for Journals by Title or ISSN
for Articles by Keywords
  Subjects -> ENGINEERING (Total: 2167 journals)
    - CHEMICAL ENGINEERING (184 journals)
    - CIVIL ENGINEERING (168 journals)
    - ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (94 journals)
    - ENGINEERING (1173 journals)
    - HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING (55 journals)
    - INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING (57 journals)
    - MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (81 journals)

ENGINEERING (1173 journals)            First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Journal of Visualization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Volcanology and Seismology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology-Mater. Sci. Ed.     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Zhejiang University SCIENCE A     Hybrid Journal  
Journal on Chain and Network Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Jurnal Teknik ITS     Open Access  
Jurnal Teknologi     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Karaelmas Science and Engineering Journal     Open Access  
Kerntechnik     Full-text available via subscription  
Kleio     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Landscape and Ecological Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Langmuir     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 42)
Latin American Journal of Computing     Open Access  
Leadership and Management in Engineering     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Learning Technologies, IEEE Transactions on     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Lighting Research and Technology     Hybrid Journal  
Logic and Analysis     Hybrid Journal  
Logica Universalis     Hybrid Journal  
Lubrication Science     Hybrid Journal  
Machines     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Machining Science and Technology: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Macromolecular Reaction Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Magazine of Concrete Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Magdeburger Journal zur Sicherheitsforschung     Open Access  
Magnetics Letters, IEEE     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Management and Production Engineering Review     Open Access  
Manufacturing Engineer     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Manufacturing Research and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Marine Technology Society Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
MATEC Web of Conferences     Open Access  
Matériaux & Techniques     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Mathematical Problems in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Mathematics of Control, Signals, and Systems (MCSS)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Mauerwerk     Hybrid Journal  
Measurement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Measurement Science Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Meccanica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Mechatronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Medical and Biological Engineering and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Medical Engineering & Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Membrane Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Membrane Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Memetic Computing     Hybrid Journal  
Metabolic Engineering Communications     Open Access  
Metal Powder Report     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Metallurgist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Metaphysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metascience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metrologia     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Microelectronic Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Microelectronics International     Hybrid Journal  
Microelectronics Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Microelectronics Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Microfluidics and Nanofluidics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Micromachines     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
MNASSA : Monthly Notes of the Astronomical Society of South Africa     Full-text available via subscription  
Modelling and Simulation in Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Modern Applied Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Molecular BioSystems     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Molecular Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Molecular Pharmaceutics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
MRS Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
MRS Online Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Multidimensional Systems and Signal Processing     Hybrid Journal  
NANO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Nano Letters     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 51)
Nano Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Nano Reviews     Open Access   (Followers: 15)
Nanopages     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nanoscale and Microscale Thermophysical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Nanoscale Systems : Mathematical Modeling, Theory and Applications     Open Access  
Nanoscience and Nanoengineering     Open Access  
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology Research     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Nanotechnologies in Russia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nanotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Nanotechnology Magazine, IEEE     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
Nanotechnology Reviews     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Natural Hazards     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 111)
Nature Nanotechnology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 50)
Naval Engineers Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
NDT & E International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Nexo Revista Científica     Open Access  
Nigerian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Nigerian Journal of Technological Research     Full-text available via subscription  
Nigerian Journal of Technology     Full-text available via subscription  
NIR news     Full-text available via subscription  
Noise Mapping     Open Access  
Nonlinear Dynamics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Nonlinear Engineering : Modeling and Application     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nonlinearity     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Nordic Journal of Science and Technology     Open Access  
Nova Scientia     Open Access  
NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nuclear Engineering and Design     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Nuclear Engineering and Technology     Open Access  
Numerical Algorithms     Hybrid Journal  
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part A: Applications: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part B: Fundamentals: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)

  First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Journal Cover   Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.387]   [H-I: 22]   [6 followers]  Follow
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1598 journals]
  • Calculating facility siting study leak sizes‐one size does not fit
    • Authors: Gary Allen Fitzgerald
      Abstract: Consequence‐based Facility Siting Studies (FSSs) typically require the user assume a credible leak size to use in the evaluation of potential releases, which is often up to a 2 inch diameter leak. Many facilities tend to be less complex in comparison to large refineries or petrochemical plants, leading operators at the less complex facilities to ask why they should assume the same leak sizes as more complex facilities. Other facilities have unique processes with safety systems and factors they would like to quantify in a consequence‐based FSS. A unique approach developed by ABS Consulting and first presented in 2011 is called the Maximum Design Leak (MDL) approach (Fitzgerald et al., 2011 Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center International Symposium, October 25, 2011). This approach calculates frequency‐based leak sizes and then applies the leak size that exceeds a frequency criterion (events/year) in a consequence‐based FSS instead of assuming a given leak size as credible. This avoids having to establish risk criteria in terms of fatalities/year and having to model a large number of scenarios yet takes advantage of many features in a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). This article presents three case studies as examples of how the MDL has been applied and illustrates the advantages of calculating leak sizes specific to scenarios being evaluated for low complexity and low risk facilities. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-10T05:40:09.865199-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11764
  • Lessons learned from an incident at a cryogenic gas processing facility
    • Authors: Adrian Pierorazio
      Abstract: In September 2009, a fatal incident occurred in a cryogenic gas processing plant. The investigation of the incident indicated a number of potential issues that may have contributed to or caused the event. These issues include hot work procedures, electrostatic discharge, electrical conduit sealing, convective “breathing” due to multiple vents, equipment age, maintenance, and worker training. The investigation concluded that the fuel for this event was provided by small leaks from the product pipes inside of the cold box; the oxygen was provided by convective “breathing” that occurred due to the presence of two vents from the cold box and the erosion of the flapper valves that were intended to seal these vents; and ignition occurred due to stray currents that resulted from poor hot work procedures, and locating the return lead far from the work location. This article provides an overview of the process and facility, a timeline of events, a summary of the investigative process, and a discussion of the lessons learned from this event. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-08T08:08:34.231781-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11763
  • Amiss, a miss, a near miss
    • Authors: John C. Wincek
      Abstract: Catastrophic incidents, while common in the world, are rare events to any single facility or even company. Were anyone to count catastrophic incidents to measure Process Safety performance, it is likely the facility would be gone before they counted to two. We look instead to Near Miss incidents as one measure of Process Safety performance. We count them and measure their frequency. We implement corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence. We look beyond the specific incident to apply the lessons in other areas. Most importantly, we look for faults in our management systems that permitted the near miss to occur. Defining near misses, identifying their occurrence, and fully learning the lessons they can teach us can be a difficult undertaking. Simple communication of these incidents can be problematic. And, learning lessons from an incident occurring at another facility can challenge even the broadest‐minded people. This article will describe the learning process that has evolved at one specialty chemical company. It will include definitions of specific types of near misses, how data are gathered and communicated, and information on the number and type of incidents occurring. The reader will gain ideas on how to classify and collect data on specific near miss incidents, and ways to communicate the information throughout a company. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-08T08:08:32.352189-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11757
  • The impact of Eastman's aniline plant explosion on process safety
    • Authors: Peter N. Lodal
      Abstract: A single presentation covering one person's first‐hand experience with a significant process safety incident, delivered at the beginning of OSHA's PSM regulation still provides contemporary lessons, even though the actual incident occurred more than 50 years ago. Lessons include: (a) stopping operations unilaterally or getting expert help when readings are unexpected or unusual, (b) establishment of a testing regimen that covers a broad range of conditions, especially those that can be achieved under abnormal circumstances (e.g., fire), and (c) the impact of “restore to original condition” maintenance activities that otherwise might not be analyzed if treated as a replacement‐in‐kind only. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:06:44.963512-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11760
  • The organic peroxides instability rating research based on adiabatic
           calorimetric approaches and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process for inherent
           safety evaluation
    • Authors: Lei Ni; Juncheng Jiang, Zhirong Wang, Jun Yao, Yuan Song, Yuan Yu
      Abstract: This article proposes a new method of instability classification of organic peroxides (ICOP) for assessing the risk of decomposition reaction of organic peroxides, based on the adiabatic calorimetric approaches and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP). Tonset is set as instability possibility index. Maximal power density, adiabatic temperature rise, maximum pressure rate, and maximum pressure are set as instability severity index (ISI) with proper weightings by FAHP. Instability possibility index and ISI are converted into ICOP based on risk matrix. The organic peroxides instability can, therefore, be quantified and divided into four levels, acceptable, moderate risk, highly dangerous, and seriously dangerous. Thermal decomposition of di‐tert‐butyl peroxide 25 mass % and tert‐butyl hydroperoxide 68.4 mass % are tested with Vent Sizing Package 2 and Phi‐Tech 1 which has the function of Accelerating Rate Calorimeter, respectively. Thermal decompositions of other organic peroxides are presented from citation. The instability rating results of these organic peroxides are presented to illustrate the validity of the method. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:05:57.659127-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11754
  • Impacts of process safety time on layer of protection analysis
    • Authors: Geoffrey Barnard; William Creel
      Abstract: The ability of an Independent Protection Layer (IPL) to achieve a given level of risk reduction is dependent upon its fulfillment of several core attributes. A key provision for any IPL to be considered effective and functionally adequate is its capability to respond to a process demand quickly enough to stop the propagation of the hazard scenario it was designed to prevent. While this seems obvious and reasonable, the estimation of Process Safety Time and the specification of IPL Response Times are more complex, and often deferred or overlooked altogether. What is Process Safety Time? How is it determined? When? And by whom? This article examines the relationship between Process Safety Time and IPL Response Times, essential variables for the justification of IPL effectiveness, and their impacts on the success of Layer of Protection Analysis. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:05:36.985744-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11759
  • 1996 amines plant explosion
    • Authors: Jerry Forest
      Abstract: Process safety management systems should be in place to ensure repeatability in operations. A good system consists of higher level procedures that describe what to do. At the plant level, the management system describes who does the activity and how it is done. Following procedures leads to predictability in operations. In 1996, Celanese had established a rigorous management system that consisted of 21 elements of process safety. However, before the elements could be fully implanted globally, failure to rigorously apply several elements led to an explosion in our Cangrejera facility resulting in two fatalities. This article discusses the management system failures of conduct of operations elements, safe operating limits, standard operating procedures and training, and critical safety equipment management and how each failed due to a common weakness of management systems. An overview of the Celanese Process Safety Lessons Learned program is presented as our way of embedding knowledge of this and other incidents in our culture to prevent similar incidents in the future. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-06T10:05:16.359278-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11765
  • Good till the last drop: How much is too much valve leakage?
    • Authors: Karen Study; Peter Allan, Adam Cozat, Kees Meliefste, Eloise Roche, Tim Wagner
      Abstract: Validating the effectiveness of safety instrumented systems (SISs) is an integral and vitally important part of maintaining protection layers and preventing a hazardous condition. However, deciding on the basis for what constitutes “sufficiently safe” can be difficult. For example, when considering valves used as the final element in SISs, many in industry are basing the Maximum Allowable Leakage Rate (MALR) on the valve tightness specification instead of the hazardous condition that is being prevented when these valves are closed. This article will review a pilot conducted at The Dow Chemical Company to compare using the valve tightness class as a basis for MALR versus a safety‐based calculated MALR. Economics and safety aspects are evaluated and the general types of safety based calculations used are reviewed. Key questions answered include: (1) what exactly is the requirement for estimating MALR, (2) how is MALR calculated using a safety basis, (3) are there differences in cost when basing MALR on valve tightness class versus a safety based calculation, (4) are time efficiencies realized when basing MALR on the safety case versus on the valve tightness class, and (5) which is usually more conservative, a valve tightness class‐based MALR or a safety‐based MALR? © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-04T01:55:25.481046-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11756
  • The evolution of process safety standards and legislation following
           landmark events—what have we learnt?
    • Authors: Trish Kerin
      Abstract: While modern process safety can be dated back to E.I. duPont in the early 1800s with the building of black powder plants including separation distances, and blast zones, the management of process safety has come a long way. Despite this, however, we have continued to see many catastrophic incidents occur, across a range of industries. There have been significant learning opportunities from the catastrophes, but are we actually applying the learnings? Exploring the past 40 years history shows a number of landmark process safety events. These events have not only changed our state of knowledge for managing process safety but have also resulted in standards and legislative change in multiple jurisdictions. This article explores the significant learnings that came out of the various landmark process safety events and the impact these changes have had on how process safety is managed today. Incidents considered as case studies in this article include the following: Flixborough UK (1974), Seveso Italy (1976), Bhopal India (1984), Piper Alpha UK (1988), Longford Australia (1998), Texas City Refinery USA (2005), Montara Australia (2009), Macondo USA (2010), and Pike River New Zealand (2010). © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-08-03T04:00:32.061132-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11762
  • Big data is it a big deal?
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      PubDate: 2015-07-30T05:22:45.986608-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11761
  • Methods and data sources for identifying members of a regulated community
    • Authors: William C. Pittman; Zhe Han, Brian Z. Harding, Jiaojun Jiang, Camilo Rosas, Alba Pineda, M. Sam Mannan
      Abstract: The Ammonium Nitrate explosion that shook West, Texas in April 2013 revealed deficiencies in the current regulatory enforcement system used for chemical safety and security in the United States. This cannot be said to be a failure of existing regulations. Rather, it is a failure in enforcement as federal regulators either had not inspected the site in decades—as with OSHA—or had not been aware of its existence at all, as with Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Regulations cannot be effective if they are not enforced and cannot be enforced unless the regulator knows who the members of the regulated community are. Methods for identifying the regulated community and moving past the voluntary reporting and compliance system currently in place have become topics of acute interest and paramount importance. This article discusses existing data sources at federal, state, and local levels that could be exploited immediately to help DHS and other regulators identify regulated facilities and begin more concerted outreach programs. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-07-23T10:20:54.843851-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11742
  • Dow learnings and actions from the deepwater horizon accident
    • Authors: John Champion; Kenan Stevick, Karen Study, Sheila Van Geffen
      Abstract: The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion on April 20, 2010, killed 11 workers, injured 16 others, and resulted in an offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that is considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry. As with all major incidents in industry, there are lessons to learn from systemic failures that resulted in the tragic loss of life, insult to the environment, and the equipment loss. Many companies, including The Dow Chemical Company, followed the subsequent investigation closely to determine which lessons could be leveraged to strengthen internal programs. Risk identification and management systems in Dow's Process and Occupational Safety programs are robust. Dow management systems are intended to meet or exceed Industry Standards with respect to design, operation, and layers of protection. The prevention of large scale accidents like Deepwater Horizon depends on an acute awareness of worst‐case scenarios and an unfailing vigilance to ensure that essential protection layers are not compromised. Dow management system reviews in 2011 on the same management systems involved in this incident identified opportunities for improvement and/or action plans in several areas. This article will focus on three programs that resulted from those management system reviews. The three programs are: a targeted High‐Consequence Emergency Response Drill program, a High Potential Process Safety Near Miss Program, and technology‐specific Process Safety Cardinal Rules. For each of the three programs, a description of the content of the program and how it was implemented at the company level is provided. Specific examples of how these programs were implemented at a facility level are included. Each of these programs play a key role in preventing a catastrophic event and have been a part of Dow's continuing process safety performance improvement over the last several years. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-07-15T02:25:02.179286-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11752
  • Erratum
    • PubDate: 2015-07-15T02:23:20.355195-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11755
  • Probabilistic modeling of business interruption and reputational losses
           for process facilities
    • Authors: Seyed Javad Hashemi; Salim Ahmed, Faisal Khan
      Abstract: This article presents probabilistic models to estimate business losses due to abnormal situations in process facilities. The main elements of business loss are identified as business interruption loss and reputational loss. The business interruption insurance approach is used to model business interruption loss. The subelements of business interruption loss are modeled based on expert knowledge using Program Evaluation Review Technique, which are then integrated using the Monte Carlo simulation approach. The reputational loss is considered as Weibull distributed, and the parameters are estimated by applying a scenario‐based approach. Copula functions are then used to develop the distribution of the aggregate loss, considering the correlation between business interruption and reputational losses. The application of the loss models is demonstrated using a distillation column case study. The models presented here provide a mechanism to monitor process facility's business performance, with associated uncertainties, and to make swift operational and safety decisions. This will help to improve process facilities safety performance and optimal allocation of resources where they are needed the most. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-07-07T09:00:17.367213-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11753
  • A method for barrier‐based incident investigation
    • Authors: Robin Pitblado; Tony Potts, Mark Fisher, Stuart Greenfield
      Abstract: Incident investigation is a formal requirement for high hazard facilities with the aim to learn from each incident and to prevent future recurrences. There are many published investigation methods, with most driving to the management system root cause and some applying newer barrier‐based methods. However, these methods either do not link tightly to the facility risk assessment or are very difficult to apply, and lessons from incidents that might reveal weaknesses, especially relating to major accidents, can be missed. This article describes a novel method for incident investigation (Barrier‐based Systematic Cause Analysis Technique) that combines the ideas of barrier‐based risk assessment with a well‐established systems‐based root cause analysis method (Systematic Cause Analysis Technique). The method described is efficient and can be applied by properly trained supervisors, and this potentially allows every incident or near‐miss event to be assessed in a consistent risk‐based format. The method clearly establishes links back to the facility risk assessment and thus identifies risk pathways that are potentially too optimistic (i.e., the risk is higher than predicted), and this can be due to initial optimism or degradation of safety barriers (human or hardware). © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-27T04:22:16.988811-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11738
  • Risky Rewards, How Company Bonuses Affect Safety: A Review, (2015) By
           Andrew Hopkins and Sarah Maslen, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham,
           England, 175 pages, $85 Australian, ISBN:
    • Authors: John Murphy
      PubDate: 2015-06-27T04:21:55.029869-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11751
  • Using alarms as a layer of protection
    • Authors: Todd Stauffer; Peter Clarke
      Abstract: Alarms and operator response to them are one of the first layers of protection used in preventing a plant upset from escalating to an incident. This article discusses how to evaluate the risk reduction (or the probability of failure on demand) of this layer when it is considered as part of a layer of protection analysis. It examines key factors such as time to respond, operator training, human factors, alarm system performance, and the reliability of the hardware used to annunciate the alarm. Recommendations will be drawn from the ISA‐18.2 standard “Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries.” Analogy will be drawn with techniques used to analyze safety instrumented functions. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-12T04:31:16.446023-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11739
  • The Ten Commandments of risk based process safety
    • Authors: Robert Rosen
      Abstract: There are many critical points for inclusion in a Risk Based Process Safety program. This paper focuses on ten of them. While a person could come up with many more, these are the most important in the author's experience. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-12T04:30:30.766244-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11750
  • Suppression effect of explosion in linked spherical vessels and pipelines
           impacted by wire‐mesh structure
    • Authors: Shangfeng Zhang; Zhirong Wang, Qingqing Zuo, Juncheng Jiang, Changde Cheng
      Abstract: A series of experiments are conducted to study suppression effect of multilayer wire‐mesh structure on methane‐air mixture explosion in linked vessels. Explosion suppression effect is analyzed for explosion suppression structures with different layers and meshes. The most reasonable multilayer wire‐mesh structure is obtained. The multilayer wire‐mesh has a greater impact on explosion intensity in the big vessel than that in the small vessel. The combination of different layer number and mesh number has different explosion suppression effect on explosion. Mesh number has little effect on explosion pressure in both vessels when the layers are few. When the layers are more, the explosion pressure in both vessels is greatly impacted by mesh number. Under the condition of the same mesh number, the more the layers are, the better the explosion suppression effect. 5 and 7 are the critical explosion suppression layer number for 40‐mesh and 60‐mesh wire‐mesh structure, respectively. Compared with 5‐layer 40‐mesh wire‐mesh structure, the effect of 7‐layer 60‐mesh wire‐mesh structure on explosion suppression is better. So, in actual explosion protection design, the optional explosion suppression structure should be decided by taking into account of the comprehensive effect of layer number and mesh number. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-06-09T00:57:38.081836-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11728
  • CFD‐based simulation study on producer gas explosion in an
           electrostatic precipitation
    • Authors: Kai Yang; Qiang Li, Zhijiang Ding, Lichun Xiao
      Abstract: Gas explosion is one of the most serious problems in the operation of electrostatic precipitation (ESP) which is applied to purify producer gas. Simulation study on the producer gas explosion in ESP has been conducted with computational fluid dynamic method. Producer gas explosion was studied experimentally in a closed rectangular vessel to validate simulation results. Numerical results were proved to be reliable and reasonable which could meet the engineering needs. The factors of flame propagation and pressure variation have also been analyzed. Furthermore, the effects of those explosion parameters such as premixed oxygen concentration, operating conditions, and local gas clouds with high oxygen content were discussed. The results show that maximum explosion pressure rises sharply with the premixed oxygen concentration increasing. Meanwhile, maximum explosion pressure increases with the operating pressure boosting, but decreases while the operating temperature elevates. Explosion pressure of local gas cloud with high oxygen content is a linear function of its volume. For this model, the critical diameter of gas clouds is 1.2 m with the oxygen concentration of 20%. The volumetric ratio of gas clouds in this model is 0.04. This study gives a reference for the optimization of oxygen monitoring‐feedback system response, and can provide theoretical guidance for the design of explosion protection. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-04-27T10:33:16.975691-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11743
  • Maintenance of fire sprinkler systems based on the dynamic assessment of
           its condition
    • Abstract: Safety is one of the major concerns of process safety engineers in most industrial facilities all over the world. To this scope, some events play an important role once the effect of their consequences can be assumed as totally undesirable. One of these events refers to the occurrence of a fire. Such event can result in catastrophic consequences for life, equipment, and continuity of activities or even leading to environmental damage. A fire protection equipment with low reliability means that this equipment are often unavailable and thus the risk of a fire increases. Maintenance of fire protection equipment is very important because this kind of systems is mostly in a dormant mode, which gives uncertainty about their operability when demanded in a real situation of fire. This article outlines the importance of tests, inspection, and maintenance operations in the context of a fire sprinkler system and proposes a methodology based on international standards and supported by test/inspection reports to correct the frequency of these actions according to the level of degradation of the components and regarding safety purposes. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-04-25T03:11:16.621317-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11740
  • Analysis of a blast due to inadvertant mixing of ammonium sulfate and
           sodium hyplochlorite
    • Authors: Graeme W. Norval
      Abstract: Ammonium sulfate and sodium hypochlorite are common industrial chemicals, often used together in water treatment. The consequences of mixing hypochlorite (chlorine) solution with ammonia solutions are well understood within the chlorine industry; detonable chloramines are produced. This knowledge is not well known in other industries; fortunately, few locations have both chemicals on site. These products were inadvertently mixed, resulting in an explosion, at a water treatment facility in Kitchener, Ontario on April 2, 2014. The chemistry of the incident is presented and discussed. Facilities that handle both chemicals, such as the water treatment industry need to have heightened sense of understanding of this particular reactive chemical hazard. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-03-25T23:41:55.473893-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11741
  • ASTM E2931: A new standard for the limiting oxygen concentration of
           combustible dusts
    • Authors: Ashok Ghose Dastidar
      Abstract: The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) has a standard on explosion protection systems, NFPA 69, which provides guidelines on effective inerting to prevent explosions. The standard specifies that for inerting to be effective the oxygen concentration must be kept below the Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC). It then goes on to specify that the ASTM International standard E2079 be used to establish the LOC. The shortcoming of this approach is that ASTM E2079 only applies to combustible gases and vapors and not combustible dusts. As a result of this deficiency ASTM International has just introduced a new standard, ASTM E2931, Standard Test Method for Limiting Oxygen (Oxidant) Concentration of Combustible Dust Clouds. This paper discusses the nuances of this standard and compares experimental results between the 20‐L chamber and the 1‐m3 chamber. Differences in the test results between the vessels and between test methods may have safety ramifications to the end user of the data. The large variation present in the repeatability and reproducibility of the LOC means that the current common practice of using a 2% safety margin for particle inerting (the least stringent of the inerting methods) may be insufficient to ensure dust cloud explosion mitigation. It is possible that additional study and improved laboratory proficiency as the test standard matures will bring down these repeatability and reproducibility errors. Additionally, if LOCs are reported in Safety Data Sheets without accompanying information regarding the test method or test vessel size used, the mitigation strategy may not provide adequate protection. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-02-11T23:58:11.161522-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11731
  • Process safety in the classroom: The current state of chemical engineering
           programs at US universities
    • Authors: Sean J. Dee; Brenton L. Cox, Russell A. Ogle
      Abstract: The role of process safety in the undergraduate and graduate curriculum is a critical component of preparing chemical engineers for their future careers. In 2011, the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) amended the requirements for Chemical, Biochemical, Biomolecular, and similarly named Engineering Programs. The change added a clause, indicating that the curriculum of said programs should not only include the engineering application of chemistry, physics, and/or biology to the design, analysis and control of processes, but also the hazards associated with those processes. Departments were then compelled to adjust their curricula to meet the new requirement which would go into effect during the 2012–2013 Accreditation evaluations. Herein, we present findings related to the major milestones and challenges associated with updating the chemical engineering curriculum to include process safety components at both the undergraduate and graduate level. First, a survey of publicly available information regarding curriculum requirements, course syllabi, and program developments at US universities will be discussed. Next, insights from evaluating the challenges associated with adding new content to an already overloaded curriculum will be discussed. Lastly, recommendations for continued improvement in the process safety education provided to undergraduate and graduate students will be presented. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-02-11T23:57:22.142132-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11732
  • Infiltration hazards for building siting studies
    • Authors: Jeffrey D. Marx; Benjamin R. Ishii
      Abstract: Facility siting studies have been a requirement for many years, specifically for facilities that must comply with OSHA's PSM program. Facility siting is frequently interpreted as performing a building siting study which adheres to the guidance given in API RP 752. Many of the siting studies conducted for large facilities over the past few decades have focused on explosion overpressure impacts to occupied buildings, with more simplistic evaluations for fire and toxic gas impacts. Toxic gas impact analyses often only evaluate the potential exposure of a building location, to a specific gas concentration, and do not evaluate the level of infiltration into the building where occupants may be impacted. Infiltration of flammable gases has largely been ignored in most building siting studies. Despite this oversight, this hazard is one which should be addressed when following the guidance found within API RP 752. Through the use of dispersion modeling and infiltration analyses, the hazards associated with flammable or toxic gas infiltration can be incorporated into a building siting study. This article outlines the process of conducting a building siting study in accordance with API RP 752, with specific emphasis on the consequence analysis for infiltration analyses. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-01-29T23:55:40.05562-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11726
  • Safety and health newsletter summer edition 2015
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      Pages: 305 - 309
      PubDate: 2015-08-10T02:53:19.00418-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11758
  • Safety improvements in a Methanation reactor
    • Authors: Mike Walton; Tony Southerton, Paul Sharp
      Abstract: A 35‐year‐old Methanator vessel required replacement due to High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA). The opportunity was taken to upgrade the over temperature protection system to meet the requirements of IEC 61511. An additional Layer of Protection was added to reduce demand on the High Temperature Trip system. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009
      PubDate: 2009-05-06T00:00:00-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.10325
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
Fax: +00 44 (0)131 4513327
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-2015