would have been sufficient to prevent the ultimate property damage. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-31T03:45:18.273299-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11701
  • Beyond the Phi factor: Correction of experimental data for vaporization in
           tempered reactions for pressure‐relief system design
    • Authors: Guibing Zhao
      Abstract: Design of emergency relief systems to accommodate runaway reactions often requires using bench‐scale adiabatic calorimeters to evaluate thermokinetic data of a full‐scale reactor. However, the well‐known method to correct bench‐scale experimental data for “thermal inertia”—the Phi factor—does not consider the effect of vaporization on thermokinetic data. Calorimeter volumetric fill ratio is an important parameter directly relating to the vaporization effect and is discussed in this article. For a 60% fill ratio, a case study of an aqueous reaction system shows that the measured reaction heat would be 7% less than the actual value for a reaction with a heat release of 800 J/g, 5% less than the actual value with a heat release of 600 J/g, and 2% less than the actual value with a heat release of 300 J/g. The temperature rise rate is even more sensitive to the fill ratio. A high fill ratio is desirable, to get more‐accurate temperature rise data for a tempered exothermic reaction. A low fill ratio requires a significant Phi correction and could also give a misleading thermokinetic interpretation of a plant‐scale reactor. Applying the same fill ratio of a plant‐scale reactor to tests in an adiabatic calorimeter—to get thermokinetic data for emergency relief sizing—is recommended. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-30T05:06:13.191234-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11692
  • On‐going developments in addressing combustible dust hazards
    • Authors: Walt Frank; Guy R. Colonna
      Abstract: The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) continues to play an important role in creating guidance for identifying and controlling hazards associated with combustible dusts. Five separate standards address hazards associated with wood‐related materials, metals, agricultural products and foodstuffs, sulfur, and all other combustible dusts (e.g., paper, plastics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals). This article will address a number of developments in NFPA's initiatives addressing combustible dust hazards. Topics to be addressed include: The status of, and recent revisions to, NFPA's combustible dust standards; NFPA's plans for a new combustible dust standard, which will address the common issues associated with controlling combustible dust hazards, leaving the commodity‐specific standards to address the issues unique to their scope; A new technical correlating committee, which will help ensure greater consistency between the approaches addressed in the various combustible dust standards; The increasing inclusion of process safety management (PSM) principles in the combustible dust standards; and The increasing allowance provided to users of NFPA standards for the use of risk‐based decision‐making in the selection of combustible dust hazard control options. Options exist for AIChE to provide technical support to a number of the above areas. The article will also preview a new Center for Chemical Process Safety project for providing tools for addressing combustible dust hazards. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-30T05:05:08.389941-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11693
  • Applicability of currently available flare radiation models for hydrogen
           and syngas
    • Authors: Derek Miller; Seungho Jung, Elizabeth Lutostansky
      Abstract: The primary purpose of a flare model is to provide a reasonably accurate prediction of radiant heat flux at any point of interest around the flame in order to be able to define safe release locations. In order to do this, a flare model needs to provide a good prediction of the following critical flame parameters: flame length, flame tilt, and radiant heat fraction, including the impact of wind and release orientation on these parameters. In addition, the model needs to distribute the radiant heat along the flame in a reasonably realistic way and to allow for the transmissivity of the ambient air. Industry standard models for vertical flares include Chamberlain [Chamberlain, Chem Eng Res Des 65 (1987)], API 521 [API STANDARD 521, Pressure‐Relieving and Depressuring Systems, 6th Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington DC, 2014], and Brzustowski & Sommer [API STANDARD 521, Pressure‐Relieving and Depressuring Systems, 6th Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington DC, 2014]. These models were originally developed primarily based on hydrocarbon data. Several commercially available consequence models allow the use of these models for all flammable materials. Due to the lack of other options, these commercially available consequence software models are often applied to hydrogen, syngas (hydrogen/carbon monoxide mixtures), and other materials that are well outside the intended scope of the models. A review has been performed to evaluate applicability of the Chamberlain, API 521, and Brzustowski & Sommer models to hydrogen and syngas, including comparison with limited published data. As a result of this review, a number of significant concerns have been identified. This has led to initiation of a new test program to collect data specifically for hydrogen and syngas and the subsequent development of new models. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-30T05:03:25.24583-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11699
  • Safety challenges in harsh environments: Lessons learned
    • Authors: Faisal Khan; Salim Ahmed, Ming Yang, Seyed Javad Hashemi, Susan Caines, Samith Rathnayaka, Dan Oldford
      Abstract: Development of natural resources in harsh environments presents significant technical and logistical challenges. An industrial workshop on “safety and integrity management of operations in harsh environments” was organized by the safety and risk engineering group at Memorial University of Newfoundland to bring together industrial practitioners, regulatory authorities, and research and development institutions to identify the safety and integrity challenges in harsh environments, share experience, and develop a roadmap for desired solutions. This article summarizes the lessons learned from the workshop on safety issues in harsh environments. The workshop identified that there are safety challenges regarding construction and operation including a lack of detailed standards, optimization with respect to winterization, and data scarcity. The remoteness of operations in harsh environments is an additional challenge. Finally, human factors add another set of challenges that arise from the physical and psychological behavior of personnel in harsh and remote environments. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-30T05:03:22.984682-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11704
  • Impact of DDT on FPSO explosion risk assessment
    • Authors: Olav Roald Hansen; Remi Martini, Jaewoong Choi, Yonghee Ryu
      Abstract: In recent explosion accidents on onshore petrochemical facilities, it has been concluded that a deflagration‐to‐detonation‐transition (DDT) took place, both with Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and gasoline vapor. DDT has also been observed in a number of large‐scale experiments. DDT leads to very high pressures (16–20 barg) and flame speeds (1,600–2,000 m/s) even outside congested regions and has a significant impact on the severity of the near‐field and far‐field explosion loads. It has not been generally accepted that DDT may be a threat at offshore petrochemical facilities and prediction tools have not been available. Thus, the potential effect of DDT is seldom considered. For Floating production, storage and offloading vessels (FPSOs), and even more Floating liquified natural gas vessels (FLNGs), due to larger dimensions and inventories, operators should be concerned that major explosion scenarios can lead to DDT phenomena. Recently, a DDT prediction parameter was implemented in the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model FLACS, and with model adjustments it is possible to calculate DDT and effect on explosion loads with good precision. A CFD‐based FPSO explosion study is presented evaluating DDT potential and impact. DDT will mainly be a concern for large cloud sizes, often larger than commonly considered for design accidental loads for an FPSO (10−4/year). Mitigation by separation walls is also evaluated. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-04T06:35:08.019603-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11694
  • What have we really learned? Twenty five years after Piper Alpha
    • Authors: Michael P. Broadribb
      Abstract: Twenty five years ago, a major disaster in the North Sea took the lives of 165 persons on board the Piper Alpha oil production platform as well as 2 people from the rescue crew. To this day, the incident represents the worst offshore oil industry disaster ever and has become an industry‐changing watershed event. The subsequent Public Inquiry report made a number of recommendations that were related to inherently safer design (ISD), including the mandatory use of a systematic fire and explosion analysis, analysis of smoke and gas ingress to living quarters, and the requirement for a temporary (safe) refuge area capable of surviving the initial fire/explosion. Other recommendations addressed analysis of the vulnerability of safety critical equipment/elements, and evacuation, escape, and rescue in the event of major incidents. Implementation of the above recommendations aimed to reduce the residual risk of the design through the use of an ISD approach. The residual risk then had to be managed by a safety management system (SMS), which is another inquiry recommendation that comprises many of the elements of process safety. Finally, the inquiry recommended developing a Safety Case to describe and justify the design, the inherent hazards and residual risk, and the SMS. This Safety Case is now the basis for periodic audits. Over the past 25 years this author has had the opportunity to visit offshore production platforms and drilling rigs and to review new offshore projects in many regions of the world. This article addresses both the strengths and weaknesses observed, and a number of common themes involving management systems, human factors, process safety and integrity management at such facilities. Comparisons will be drawn to the evidence aimed at preventing future major incidents that the author and others presented at the Piper Alpha Inquiry, and to the Inquiry recommendations. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-27T22:30:24.687964-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11691
  • The treatment of domino effects in process hazard analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Domino effects produce hazard scenarios that involve escalating consequences as a chain of linked events propagates throughout and beyond the process where they originate. Such scenarios have been the subject of accident survey studies and quantitative risk analyses but their identification in process hazard analysis (PHA) has received less attention. This article discusses the nature and types of domino effects and a procedure is provided to address them in PHA. The role of separate domino effects studies is described, insights into domino effects that can assist PHA practitioners are provided, and some pitfalls in addressing domino effects are identified. The identification of domino effects in PHA is illustrated using an actual accident that occurred in a refinery. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-12T03:45:49.020131-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11687
  • Competency requirements for process safety auditors
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Auditing is a critical aspect of a process safety program which ensures the program is designed appropriately and implemented properly. The competency of process safety auditors is essential for quality audits. The nature of process safety auditing is described to clarify the responsibilities of auditors. Suitable criteria for selecting process safety auditors to ensure their competency are identified and discussed. Criteria for lead auditors, team auditors, and audit teams are addressed. Also, performance metrics that can be used to judge the performance of process safety auditors are described. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-26T09:26:11.827654-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11684
  • The importance of defining the purpose, scope, and objectives for process
           hazard analysis studies
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: The preparation of a statement of purpose, scope, and objectives (PSO) is essential to ensure that process hazard analysis studies are focused and complete. A PSO statement defines what must be addressed but also constrains studies to appropriate content. PSO statements help to ensure studies are conducted effectively and efficiently. This article describes the content of a PSO statement and provides guidance on its preparation and use. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-18T23:49:36.632423-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11682
  • Prediction of methane's flammability using chemical equilibrium
    • Authors: Jianguo Du; Honghao Ma, Zhongwei Qu, Luqing Wang
      Abstract: This article illustrates a method to predict flammability of mixtures containing methane, oxygen, and other inert gases like nitrogen and carbon dioxide based on chemical equilibrium. Calculated adiabatic flame temperature (CAFT) is used as a parameter to determine whether a fuel mixture is combustible or not. Our calculated results are obtained with initial conditions of 1 atm and 298 K. Compared with experimental data reported in the literature, we find that 1,450 K is an appropriate threshold of flammability. Mixtures with adiabatic flame temperatures higher than this value are considered flammable while those lower are judged as nonflammable. Using this criterion, it is convenient for us to predict the flammable zone and prevent the existence of flammable mixtures to ensure security. Showing the CAFT of fuel mixtures with various concentrations in a triangular flammability diagram, we can easily find out the influence of inert gases, oxygen, and soot formation on the mixture's flammability, respectively. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-08T23:50:08.586618-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11679
  • Are unconfined hydrogen vapor cloud explosions credible'
    • Authors: James Kelly Thomas; Craig Eastwood, Martin Goodrich
      First page: 36
      Abstract: Owner/operators of chemical processing and petroleum refining sites often ask whether unconfined hydrogen vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) can actually occur. This question normally arises during the course of a consequence‐based facility siting study (FSS) or a quantitative risk assessment (QRA). While it is generally recognized that a hydrogen release within a process enclosure could lead to an explosion, the potential for an external hydrogen release to cause a VCE is not as widely recognized and is often questioned. This uncertainty appears to stem from the impression that a hydrogen release always ignites quickly and near the point of release such that a flammable cloud does not have time to develop prior to ignition and/or that a hydrogen release never produces a flammable cloud of any significant volume due to its positive buoyancy. Unfortunately, neither impression is correct. Hydrogen releases are actually susceptible to delayed ignition, and hydrogen releases can form significant flammable gas clouds near grade level. Unconfined hydrogen VCEs can and do occur. Furthermore, given the potential for rapid flame acceleration associated with hydrogen, the consequences of a hydrogen VCE can be severe. Consideration of such events in FSS and QRAs is, therefore, warranted. Prior accidental hydrogen VCEs are reviewed to establish that such events do occur. Selected hydrogen VCE tests are also discussed to establish the potential severity of such events. Moosemiller and Galindo [10th Global Congress on Process Safety, 2014 Annual AIChE Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March 30–April 2, 2014] reviewed the ignition characteristics of hydrogen relative to the potential for a delayed ignition, and only the conclusions from that article are presented here. Example dispersions, using both simplified dispersion and computational fluid dynamics methods, are presented to illustrate the flammable gas volumes that can be created by hydrogen release scenarios. Blast load predictions are presented to illustrate the range of loads that could result from a hydrogen VCE due to such a release. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-26T09:26:10.911382-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11685
  • Simplified methods of using probit analysis in consequence analysis
    • Authors: Michael James
      First page: 58
      Abstract: Ensuring personnel can safely shelter during a chemical release is critical. The probit function is useful in determining maximum safe sheltering time. Probits provide a link between probability of expected response and the exposure of a population to a specific event. Probit analysis can provide an estimate of the percentage of sheltered occupants with potential for adverse response to a chemical release. Probits can be used to estimate duration of exposure for probability of nuisance‐level response, loss of consciousness, or fatal exposures. Dispersion modeling tools provide data on predicted effects in response to long‐term exposure (typically 1 h). However, these tools do not define the maximum allowable exposure time for building occupants before loss of consciousness or fatalities are seen. This article provides methodology for estimating critical exposure duration. This article provides a methodology with existing MS Excel formulas in measuring probits to arrive at probability of response to a toxic release. While data on probit values for some chemicals is readily available, there is minimal guidance in the open literature on developing estimates of probit constants where they do not currently exist or are not published. This article presents a methodology for estimating probit constants based on toxicological data. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-03T22:00:14.225948-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11686
  • Properly calculate vessel and piping wall temperatures during depressuring
           and relief
    • Authors: Georges A. Melhem; David Gaydos
      First page: 64
      Abstract: Determining if and when a vessel and/or piping component is going to fail under fire exposure and/or from cold temperature embrittlement is an important factor in consequence analysis and risk assessment. This article describes detailed methods for establishing the conditions for vessel/piping failure and whether the material of construction for vessels and piping is properly selected for fire exposure and/or cold depressuring/relief. Several case studies are used to illustrate important concepts dealing with how wall temperatures should be calculated for single and multiphase systems in order to establish if a vessel and/or a piping component is going to fail. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-17T04:05:43.420927-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11689
  • Security risk assessment and protection in the chemical and process
    • Authors: Genserik Reniers; Paul Lerberghe, Coen Gulijk
      First page: 72
      Abstract: This article describes a security risk assessment and protection methodology that was developed for use in the chemical and process industries in Belgium. The method employs a risk‐based approach according to design principles for object‐oriented protection, using so‐called Typicals. The approach is beneficial for workers in the chemical industry because of the familiarity with safety models and concepts in this particular industry. The model combines the rings‐of‐protection approach with generic security practices including management and procedures, security technology (e.g., CCTV, fences, and access control), and human interactions (proactive as well as reactive). The method is illustrated in a case‐study where a practical protection plan was developed for an existing chemical company. This article demonstrates that the method is useful for similar chemical and process industrial activities far beyond the Belgian borders, as well as for cross‐industrial security protection. In summary, this article offers an insight into how the chemical sector might protect itself on the one hand and an insight into how security risk management may be practiced on the other hand. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-23T23:45:30.66163-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11683
  • Organizational change management for process safety
    • Authors: John Wincek; Luís Sávio Sousa, Molly R. Myers, Henry Ozog
      First page: 89
      Abstract: It has long been acknowledged that when not properly evaluated and controlled, changes to physical equipment in a facility can lead to serious incidents with potentially severe consequences. Management of change (MOC) systems, replete with a variety of electronic systems, flow charts, and checklists, have been developed by a number of reliable organizations throughout the world to manage these physical changes. It is less commonly recognized that other types of changes such as changes in job responsibilities, loss of key personnel, or even changes in shift hours can have an adverse impact on process safety. These and other nonphysical changes, collectively referred to as Organizational Changes, can lead to serious incidents with potentially severe consequences. Due to their focus on managing physical changes, most MOC systems have overlooked or only superficially address organizational change management (OCM) and the impact of organizational changes that affect process safety. Organizational change is an unavoidable aspect of doing business. There is a large variety of changes which fit under this umbrella of organizational change. Any of these types of changes could result in catastrophic consequences if the changes are not successfully administered. Effective OCM procedures must include a system for managing potential modifications to a variety of organizational aspects. The Center for Chemical Process Safety recently published a new guideline book covering OCM. This presentation will highlight some of the key concerns related to OCM which are covered in this new publication and which should be included in a successful OCM program. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-17T04:03:57.766038-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11688
  • Paradigm Shift in the Regulatory Application of Safety Management Systems
           to Offshore Facilities
    • Authors: Steven T. Maher; George D. Long, Ramine S. Cromartie, Ian S. Sutton, Mark R. Steinhilber
      Abstract: The April 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and release from the Macondo Well resulted in a re‐examination of the existing regulatory framework, significant modifications to the structure and function of key regulatory agencies, and the application of new safety management system (SMS) requirements to offshore facilities in United States waters. Late‐2010 witnessed the evolution of both prescriptive and performance‐based regulations designed to address the direct and underlying causes of this tragedy. The objective of this article is to briefly review these new regulatory requirements and illustrate how they are related to the application of other SMSs, for both offshore and onshore facilities. The common themes, objectives, and overlaps of specific onshore and offshore SMS elements was examined, and tips on how these overlaps can be used to more effectively (and sensibly) implement these programs is discussed. This article also outlined successful SMS programs that are being applied by various state agencies to onshore and offshore coastal facilities, and derived lessons‐learned from these programs that may assist in the implementation of related federal programs. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:45.364026-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11558
  • Safety improvements in a Methanation reactor
    • Authors: Mike Walton; Tony Southerton, Paul Sharp
      Abstract: A 35‐year‐old Methanator vessel required replacement due to High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA). The opportunity was taken to upgrade the over temperature protection system to meet the requirements of IEC 61511. An additional Layer of Protection was added to reduce demand on the High Temperature Trip system. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009
      PubDate: 2009-05-06T00:00:00-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.10325
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
Fax: +00 44 (0)131 4513327
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-2015