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Journal Cover Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.359]   [H-I: 28]   [6 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1609 journals]
  • Transportation risk management: One company's approach
    • Authors: Elizabeth Lutostansky; Gary Miller, Martin Dennehy
      Abstract: Air Products has a long history in process safety risk management. The company evaluates the risk of transporting hazardous substances in addition to its risk assessments for fixed sites and pipelines. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) book, Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis, has been used as the starting point for the Air Products approach to this subject. Over the past few years, the company has refined its transportation assessment methodology and calculation tools and has established a work process where the businesses and supply chains are integrated into the transportation risk analysis (TRA) process. The purpose of this article is to summarize Air Products' TRA process, including criteria for deciding if TRA is required, selection of release scenarios considered in a TRA, assumptions made regarding populations and weather conditions and the overall risk review process. An example risk analysis will be presented. Comments on the comparison of TRA with pipeline TRA will also be provided. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-16T04:06:31.821829-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11852
       
  • Used, classic, or antique; solving the enigma of disciplined adherence to
           standards for existing equipment
    • Authors: Jack McCavit; Todd Aukerman, Jeff Fox, Rukyah Hennessey
      Abstract: What do you consider when buying a used car? Do you have minimum safety requirements for your used car? Similarly, do you have minimum safety requirements for existing equipment in your plant? One of the CCPS Vision 20/20 Industry Tenets is Disciplined Adherence to Standards. In this tenet, Vision 20/20 puts special emphasis on application of standards for existing equipment. Companies with great process safety performance recognize that having minimum standards for existing equipment is as important as having them for new projects. However, identifying and applying relevant standards to equipment that may have been installed decades ago can be challenging. This article will describe how to establish minimum standards for existing equipment and will provide a suggested approach for the implementation of these internal or common industry standards. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-16T04:06:29.64825-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11851
       
  • Personnel safety with pressurized gas systems
    • Authors: Lee C. Cadwallader; Haihua Zhao
      Abstract: In this article, selected aspects of safety with compressed gas systems are discussed. Several accident case histories are described that illustrate the potential modes of injury from gas jets, pressure‐driven missiles, and asphyxiants. Using high‐pressure helium and nitrogen, estimates of safe exclusion distances to prevent skin injuries from gas leaks are calculated for differing pressures, temperatures, and breach sizes. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-08T07:05:21.593356-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11850
       
  • Application of a liquid nitrogen direct jet system to the extinguishment
           of oil pool fires in open space
    • Authors: Bobo Shi; Fubao Zhou
      Abstract: Liquid fuel fires occurring during industrial processes are serious safety concerns around the world due to their devastating impact on lives, the environment and property. In this study, a liquid nitrogen delivery system was set up to extinguish the oil pool fires in open space. Effects of liquid nitrogen flow rate, pipe diameter, and liquid nitrogen release distance on the suppression process were analyzed according to the mass loss, burning rate and temperature variations. When liquid nitrogen release distance was 0.50 m and pipe diameter was 0.04 m, fire extinguishing time was the shortest 1.6 s and the temperature decrease rate above the liquid fuel surface reached 275°C/s. Fuel surface cooling and blow off process were revealed through the experiments as two kinds of fire extinguishing mechanisms. Based on the flame images captured by high speed camera, the flame expansion phenomenon might occur early in liquid nitrogen injection, especially the situation of the higher flow rate of liquid nitrogen. Three approaches (ground fixed system, moving transportation, and directional transportation of liquid nitrogen) are provided for fire extinguishment of large scale fires. The results obtained provide important reference for the conduct of fire extinguishment for fires. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-08-16T02:36:38.239568-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11840
       
  • RAGAGEP considerations for relief and flare systems
    • Authors: Georges A. Melhem; Casey Houston
      Abstract: Recent emphasis on Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) increased the scope of relief systems risk factors that require evaluation to develop complete and compliant Pressure Relief and Flare Systems documentation. Failure to comply with RAGAGEP ((d)(3)(ii)) is the most cited element of the Process Safety Management requirements. This paper discusses how RAGAGEP considerations now require evaluation and proper documentation of risk factors that are often overlooked including but not limited to: dispersion analysis, thermal radiation, noise, vibration risk, reaction forces and structural supports, metal cold temperatures due to expansion cooling and two phase flow, hot temperatures due to fire exposure and/or runaway reactions, PRV stability, chemical reaction systems, and loss of high pressure/low pressure interface. Important RAGAGEP considerations for these additional risk factors are highlighted and discussed. Recommendations are provided on how to best address these factors in the evaluation and documentation of design basis. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-08-11T05:00:37.871146-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11839
       
  • Human Error in Process Plant Design and Operations, a Practitioner's
           Guide, a Review (2016) By J. Robert Taylor, CR Press, Taylor & Francis
           
    • Authors: John Murphy
      PubDate: 2016-08-09T06:05:44.398434-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11841
       
  • Anatomy of Tianjin Port fire and explosion: Process and causes
    • Authors: Gui Fu; Jianhao Wang, Mingwei Yan
      Abstract: An investigation was performed into the Tianjin Port fire and explosion accident. It mainly focused on the process and causes. Initially, nitrocellulose burned spontaneously and the fire resulted in two major explosions of hazardous chemicals (mainly ammonium nitrate). Rough handling during the moving, loading and unloading of nitrocellulose directly resulted in the spontaneous combustion. Specifically, stacking various hazardous chemicals in the same area and storing ammonium nitrate in the port without permission caused the spread of the fire and the two major explosions. The implementation of Ruihai Company's management system (e.g., the safety training, safety supervision, etc.) for storage and transport of hazardous chemicals was deficient, and they neglected the importance of safety during production. Periodic safety inspection (e.g., the hazard identification, storage plan of hazardous chemicals, management system weaknesses, etc.) from local government agencies was not adequate and rigorous. Following accidents, casualties can be reduced or even avoided through adequate evacuation and rescue. Lessons can be learned from this disaster to avoid similar mistakes within the industry in the future. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-26T08:46:47.676428-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11837
       
  • When it comes to ammonium nitrate, the initiator is free
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      PubDate: 2016-07-26T08:46:05.809435-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11838
       
  • Fall 2016 safety & health news
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2016-07-19T05:41:00.572128-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11836
       
  • The eye opener: Preparing for and performing facility siting to best
           communicate with upper management
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: Upon completion of a facility siting study, a major step in the critical path for implementation is acceptance from upper management on the remediation plan. Communicating with upper management occurs at the end of several steps which can be strategically mapped in order to maximize upper management's understanding of the needs of a site's remediation requirements. Using an example chemical plant, this paper will detail the process of initiating a facility siting study, provide a novel approach to prioritizing building remediation requirements, and discuss how the resulting information can best be framed and communicated to upper management. In addition to discussing strategies for effective communication with upper management on proposed facility siting strategies, the paper also details an online system that could be used for keeping facility siting data evergreen after the study is completed. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-17T23:25:41.39118-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11835
       
  • Expanded Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW4) for determining chemical
           compatibility, past, present, and future
    • Authors: James Farr; Dave Gorman, Dan Sliva, Al Hielscher, Trong Nguyen, George Baran, Brenton Drake, Emory Ford, Dave Frurip, Kirk Mulligan, John W. Ryan, Dalina Viveros
      Abstract: Chemical compatibility is a key consideration throughout the chemical industry wherever two or more chemicals have the potential to mix, either inadvertently or by design. One of the most comprehensive tools available for determining chemical compatibility, the NOAA Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW), has gained significant traction since the release of the third version (CRW3) in 2012. In 3 years, this free software has been downloaded >200,000 times and has become the chemical compatibility tool of choice at many organizations. As a result of an ongoing partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), The Dow Chemical Company, The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Materials Technology Institute (MTI) and other industrial/academic/government volunteers, a fourth version of the CRW (CRW4) has been developed. The expanded capabilities of this new version include a materials of construction section, improved import/exporting/data sharing capabilities, additional reactive groups to aid in determining compatibility decisions, several user interface enhancements, along with the correction of minor issues found in the CRW3. This article will describe past development, the new features included in the CRW4, followed by a brief discussion of future development plans for the software tool. Such developments should solidify this tool's position as the gold standard within the chemical industry for determining chemical hazards. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-17T23:25:33.181123-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11833
       
  • Experimental investigation of the innovative foaming device using gas as
           the sole power for firefighting
    • Authors: Zhilin Xi
      Abstract: Foam is used as an efficient means of firefighting. The innovative foaming device using gas as the sole power is designed to replace the previous foam generating system using two or three power sources, and appropriate size of the new foaming device can be made to control dust and fire in households or companies based on the actual need. The results of the experimental investigation on the new device in three cases are as follows: in the first case, the minimum working pressure is 0.4 MPa and the working flow range is: 8.0858 m3/h ≤ qa ≤ 48.45 m3/h and qL ≤ 0.4532 m3/h. In the second case, the maximum working time of the new foaming device is 109 s and the minimum working pressure of the storage tank II is 0.26 Mpa. In the third case, the maximum working time of the new device is 205 s and the minimum working pressure values of the storage tanks I and II are 0.26 Mpa and 0.3 Mpa respectively. The fire extinguishing experiment is explained in this article, and the results show that the foam generated by the new foaming device is more effective and efficient than the ABC powder fire extinguisher. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-15T05:31:12.815552-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11834
       
  • Parametric generation of explosion scenarios for quantitative risk
           assessment of gas explosion in offshore plants
    • Authors: YeongAe Heo; Inwon Lee
      Abstract: In this study, probabilistic risk assessment has been carried out for the prediction of gas explosion loads due to hydrocarbon leaks and subsequent explosions in the topside of offshore platforms. In the initial phase of the risk assessment, the effect of various scenario parameters on the annual probability of gas explosion was quantified via a MATLAB code. For calculating the gas explosion frequency, the hydrocarbon leak frequencies and the ignition probabilities were derived from the HCR (HydroCarbon Release) database from the Health & Safety Executive (HSE, UK), and the IP (Ignition Probability) report from UKOOA (UK Offshore Operators Association), respectively. The MATLAB code has the algorithm to cope with the varying design practice in either Front End Engineering Design phase or detailed design phase. User‐definable parameter setup and spreadsheet data input provide the user with the flexibility in selecting relevant level of elaboration for such design parameters as the leak size distribution, the hydrocarbon composition, etc. These features of the code enable controlling the number of explosion scenarios without any parameter range remaining unaccounted for. The present MATLAB code has been applied to generate hydrocarbon leak scenarios and corresponding explosion probability for the topside process modules of a specific oil Floating Production, Storage and Offloading. Varying the number of cases for each parameter leads to the variation of the number of explosion scenarios selected, which are either 48 or 24 in the particular case. For each explosion scenario, the gas leak and explosion simulation was carried out using the FLame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) commercial S/W package, giving rise to the annual probability of exceedance for the explosion overpressure. Discussion of the influence of explosion scenario selection method on the change of the overpressure exceedance curves is made. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-04T06:21:04.534931-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11832
       
  • Beyond HAZOP and LOPA: Four different company approaches
    • Authors: Jerry Wayne Chastain; Paul Delanoy, Chris Devlin, Thomas Mueller, Karen Study
      Abstract: For operations where application of standards, regulations, and/or Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices may not be sufficient to address a particular company's risk, several options exist. For qualitative assessment of process hazards, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) and What‐If reviews are two of the most common petrochemical industry methods used. Up to 80% of a company's process hazard analysis (PHA) may consist of HAZOP and What‐If reviews (Nolan, Application of HAZOP and What‐If Safety Reviews to the Petroleum, Petrochemical and Chemical Industries, William Andrew Publishing/Noyes, 1994, p. 1). After the PHA, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is commonly used throughout industry to evaluate the required safety integrity level for instrumented protection layers in a semiquantitative manner (Dowell, International Conference and Workshop on Risk Analysis in Process Safety, CCPS/AIChE, 1997). HAZOP, What‐If, and LOPA are all straightforward methods and are relatively easy to perform. However, much like a hammer, they are not always the best or most appropriate tool for a given job. At times, more advanced methodologies such as Fault Tree Analysis, Quantitative Risk Assessment, Event Tree, Failure Mode, and Effects Analysis and Human Reliability Analysis are necessary to properly assess risk. However, these more advanced tools come with a price. They are often more expensive, time consuming, and require a higher level of expertise. The decision to use these higher level methodologies is not taken lightly and different companies use different criteria for determining when to take this next step. This article will present approaches by four companies, BASF, Celanese, The Dow Chemical Company, and Eastman Chemical Company. Each company will outline criteria used to determine when to go beyond HAZOP, What‐If, and LOPA and will present examples where more advanced techniques were used. The intent of this article is to provide readers with real world examples that demonstrate the appropriate application of the “right” tool and to illustrate what criteria can be used to make informed decisions regarding selection of a PHA methodology. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-06-21T06:15:32.067724-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11831
       
  • Dynamic risk‐based maintenance for offshore processing facility
    • Authors: Jyoti Bhandari; Ehsan Arzaghi, Rouzbeh Abbassi, Vikram Garaniya, Faisal Khan
      Abstract: Processing facilities in a marine environment may not remain safe and available if they are not well maintained. Dynamic risk‐based maintenance (RBM) methodology is a tool for maintenance planning and decision making, used to enhance the safety and availability of the equipment. It also assists in identifying and prioritizing the maintenance of equipment based on the level of risk. This article discusses an advanced methodology for the design of an optimum maintenance program integrating a dynamic risk‐based approach with a maintenance optimization technique. In this study, Bayesian Network (BN) is employed to develop a new dynamic RBM methodology that is capable of using accident precursor information in order to revise the risk profile. The use of this methodology is based on its failure prediction capability which optimizes the cost of maintenance. The developed methodology is applied to a case study involving a failure of a separator system in the offshore oil and gas production platform considering marine environments. The result shows it is essential that the valve system in the separator needs to be planned for maintenance once every 25 days; however, the cooler system can be planned for repairs once only biennially. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted to study the criticality of the operating system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-05-06T23:55:28.973882-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11829
       
  • Risk assessment on chemical plants by the method of safety checklist
           analysis
    • Authors: Zhang Xiaoliang; Shen Qian, Zhao Daoliang, Zhang Zhikai, He Rui, Song Huijuan
      Abstract: In this article, 46 chemical plants were investigated and assessed by Safety Department of Shanghai Institute of Technology in China. The safety management and technology ability and level were evaluated by the method of Safety Checklist Analysis (SCA) under the perspective of Safety Specialty Engineer. The risk levels of the overall of 46 plants were got. The SCA assessment presents the visible and invisible risks of the plants quantitatively and plainly. The results show that a majority of the plants have not fully implemented either on the good safety management or the reliable safety practice technology. The level of the overall risk indicate that about 35% of the plants reach the level of A (Scores ≥90), and others both lower than A, even 2 plants in the level of E, with total disregard for their health, safety, and well‐being. Otherwise, 23 items were surveyed and judged one by one in safety assessment by SCA, and put forward suggestions for rectify and reform, which helps the plants recognize the reality of the situation and make better in the future. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-20T04:18:03.998042-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11827
       
  • Process safety: A wicked problem?
    • Authors: James Moseman
      Abstract: The nature of process accidents is discussed, and the relevant definition of Horst Rittel's social phenomenon, “wicked problems,” is examined. Existing accident models are reviewed for inclusion of social drivers thought to dominate process accidents. A suggested method, new to process safety and termed morphological analysis, is offered to uncover unacknowledged drivers. Give the purported fit of process safety as a wicked problem, an assessment of the US Chemical Safety Board's “Most Wanted” is made doubting its potential reduction in accidents. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-15T04:15:39.086593-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11826
       
  • Interrelations between process safety management elements
    • Authors: Hanida Abdul Aziz; Azmi Mohd Shariff, Risza Rusli
      Abstract: OSHA PSM standard has been established with 14 elements that define the management principles to control process hazards and protect the workplace. One of the key factors to the success of Process Safety Management (PSM) implementation is that each element comes as a component in an integrated PSM program. Although various kind of integrated safety management systems have been introduced, direct integration system between PSM elements was not extensively studied due to vague concept on interrelation between PSM elements. This also hampers efforts in designing and developing integrated system for PSM. In this study, the interrelation of critical PSM elements was analyzed based on objectives and information functional of the elements stipulated in OSHA PSM regulations. From the conducted analysis, all the critical elements are interrelated at least with other seven PSM elements. Among the elements, Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity were identified to have the highest interrelations comprising of 12 interrelated PSM elements. The developed PSM matrix has systematically showed the interrelation of critical PSM elements that useful for the development of Integrated PSM system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:49.613016-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11824
       
  • Lower explosion limit/minimum explosible concentration testing for hybrid
           mixtures in the Godbert‐Greenwald furnace
    • Authors: Emmanuel Kwasi Addai; Dieter Gabel, Ulrich Krause
      Abstract: Experimental investigations of the lower explosion limits (LEL) of three‐component hybrid mixtures of six combustible dusts, three gases, and four solvents were performed in the modified Godbert‐Greenwald furnace. The test protocol was in accordance with European standard EN 50281‐2‐1 which is originally used to determine the minimum ignition temperature of dusts. Modification was done on the equipment to test for the explosion limits for dusts, gases, solvents, and hybrid mixtures. In order to prove the validity of our experimental procedure, the LEL for pure gases were initially tested and the results were compared with values found in literature obtained from the standard procedure which show very good agreement. The experimental results demonstrated a significant decrease of the explosion limits of gas, solvent, or dust and an increase in the likelihood of explosion when a small amount of dust was mixed with gas or solvent and vice versa. For example, the minimum explosible concentration (MEC) of high density polyethylene (HDPE) of 174 g/m3 decreased to 130 g/m3 upon addition of methane the concentration of which itself was below the LEL. The MEC of HDPE further decreased to 65 g/m3 when a nonexplosible concentration of hexane was added. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:31.061074-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11825
       
  • The effect of an obstacle on methane‐air explosions in a spherical
           vessel connected to a pipeline
    • Authors: Qingqing Zuo; Zhirong Wang, Yaya Zhen, Shangfeng Zhang, Yiqing Cui, Juncheng Jiang
      Abstract: A series of experiments are carried out to reveal the effect of an obstacle on the explosion intensity of a methane‐air mixture in a spherical vessel connected to a pipeline. Results show that obstacle presence, blockage ratio, and position play significant roles in explosion intensity. The oscillation amplitude of pressure both in the vessel and at the pipeline terminus weakens when an obstacle exists in the pipeline. The effects of the blockage ratio on explosion intensity are different when obstacle position changes. Explosive intensity decreases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is set at the intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline and in the middle section of the pipeline. Moreover, when the blockage ratio is ∼56%, the minimum explosion intensity is obtained when the obstacle is set at the middle section of the pipeline. Explosion intensity increases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus. The most dangerous case is when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus, especially when the blockage ratio is 75% or greater. The maximum pressure and the rate of pressure increase at the point of intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline are higher than at the middle section. The conclusions provide an important reference for designing explosion venting safety systems and explosion‐resistant designs. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-31T06:25:59.078642-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11823
       
  • Effect of pipe length on methane explosion in interconnected vessels
    • Authors: Kai Zhang; Zhirong Wang, Juncheng Jiang, Wei Sun, Mingwei You
      Abstract: A series of experiments have been conducted to study the influence of pipe length on methane‐air mixture explosion in linked vessels. Two kinds of setups, that is, a spherical vessel connected to a pipe and two spherical vessels connected by a pipe, are used. The characteristics of explosion pressure and flame propagation speed in linked vessels are obtained. The influence of flame propagation direction and the ignition position on explosion pressure and the flame propagation speed are also analyzed under different pipe lengths. The experimental results show that the maximum explosion pressure and the pressure rising rate in the secondary vessel increase with pipe length. The maximum explosion pressure and pressure rising rate increase most obviously when the small vessel is used as the secondary vessel. Moreover, the pressure oscillation is more violent. However, the primary vessel explosion pressure changes a little when pipe length changed. The flame propagation speed from the primary vessel to the secondary vessel increased with pipe length, but the flame propagation acceleration decreased with pipe length. When the pipe diameter and length is constant, bigger primary vessel causes higher initial flame propagation speed; smaller secondary vessel causes stronger blocking effect during the flame propagation. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-31T06:25:40.650789-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11819
       
  • The great commandment of process safety
    • Authors: Milos Ferjencik; Aline Cardoso Anastacio, Jindrich Masin
      PubDate: 2016-03-24T05:31:06.765705-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11821
       
  • Learning from incidents at a Norwegian and a Polish refinery
    • Abstract: Today companies are expected to learn from incidents in the form of accidents and near misses to improve safety at their facilities. In this article, we examine how two refineries located in Poland and Norway work to learn from incidents. We address the nature of their classification systems and how they select incidents for particularly thorough analysis or investigation, methods for analysis of less severe and severe incidents as well as participation in activities, the nature of follow up activities at the refineries and who these are directed at, as well as learning among contractors who carry out maintenance and projects at the refineries. For each of the stages of incident treatment, we consider the similarities and differences between the refineries and how the practices that are used may affect learning. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-21T01:46:01.5195-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11822
       
  • Create a firm process safety foundation for your new facilities
    • Authors: Victor H. Edwards
      Abstract: Documented here is the acceptance speech of the 2015 Norton H. Walton‐Russell L. Miller Award of the Safety and Health Division of AIChE. The award was presented to Dr. Victor H. Edwards at the annual division banquet at the Global Congress on Process Safety in Austin, TX on April 28, 2015. The speech emphasizes the crucial role that process safety should play in the concept, siting, and design of process plants. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-18T01:00:39.574686-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11820
       
  • Lessons in process safety management learned in the Kaohsiung gas
           explosion accident in Taiwan
    • Abstract: A series of explosions attributed to leakage of propylene from an underground pipeline resulted in 32 fatalities and 321 injuries in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, in 2014. An analysis of this gas explosion indicated that such an accident could have been prevented, or the consequences might not have been as severe if certain elements of process safety management (PSM) had been applied. Proper execution of PSM, including management of change, mechanical integrity, process hazard analysis (PHA), process safety information (PSI), and training, can prevent the occurrence of such explosion accidents. The impact of this explosion could have been reduced had these PSM elements, particularly PHA, operating procedures, training, PSI, and emergency planning and response, been executed. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-17T01:45:41.537162-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11818
       
  • Anatomy of explosives spontaneous combustion accidents in the Chinese
           underground coal mine: Causes and prevention
    • Authors: Jianhao Wang; Jiangshi Zhang, Kai Zhu, Lin Zhou
      Abstract: Explosives spontaneous combustion accidents in underground coal mines have not been taken seriously in China despite serious casualties and property losses. In order to avoid disasters of this sort, anatomy on eight accidents were performed, mainly involving the process of the occurrence and development, characteristics of casualties, causes and prevention. Improper storage and use of shoddy explosives were the primary reasons for these accidents. Toxic gases and smoke were generated in the explosives' smoldering or burning, so the poisoning and suffocation were the main types of casualties. Besides, unsafe acts of different staff, which resulted in the occurrence of accidental events and the expansion of casualties (i.e., affecting the evacuation and rescue), were analyzed emphatically, and almost all of them were violations. The senior manager and middle manager were the main producers of unsafe acts, which can provide the guidance for employees' targeted training and supervision. Overall, eliminating unsafe acts is an effective way to prevent this kind of accidents, and casualties can be reduced or even avoided through the proper evacuation and rescue. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-16T00:35:45.636859-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11816
       
  • Fire extinguishment behaviors of liquid fuel using liquid nitrogen jet
    • Authors: Bobo Shi; Fubao Zhou
      Abstract: Liquid nitrogen for liquid fuel fires extinguishing is still a new and hot topic. Fire extinguishment behaviors of liquid nitrogen are not yet fully understood, and the related research is still in its infancy. In this article, a flexible liquid nitrogen jet system was set up to examine the process of liquid nitrogen interacting with the pool fire in an open space. The main objective of this article is to compare the extinguishment behaviors of vertical/horizontal jet of liquid nitrogen for extinguishing oil pool fires by the measurements of weight, thermocouples temperature, and infrared thermal image. As a result, experiment discovered that liquid nitrogen has a satisfactory performance for the pool firefighting. And the horizontal jet of liquid nitrogen is more effective than the vertical jet in terms of fire extinguishing time and the required amount of liquid nitrogen. The shape of fire flame during the period of horizontal liquid nitrogen jet was completely different from that during the period of vertical liquid nitrogen jet. The fire extinguishing mechanism of vertical/horizontal liquid nitrogen jet was revealed, respectively. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-22T07:54:28.113214-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11815
       
  • How does “deviation” become “normal”?
    • Authors: Jennifer F. Mize
      Abstract: How does deviation from established safe practices become institutionalized within an organization? Conducting day‐to‐day and routine operations in a manner inconsistent with documented policies, procedures, and practices can lead to failure to appropriately identify and manage hazards. A continued tolerance for “getting the job done” when the methods used do not follow established instructions can lead to the normalization of deviation, especially when employees are rewarded for taking initiative. This article will present examples of deviations that have occurred due to failure to acknowledge change, resource constraints, and other factors. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-05T05:31:31.409152-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11803
       
  • Evaluation of uncertainty in safety integrity level calculations
    • Abstract: The evaluation of the safety integrity level (SIL) of a new or existing safety instrumented system (SIS) requires detailed calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance‐testing cycle for the system. The failure rates of the devices are taken from standard failure rate tabulations of equipment. The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant experience. The quantitative evaluation determines the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a demand mode SIS and yields the SIL of the SIS. All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain. This article explores the impact of uncertainty on the PFD calculation for a SIS. The “70%” rule of thumb from IEC 61508 is compared to results obtained using probability theory such as variance contribution analysis (VCA). A proposed methodology for handling the uncertainty in the PFD calculations is presented based on the application of the VCA method. An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2016-01-23T03:46:39.298403-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11805
       
  • Consequence modeling of dynamic source terms
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: While several dispersion modeling tools provide modeling tools for static situations, it is challenging to model conditions when there are several variables continually changing. This article discusses several modeling approaches to solve the source term of a release event, including: tracking the concentration of vapor inside of a structure; accounting for heat of solution of a leak of strong acid while deluge is applied; and modeling the output from a scrubber given a dynamic input stream. Upon development of the source term, a method for applying the source term to common dispersion modeling packages is explained. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2016-01-09T05:50:04.193687-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11804
       
  • Calorimetric study of the exothermic decomposition of dimethyl sulfoxide
    • Authors: B. Todd Brandes; Daniel K. Smith
      Abstract: Dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) is a widely used solvent often employed for a variety of organic syntheses. It is stable at room temperature, can dissolve many types of organic materials, and is miscible in water. However, upon heating in a closed system under conditions typically achievable in a commercial chemical plant, DMSO undergoes significantly exothermic and hazardous decomposition which could realistically lead to a pressure vessel explosion unless adequate protection layers were installed, possibly including a pressure relief system. This study provides calorimetry data from several apparatus and methods to characterize the decomposition to aid in assessing hazards and designing protection systems. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-01-06T05:50:25.602191-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11802
       
  • Table of contents
    • Pages: 213 - 213
      PubDate: 2016-08-08T09:47:21.166856-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11774
       
  • Safety improvements in a Methanation reactor
    • Authors: Mike Walton; Tony Southerton, Paul Sharp
      Abstract: A 35‐year‐old Methanator vessel required replacement due to High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA). The opportunity was taken to upgrade the over temperature protection system to meet the requirements of IEC 61511. An additional Layer of Protection was added to reduce demand on the High Temperature Trip system. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009
      PubDate: 2009-05-06T00:00:00-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.10325
       
 
 
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