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Journal Cover Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.387]   [H-I: 22]   [6 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1598 journals]
  • Risk assessment on chemical plants by the method of safety checklist
           analysis
    • Authors: Zhang Xiaoliang; Shen Qian, Zhao Daoliang, Zhang Zhikai, He Rui, Song Huijuan
      Abstract: In this article, 46 chemical plants were investigated and assessed by Safety Department of Shanghai Institute of Technology in China. The safety management and technology ability and level were evaluated by the method of Safety Checklist Analysis (SCA) under the perspective of Safety Specialty Engineer. The risk levels of the overall of 46 plants were got. The SCA assessment presents the visible and invisible risks of the plants quantitatively and plainly. The results show that a majority of the plants have not fully implemented either on the good safety management or the reliable safety practice technology. The level of the overall risk indicate that about 35% of the plants reach the level of A (Scores ≥90), and others both lower than A, even 2 plants in the level of E, with total disregard for their health, safety, and well‐being. Otherwise, 23 items were surveyed and judged one by one in safety assessment by SCA, and put forward suggestions for rectify and reform, which helps the plants recognize the reality of the situation and make better in the future. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-20T04:18:03.998042-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11827
       
  • Process safety: A wicked problem?
    • Authors: James Moseman
      Abstract: The nature of process accidents is discussed, and the relevant definition of Horst Rittel's social phenomenon, “wicked problems,” is examined. Existing accident models are reviewed for inclusion of social drivers thought to dominate process accidents. A suggested method, new to process safety and termed morphological analysis, is offered to uncover unacknowledged drivers. Give the purported fit of process safety as a wicked problem, an assessment of the US Chemical Safety Board's “Most Wanted” is made doubting its potential reduction in accidents. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-15T04:15:39.086593-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11826
       
  • Interrelations between process safety management elements
    • Authors: Hanida Abdul Aziz; Azmi Mohd Shariff, Risza Rusli
      Abstract: OSHA PSM standard has been established with 14 elements that define the management principles to control process hazards and protect the workplace. One of the key factors to the success of Process Safety Management (PSM) implementation is that each element comes as a component in an integrated PSM program. Although various kind of integrated safety management systems have been introduced, direct integration system between PSM elements was not extensively studied due to vague concept on interrelation between PSM elements. This also hampers efforts in designing and developing integrated system for PSM. In this study, the interrelation of critical PSM elements was analyzed based on objectives and information functional of the elements stipulated in OSHA PSM regulations. From the conducted analysis, all the critical elements are interrelated at least with other seven PSM elements. Among the elements, Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity were identified to have the highest interrelations comprising of 12 interrelated PSM elements. The developed PSM matrix has systematically showed the interrelation of critical PSM elements that useful for the development of Integrated PSM system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:49.613016-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11824
       
  • Lower explosion limit/minimum explosible concentration testing for hybrid
           mixtures in the Godbert‐Greenwald furnace
    • Authors: Emmanuel Kwasi Addai; Dieter Gabel, Ulrich Krause
      Abstract: Experimental investigations of the lower explosion limits (LEL) of three‐component hybrid mixtures of six combustible dusts, three gases, and four solvents were performed in the modified Godbert‐Greenwald furnace. The test protocol was in accordance with European standard EN 50281‐2‐1 which is originally used to determine the minimum ignition temperature of dusts. Modification was done on the equipment to test for the explosion limits for dusts, gases, solvents, and hybrid mixtures. In order to prove the validity of our experimental procedure, the LEL for pure gases were initially tested and the results were compared with values found in literature obtained from the standard procedure which show very good agreement. The experimental results demonstrated a significant decrease of the explosion limits of gas, solvent, or dust and an increase in the likelihood of explosion when a small amount of dust was mixed with gas or solvent and vice versa. For example, the minimum explosible concentration (MEC) of high density polyethylene (HDPE) of 174 g/m3 decreased to 130 g/m3 upon addition of methane the concentration of which itself was below the LEL. The MEC of HDPE further decreased to 65 g/m3 when a nonexplosible concentration of hexane was added. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:31.061074-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11825
       
  • The effect of an obstacle on methane‐air explosions in a spherical
           vessel connected to a pipeline
    • Authors: Qingqing Zuo; Zhirong Wang, Yaya Zhen, Shangfeng Zhang, Yiqing Cui, Juncheng Jiang
      Abstract: A series of experiments are carried out to reveal the effect of an obstacle on the explosion intensity of a methane‐air mixture in a spherical vessel connected to a pipeline. Results show that obstacle presence, blockage ratio, and position play significant roles in explosion intensity. The oscillation amplitude of pressure both in the vessel and at the pipeline terminus weakens when an obstacle exists in the pipeline. The effects of the blockage ratio on explosion intensity are different when obstacle position changes. Explosive intensity decreases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is set at the intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline and in the middle section of the pipeline. Moreover, when the blockage ratio is ∼56%, the minimum explosion intensity is obtained when the obstacle is set at the middle section of the pipeline. Explosion intensity increases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus. The most dangerous case is when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus, especially when the blockage ratio is 75% or greater. The maximum pressure and the rate of pressure increase at the point of intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline are higher than at the middle section. The conclusions provide an important reference for designing explosion venting safety systems and explosion‐resistant designs. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-31T06:25:59.078642-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11823
       
  • Effect of pipe length on methane explosion in interconnected vessels
    • Authors: Kai Zhang; Zhirong Wang, Juncheng Jiang, Wei Sun, Mingwei You
      Abstract: A series of experiments have been conducted to study the influence of pipe length on methane‐air mixture explosion in linked vessels. Two kinds of setups, that is, a spherical vessel connected to a pipe and two spherical vessels connected by a pipe, are used. The characteristics of explosion pressure and flame propagation speed in linked vessels are obtained. The influence of flame propagation direction and the ignition position on explosion pressure and the flame propagation speed are also analyzed under different pipe lengths. The experimental results show that the maximum explosion pressure and the pressure rising rate in the secondary vessel increase with pipe length. The maximum explosion pressure and pressure rising rate increase most obviously when the small vessel is used as the secondary vessel. Moreover, the pressure oscillation is more violent. However, the primary vessel explosion pressure changes a little when pipe length changed. The flame propagation speed from the primary vessel to the secondary vessel increased with pipe length, but the flame propagation acceleration decreased with pipe length. When the pipe diameter and length is constant, bigger primary vessel causes higher initial flame propagation speed; smaller secondary vessel causes stronger blocking effect during the flame propagation. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-31T06:25:40.650789-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11819
       
  • The great commandment of process safety
    • Authors: Milos Ferjencik; Aline Cardoso Anastacio, Jindrich Masin
      PubDate: 2016-03-24T05:31:06.765705-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11821
       
  • The probability circular ruler “PCR” (process safety metrics)
    • Abstract: The explanation of process safety protection layers and related probability of failure does not need to be complicated. This article shows visuals that can be used to explain the complexity of safety layers and their relationship to reduce the risk of an overall incident. It is proposed that the “Swiss Cheese Model” be replaced with a more realistic probability wheel referred to as the probability circular ruler, leading to usable information to be included in the P&ID as tagging labels with safety data of the process protecting device. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-21T01:46:26.111716-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11817
       
  • Learning from incidents at a Norwegian and a Polish refinery
    • Abstract: Today companies are expected to learn from incidents in the form of accidents and near misses to improve safety at their facilities. In this article, we examine how two refineries located in Poland and Norway work to learn from incidents. We address the nature of their classification systems and how they select incidents for particularly thorough analysis or investigation, methods for analysis of less severe and severe incidents as well as participation in activities, the nature of follow up activities at the refineries and who these are directed at, as well as learning among contractors who carry out maintenance and projects at the refineries. For each of the stages of incident treatment, we consider the similarities and differences between the refineries and how the practices that are used may affect learning. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-21T01:46:01.5195-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11822
       
  • Create a firm process safety foundation for your new facilities
    • Authors: Victor H. Edwards
      Abstract: Documented here is the acceptance speech of the 2015 Norton H. Walton‐Russell L. Miller Award of the Safety and Health Division of AIChE. The award was presented to Dr. Victor H. Edwards at the annual division banquet at the Global Congress on Process Safety in Austin, TX on April 28, 2015. The speech emphasizes the crucial role that process safety should play in the concept, siting, and design of process plants. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-18T01:00:39.574686-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11820
       
  • Lessons in process safety management learned in the Kaohsiung gas
           explosion accident in Taiwan
    • Abstract: A series of explosions attributed to leakage of propylene from an underground pipeline resulted in 32 fatalities and 321 injuries in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, in 2014. An analysis of this gas explosion indicated that such an accident could have been prevented, or the consequences might not have been as severe if certain elements of process safety management (PSM) had been applied. Proper execution of PSM, including management of change, mechanical integrity, process hazard analysis (PHA), process safety information (PSI), and training, can prevent the occurrence of such explosion accidents. The impact of this explosion could have been reduced had these PSM elements, particularly PHA, operating procedures, training, PSI, and emergency planning and response, been executed. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-17T01:45:41.537162-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11818
       
  • Anatomy of explosives spontaneous combustion accidents in the Chinese
           underground coal mine: Causes and prevention
    • Authors: Jianhao Wang; Jiangshi Zhang, Kai Zhu, Lin Zhou
      Abstract: Explosives spontaneous combustion accidents in underground coal mines have not been taken seriously in China despite serious casualties and property losses. In order to avoid disasters of this sort, anatomy on eight accidents were performed, mainly involving the process of the occurrence and development, characteristics of casualties, causes and prevention. Improper storage and use of shoddy explosives were the primary reasons for these accidents. Toxic gases and smoke were generated in the explosives' smoldering or burning, so the poisoning and suffocation were the main types of casualties. Besides, unsafe acts of different staff, which resulted in the occurrence of accidental events and the expansion of casualties (i.e., affecting the evacuation and rescue), were analyzed emphatically, and almost all of them were violations. The senior manager and middle manager were the main producers of unsafe acts, which can provide the guidance for employees' targeted training and supervision. Overall, eliminating unsafe acts is an effective way to prevent this kind of accidents, and casualties can be reduced or even avoided through the proper evacuation and rescue. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-16T00:35:45.636859-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11816
       
  • Fire extinguishment behaviors of liquid fuel using liquid nitrogen jet
    • Authors: Bobo Shi; Fubao Zhou
      Abstract: Liquid nitrogen for liquid fuel fires extinguishing is still a new and hot topic. Fire extinguishment behaviors of liquid nitrogen are not yet fully understood, and the related research is still in its infancy. In this article, a flexible liquid nitrogen jet system was set up to examine the process of liquid nitrogen interacting with the pool fire in an open space. The main objective of this article is to compare the extinguishment behaviors of vertical/horizontal jet of liquid nitrogen for extinguishing oil pool fires by the measurements of weight, thermocouples temperature, and infrared thermal image. As a result, experiment discovered that liquid nitrogen has a satisfactory performance for the pool firefighting. And the horizontal jet of liquid nitrogen is more effective than the vertical jet in terms of fire extinguishing time and the required amount of liquid nitrogen. The shape of fire flame during the period of horizontal liquid nitrogen jet was completely different from that during the period of vertical liquid nitrogen jet. The fire extinguishing mechanism of vertical/horizontal liquid nitrogen jet was revealed, respectively. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-22T07:54:28.113214-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11815
       
  • Instructions to authors
    • PubDate: 2016-02-16T07:23:38.271648-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11769
       
  • Introduction: Fifty years of “the Loss Prevention Symposium”
    • Authors: Henry Febo
      PubDate: 2016-02-05T05:32:09.151983-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11813
       
  • A career in process safety: 50 years of LPS
    • Authors: Arthur M. (Art) Dowell
      Abstract: Drawing from a career from 1963 through 2016 in the chemical and process industries, this article will describe some informal practices of process safety elements observed during the Master‐Apprentice era of the 1960s. The article will trace the development of incident investigation, Process Hazard Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis tools used by the author. It will touch on safety instrumented systems and the development of Layer of Protection Analysis to determine how strong the safety instrumented functions should be. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-05T05:31:50.760989-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11814
       
  • How does “deviation” become “normal”?
    • Authors: Jennifer F. Mize
      Abstract: How does deviation from established safe practices become institutionalized within an organization? Conducting day‐to‐day and routine operations in a manner inconsistent with documented policies, procedures, and practices can lead to failure to appropriately identify and manage hazards. A continued tolerance for “getting the job done” when the methods used do not follow established instructions can lead to the normalization of deviation, especially when employees are rewarded for taking initiative. This article will present examples of deviations that have occurred due to failure to acknowledge change, resource constraints, and other factors. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-05T05:31:31.409152-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11803
       
  • Spring 2016 Safety & Health News
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2016-02-02T02:16:21.29949-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11810
       
  • Fifty Years of LPS and What Do We Have to Show for It?
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      PubDate: 2016-02-01T04:24:21.22177-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11809
       
  • Evaluation of uncertainty in safety integrity level calculations
    • Abstract: The evaluation of the safety integrity level (SIL) of a new or existing safety instrumented system (SIS) requires detailed calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance‐testing cycle for the system. The failure rates of the devices are taken from standard failure rate tabulations of equipment. The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant experience. The quantitative evaluation determines the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a demand mode SIS and yields the SIL of the SIS. All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain. This article explores the impact of uncertainty on the PFD calculation for a SIS. The “70%” rule of thumb from IEC 61508 is compared to results obtained using probability theory such as variance contribution analysis (VCA). A proposed methodology for handling the uncertainty in the PFD calculations is presented based on the application of the VCA method. An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2016-01-23T03:46:39.298403-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11805
       
  • Consequence modeling of dynamic source terms
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: While several dispersion modeling tools provide modeling tools for static situations, it is challenging to model conditions when there are several variables continually changing. This article discusses several modeling approaches to solve the source term of a release event, including: tracking the concentration of vapor inside of a structure; accounting for heat of solution of a leak of strong acid while deluge is applied; and modeling the output from a scrubber given a dynamic input stream. Upon development of the source term, a method for applying the source term to common dispersion modeling packages is explained. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2016-01-09T05:50:04.193687-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11804
       
  • Calorimetric study of the exothermic decomposition of dimethyl sulfoxide
    • Authors: B. Todd Brandes; Daniel K. Smith
      Abstract: Dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) is a widely used solvent often employed for a variety of organic syntheses. It is stable at room temperature, can dissolve many types of organic materials, and is miscible in water. However, upon heating in a closed system under conditions typically achievable in a commercial chemical plant, DMSO undergoes significantly exothermic and hazardous decomposition which could realistically lead to a pressure vessel explosion unless adequate protection layers were installed, possibly including a pressure relief system. This study provides calorimetry data from several apparatus and methods to characterize the decomposition to aid in assessing hazards and designing protection systems. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-01-06T05:50:25.602191-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11802
       
  • Table of contents
    • Pages: 1 - 1
      PubDate: 2016-02-16T07:23:40.893446-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11770
       
  • Surviving the black swan, strategies for process safety specialists, and
           companies to survive unpredicted catastrophic events
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      Pages: 13 - 17
      Abstract: This article is a continuation of three articles that I have authored or coauthored on the “black swan,” the rare and unpredictable catastrophic event. The first two papers discussed the concept of the black swan as applied to the chemical and petroleum processing industries and the difficulty in predicting such events. The third paper discussed the fact that we have difficulty maintaining the lesson's learned from black swan events that have occurred. I have survived and witnessed several black swans. Each has affected me personally and professionally. Black swan events are rare but inevitable. Some individuals and companies survive black swan events and continue on while others do not. I have learned that many black swan events, although initially viewed as catastrophes, can result in opportunities from a process safety improvement, career, and personal perspective. This article presents examples of black swan events that have impacted my career in process safety, often in a positive way, and strategies for surviving these “black swan” events from a personal, professional, and a company point of view. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 13–17, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-16T07:23:39.695302-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11812
       
  • Life‐safety concerns in chemical plants
    • Authors: Richard W. Prugh
      Pages: 18 - 25
      Abstract: The safety and health standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Act do not specifically address life safety in chemical plants, other than requiring owners and operators to “provide a safe place to work” and to ensure that “employees may evacuate the workplace safely.” NFPA 101 would classify chemical plants as high‐hazard industrial occupancies, and a primary concern is to ensure “minimal danger to occupants in case of fire or other emergency before they have time to use exits to escape.” NFPA 1 also requires that the design and operation of buildings and facilities “provide an environment for the occupants that is reasonably safe from fire and similar emergencies, for the amount of time needed to evacuate.” Thus, most life‐safety requirements are concerned with safe exit. There are, however, other life‐safety hazards that should be of concern to chemical plant owners and operators. They include many single‐exit locations, such as the upper levels on distillation/fractionation columns, scrubbers, and other tall equipment; elevated work platforms as atop multistory buildings and smokestacks; platforms above tank cars, tank trucks, and hopper cars; at the head of bucket elevators; work spaces above false ceilings; and ladder‐access roofs over operating areas. Also, chemical‐plant life‐safety hazards include flash fire (flammable vapors and combustible dusts); releases of toxic gases and vapors; and vessel rupture from runaway reaction or other causes of overpressure. This article presents practical countermeasures for these life‐safety hazards. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 18–25, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-16T07:23:38.681605-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11808
       
  • History of the loss prevention symposium: The first 50
           years—“there are no secrets in safety”
    • Pages: 32 - 35
      Abstract: This article presents a short history of the AIChE Loss Prevention Symposium (LPS) from its founding in 1967 to the present. The article gives the reader a general understanding of the development of the LPS along with published references to more detailed accounts of various aspects of the history of process safety efforts in the United States. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 32–35, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-16T07:23:40.393153-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11811
       
  • Limiting oxygen concentrations of gases
    • Authors: Laurence G. Britton; Martin P. Clouthier, Benjamin K. Harrison, Samuel A. Rodgers
      Pages: 107 - 114
      Abstract: This article discusses technical and practical aspects of the limiting oxygen concentration (LOC) including a detailed appraisal of possible sources of measurement error. LOC values obtained in the “classical” 5‐cm diameter, vertical tube apparatus have been described as nonconservative owing to flame quenching. However, much of the difference between classical LOC values and those obtained in closed vessels using ASTM E2079 is due to the change in the definition of “ignition.” Formerly defined as propagation of a visible flame through a vertical tube at least 1.5 m tall, which in a closed tube would typically generate an overpressure in excess of 100%, ignition is now defined as an overpressure that exceeds 7%. The small pressure rise criterion tends to underestimate the LOC in smaller test vessels, especially for tests made at elevated pressures and temperatures. More use should be made of ASTM E2079's flexibility regarding the use of larger pressure rise criteria. Having lost sight of the flame, it is important not to lose sight of the objective, namely to select test criteria that correctly predict the flammable limits pertaining to large volumes of gas mixture. Additional “reference quality” LOC data are needed both to improve the definition of “ignition” with respect to test vessel volume and to investigate the accuracy of LOC estimation techniques. Any large‐scale reference quality test program should investigate the effect of low levels of forced turbulence on measured LOC values. The NFPA “Explosion Protection Systems” Technical Committee recently supported the development of two Tentative Interim Amendments (TIAs) to NFPA 69 “Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems.” The first TIA resolves issues with the table of LOC values for gases, which had been modified and over‐corrected in the 2008–2014 editions. The second TIA introduces a simple method for estimating the LOCs of single gases and gas mixtures based on the equation LOC = LFL × S, where LFL is the lower flammable limit and S the molar stoichiometric ratio of oxygen to fuel. An Appendix describes the two TIA recommendations while a second Appendix describes how the estimating methods have been incorporated into ASTM's “CHETAH” Program. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 107–114, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-16T07:23:37.78868-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11806
       
  • Application of microfluidics technology in chemical engineering for
           enhanced safety
    • Authors: Bing Sun; Jie Jiang, Ning Shi, Wei Xu
      Abstract: The unique virtues of microfluidic technology have earned it an important place in a variety of chemical engineering applications. Among advantages including improved selectivity or yield, one crucial yet often neglected one is enhanced safety. Herein, we have critically reviewed latest progress in the study of using microreactors to reduce associated risk when performing experiments. Related research results have been carefully selected and categorized based on the major consideration to employ microfluidic technology, for example, fast heat/mass transfer, tolerance to high pressure, and confinement of toxic materials. Frontiers and remaining challenge of the field have been addressed at the end of this review as well. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-12-22T08:08:30.195101-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11801
       
  • Environmental risk assessment of a biogas station
    • Abstract: This article investigates the environmental risk assessment of a biogas station, in particular an example attached to a wastewater treatment plant. Such analysis focused on assessing the environmental risk presented by leakage of liquid material from the biogas reactor into a neighboring river. The risk methodology proposed herein is based on the principle of risk assessment regarding a major incident within the petrochemical industry. The threat of environmental damage from biogas production is low, when compared with the petrochemical industry, but represents a branch of industry worthy of heightened health, safety, and risk methodologies. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-30T04:52:29.411044-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11799
       
  • A lesson learned by attending 37 years of loss prevention symposia
    • Authors: Thomas H. Pratt
      Abstract: In responding to the request to give a paper at the 50th Loss Prevention Symposium, this article gives a brief synopsis of my career, and how attending the annual LPS meetings over the last 37 years has tremendously supported my professional work. It relates how a theoretical physical chemist was transformed into a consultant having an expertise in electrostatic ignitions of fires and explosions. Of all the reasons, one could have for attending an LPS, networking is singled out, emphasized, and supported by examples. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-27T05:36:11.152792-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11800
       
  • PSM auditing: Thinking beyond compliance
    • Authors: Stephen Gill
      Abstract: The process safety management (PSM) rule requires a “compliance audit” at least every 3 years. This description implies that the purpose of the audit is to ensure that legal requirements are met. Thoughtful companies recognize that meeting the minimum legal requirements may not be sufficient, and also audit for conformance with their internal company standards and procedures. However, in audit programs designed to check compliance with either legal or legal + internal requirements, there is an implicit assumption that conformance will result in an acceptable process safety performance. In other words, if all of the “inputs” are right (i.e., there is compliance with the standards and procedures), then process safety is being managed effectively—and the desired “outputs” will follow. This assumption may not be valid! In reality, managing process safety requires the meshing or connecting of several related work processes or activities in order to effectively deliver the desired results. Checking each activity for compliance with standards does not necessarily ensure that the sum of the connected activities is delivering what was intended. Take, for example, the identification and control of major risk scenarios. The PSM intention is that risk scenarios are identified in either the initial Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) or subsequent revalidation, sufficient controls are provided to meet the corporate risk criteria, the controls are maintained throughout the operating life, the operating, technical, and management teams are trained in and understand the scenarios and the scenarios are well documented in the operating procedures. Compliance auditing typically checks that all of the individual activities are “compliant” (PHA conducted on time and actions closed, trip system testing completed per schedule, training records complete, operating procedures updated on time, etc.). Such an approach does not typically track that the content is carried consistently through the collection of processes, and that the knowledge and controls for the identified scenarios are in place and robust. This article proposes an audit approach which checks both that the organization is compliant with the prescribed activities and procedures, and that the activities and procedures are effectively delivering the intended results. The main focus is on applying this approach to the aspects of PSM that address specific risk scenarios and their associated controls. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-26T06:13:07.041016-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11797
       
  • Cracking the code of process safety culture with organizational network
           analysis
    • Authors: Keith O. Hunter; Elliot M. Wolf
      Abstract: Organizations in the chemical process industry invest considerable amounts of time and resources managing change and implementing best practices to maintain safe operations and achieve operational objectives. Consequently, most executives and senior managers responsible for performance rely on formal organizational structure to achieve these objectives. However, front line employees responsible for ensuring safe operation of hazardous chemical processes are often influenced more by the informal than the formal organization in their daily activities. The dynamics of informal networks among workers are critical determinants of strong operational discipline (OD), process safety culture, and business performance. Yet, organizational social networks are often overlooked or not well understood by management. We discuss how organizational network analysis may improve our understanding of process safety culture. We also share results from our exploratory study that used a novel survey instrument to measure OD at the individual level in conjunction with a social network survey indicating interaction for the exchange of job task information and process safety advice, respectively. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-23T02:31:49.695466-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11793
       
  • Analysis of effects of detonation of explosive substances on humans from
           characteristic curves explosive mass–distance from the origin of the
           explosion
    • Abstract: The serious consequences of explosions justify the efforts in prevention. The inherent danger of the phenomenon and the possibility of causing other concatenated accidents (domino effect) can increase the damage. To assess the damage and plan the emergency, it is necessary to determine the possible scope of dangerous magnitudes of the explosion (high pressure, mechanical impulse, and range of the fragments). It is important to consider that the peak overpressure of explosive detonation is relatively high and impulse width short near the source. Both parameters (overpressure and impulse) decrease with the distance but the decrease is not uniform, so that the ratio of contributions of overpressure and impulse to damage of receptors differ. In this work, the TNT equivalence method has been selected to determine the overpressure and impulse of the wave when detonation of high explosives occurs outdoors and the most recognized PROBIT functions to estimate the consequences of such accidents on humans. Combining both methodologies for each type of damage, graphical relationships of the primary parameters were obtained. Previously existing relationships have been parameterized to facilitate its implementation in software and to provide intuitive information to use it in studies of risk analysis of these accidents. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:55:35.601145-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11794
       
  • Why are major accidents still occurring?
    • Authors: Elisio Carvalho Silva
      Abstract: The loss of technological knowledge is an important contributing factor to a major accident occurs. This article analyzed several major accident reports to corroborate to this premise. The more an organization moves further away from a known technology, the risk of an accident occurring considerably increases. This work discusses three ways in which technological knowledge can be lost: (1) new technology; (2) loss of knowledge due to inadequate training, procedures, and information; and (3) the failure to incorporate new knowledge (e.g., the lessons learned). For each means of technological knowledge loss, this article refers to an important major accident and shows how it contributed to the accident. It also addresses the types of failures and the concept of independent protection layers to help explain how to reduce the possibility of a major accident occurs. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:55:07.775901-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11795
       
  • Dependent, independent, and pseudo‐independent protection layers in
           risk analysis
    • Authors: Hui Jin; Angela Summers
      Abstract: Risk analysis is an important tool to provide support for various risk management decisions in hazardous industries. For the last decade, the semiquantitative Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has been the dominating risk analysis technique in the US process industry. One basic assumption in LOPA is that all the protection layers are independent from each other and from the initiating cause; otherwise, no risk reduction credit should be taken in the LOPA. However, many processes do have protection layers, which are dependent to some extent. For these systems, assuming independency may be too optimistic, whereas disregarding the partial risk reduction afforded from a partially dependent protection layer is pessimistic. This article considers processes with dependent protection layers (with a shared component), independent protection layers, and pseudo‐independent protection layers (subject to common cause failure). A long distance gas pipeline system is used as an example. Using reduced Event Trees for incident scenario modeling, Fault Trees for protection layers, and solving them in a coupled calculation, this article shows how protection layer dependencies are treated in risk analysis to obtain the overall risk reduction without being too optimistic or pessimistic. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:54:51.497428-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11796
       
  • Chemical Process Safety, 4th Edition, Learning from Case Histories (2015)
           By Roy E. Sanders, Butterworth‐Heinemann (Elsevier), Kidlington,
           Oxford, UK and Waltham, MA, 486 pages, $100, ISBN:
           978‐0‐12‐801425‐7
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:54:27.936958-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11798
       
  • Evacuation simulation of confined spaces in petrochemical facilities
    • Authors: Zhen Wang; Peg Wilson, Qingsheng Wang
      Abstract: With the growth of the petrochemical industry, confined space evacuation has been a major safety issue due to the potential fatalities and injuries caused by inadequate emergency response. In this work, two existing software, BuildingEXODUS and FDS+Evac, were used to simulate the required safe egress time (RSET) in different evacuation environments. Vertical and horizontal storage tanks were constructed using these two simulation software. Then, different parameters such as occupant load, with and without internal obstruction, and exit size were studied in different simulation scenarios. The simulation results from the software have shown good agreement with those from field experiments. It was found that the RSET of a vertical storage tank is nearly half of that of a horizontal storage tank. The work has demonstrated that the fire safety software could be used to simulate evacuations from confined spaces in petrochemical facilities. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-05T08:00:27.737301-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11792
       
  • Risk assessment for fire and explosion accidents of steel oil tanks using
           improved AHP based on FTA
    • Authors: Miao Zhang; Wenhua Song, Zhen Chen, Ji Wang
      Abstract: The fire and explosion accidents of steel oil tanks is an extreme threat for crude oil storage, and they are considerably difficult to extinguish and easy to spread. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) are often used for the risk assessment of such accidents. The probabilities of basic events are very different to obtain. For example, the failure probabilities of most components in industrial are related to their service time, work environment, operating, and some probabilities of human factors are more difficult to establish. So, there are no sufficient data for FTA to make accurate quantitative assessments, whereas the AHP relies on expert judgment and scoring, which have great subjectivity. Both the structural importance of the basic events for FTA and the weight of the index layer for the AHP significantly affect the top event. A new approach is proposed to improve the AHP method. The judgment matrices of AHP are developed based on the basic events, structural importance of FTA, and the expert scoring of AHP. In addition, the new method reconciles the differences of FTA and AHP by combining the weighting factors, and has been tested and validated by applying for fire and explosion accidents of different types of steel oil tanks. Finally, the risk of boilover fire in tank park and its influencing factors are discussed. The results provide valuable information for the decision maker to improve the safety performance and to set up an effective firefighting strategy. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-10-31T04:50:08.254596-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11780
       
  • Process design and engineering: A missing process safety element
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      PubDate: 2015-09-22T04:32:34.355832-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11781
       
  • The meaning and importance of process safety competency
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Process safety competency is subject to regulation in some jurisdictions, such as in the United Kingdom by the Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE) under the Control of Major Accident Hazard regulations. Process safety competency is one of 20 elements in the risk‐based process safety (RBPS) management system developed by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). However, competency as used in this RBPS element is not the same as the competency regulated by the UK HSE. The RBPS competency element addresses managing a knowledge base of process information and not competency as defined by other CCPS publications which use the term with a similar meaning to the UK HSE. This makes for a confusing situation for companies interested in improving their management of process safety competency. The scope of the RBPS element should be revised to address true competency. Currently, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Process Safety Management Standard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Risk Management Program rule do not address competency. However, both regulators are considering revisions to these regulations, including the incorporation of additional elements from the CCPS RBPS management system that are not currently in the regulations. One of these elements is process safety competency, as defined in the CCPS RBPS management system. This action would result in an inadequate treatment of competency. If a competency element is incorporated into the regulations, it should address true competency. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:51:19.698347-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11767
       
  • Designing risk matrices to avoid risk ranking reversal errors
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Risk matrices are used in process safety to rate and rank risks of hazardous events to help with decision making on risk reduction for processes. For example, commonly they are used in process hazard analysis to rate the risks of hazard scenarios. Flaws in their theoretical framework and mathematical inconsistencies in their use have been identified in the risk analysis literature. These flaws pose potentially serious problems for the application of risk matrices in process safety. One of the most significant flaws is the potential for risk ranking reversals wherein an incorrect assignment of a higher risk event to a lower risk level and a lower risk event to a higher risk level may occur. This article discusses the nature of the problem and describes how it can be addressed for risk matrices used in process safety. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:51:01.253331-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11768
       
  • Modeling liquid fuel cascades with OpenFOAM
    • Authors: Marco Macchi; Jennifer X. Wen, Konstantin Volkov, Ali Heidari, Yongmann M. Chung
      Abstract: Evaporating liquid cascades resulting from gasoline and liquefied natural gas tanks overfilling or rupture of elevated pipes create a source of flammable vapor cloud. Such phenomena were responsible for the formation of the large fuel vapor cloud, the ignition of which resulted in the large scale explosion, in Buncefield [Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, Explosion Mechanism Advisory Group Report, 2007] on December 11, 2005 at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, an oil storage facility located by Hemel Hempstead in Hertfordshire, England. Despite its significance, there lacks adequate models treating the underlying physics of this phenomenon. The present study numerically analyses fuel cascades which are considered as a droplet‐laden system. Consideration is given to vapor production inside the cascade due to droplets evaporation and breakup. The solver used here is a modification of the sprayFoam solver which is present in the open source computational fluid dynamics (CFD) toolbox OpenFOAM® [OpenFOAM 2.3.0, Available at http://www.openfoam.com]. The fuel droplets evaporate during their motion and create a cloud of flammable vapor. In order to capture the characteristics of the hazardous phenomena, the CFD model needs to address the underlying physics with adequate submodels. In the present study, the multiphase flow is simulated with a combined Eulerian‐Lagrangian approach. The governing equations of the gas phase represent the conservation equations of mass, momentum, and energy including the source terms arising from the interaction with the droplets. The Reynolds Averaged Navier–Stokes simulation approach was used for its computational efficiency. The Large‐Eddy Simulation would be more robust in handling the interaction of the droplets with the flow but it would require more computational resource. The particulate phase is simulated through a Lagrangian deterministic or stochastic tracking models to provide particle trajectories and particle concentration. Particular emphasis is given to the effect of impingement of droplets to account for the effect of splashing in the impact region. The study involves developing robust and accurate modeling approaches for the instabilities and aerodynamic breakup in the cascade which contribute to the formation of the cloud, air entrainment, and fuel impingement on deflector plates. Suitable submodels have been implemented in OpenFOAM® to facilitate the study. The predictions are compared with the experimental measurements and CFD predictions previously conducted by Atkinson and Coldrick [Research Report 908, 2012] from the Health and Safety Laboratory, an agency of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The present predictions are found to better capture the interaction between the droplets and the gas phase. Improved agreement with the experimental measurements in the gasoline fuel cascades has also been achieved. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:50:38.429979-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11777
       
  • Experimental and numerical study of premixed methane/air flame propagating
           in various L/D closed ducts
    • Authors: Peng Chen; Yanchao Li, Shilong Guo, Jing Ji
      Abstract: The article aims at explaining the effects of L/D (the ratio of length to diameter) on premixed methane/air flame propagation in the closed duct, which is based essentially on the experimental and numerical methods. High‐speed camera, pressure transducer, and large eddy simulation model are used to study the flame shape changes and pressure build‐up in the closed ducts with various L/D. The results demonstrate that the premixed flame propagation undergoes four typical stages, namely spherical flame, finger‐shaped flame, flat flame, and tulip flame. The pressure growth rate and the flame tip speed reach the maximum value simultaneously when the flame lateral sides touch the sidewalls in the closed duct. The dynamic synchronization of the flame tip speed and the pressure growth rate indicates the tulip flame is a purely hydrodynamic phenomenon resulting from the interaction of the flame front and the pressure wave. Particularly, the maximum flame tip speed increases linearly with increasing L/D. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:50:22.27212-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11778
       
  • Efficiency prediction of control room operators based on human reliability
           analysis and dynamic decision‐making style in the process industry
    • Authors: Esmaeil Zarei; Iraj Mohammadfam, Mostafa Mirzaei Aliabadi, Ali Jamshidi, Fakhradin Ghasemi
      Abstract: Process industries have a potential for the occurrence of major accidents. These accidents can have severe adverse effects on human health and the environment and they can cause extensive damage to equipment and buildings. During major process upsets, central control rooms are among the most stressful workplaces in the world. Therefore, Human Reliability Analysis and Dynamic Decision‐Making Styles (DDMSs) play an important role in safety management in these industries. This study employs the intelligent Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System model associated with two questionnaires along with Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method to analyze the Human Reliability Influencing Factors (HRIFs) and DDMSs of the control room operators and to determine the efficiency of operators as well as their dominant and efficient decision‐making styles. Nine influencing factors on human reliability and five DDMSs are evaluated and the correlation between the HRIFs is investigated. Efficiency of the operators, according to the HRIFs, is determined and they are ranked. Next, the most dominant and efficient of the DDMSs among the operators was identified. Finally, an intelligent algorithm for determining the efficiency of a control room's operators is developed. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-09-14T09:49:26.900589-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11782
       
  • Calculating facility siting study leak sizes‐one size does not fit
           all
    • Authors: Gary Allen Fitzgerald
      Abstract: Consequence‐based Facility Siting Studies (FSSs) typically require the user assume a credible leak size to use in the evaluation of potential releases, which is often up to a 2 inch diameter leak. Many facilities tend to be less complex in comparison to large refineries or petrochemical plants, leading operators at the less complex facilities to ask why they should assume the same leak sizes as more complex facilities. Other facilities have unique processes with safety systems and factors they would like to quantify in a consequence‐based FSS. A unique approach developed by ABS Consulting and first presented in 2011 is called the Maximum Design Leak (MDL) approach (Fitzgerald et al., 2011 Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center International Symposium, October 25, 2011). This approach calculates frequency‐based leak sizes and then applies the leak size that exceeds a frequency criterion (events/year) in a consequence‐based FSS instead of assuming a given leak size as credible. This avoids having to establish risk criteria in terms of fatalities/year and having to model a large number of scenarios yet takes advantage of many features in a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). This article presents three case studies as examples of how the MDL has been applied and illustrates the advantages of calculating leak sizes specific to scenarios being evaluated for low complexity and low risk facilities. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-10T05:40:09.865199-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11764
       
  • Lessons learned from an incident at a cryogenic gas processing facility
    • Authors: Adrian Pierorazio
      Abstract: In September 2009, a fatal incident occurred in a cryogenic gas processing plant. The investigation of the incident indicated a number of potential issues that may have contributed to or caused the event. These issues include hot work procedures, electrostatic discharge, electrical conduit sealing, convective “breathing” due to multiple vents, equipment age, maintenance, and worker training. The investigation concluded that the fuel for this event was provided by small leaks from the product pipes inside of the cold box; the oxygen was provided by convective “breathing” that occurred due to the presence of two vents from the cold box and the erosion of the flapper valves that were intended to seal these vents; and ignition occurred due to stray currents that resulted from poor hot work procedures, and locating the return lead far from the work location. This article provides an overview of the process and facility, a timeline of events, a summary of the investigative process, and a discussion of the lessons learned from this event. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-08T08:08:34.231781-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11763
       
  • Amiss, a miss, a near miss
    • Authors: John C. Wincek
      Abstract: Catastrophic incidents, while common in the world, are rare events to any single facility or even company. Were anyone to count catastrophic incidents to measure Process Safety performance, it is likely the facility would be gone before they counted to two. We look instead to Near Miss incidents as one measure of Process Safety performance. We count them and measure their frequency. We implement corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence. We look beyond the specific incident to apply the lessons in other areas. Most importantly, we look for faults in our management systems that permitted the near miss to occur. Defining near misses, identifying their occurrence, and fully learning the lessons they can teach us can be a difficult undertaking. Simple communication of these incidents can be problematic. And, learning lessons from an incident occurring at another facility can challenge even the broadest‐minded people. This article will describe the learning process that has evolved at one specialty chemical company. It will include definitions of specific types of near misses, how data are gathered and communicated, and information on the number and type of incidents occurring. The reader will gain ideas on how to classify and collect data on specific near miss incidents, and ways to communicate the information throughout a company. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-08T08:08:32.352189-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11757
       
  • The impact of Eastman's aniline plant explosion on process safety
           awareness
    • Authors: Peter N. Lodal
      Abstract: A single presentation covering one person's first‐hand experience with a significant process safety incident, delivered at the beginning of OSHA's PSM regulation still provides contemporary lessons, even though the actual incident occurred more than 50 years ago. Lessons include: (a) stopping operations unilaterally or getting expert help when readings are unexpected or unusual, (b) establishment of a testing regimen that covers a broad range of conditions, especially those that can be achieved under abnormal circumstances (e.g., fire), and (c) the impact of “restore to original condition” maintenance activities that otherwise might not be analyzed if treated as a replacement‐in‐kind only. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:06:44.963512-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11760
       
  • The organic peroxides instability rating research based on adiabatic
           calorimetric approaches and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process for inherent
           safety evaluation
    • Authors: Lei Ni; Juncheng Jiang, Zhirong Wang, Jun Yao, Yuan Song, Yuan Yu
      Abstract: This article proposes a new method of instability classification of organic peroxides (ICOP) for assessing the risk of decomposition reaction of organic peroxides, based on the adiabatic calorimetric approaches and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP). Tonset is set as instability possibility index. Maximal power density, adiabatic temperature rise, maximum pressure rate, and maximum pressure are set as instability severity index (ISI) with proper weightings by FAHP. Instability possibility index and ISI are converted into ICOP based on risk matrix. The organic peroxides instability can, therefore, be quantified and divided into four levels, acceptable, moderate risk, highly dangerous, and seriously dangerous. Thermal decomposition of di‐tert‐butyl peroxide 25 mass % and tert‐butyl hydroperoxide 68.4 mass % are tested with Vent Sizing Package 2 and Phi‐Tech 1 which has the function of Accelerating Rate Calorimeter, respectively. Thermal decompositions of other organic peroxides are presented from citation. The instability rating results of these organic peroxides are presented to illustrate the validity of the method. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:05:57.659127-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11754
       
  • 1996 amines plant explosion
    • Authors: Jerry Forest
      Abstract: Process safety management systems should be in place to ensure repeatability in operations. A good system consists of higher level procedures that describe what to do. At the plant level, the management system describes who does the activity and how it is done. Following procedures leads to predictability in operations. In 1996, Celanese had established a rigorous management system that consisted of 21 elements of process safety. However, before the elements could be fully implanted globally, failure to rigorously apply several elements led to an explosion in our Cangrejera facility resulting in two fatalities. This article discusses the management system failures of conduct of operations elements, safe operating limits, standard operating procedures and training, and critical safety equipment management and how each failed due to a common weakness of management systems. An overview of the Celanese Process Safety Lessons Learned program is presented as our way of embedding knowledge of this and other incidents in our culture to prevent similar incidents in the future. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:05:16.359278-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11765
       
  • Good till the last drop: How much is too much valve leakage?
    • Authors: Karen Study; Peter Allan, Adam Cozat, Kees Meliefste, Eloise Roche, Tim Wagner
      Abstract: Validating the effectiveness of safety instrumented systems (SISs) is an integral and vitally important part of maintaining protection layers and preventing a hazardous condition. However, deciding on the basis for what constitutes “sufficiently safe” can be difficult. For example, when considering valves used as the final element in SISs, many in industry are basing the Maximum Allowable Leakage Rate (MALR) on the valve tightness specification instead of the hazardous condition that is being prevented when these valves are closed. This article will review a pilot conducted at The Dow Chemical Company to compare using the valve tightness class as a basis for MALR versus a safety‐based calculated MALR. Economics and safety aspects are evaluated and the general types of safety based calculations used are reviewed. Key questions answered include: (1) what exactly is the requirement for estimating MALR, (2) how is MALR calculated using a safety basis, (3) are there differences in cost when basing MALR on valve tightness class versus a safety based calculation, (4) are time efficiencies realized when basing MALR on the safety case versus on the valve tightness class, and (5) which is usually more conservative, a valve tightness class‐based MALR or a safety‐based MALR? © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-04T01:55:25.481046-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11756
       
  • The evolution of process safety standards and legislation following
           landmark events—what have we learnt?
    • Authors: Trish Kerin
      Abstract: While modern process safety can be dated back to E.I. duPont in the early 1800s with the building of black powder plants including separation distances, and blast zones, the management of process safety has come a long way. Despite this, however, we have continued to see many catastrophic incidents occur, across a range of industries. There have been significant learning opportunities from the catastrophes, but are we actually applying the learnings? Exploring the past 40 years history shows a number of landmark process safety events. These events have not only changed our state of knowledge for managing process safety but have also resulted in standards and legislative change in multiple jurisdictions. This article explores the significant learnings that came out of the various landmark process safety events and the impact these changes have had on how process safety is managed today. Incidents considered as case studies in this article include the following: Flixborough UK (1974), Seveso Italy (1976), Bhopal India (1984), Piper Alpha UK (1988), Longford Australia (1998), Texas City Refinery USA (2005), Montara Australia (2009), Macondo USA (2010), and Pike River New Zealand (2010). © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-03T04:00:32.061132-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11762
       
  • Methods and data sources for identifying members of a regulated community
    • Authors: William C. Pittman; Zhe Han, Brian Z. Harding, Jiaojun Jiang, Camilo Rosas, Alba Pineda, M. Sam Mannan
      Abstract: The Ammonium Nitrate explosion that shook West, Texas in April 2013 revealed deficiencies in the current regulatory enforcement system used for chemical safety and security in the United States. This cannot be said to be a failure of existing regulations. Rather, it is a failure in enforcement as federal regulators either had not inspected the site in decades—as with OSHA—or had not been aware of its existence at all, as with Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Regulations cannot be effective if they are not enforced and cannot be enforced unless the regulator knows who the members of the regulated community are. Methods for identifying the regulated community and moving past the voluntary reporting and compliance system currently in place have become topics of acute interest and paramount importance. This article discusses existing data sources at federal, state, and local levels that could be exploited immediately to help DHS and other regulators identify regulated facilities and begin more concerted outreach programs. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-07-23T10:20:54.843851-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11742
       
  • Using alarms as a layer of protection
    • Authors: Todd Stauffer; Peter Clarke
      Abstract: Alarms and operator response to them are one of the first layers of protection used in preventing a plant upset from escalating to an incident. This article discusses how to evaluate the risk reduction (or the probability of failure on demand) of this layer when it is considered as part of a layer of protection analysis. It examines key factors such as time to respond, operator training, human factors, alarm system performance, and the reliability of the hardware used to annunciate the alarm. Recommendations will be drawn from the ISA‐18.2 standard “Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries.” Analogy will be drawn with techniques used to analyze safety instrumented functions. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-12T04:31:16.446023-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11739
       
  • Suppression effect of explosion in linked spherical vessels and pipelines
           impacted by wire‐mesh structure
    • Authors: Shangfeng Zhang; Zhirong Wang, Qingqing Zuo, Juncheng Jiang, Changde Cheng
      Abstract: A series of experiments are conducted to study suppression effect of multilayer wire‐mesh structure on methane‐air mixture explosion in linked vessels. Explosion suppression effect is analyzed for explosion suppression structures with different layers and meshes. The most reasonable multilayer wire‐mesh structure is obtained. The multilayer wire‐mesh has a greater impact on explosion intensity in the big vessel than that in the small vessel. The combination of different layer number and mesh number has different explosion suppression effect on explosion. Mesh number has little effect on explosion pressure in both vessels when the layers are few. When the layers are more, the explosion pressure in both vessels is greatly impacted by mesh number. Under the condition of the same mesh number, the more the layers are, the better the explosion suppression effect. 5 and 7 are the critical explosion suppression layer number for 40‐mesh and 60‐mesh wire‐mesh structure, respectively. Compared with 5‐layer 40‐mesh wire‐mesh structure, the effect of 7‐layer 60‐mesh wire‐mesh structure on explosion suppression is better. So, in actual explosion protection design, the optional explosion suppression structure should be decided by taking into account of the comprehensive effect of layer number and mesh number. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-09T00:57:38.081836-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11728
       
  • CFD‐based simulation study on producer gas explosion in an
           electrostatic precipitation
    • Authors: Kai Yang; Qiang Li, Zhijiang Ding, Lichun Xiao
      Abstract: Gas explosion is one of the most serious problems in the operation of electrostatic precipitation (ESP) which is applied to purify producer gas. Simulation study on the producer gas explosion in ESP has been conducted with computational fluid dynamic method. Producer gas explosion was studied experimentally in a closed rectangular vessel to validate simulation results. Numerical results were proved to be reliable and reasonable which could meet the engineering needs. The factors of flame propagation and pressure variation have also been analyzed. Furthermore, the effects of those explosion parameters such as premixed oxygen concentration, operating conditions, and local gas clouds with high oxygen content were discussed. The results show that maximum explosion pressure rises sharply with the premixed oxygen concentration increasing. Meanwhile, maximum explosion pressure increases with the operating pressure boosting, but decreases while the operating temperature elevates. Explosion pressure of local gas cloud with high oxygen content is a linear function of its volume. For this model, the critical diameter of gas clouds is 1.2 m with the oxygen concentration of 20%. The volumetric ratio of gas clouds in this model is 0.04. This study gives a reference for the optimization of oxygen monitoring‐feedback system response, and can provide theoretical guidance for the design of explosion protection. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-04-27T10:33:16.975691-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11743
       
  • Maintenance of fire sprinkler systems based on the dynamic assessment of
           its condition
    • Abstract: Safety is one of the major concerns of process safety engineers in most industrial facilities all over the world. To this scope, some events play an important role once the effect of their consequences can be assumed as totally undesirable. One of these events refers to the occurrence of a fire. Such event can result in catastrophic consequences for life, equipment, and continuity of activities or even leading to environmental damage. A fire protection equipment with low reliability means that this equipment are often unavailable and thus the risk of a fire increases. Maintenance of fire protection equipment is very important because this kind of systems is mostly in a dormant mode, which gives uncertainty about their operability when demanded in a real situation of fire. This article outlines the importance of tests, inspection, and maintenance operations in the context of a fire sprinkler system and proposes a methodology based on international standards and supported by test/inspection reports to correct the frequency of these actions according to the level of degradation of the components and regarding safety purposes. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-04-25T03:11:16.621317-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11740
       
  • Analysis of a blast due to inadvertant mixing of ammonium sulfate and
           sodium hyplochlorite
    • Authors: Graeme W. Norval
      Abstract: Ammonium sulfate and sodium hypochlorite are common industrial chemicals, often used together in water treatment. The consequences of mixing hypochlorite (chlorine) solution with ammonia solutions are well understood within the chlorine industry; detonable chloramines are produced. This knowledge is not well known in other industries; fortunately, few locations have both chemicals on site. These products were inadvertently mixed, resulting in an explosion, at a water treatment facility in Kitchener, Ontario on April 2, 2014. The chemistry of the incident is presented and discussed. Facilities that handle both chemicals, such as the water treatment industry need to have heightened sense of understanding of this particular reactive chemical hazard. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-03-25T23:41:55.473893-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11741
       
  • ASTM E2931: A new standard for the limiting oxygen concentration of
           combustible dusts
    • Authors: Ashok Ghose Dastidar
      Abstract: The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) has a standard on explosion protection systems, NFPA 69, which provides guidelines on effective inerting to prevent explosions. The standard specifies that for inerting to be effective the oxygen concentration must be kept below the Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC). It then goes on to specify that the ASTM International standard E2079 be used to establish the LOC. The shortcoming of this approach is that ASTM E2079 only applies to combustible gases and vapors and not combustible dusts. As a result of this deficiency ASTM International has just introduced a new standard, ASTM E2931, Standard Test Method for Limiting Oxygen (Oxidant) Concentration of Combustible Dust Clouds. This paper discusses the nuances of this standard and compares experimental results between the 20‐L chamber and the 1‐m3 chamber. Differences in the test results between the vessels and between test methods may have safety ramifications to the end user of the data. The large variation present in the repeatability and reproducibility of the LOC means that the current common practice of using a 2% safety margin for particle inerting (the least stringent of the inerting methods) may be insufficient to ensure dust cloud explosion mitigation. It is possible that additional study and improved laboratory proficiency as the test standard matures will bring down these repeatability and reproducibility errors. Additionally, if LOCs are reported in Safety Data Sheets without accompanying information regarding the test method or test vessel size used, the mitigation strategy may not provide adequate protection. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-02-11T23:58:11.161522-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11731
       
  • Infiltration hazards for building siting studies
    • Authors: Jeffrey D. Marx; Benjamin R. Ishii
      Abstract: Facility siting studies have been a requirement for many years, specifically for facilities that must comply with OSHA's PSM program. Facility siting is frequently interpreted as performing a building siting study which adheres to the guidance given in API RP 752. Many of the siting studies conducted for large facilities over the past few decades have focused on explosion overpressure impacts to occupied buildings, with more simplistic evaluations for fire and toxic gas impacts. Toxic gas impact analyses often only evaluate the potential exposure of a building location, to a specific gas concentration, and do not evaluate the level of infiltration into the building where occupants may be impacted. Infiltration of flammable gases has largely been ignored in most building siting studies. Despite this oversight, this hazard is one which should be addressed when following the guidance found within API RP 752. Through the use of dispersion modeling and infiltration analyses, the hazards associated with flammable or toxic gas infiltration can be incorporated into a building siting study. This article outlines the process of conducting a building siting study in accordance with API RP 752, with specific emphasis on the consequence analysis for infiltration analyses. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-01-29T23:55:40.05562-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11726
       
 
 
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