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  Subjects -> ENGINEERING (Total: 1953 journals)
    - CHEMICAL ENGINEERING (153 journals)
    - CIVIL ENGINEERING (148 journals)
    - ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (81 journals)
    - ENGINEERING (1110 journals)
    - ENGINEERING MECHANICS AND MATERIALS (290 journals)
    - HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING (45 journals)
    - INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING (52 journals)
    - MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (74 journals)

ENGINEERING (1110 journals)            First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Measurement Science Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Meccanica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Mechatronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Medical and Biological Engineering and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Medical Engineering & Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Membrane Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Membrane Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Memetic Computing     Hybrid Journal  
Metal Powder Report     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Metallurgist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Metaphysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metascience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metrologia     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Microelectronic Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Microelectronics International     Hybrid Journal  
Microelectronics Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Microelectronics Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Microfluidics and Nanofluidics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Micromachines     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
MNASSA : Monthly Notes of the Astronomical Society of South Africa     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Modelling and Simulation in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Modern Applied Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Molecular BioSystems     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Molecular Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Molecular Pharmaceutics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
MRS Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
MRS Online Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Multiagent and Grid Systems     Hybrid Journal  
Multidimensional Systems and Signal Processing     Hybrid Journal  
NANO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Nano Letters     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 42)
Nano Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nano Reviews     Open Access   (Followers: 15)
Nanopages     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nanoscale and Microscale Thermophysical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Nanoscale Systems : Mathematical Modeling, Theory and Applications     Open Access  
Nanotechnologies in Russia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nanotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Nanotechnology Magazine, IEEE     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Nanotechnology Reviews     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Natural Hazards     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 198)
Nature Nanotechnology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 44)
Naval Engineers Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
NDT & E International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Nexo Revista Científica     Open Access  
Nigerian Journal of Technological Research     Full-text available via subscription  
Nigerian Journal of Technology     Full-text available via subscription  
NIR news     Full-text available via subscription  
Nonlinear Dynamics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Nonlinear Engineering : Modeling and Application     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nonlinearity     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Nova Scientia     Open Access  
NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nuclear Engineering and Design     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Numerical Algorithms     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part A: Applications: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part B: Fundamentals: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Ocean Science Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Oil and Gas Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Online Journal for Global Engineering Education     Open Access  
Open Journal of Fluid Dynamics     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Open Journal of Safety Science and Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Operations Research Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Optical Communications and Networking, IEEE/OSA Journal of     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Optimization and Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Opto-Electronics Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
OR Spectrum     Hybrid Journal  
Organic Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ozone Science & Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Papers In Regional Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Particle & Particle Systems Characterization     Hybrid Journal  
Particulate Science and Technology: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Perspectives on Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Pesquisa Operacional     Open Access  
Pest Management Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Petroleum Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Phase Transitions: A Multinational Journal     Hybrid Journal  
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Physica B: Condensed Matter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Physica C: Superconductivity     Hybrid Journal  
Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Physics of Fluids     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Planning News     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Plasma Devices and Operations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Plasma Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Plasmonics     Hybrid Journal  
Platinum Metals Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Polar Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Polar Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Polímeros: Ciência e Tecnologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Polish Maritime Research     Open Access  
Polymer Engineering & Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Polymer International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Polymer Science Series A     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Polymer Science Series B     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Polymer Science Series C     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Polymer-Plastics Technology and Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Polymers     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Polymers for Advanced Technologies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Popular Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24)

  First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Journal Cover Process Safety Progress
   Journal TOC RSS feeds Export to Zotero [4 followers]  Follow    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
     ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
     Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1603 journals]   [SJR: 0.366]   [H-I: 20]
  • Enterprise PSM development, implementation, and auditing
    • Authors: David A. Moore; Michael J. Hazzan, David M. Heller, Martin R. Rose
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Process safety management (PSM) system auditing is evolving into a more business critical function and is receiving far more attention than previously as PSM evolves. The expectation for success in PSM is high and auditing is a key opportunity to validate the process and improve performance. Most auditing processes address the PSM system from an incomplete approach without consideration of the actual design of the management system or goals of the organization. Auditing can be more effective if synchronized to organizational design and goals. PSM management systems and the audit process that review them need to be defined from the fundamentals, including the following considerations: What management model will be used? Which elements will the process comprise? Is the program regulatory driven or performance driven? Are there multiple performance objectives to be met? What key performance indicators (KPIs) will be used to measure performance? With that foundation, the auditing process can be defined to assure compliance to the required system. Many companies are only now facing the rationalization of global PSM performance. This article will outline an approach for defining corporate objectives, understanding options available, defining a PSM program, defining performance objectives and KPIs, designing an audit program, and then executing the audit process. This is a necessity to ensure that the enterprise‐wide process is defined and managed for responsible management of process hazards [9th Global Congress on Process Safety, San Antonio, TX, April 29–May 1, 2013]. © 2014 The
      Authors . Process Safety Progress published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-08T07:31:10.666548-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11690
       
  • Examining the use of blast resistant modules within API 753 zones 1 and 2
    • Authors: David B. Skelton
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: On March 23, 2005, a vapor cloud explosion at a Texas City oil refinery injured more than 180 people and claimed 15 lives. The deaths were a result of a blast pressure wave striking contractor trailers located near the explosion fuel source. Accident investigation determined the trailers were sited inappropriately close to relief device outlets which contributed heavily to the loss of lives. As a result, API Recommended Practice (RP) 753 [API RP 753, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings, First Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, 2007] was drafted in 2007. API RP 753 provides guidance to reduce the risk of injury as a result of fire, explosion, or toxic release for inhabitants of portable buildings located in the proximity of refineries, petrochemical and chemical operations, natural gas liquids, extraction plants, and other industries. This article outlines a conceptual methodology to evaluate blast resistant modules for use in potentially hazardous locations. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-08T02:41:35.943625-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11695
       
  • Effectiveness of improvised gas absorption techniques for emergency
           responders at releases of toxic gases
    • Authors: Hannes Kern; Matthias Taferner, Harald Raupenstrauch
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: During accidental releases of toxic gases emergency responders use different measures to eliminate the threat of a toxic gas cloud. Case studies from incidents in Vienna or in Trieben in Austria showed the need for studies on the effectiveness of such measures. An Trieben in 2009 IBC tank with 1,000 l of nitric acid (53%) was flipped over by a forklift and cracked open in the top area. The content was fully released and lead to serious corrosion effects on storage racks combined with the production of critical amounts of nitrous fumes. A storage and chemical handling area of several hundred square meters was filled by nitrous fumes with concentrations of up to 100 ppm. Emergency responders used an improvised gas absorption system to clear the area of toxic fumes. Outside the sealed area concentrations of nitrous fumes well below the AEGL‐2 (4h) value for nitrous dioxide where measured. In the course of the analyses of the response, the effectiveness of improvised gas absorption techniques was investigated. For the investigations, chlorine and ammonia in combination with a mobile exhauster, (10,000 m3/h) commonly used by emergency responders in Austria were used. Different methods of gas absorption were investigated and tested on their practical relevance. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-08-06T02:48:47.832513-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11705
       
  • Domino effect in a catastrophic solid oxidizer fire
    • Authors: Russell A. Ogle; Juan C. Ramirez, Todd M. Hetrick
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: This case study examines a succession of three separate fires which occurred in a period of 4 days at an agricultural chemical manufacturing facility. The facility was located in a small chemical park. The succession of fires illustrates the concept of the domino effect: the first fire caused the second fire, and the second fire caused the third. The final fire was responsible for the total destruction of two businesses and the interruption of a third business. Each fire involved the solid oxidizer sodium chlorate. Despite having manufactured agricultural chemicals for over 25 years, the owner and management of the facility had lost their sense of vulnerability to the hazards of sodium chlorate. The fundamental root cause of these fires was the facility owner's inadequate control of the hazards of sodium chlorate. Workers at the facility had little comprehension of the ability of sodium chlorate to cause organic materials to spontaneously ignite. Housekeeping at the facility was poor. And finally, too large of a quantity of sodium chlorate was stored inside the facility, and this large inventory of solid oxidizer was placed adjacent to combustible materials. Simple procedural safeguards would have been sufficient to prevent the ultimate property damage. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-31T03:45:18.273299-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11701
       
  • Beyond the Phi factor: Correction of experimental data for vaporization in
           tempered reactions for pressure‐relief system design
    • Authors: Guibing Zhao
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Design of emergency relief systems to accommodate runaway reactions often requires using bench‐scale adiabatic calorimeters to evaluate thermokinetic data of a full‐scale reactor. However, the well‐known method to correct bench‐scale experimental data for “thermal inertia”—the Phi factor—does not consider the effect of vaporization on thermokinetic data. Calorimeter volumetric fill ratio is an important parameter directly relating to the vaporization effect and is discussed in this article. For a 60% fill ratio, a case study of an aqueous reaction system shows that the measured reaction heat would be 7% less than the actual value for a reaction with a heat release of 800 J/g, 5% less than the actual value with a heat release of 600 J/g, and 2% less than the actual value with a heat release of 300 J/g. The temperature rise rate is even more sensitive to the fill ratio. A high fill ratio is desirable, to get more‐accurate temperature rise data for a tempered exothermic reaction. A low fill ratio requires a significant Phi correction and could also give a misleading thermokinetic interpretation of a plant‐scale reactor. Applying the same fill ratio of a plant‐scale reactor to tests in an adiabatic calorimeter—to get thermokinetic data for emergency relief sizing—is recommended. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-30T05:06:13.191234-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11692
       
  • On‐going developments in addressing combustible dust hazards
    • Authors: Walt Frank; Guy R. Colonna
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) continues to play an important role in creating guidance for identifying and controlling hazards associated with combustible dusts. Five separate standards address hazards associated with wood‐related materials, metals, agricultural products and foodstuffs, sulfur, and all other combustible dusts (e.g., paper, plastics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals). This article will address a number of developments in NFPA's initiatives addressing combustible dust hazards. Topics to be addressed include: The status of, and recent revisions to, NFPA's combustible dust standards; NFPA's plans for a new combustible dust standard, which will address the common issues associated with controlling combustible dust hazards, leaving the commodity‐specific standards to address the issues unique to their scope; A new technical correlating committee, which will help ensure greater consistency between the approaches addressed in the various combustible dust standards; The increasing inclusion of process safety management (PSM) principles in the combustible dust standards; and The increasing allowance provided to users of NFPA standards for the use of risk‐based decision‐making in the selection of combustible dust hazard control options. Options exist for AIChE to provide technical support to a number of the above areas. The article will also preview a new Center for Chemical Process Safety project for providing tools for addressing combustible dust hazards. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-30T05:05:08.389941-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11693
       
  • Applicability of currently available flare radiation models for hydrogen
           and syngas
    • Authors: Derek Miller; Seungho Jung, Elizabeth Lutostansky
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: The primary purpose of a flare model is to provide a reasonably accurate prediction of radiant heat flux at any point of interest around the flame in order to be able to define safe release locations. In order to do this, a flare model needs to provide a good prediction of the following critical flame parameters: flame length, flame tilt, and radiant heat fraction, including the impact of wind and release orientation on these parameters. In addition, the model needs to distribute the radiant heat along the flame in a reasonably realistic way and to allow for the transmissivity of the ambient air. Industry standard models for vertical flares include Chamberlain [Chamberlain, Chem Eng Res Des 65 (1987)], API 521 [API STANDARD 521, Pressure‐Relieving and Depressuring Systems, 6th Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington DC, 2014], and Brzustowski & Sommer [API STANDARD 521, Pressure‐Relieving and Depressuring Systems, 6th Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington DC, 2014]. These models were originally developed primarily based on hydrocarbon data. Several commercially available consequence models allow the use of these models for all flammable materials. Due to the lack of other options, these commercially available consequence software models are often applied to hydrogen, syngas (hydrogen/carbon monoxide mixtures), and other materials that are well outside the intended scope of the models. A review has been performed to evaluate applicability of the Chamberlain, API 521, and Brzustowski & Sommer models to hydrogen and syngas, including comparison with limited published data. As a result of this review, a number of significant concerns have been identified. This has led to initiation of a new test program to collect data specifically for hydrogen and syngas and the subsequent development of new models. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-30T05:03:25.24583-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11699
       
  • Safety challenges in harsh environments: Lessons learned
    • Authors: Faisal Khan; Salim Ahmed, Ming Yang, Seyed Javad Hashemi, Susan Caines, Samith Rathnayaka, Dan Oldford
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Development of natural resources in harsh environments presents significant technical and logistical challenges. An industrial workshop on “safety and integrity management of operations in harsh environments” was organized by the safety and risk engineering group at Memorial University of Newfoundland to bring together industrial practitioners, regulatory authorities, and research and development institutions to identify the safety and integrity challenges in harsh environments, share experience, and develop a roadmap for desired solutions. This article summarizes the lessons learned from the workshop on safety issues in harsh environments. The workshop identified that there are safety challenges regarding construction and operation including a lack of detailed standards, optimization with respect to winterization, and data scarcity. The remoteness of operations in harsh environments is an additional challenge. Finally, human factors add another set of challenges that arise from the physical and psychological behavior of personnel in harsh and remote environments. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-30T05:03:22.984682-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11704
       
  • Lessons learned from case studies of hazardous waste/chemical reactivity
           incidents
    • Authors: Brenton L. Cox; Andrew R. Carpenter, Russell A. Ogle
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: The treatment of hazardous waste poses some unique chemical reactivity hazard management challenges. Hazardous waste in the United States is regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, typically due to potential environmental and health hazards. However, hazardous waste can also have chemical reactivity hazards associated with storage, handling, or mixing with other materials. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has been active in communicating chemical reactivity hazards to the regulated community and has identified numerous sources for additional information. The Center for Chemical Process Safety has also been very active in providing advisory materials and monographs on the safe management of chemical reactivity hazards. Other federal government agencies, such as the Chemical Safety Board and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, have also taken up the call for increased awareness of the hazards of unintentional chemical reactions. Despite these efforts, history of incidents indicates that reactive chemical hazards associated with hazardous waste still go overlooked. In this article, we review hazardous waste incidents through case studies and public sector reports through the lens of chemical reactivity hazard management. In each incident, inadvertent heating resulted in an unintended chemical reaction, and sufficient information existed or could have been obtained to identify the hazards. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-25T00:15:15.901277-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11698
       
  • Novel ways to present process safety concepts
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      PubDate: 2014-07-25T00:15:02.140104-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11697
       
  • Understanding hazards, consequences, LOPA, SILs, PFD, and RRFs as related
           to risk and hazard assessment
    • Authors: Roberto Fernández Blanco
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: This article is intended for any engineer, supervisor, or manager who does not specialize in process safety engineering. It presents the concept of layers of protection analysis, safety integrity level (SIL) and its relationship to probability of failure on demand (PFD) and the related risk reduction factors (RRFs). Novel SIL/PFD/RRF graphics are presented to help the reader understand the concepts involved. An example using a safety instrument function for a gas‐fired boiler is also used to help the reader understand the concepts. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-25T00:14:58.763434-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11700
       
  • Impact of DDT on FPSO explosion risk assessment
    • Authors: Olav Roald Hansen; Remi Martini, Jaewoong Choi, Yonghee Ryu
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: In recent explosion accidents on onshore petrochemical facilities, it has been concluded that a deflagration‐to‐detonation‐transition (DDT) took place, both with Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and gasoline vapor. DDT has also been observed in a number of large‐scale experiments. DDT leads to very high pressures (16–20 barg) and flame speeds (1,600–2,000 m/s) even outside congested regions and has a significant impact on the severity of the near‐field and far‐field explosion loads. It has not been generally accepted that DDT may be a threat at offshore petrochemical facilities and prediction tools have not been available. Thus, the potential effect of DDT is seldom considered. For Floating production, storage and offloading vessels (FPSOs), and even more Floating liquified natural gas vessels (FLNGs), due to larger dimensions and inventories, operators should be concerned that major explosion scenarios can lead to DDT phenomena. Recently, a DDT prediction parameter was implemented in the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model FLACS, and with model adjustments it is possible to calculate DDT and effect on explosion loads with good precision. A CFD‐based FPSO explosion study is presented evaluating DDT potential and impact. DDT will mainly be a concern for large cloud sizes, often larger than commonly considered for design accidental loads for an FPSO (10−4/year). Mitigation by separation walls is also evaluated. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-07-04T06:35:08.019603-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11694
       
  • What have we really learned? Twenty five years after Piper Alpha
    • Authors: Michael P. Broadribb
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Twenty five years ago, a major disaster in the North Sea took the lives of 165 persons on board the Piper Alpha oil production platform as well as 2 people from the rescue crew. To this day, the incident represents the worst offshore oil industry disaster ever and has become an industry‐changing watershed event. The subsequent Public Inquiry report made a number of recommendations that were related to inherently safer design (ISD), including the mandatory use of a systematic fire and explosion analysis, analysis of smoke and gas ingress to living quarters, and the requirement for a temporary (safe) refuge area capable of surviving the initial fire/explosion. Other recommendations addressed analysis of the vulnerability of safety critical equipment/elements, and evacuation, escape, and rescue in the event of major incidents. Implementation of the above recommendations aimed to reduce the residual risk of the design through the use of an ISD approach. The residual risk then had to be managed by a safety management system (SMS), which is another inquiry recommendation that comprises many of the elements of process safety. Finally, the inquiry recommended developing a Safety Case to describe and justify the design, the inherent hazards and residual risk, and the SMS. This Safety Case is now the basis for periodic audits. Over the past 25 years this author has had the opportunity to visit offshore production platforms and drilling rigs and to review new offshore projects in many regions of the world. This article addresses both the strengths and weaknesses observed, and a number of common themes involving management systems, human factors, process safety and integrity management at such facilities. Comparisons will be drawn to the evidence aimed at preventing future major incidents that the author and others presented at the Piper Alpha Inquiry, and to the Inquiry recommendations. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-27T22:30:24.687964-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11691
       
  • Properly calculate vessel and piping wall temperatures during depressuring
           and relief
    • Authors: Georges A. Melhem; David Gaydos
      Abstract: Determining if and when a vessel and/or piping component is going to fail under fire exposure and/or from cold temperature embrittlement is an important factor in consequence analysis and risk assessment. This article describes detailed methods for establishing the conditions for vessel/piping failure and whether the material of construction for vessels and piping is properly selected for fire exposure and/or cold depressuring/relief. Several case studies are used to illustrate important concepts dealing with how wall temperatures should be calculated for single and multiphase systems in order to establish if a vessel and/or a piping component is going to fail. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-17T04:05:43.420927-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11689
       
  • Organizational change management for process safety
    • Authors: John Wincek; Luís Sávio Sousa, Molly R. Myers, Henry Ozog
      Abstract: It has long been acknowledged that when not properly evaluated and controlled, changes to physical equipment in a facility can lead to serious incidents with potentially severe consequences. Management of change (MOC) systems, replete with a variety of electronic systems, flow charts, and checklists, have been developed by a number of reliable organizations throughout the world to manage these physical changes. It is less commonly recognized that other types of changes such as changes in job responsibilities, loss of key personnel, or even changes in shift hours can have an adverse impact on process safety. These and other nonphysical changes, collectively referred to as Organizational Changes, can lead to serious incidents with potentially severe consequences. Due to their focus on managing physical changes, most MOC systems have overlooked or only superficially address organizational change management (OCM) and the impact of organizational changes that affect process safety. Organizational change is an unavoidable aspect of doing business. There is a large variety of changes which fit under this umbrella of organizational change. Any of these types of changes could result in catastrophic consequences if the changes are not successfully administered. Effective OCM procedures must include a system for managing potential modifications to a variety of organizational aspects. The Center for Chemical Process Safety recently published a new guideline book covering OCM. This presentation will highlight some of the key concerns related to OCM which are covered in this new publication and which should be included in a successful OCM program. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-17T04:03:57.766038-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11688
       
  • The treatment of domino effects in process hazard analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Domino effects produce hazard scenarios that involve escalating consequences as a chain of linked events propagates throughout and beyond the process where they originate. Such scenarios have been the subject of accident survey studies and quantitative risk analyses but their identification in process hazard analysis (PHA) has received less attention. This article discusses the nature and types of domino effects and a procedure is provided to address them in PHA. The role of separate domino effects studies is described, insights into domino effects that can assist PHA practitioners are provided, and some pitfalls in addressing domino effects are identified. The identification of domino effects in PHA is illustrated using an actual accident that occurred in a refinery. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-12T03:45:49.020131-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11687
       
  • Safety instrumented systems in lieu of pressure relief valves
    • Authors: Dustin J. Smith
      Abstract: There are two aspects to risk assessments: safety issues and regulatory issues. Usually the two are aligned, but not always. This article explains ASME B&PVC Section VIII (Sec VIII) [American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code: Section VIII, Division I. s.l.] requirements along with other industry guidance for using Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) in lieu of pressure relief devices (e.g., pressure relief valves or rupture disks). For most pressure vessels in petrochemical installations in the United States, the Sec VIII requirements are regulatory requirements. A designer that is implementing facility changes from a corporate risk assessment (e.g., Layer of Protection Analysis or Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)) would do well to also meet the minimum regulatory requirements for overpressure in Sec VIII. Typical risk assessments allow the designer to consider both the likelihood and consequences of an overpressure scenario in determining if additional mitigation is required. Whereas, Sec VIII does not allow any credible overpressure scenarios (solely based on likelihood) unless there is adequate capacity provided by a relief device. This article discusses the detailed typical risk analysis compared to the requirements of Sec VIII overpressure protection by system design. The SIS reliability rating or determination of said rating (e.g., SIL‐3 Systems) is outside the scope of this article. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-06T23:28:47.827247-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11681
       
  • Simplified methods of using probit analysis in consequence analysis
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: Ensuring personnel can safely shelter during a chemical release is critical. The probit function is useful in determining maximum safe sheltering time. Probits provide a link between probability of expected response and the exposure of a population to a specific event. Probit analysis can provide an estimate of the percentage of sheltered occupants with potential for adverse response to a chemical release. Probits can be used to estimate duration of exposure for probability of nuisance‐level response, loss of consciousness, or fatal exposures. Dispersion modeling tools provide data on predicted effects in response to long‐term exposure (typically 1 h). However, these tools do not define the maximum allowable exposure time for building occupants before loss of consciousness or fatalities are seen. This article provides methodology for estimating critical exposure duration. This article provides a methodology with existing MS Excel formulas in measuring probits to arrive at probability of response to a toxic release. While data on probit values for some chemicals is readily available, there is minimal guidance in the open literature on developing estimates of probit constants where they do not currently exist or are not published. This article presents a methodology for estimating probit constants based on toxicological data. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-06-03T22:00:14.225948-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11686
       
  • Competency requirements for process safety auditors
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Auditing is a critical aspect of a process safety program which ensures the program is designed appropriately and implemented properly. The competency of process safety auditors is essential for quality audits. The nature of process safety auditing is described to clarify the responsibilities of auditors. Suitable criteria for selecting process safety auditors to ensure their competency are identified and discussed. Criteria for lead auditors, team auditors, and audit teams are addressed. Also, performance metrics that can be used to judge the performance of process safety auditors are described. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-26T09:26:11.827654-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11684
       
  • Are unconfined hydrogen vapor cloud explosions credible'
    • Authors: James Kelly Thomas; Craig Eastwood, Martin Goodrich
      Abstract: Owner/operators of chemical processing and petroleum refining sites often ask whether unconfined hydrogen vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) can actually occur. This question normally arises during the course of a consequence‐based facility siting study (FSS) or a quantitative risk assessment (QRA). While it is generally recognized that a hydrogen release within a process enclosure could lead to an explosion, the potential for an external hydrogen release to cause a VCE is not as widely recognized and is often questioned. This uncertainty appears to stem from the impression that a hydrogen release always ignites quickly and near the point of release such that a flammable cloud does not have time to develop prior to ignition and/or that a hydrogen release never produces a flammable cloud of any significant volume due to its positive buoyancy. Unfortunately, neither impression is correct. Hydrogen releases are actually susceptible to delayed ignition, and hydrogen releases can form significant flammable gas clouds near grade level. Unconfined hydrogen VCEs can and do occur. Furthermore, given the potential for rapid flame acceleration associated with hydrogen, the consequences of a hydrogen VCE can be severe. Consideration of such events in FSS and QRAs is, therefore, warranted. Prior accidental hydrogen VCEs are reviewed to establish that such events do occur. Selected hydrogen VCE tests are also discussed to establish the potential severity of such events. Moosemiller and Galindo [10th Global Congress on Process Safety, 2014 Annual AIChE Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March 30–April 2, 2014] reviewed the ignition characteristics of hydrogen relative to the potential for a delayed ignition, and only the conclusions from that article are presented here. Example dispersions, using both simplified dispersion and computational fluid dynamics methods, are presented to illustrate the flammable gas volumes that can be created by hydrogen release scenarios. Blast load predictions are presented to illustrate the range of loads that could result from a hydrogen VCE due to such a release. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-26T09:26:10.911382-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11685
       
  • Security risk assessment and protection in the chemical and process
           industry
    • Authors: Genserik Reniers; Paul Lerberghe, Coen Gulijk
      Abstract: This article describes a security risk assessment and protection methodology that was developed for use in the chemical and process industries in Belgium. The method employs a risk‐based approach according to design principles for object‐oriented protection, using so‐called Typicals. The approach is beneficial for workers in the chemical industry because of the familiarity with safety models and concepts in this particular industry. The model combines the rings‐of‐protection approach with generic security practices including management and procedures, security technology (e.g., CCTV, fences, and access control), and human interactions (proactive as well as reactive). The method is illustrated in a case‐study where a practical protection plan was developed for an existing chemical company. This article demonstrates that the method is useful for similar chemical and process industrial activities far beyond the Belgian borders, as well as for cross‐industrial security protection. In summary, this article offers an insight into how the chemical sector might protect itself on the one hand and an insight into how security risk management may be practiced on the other hand. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-23T23:45:30.66163-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11683
       
  • The importance of defining the purpose, scope, and objectives for process
           hazard analysis studies
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: The preparation of a statement of purpose, scope, and objectives (PSO) is essential to ensure that process hazard analysis studies are focused and complete. A PSO statement defines what must be addressed but also constrains studies to appropriate content. PSO statements help to ensure studies are conducted effectively and efficiently. This article describes the content of a PSO statement and provides guidance on its preparation and use. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-05-18T23:49:36.632423-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11682
       
  • Addressing enablers in layers of protection analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: 221 - 226
      Abstract: Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) is used to evaluate the risk of individual hazard scenarios by combining initiating event frequencies with failure probabilities of protection layers. Some practitioners include events and conditions that enable the occurrence of hazard scenarios in the analysis, such as conditional modifiers, but sometimes they are excluded to ensure conservative results. However, these events and conditions, and other factors that enable scenarios, are often key parts of hazard scenarios and their exclusion from the analysis can result in overly conservative results. This article broadens the definition of enabling events and conditions to include other factors that can have a significant impact on the risk of hazard scenarios. Such other factors include management systems to account for inadequacies in, and failure to follow, policies, procedures, and work instructions; at‐risk factors to account for the time period in which a process is at risk; incident outcomes to represent different possible consequences for the same initiating event; and release conditions to account for different release conditions or circumstances. Their inclusion in LOPA studies is described with examples. The determination of adjustment factors to account for their effect on scenario risk is also demonstrated. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 221–226, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-22T23:55:26.127861-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11639
       
  • New quantitative risk criteria for US LNG facilities
    • Authors: Ellen H. McInerney; Ryan J. Hart, Delmar “Trey” Morrison, Harri K. Kytömaa
      Pages: 237 - 246
      Abstract: The recent increase in natural gas production has expanded the outlook for exporting domestically produced natural gas. As a result, many existing liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facilities in the United States are proposing to construct liquefaction facilities collocated with existing import terminals. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviews and approves applications for construction. As part of this process, the applicant must perform specific hazardous release consequence analyses to demonstrate flammable vapor dispersion exclusion zones, thermal radiation exclusion zones, and explosion overpressure exclusion zones to meet criteria established in 49 CFR 193 and NFPA 59A. Over the last few years, FERC has refined the risk analysis criteria for LNG facility construction projects. While the current regulations do not specify quantitative risk assessment (QRA) as a necessary hazard analysis tool, FERC has recently issued guidance for the selection of leak sizes based upon failure frequencies for piping systems. In particular, scenarios with failure frequencies greater than 3 × 10−5 per year must be considered. The underlying studies that FERC relied upon to derive the failure frequency criterion for single accidental leak source size determination (i.e., 3 × 10−5 to 5 × 10−5 per year) are largely based on generic industry data not LNG‐specific data. The net result of this criterion has been to require elements of QRA as part of LNG facility permitting process to identify the scenarios that need to be considered and those that do not. This is a shift in the paradigm away from prescriptive leak sizes and single accidental release scenarios that had been used for receiving terminals constructed over the last decade. This shift in paradigm coincides with and was likely motivated by the North American transition from receiving terminals to liquefaction export terminals. Receiving terminals are considerably simpler in their design than export terminals, which require refrigeration units to liquefy the gas. This article aims to provide an analysis and discussion of the FERC failure frequency arguments grounded in the strength and weaknesses of the underlying databases. An open question is whether this new criterion provides a reasonable improvement in safety over the prior requirements. The underlying historic databases and studies do not reflect the major differences on the safety records between the LNG industry and general industry. More specifically, they do not necessarily take into consideration the effects of cryogenic processes, management systems, materials of construction, or failure modes on the failure rate data. Given the basis of generic industry failure rates, the question arises as to whether the failure rate thresholds that trigger the requirement to consider certain scenarios are appropriate. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 237–246, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-27T23:56:52.801127-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11657
       
  • Process safety leading indicators survey–February 2013: Center for
           chemical process safety–white paper
    • Authors: Stevick Kenan; Shakeel Kadri
      Pages: 247 - 258
      Abstract: This article provides an update on the Chemical Industries use, direction, and effectiveness of leading indicators and provides recommended leading indicators to help drive performance in a common direction. As the use of leading indicators is in its nascent stages, it is anticipated that additional surveys and updates will be published on a biannual basis. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 247–258, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-23T00:01:11.915139-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11654
       
  • Loss functions and their applications in process safety assessment
    • Authors: Seyed Javad Hashemi; Salim Ahmed, Faisal Khan
      Pages: 285 - 291
      Abstract: Process deviations, along with failure of control systems and protection layers, result in safety and quality loss in plant operations. This article proposes an operational risk‐based warning system design methodology based on overall system loss. Loss functions (LFs) are used to define the relationship between process deviations and system loss. For this purpose, properties associated with quadratic LF and a set of inverted probability LFs are investigated and compared. The results suggest that LFs can be used in a novel way to assess operational stability and system safety. The proposed consequence assessment methodology using LFs is then incorporated into a risk‐based warning system design model to analyze warnings associated with process deviations. A simulated case study is presented to demonstrate potential application of the proposed methodology; the study examines the response to a temperature surge for a reactor system. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 285–291, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-02-04T07:51:52.542816-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11659
       
  • Optimization of process alarm thresholds: A multidimensional kernel
           density estimation approach
    • Authors: Zang Hao; Li Hongguang
      Pages: 292 - 298
      Abstract: Rationality of alarm systems enormously impacts safety and economic performances of process plants, which definitely demands for process alarm threshold optimization. In this work, first, we analyze the assignable causes of missed alarms and false alarms from the probability theory perspectives before formulating corresponding calculation metrics based on Bayesian Inference. Then, we minimize missed alarm probability (MAP) and false alarm probability (FAP) in a multidimensional space, where the kernel density estimation method is invoked to estimate joint probability density functions using process historical data. Mathematical models associated with multivariable process alarm threshold optimization are established on the basis of density functions, and gradient descent algorithms are employed to achieve advisable alarm thresholds. An industrial application shows that this approach effectively reduces MAP of the plant, as well as lowers FAP to a relatively reasonable level. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 292–298, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-27T23:56:32.029259-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11658
       
  • Development of a steel component combustion model for fires involving pure
           oxygen systems
    • Authors: Brenton L. Cox; Sean J. Dee, Ryan J. Hart, Delmar R. Morrison
      Pages: 299 - 304
      Abstract: Pure oxygen systems pose significant fire and explosion risk to equipment, operations, and personnel if a loss of oxygen containment occurs. In industrial oxygen systems, combustion of metal can be initiated by a variety of ignition sources. The combustion of process vessel walls, components, or piping can result in loss of containment of pressurized oxygen. Automatic shutdown and isolation systems are designed to detect loss of containment, incipient loss of containment due to process parameters (e.g., pressure drop), or internal fire conditions. The effectiveness of these isolation systems is dependent upon the speed with which they activate after the initiating event. The prediction of failure modes and time scales can be an important tool in the design, operation, and maintenance of industrial high purity oxygen systems. Modeling of metal consumption in oxygen fueled fires requires consideration of multiple ignition mechanisms. Previously published experimentation has been motivated by the need to compare the relative burn resistance of metals and nonmetals under a variety of operating conditions, but has not produced a tool to inform the potential for loss of containment in oxygen systems based on the different ignition mechanism failure modes. This work aims to develop a series of theoretical models using experimental results and kinetic relationships in order to predict loss of containment in piping for industrial systems for combinations of different failure modes. Using this type of analysis, process designers can make informed decisions on the design of high purity oxygen systems, the timescale required by emergency shutdown systems, and schedules for routine maintenance and inspection. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 299–304, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-28T00:35:27.643263-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11660
       
  • Safety & Health News
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      Pages: 305 - 308
      PubDate: 2014-08-12T14:52:04.892744-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11696
       
  • Initiating events, levels of causality, and process hazard analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: 217 - 220
      Abstract: Process hazard analysis (PHA) is used to identify hazard scenarios for a process and determine if the risk from the scenarios is tolerable. Each scenario begins with an initiating event that is made up of one or more causes. These causes must be recorded in sufficient detail to allow the PHA team to determine the particulars of the scenarios and develop any needed risk reduction measures. There is a hierarchy of causality wherein there are immediate, basic, underlying, and root causes of events. A suitable level of causality must be used in PHA. This article describes the hierarchy, recommends the level that should be used in PHA, and provides guidelines for the information that should be recorded in a PHA worksheet for different types of causes. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 217–220, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-11T22:43:00.520623-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11649
       
  • Allocation of risk tolerance criteria
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: 227 - 230
      Abstract: Risk analysis evaluates the risk of individual hazard scenarios and hazardous events that contribute to the overall risk of a hazardous facility. Therefore, some practitioners employ risk tolerance criteria for hazard scenarios or hazardous events by allocating or apportioning overall facility risk to the scenarios or events. Issues encountered in allocating facility risk tolerance criteria are discussed in this article, including estimating the number of scenarios or events to which a person may be exposed, introducing uncertainty into risk tolerance criteria, and defining scenarios or events uniquely and equivalently. Recommendations are made for using risk tolerance criteria appropriately. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 227–230, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-09-13T21:50:34.135431-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11634
       
  • Using Failure Modes to Enhance What‐If Analysis
    • Authors: Robert L. Collins
      Pages: 231 - 236
      Abstract: What‐If Analysis is one of the most commonly used methods for performing a process hazards analysis (PHA) of a potentially hazardous chemical process. It is used so widely because it is perhaps the simplest and quickest way to perform a PHA. The speed of the PHA method often sacrifices quality by missing important scenarios simply because the right what‐if question was never asked. This article will show how the quality of a What‐If Analysis can be enhanced using failure modes for system component types without significantly increasing study time. A “smart” system using off‐the‐shelf computer software combined with specially designed subroutines or macros is used to demonstrate this process. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 231–236, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-15T04:30:48.289128-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11655
       
  • Safety management systems at unregulated upstream oil and gas facilities
    • Authors: Kristin D. Norton; Michael B. Saura, Colin R. Scholtz
      Pages: 259 - 264
      Abstract: Upstream oil and gas facilities are typically exempt from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Process Safety Management standard; however, in light of recent regulatory scrutiny on the safety of upstream operations, many operating companies have extended their safety management programs to their upstream facilities creating challenges for implementation. Many of these facilities have been operating without significant incidents for many years without proper Process Safety Information, Process Hazard Analyses, Management of Change programs, etc. making the challenge of accepting and implementing these programs difficult to embrace. This article is focused on providing insights and practical tips for the implementation of safety programs at upstream facilities to enhance the commitment to implementing process safety with limited resources. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 259–264, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-10-30T06:28:34.654043-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11653
       
  • Modeling of time‐varying dispersion for releases including potential
           rainout
    • Authors: Henk W.M. Witlox; Mike Harper
      Pages: 265 - 273
      Abstract: Many commonly used atmospheric dispersion models cannot accurately simulate time‐varying releases of hazardous chemicals in the atmosphere. A new version of the Phast Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) has been developed to more accurately simulate time‐varying effects resulting from a decreasing discharge rate in a vessel or pipe and/or resulting from a time‐varying pool (following rainout or from direct spill). The new model includes effects of along‐wind diffusion which reduces concentrations in the far‐field. This is particularly relevant for toxic releases. The new formulation presumes a number of “observers” to be released at successive times from the point of discharge or the upwind edge of the pool. The UDM first carries out pseudo steady‐state calculations for each observer, where the release data correspond to the time at which the observer is released, and where the observer picks up vapor while traveling over the evaporating pool. Subsequently, effects of along‐wind diffusion are included by means of Gaussian integration of observer concentrations over the downwind distance. The above new UDM formulation has been verified against the time‐varying HGSYSTEM model HEGADAS‐T for the specific case of dispersion directly from a pool. Furthermore, it has been tested for more general cases including elevated releases with rainout. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 265–273, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-08T03:08:06.390607-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11652
       
  • BLEVE overpressure: Multiscale comparison of blast wave modeling
    • Authors: D. Laboureur; F. Heymes, E. Lapebie, J.M. Buchlin, P. Rambaud
      Pages: 274 - 284
      Abstract: BLEVE overpressure modeling has been already widely studied but only few validations including the scale effect have been made. After a short overview of the main models available in literature, a comparison is done with different scales of measurements, taken from previous studies or coming from experiments performed in the frame of this research project. A discussion on the best model to use in different cases is finally proposed. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 274–284, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-09-17T10:25:26.960294-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11626
       
 
 
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