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Journal Cover Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.359]   [H-I: 28]   [6 followers]  Follow
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1605 journals]
  • Safety & health news spring 2017
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2017-02-09T00:50:25.164063-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11879
  • Smartphone use in process safety
    • Authors: Deborah Pano; Christina Baulch
      Abstract: Every development in technology brings the opportunity to build a safer future, in process safety and beyond. In the age of smartphones, this opportunity comes in the form of safety applications, education, and communication through social media. Because the majority of those in the workforce own smartphones, these devices may act as valuable tools for engineers, and are a possible medium for sending alerts and notifications. Because we live in the age of information, applications have been developed specifically to cater to the unmet needs of engineers. Technology has allowed us to have the information we need in the palm of our hand at a moment's notice, and access to this information will lead us to a safer tomorrow. Note that in some facilities, cell phones may be monitored or even prohibited. Always abide by the facility's rules to ensure everyone's safety, particularly in relation to cell phone use. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-08T01:21:10.970195-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11884
  • Erratum: Dangerously close: The CSB's investigation into the fatal fire
           and explosion in west, Texas
    • PubDate: 2017-02-07T02:16:39.510015-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11882
  • Atmospheric tank failures: Mechanisms and an unexpected case study
    • Authors: Michael S. Schmidt
      Abstract: The literature on catastrophic failures of low-pressure tanks focuses on the ignition of explosive mixtures in the vapor space of those tanks, and rightly so, because most catastrophic failures of atmospheric tanks involve explosions of such mixtures. Moreover, there is a general sense in the industry that other than explosions of flammable mixtures, the only other hazard associated with low-pressure tanks is the occasional dramatic implosion of a vessel that is inadequately protected against vacuum.In fact, there are a number of mechanisms that can lead to the catastrophic failure of a low-pressure tank that have nothing to do with combustion or unprotected vacuum. Under certain circumstances, even a tank equipped with an atmospheric vent and containing nothing other than salt water can explode, with disastrous impacts.This article reviews the mechanisms for catastrophic failure of low pressure tanks, both implosion and explosion, and serves as a reminder for experienced process safety practitioners and as a tutorial for new process safety practitioners of what to look for during a hazard review. It also includes a case study of an atmospheric caustic tank explosion that resulted from a previously unreported mechanism that involved neither combustion nor vacuum. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:52.316894-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11881
  • A technique to control major hazards of the coal gasification process
           developed from critical events and safety barriers
    • Authors: Feng Sun; Wei Xu, Guangjian Wang, Bing Sun
      Abstract: Many coal gasification related accidents happened in China recently. Investigations of the accidents show that the performance of safety barriers and the risk influence factors contributing to it plays an important role. Lack of attention on the performance of safety barriers and associated risk influence factors hinder the thorough understanding of these accidents and, therefore, needs to be addressed by providing a new analysis methodology. Herein, we developed an approach from critical events and safety barriers to control the major hazards during the coal gasification process. The method consists of process hazard identification based on critical events, barrier performance evaluation based on barrier diagrams, and quantification of risk influence factors based on Bayesian network. The application of the method indicates that it is suitable for controlling major hazards of the coal gasification process as well as other chemical processes. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:42.185681-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11880
  • Smartphones and process safety
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:40.051872-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11883
  • Modeling and validation of dispersion following an instantaneous vapor or
           two-phase release from a pressurized vessel
    • Authors: Henk W.M. Witlox; Mike Harper, David Webber
      Abstract: This article presents a new model for the initial dispersion phase of energetic instantaneous expansion following a catastrophic vessel rupture. This model has been implemented as a new sub-model in the Phast dispersion model and is based on more sound physical principles than the old Phast sub-model. It allows for both vapor and two-phase releases. In the case of two-phase releases, droplets are assumed to expand radially, potentially leading to time-varying droplet rainout and the formation of a spreading evaporating liquid pool. For ground-level vapor or two-phase releases the correctness of the numerical predictions is confirmed against an analytical solution. The model has been validated against previously published experimental data for pressurized releases with and without rainout. This includes ground-level releases for nitrogen vapor and flashing liquid propylene, and elevated flashing liquid releases for Freon 11, Freon 12, propane and butane. Overall the old model tends to under-predict the cloud radius and cloud speed versus time, while the new model more closely agrees with small-scale experimental data. Therefore the new model produces smaller concentrations and doses, and is less conservative. For two-phase releases the new model predicts an increased amount of rainout, which is more in line with the experimental data. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:38.916611-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11876
  • Auditing management systems for safety controls, alarms, and interlocks:
           How effective are your instrumented protective systems?
    • Authors: Monica Hochleitner; Eloise Roche
      Abstract: Functional safety audits evaluate the performance of the management systems and procedures required to keep safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI) working effectively. Organizations invest thousands, sometimes millions, of dollars installing automation systems in safety applications to minimize the risk of their enterprise. Return on investment in SCAI systems, and the achieved degree of risk reduction, can be negatively impacted by human error, such as inadequate installation, testing, maintenance, or operation of the automation systems. Administrative controls and organizational discipline are needed to identify and correct these errors. This article will provide an introduction to the purpose, key content, and planning of a functional safety audit. The case studies presented will illustrate how safety system effectiveness could have been improved if a detailed audit of the implemented SCAI had been conducted and the findings addressed in a timely fashion. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:32.656454-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11875
  • One company's observations on the implementation of LOPA
    • Authors: Anne Bertelsmann
      Abstract: Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has gained popularity as a semi-quantitative risk assessment tool, but often unexpected difficulties are encountered when rolling out LOPA. This article discusses the practical aspects of LOPA implementation in Marathon Petroleum Company LP's Refining Organization (MPC Refining). Specifically, it shows how scenarios are selected from a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and how they are organized for conducting LOPA efficiently, and it discusses whether to conduct LOPA concurrently or after the HAZOP. The article also compares the [cause consequence] or [consequence cause] methodology and addresses the implications of combining multiple causes in a single scenario.Another key aspect of LOPA implementation is the set of numerical values used for frequencies, modifiers and risk-reduction factors. The article shows how numerical values should be tied to the risk matrix and how internal consistency is achieved through the use of standardized values and restrictions on the use of frequency modifiers. It discusses potential solutions for cases where the LOPA outcome does not meet the risk target. Finally, the article shows how the use of application standards can supplement LOPA by defining minimum protections and providing standard LOPA scenarios. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:29.452056-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11873
  • Chinese process safety management core elements and control measures
    • Authors: Aitao Zhou; Lingpeng Fan, Mingfei Ma, Bo Tao
      Abstract: With the popularization and application of chemical process safety management (PSM) systems in the chemical industry, the use of such systems in China has become the focus of a large volume of research. In this article, 12 elements included in the current Chinese PSM system are divided into four stages from a structural point of view. This division will be helpful in the follow-up analysis. After a careful analysis of the evaluation results for one PSM pilot study in Nanjing, some correlations have been found between the results of the elemental evaluation. Small- and medium-sized chemical plants make up a large proportion of Chinese chemical plants and many chemical accidents take place in these plants, so a simplified PSM system in practical operation need to be found. Based on a previous PSM structural analysis, the secondary elements of the PSM system can be removed. This allows researchers to avoid the traditional method of analyzing PSM elements individually. In the concrete analysis process, a theoretical analysis of the correlation degree between elements can be combined with the results of accident investigations. The simplified Chinese PSM system consists of four core elements: Process safety information, process hazard analysis, training, and emergency management. Based on the current applications of these four core elements in China, a consideration of correlations between these elements is used to make several suggestions for improving China's PSM systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-01-22T11:20:24.826483-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11878
  • Practical Leadership Skills for Safety Professionals and Project
           Engineers, A Review (2016) By Gary L. Winn, PhD, CRC Press, Taylor &
           Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL 33487, 330 pages, $67.46, ISBN-9781498758222
    • Authors: John Murphy
      PubDate: 2017-01-17T03:37:16.666582-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11872
  • Layer of protection analysis as a multifunctional team problem solving
    • Authors: Edward Cialkowski
      Abstract: Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has been widely adopted as a method of organizing and quantifying hazard rates. Frequently, an initial LOPA may indicate that a risk target has not been met and that a scenario requires additional layers of protection. Unlike Fault Tree Analysis, the inherent simplicity of the LOPA format makes it conducive for use directly as a problem solving tool in a team environment to close risk gaps. Teams at Air Products with representatives from operations, process controls, process design and process safety, have effectively used the LOPA format in problem-solving sessions to identify and improve components of the analysis involving human error, controls architecture, and inherently safer process designs. This multifunctional team approach has resulted in broader ownership of the safety analysis by the full team of stakeholders, and this has ultimately led to more cost effective solutions. The benefits of multifunctional team review are illustrated with a case study example. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-12-29T00:35:23.835587-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11870
  • Think facility, act on integrity
    • Authors: Robert F. Wasileski
      Abstract: The Chemical Processing Industry (CPI) has witnessed growth in Mechanical Integrity (MI) programs, which have evolved from standards-based compliance, to continuous improvement programs, and on to risk-based programs. For instance, operators (i.e., manufacturers) have redesigned corporate standards, plant-level procedures and field practices to keep pace with incident learnings and recommended practices, such as those espoused by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Furthermore, the property insurance industry has duly taken note of this MI evolution, giving rise to a significantly greater focus on MI programs during insurance surveys and inspections. Meanwhile, incident investigators remain in demand as incidents with MI-related causes continue to occur in the CPI. This apparent disconnect naturally raises questions in regards to subjects such as “risk based inspection (RBI),” “reliability centered maintenance (RCM),” “industry best practice,” and “inspection, testing and preventive maintenance (ITPM).”MI programs play a considerably important role in the process safety lifecycle of equipment. The engineering design phase of a project may be on the order of just days, up to several years for a complete plant. Procurement and construction typically follow a similar timeline proportionate with the engineering design phase. However, once a facility becomes fully operational, the time devoted toward operation and maintenance will normally far out-weigh the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) period, and may last for many decades. As such, the process safety equipment lifecycle (PSEL) may be largely governed by the MI program.The PSEL is explained in this article, with an examination of the central elements which should be embraced by a comprehensive MI program. While the article demonstrates the breadth and depth of MI, it aptly proposes a practical approach toward the management system that forms the foundation of a robust MI program. The proposed framework leverages the Onion Skin diagram in the context of the equipment lifecycle to create an intuitive approach to MI management. This management system framework is comprehensive, sound, and practical for implementation at facilities of most any size. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-12-26T10:35:24.993338-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11869
  • Hazards inherent to control systems: Case studies and lessons learned
    • Authors: Brenton L. Cox; Stephen W. Garner, Andrew R. Carpenter, Mark T. Fecke
      Abstract: Control systems are an integral part of almost all chemical processes, regardless of size or complexity. As the demands for performance and safety increase, control systems will only proliferate. With automation comes the ability to develop more complex and interrelated processes, and to respond more rapidly to disturbances. However, increased reliance on control systems, both discrete and continuous, requires increased diligence with respect to their development and testing, as well as the implementation of independent layers of protection.A control system that provides optimal product for typical feed conditions may behave poorly during abnormal conditions, such as idling or turnarounds. Similarly, independent control systems charged with safety instrumented functions may not be called upon to act until they become necessary to prevent or mitigate an emergency situation. To recognize and mitigate hazards associated with control systems, process design and process hazard assessment teams may need to consider these and other potential issues.Presented here is a brief overview of the hazards associated with control systems. Finally, case studies are used to highlight the need for considering the potential hazards associated with control systems, from the design stage, through startup, operation, and turnarounds. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-12-02T04:11:03.706557-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11868
  • Simultaneous Operation (SIMOP) Review: An Important Hazard Analysis Tool
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Simultaneous operations (SIMOPs) occur within process facilities when two or more activities occur at the same time and place. They may involve risks that are not identified when each activity is considered by itself. A SIMOP review identifies possible interactions between activities that may adversely impact people, property, or the environment. SIMOP reviews are an important adjunct to the performance of process hazard analyses such as hazard and operability studies. A number of major process industry accidents have involved SIMOPs. Several examples are described. A procedure for conducting a SIMOP review and an example are provided. The development of a plan to address the performance of SIMOPs using the results of SIMOP reviews is discussed and plan contents are identified. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-11-11T00:35:32.188863-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11866
  • Revisions to FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-14, Fire
           Protection for Chemical Plants
    • Authors: Matthew Daelhousen; Henry L. Febo
      Abstract: For nearly two centuries, businesses around the world have relied on FM Global and its property loss prevention data sheets to reduce risk at their facilities. Data Sheet 7-14, Fire Protection for Chemical Plants, addresses fire and explosion hazards at chemical manufacturing plants and similar processing facilities, particularly those associated with ignitable liquid, flammable gas, and liquefied flammable gas where a release could result in a fire of long duration. In 2014, FM Global assigned a team of engineers to update the data sheet, which had not undergone a major revision in over 15 years.A primary focus of the revision was to reduce reliance on prescriptive guidelines when designing fire protection systems at chemical plants. Renewed emphasis was placed on identifying potential fire/explosion scenarios, and designing fire protection systems appropriate for the anticipated loss scenario. Additionally, safeguards to minimize the volume of the potential liquid or gas release were developed, such as accidental release control systems, siting guidance, and other passive methods to mitigate damage in the event of a release. This new guidance is based on a mixture of scientific research, loss history, and engineering experience. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-11-10T01:16:29.714121-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11864
  • Suppression of overpressure during a vapor cloud explosion — A new
    • Authors: Norbert Baron; Chris R. Buchwald
      Abstract: In this article, a new concept is presented with the intent to suppress the generation of damaging overpressures during a vapor cloud explosion via triggering ignitions at additional locations within the vapor cloud immediately after the primary ignition has occurred. The resulting lower explosion overpressures would then be less damaging to buildings and their occupants. The results of early experimental work support the hypothesis underlying this new concept. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-11-07T05:47:55.642361-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11807
  • Full-scale experiments to study shock waves generated by the rupture of a
           high-pressure pipeline
    • Authors: JianYuan Wu; Yuan Long, Chong Ji, QuanJun Xu, YiMing Mao, KeJian Song
      Abstract: Large-scale experimental investigations were conducted on the flow structures and intensity of shock waves generated by the rupture of a high-pressure pipeline. In the experiments, the bursting of pipes was caused by an initial crack introduced on the upper center of the pipe. The crack velocity, pressure-time trace and explosion overpressure were measured. The intensity of the far-field explosion overpressure was estimated based on the extent of damage to buildings. The results demonstrated that the shock waves generated by a pipeline rupture indicate an extremely strong directional effect in the near-field, and their measured speeds were similar to the speeds calculated from theory. Not all of the gas energy participates in the explosion of a long pipeline, and an equation is established to calculate the gas energy involved in a pipeline blast. The TNT equivalency approach was used to calculate the explosion overpressure, and the impulse generated by the pipeline rupture and its applicability were discussed. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-10-24T01:55:58.394046-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11859
  • Safety & health news winter 2016
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2016-10-21T08:40:21.99158-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11862
  • NFPA combustible dust standards—2016 update
    • Authors: Susan Bershad
      Abstract: Every year, destructive and deadly dust-related fires and explosions affect a wide range of industries around the globe. In the United States alone, 50 combustible dust accidents occurred between 2008 and 2012. To manage the dust-related fire, flash-fire, and explosion hazards in industries that use dust collection and handling equipment, or have processes that may generate combustible dust, the NFPA has recently published NFPA 652, Standard on the Fundamentals of Combustible Dust. This article provides an update of the NFPA combustible dust standards. Now that NFPA 652 has been published, this article reviews how the industry and commodity-specific dust standards (NFPA 664: Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, NFPA 654: Prevention of Fire and Explosion from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, NFPA 61: Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities, NFPA 484: Combustible Metals, and NFPA 655: Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosion) interact with NFPA 652 to provide requirements for the protection of facilities with combustible dusts. An update is provided on the status of the commodity specific standards and how they are evolving to correlate with NFPA 652. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-10-18T23:30:20.03365-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11863
  • Bayesian network and bow tie to analyze the risk of fire and explosion of
    • Authors: Zerouali Bilal; Kara Mohammed, Hamaidi Brahim
      Abstract: As accidents were and still one of the main reasons standing behind the increasing rates of casualties such as death, injuries, and evacuations, the constant improvement of safety measures especially in the field of hydrocarbons remains a major concern. Therefore, in the work in hand, we attempt to shed the light on the ways of developing a method for the evaluation of risks of fire and explosions of pipelines. The causes of the latter and consequences are, in one hand, analyzed by means of fault tree and bow tie methods. On the other hand, a quantitative analysis implementing the Bayesian networks is used to estimate the probability of occurrence of the adverse event. Moreover, 72 basic events were found to be of the primary causes provoking the occurrence of undesirable events. However, some experts often find it difficult to precisely determine the probabilities of occurrence of basic events of the tree. For the purpose of evaluating the occurrence of each basic event, we used the fuzzy logic. Hence, at the end of the study, we were able to develop a model that could help us evaluate the risks accompanied the fires and pipelines explosion as well as the consequences. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-10-14T08:25:49.809962-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11860
  • The U.S. Chemical Safety Board, an important advocate for process safety,
           a personal view
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2016-10-14T08:25:38.711133-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11861
  • A framework for critical thinking in process safety management
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Abstract: Process safety management requires many decisions to be made that influence the safety of processes. Human decision making is subject to flaws in reasoning and poor decisions have led to process safety incidents. The discipline of critical thinking can be used to evaluate the merits of decisions. Its application in process safety management will reduce the likelihood of incidents. A framework for applying critical thinking is described and its use is illustrated with a worked example. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-10-11T01:40:29.51459-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11858
  • Advanced analysis to supplement HAZOP/LOPA for effective process design
    • Authors: William R. Banick; Cindy Wei
      Abstract: The HAZOP and LOPA methods are commonly used for qualitative hazard identification and semi-quantitative assessment of risk in the process industries. Integration of HAZOP and LOPA techniques into a single study has provided the practical advantage of utilizing the same team of subject matter experts to complete evaluation of hazard scenarios, identify needs for further risk reduction, recommend specific safeguards required and confirm resulting residual risk is acceptable. While practical and efficient, the one-step comprehensive integrated HAZOP/LOPA method can have pitfalls. In particular, use of LOPA alone to confirm risk acceptability can lead to complex solutions to meet order-of-magnitude threshold requirements for risk reduction and restrictive requirements for independent protection layers (IPLs). Quantitative methods are sometimes required beyond HAZOP/LOPA to obtain a more precise evaluation of identified hazards and benefits of the associated safeguards. This article presents a risk assessment approach incorporating advanced analysis, including human factors task, fault tree and cost-benefit analysis, following HAZOP/LOPA analysis. To illustrate this approach, an example is shown on the selection of appropriate engineering design options for cyclic regeneration of dense phase ethylene treaters, which have unique safety concerns. Using advanced analysis, a cost effective design solution is developed and is shown to reduce risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-28T04:56:17.589372-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11855
  • A network based approach to envisage potential accidents in offshore
           process facilities
    • Authors: Al-Amin Baksh; Rouzbeh Abbassi, Vikram Garaniya, Faisal Khan
      Abstract: Envisaging potential accidents in large scale offshore process facilities such as Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) is complex and could be best characterized through evolving scenarios. In the present work, a new methodology is developed to incorporate evolving scenarios in a single model and predicts the likelihood of accident. The methodology comprises; (a) evolving scenario identification, (b) accident consequence framework development, (c) accident scenario likelihood estimation, and (d) ranking of the scenarios. Resulting events in the present work are modeled using a Bayesian network approach, which represents accident scenarios as cause-consequences networks. The methodology developed in this article is compared with case studies of ammonia and Liquefied Natural Gas from chemical and offshore process facility, respectively. The proposed method is able to differentiate the consequence of specific events and predict probabilities for such events along with continual updating of consequence probabilities of fire and explosion scenarios taking into account. The developed methodology can be used to envisage evolving scenarios that occur in the offshore oil and gas process industry; however, with further modification it can be applied to different sections of marine industry to predict the likelihood of such accidents. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-28T04:56:08.703581-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11854
  • Transportation risk management: One company's approach
    • Authors: Elizabeth Lutostansky; Gary Miller, Martin Dennehy
      Abstract: Air Products has a long history in process safety risk management. The company evaluates the risk of transporting hazardous substances in addition to its risk assessments for fixed sites and pipelines. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) book, Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis, has been used as the starting point for the Air Products approach to this subject. Over the past few years, the company has refined its transportation assessment methodology and calculation tools and has established a work process where the businesses and supply chains are integrated into the transportation risk analysis (TRA) process.The purpose of this article is to summarize Air Products' TRA process, including criteria for deciding if TRA is required, selection of release scenarios considered in a TRA, assumptions made regarding populations and weather conditions and the overall risk review process. An example risk analysis will be presented. Comments on the comparison of TRA with pipeline TRA will also be provided. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-16T04:06:31.821829-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11852
  • Used, classic, or antique; solving the enigma of disciplined adherence to
           standards for existing equipment
    • Authors: Jack McCavit; Todd Aukerman, Jeff Fox, Rukyah Hennessey
      Abstract: What do you consider when buying a used car? Do you have minimum safety requirements for your used car? Similarly, do you have minimum safety requirements for existing equipment in your plant? One of the CCPS Vision 20/20 Industry Tenets is Disciplined Adherence to Standards. In this tenet, Vision 20/20 puts special emphasis on application of standards for existing equipment. Companies with great process safety performance recognize that having minimum standards for existing equipment is as important as having them for new projects. However, identifying and applying relevant standards to equipment that may have been installed decades ago can be challenging. This article will describe how to establish minimum standards for existing equipment and will provide a suggested approach for the implementation of these internal or common industry standards. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-16T04:06:29.64825-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11851
  • Personnel safety with pressurized gas systems
    • Authors: Lee C. Cadwallader; Haihua Zhao
      Abstract: In this article, selected aspects of safety with compressed gas systems are discussed. Several accident case histories are described that illustrate the potential modes of injury from gas jets, pressure‐driven missiles, and asphyxiants. Using high‐pressure helium and nitrogen, estimates of safe exclusion distances to prevent skin injuries from gas leaks are calculated for differing pressures, temperatures, and breach sizes. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-09-08T07:05:21.593356-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11850
  • Application of a liquid nitrogen direct jet system to the extinguishment
           of oil pool fires in open space
    • Authors: Bobo Shi; Fubao Zhou
      Abstract: Liquid fuel fires occurring during industrial processes are serious safety concerns around the world due to their devastating impact on lives, the environment and property. In this study, a liquid nitrogen delivery system was set up to extinguish the oil pool fires in open space. Effects of liquid nitrogen flow rate, pipe diameter, and liquid nitrogen release distance on the suppression process were analyzed according to the mass loss, burning rate and temperature variations. When liquid nitrogen release distance was 0.50 m and pipe diameter was 0.04 m, fire extinguishing time was the shortest 1.6 s and the temperature decrease rate above the liquid fuel surface reached 275°C/s. Fuel surface cooling and blow off process were revealed through the experiments as two kinds of fire extinguishing mechanisms. Based on the flame images captured by high speed camera, the flame expansion phenomenon might occur early in liquid nitrogen injection, especially the situation of the higher flow rate of liquid nitrogen. Three approaches (ground fixed system, moving transportation, and directional transportation of liquid nitrogen) are provided for fire extinguishment of large scale fires. The results obtained provide important reference for the conduct of fire extinguishment for fires. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-08-16T02:36:38.239568-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11840
  • RAGAGEP considerations for relief and flare systems
    • Authors: Georges A. Melhem; Casey Houston
      Abstract: Recent emphasis on Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) increased the scope of relief systems risk factors that require evaluation to develop complete and compliant Pressure Relief and Flare Systems documentation. Failure to comply with RAGAGEP ((d)(3)(ii)) is the most cited element of the Process Safety Management requirements.This paper discusses how RAGAGEP considerations now require evaluation and proper documentation of risk factors that are often overlooked including but not limited to: dispersion analysis, thermal radiation, noise, vibration risk, reaction forces and structural supports, metal cold temperatures due to expansion cooling and two phase flow, hot temperatures due to fire exposure and/or runaway reactions, PRV stability, chemical reaction systems, and loss of high pressure/low pressure interface.Important RAGAGEP considerations for these additional risk factors are highlighted and discussed. Recommendations are provided on how to best address these factors in the evaluation and documentation of design basis. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-08-11T05:00:37.871146-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11839
  • Human Error in Process Plant Design and Operations, a Practitioner's
           Guide, a Review (2016) By J. Robert Taylor, CR Press, Taylor & Francis
    • Authors: John Murphy
      PubDate: 2016-08-09T06:05:44.398434-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11841
  • The eye opener: Preparing for and performing facility siting to best
           communicate with upper management
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: Upon completion of a facility siting study, a major step in the critical path for implementation is acceptance from upper management on the remediation plan. Communicating with upper management occurs at the end of several steps which can be strategically mapped in order to maximize upper management's understanding of the needs of a site's remediation requirements.Using an example chemical plant, this paper will detail the process of initiating a facility siting study, provide a novel approach to prioritizing building remediation requirements, and discuss how the resulting information can best be framed and communicated to upper management. In addition to discussing strategies for effective communication with upper management on proposed facility siting strategies, the paper also details an online system that could be used for keeping facility siting data evergreen after the study is completed. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-17T23:25:41.39118-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11835
  • Expanded Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW4) for determining chemical
           compatibility, past, present, and future
    • Authors: James Farr; Dave Gorman, Dan Sliva, Al Hielscher, Trong Nguyen, George Baran, Brenton Drake, Emory Ford, Dave Frurip, Kirk Mulligan, John W. Ryan, Dalina Viveros
      Abstract: Chemical compatibility is a key consideration throughout the chemical industry wherever two or more chemicals have the potential to mix, either inadvertently or by design. One of the most comprehensive tools available for determining chemical compatibility, the NOAA Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW), has gained significant traction since the release of the third version (CRW3) in 2012. In 3 years, this free software has been downloaded >200,000 times and has become the chemical compatibility tool of choice at many organizations. As a result of an ongoing partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), The Dow Chemical Company, The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Materials Technology Institute (MTI) and other industrial/academic/government volunteers, a fourth version of the CRW (CRW4) has been developed. The expanded capabilities of this new version include a materials of construction section, improved import/exporting/data sharing capabilities, additional reactive groups to aid in determining compatibility decisions, several user interface enhancements, along with the correction of minor issues found in the CRW3. This article will describe past development, the new features included in the CRW4, followed by a brief discussion of future development plans for the software tool. Such developments should solidify this tool's position as the gold standard within the chemical industry for determining chemical hazards. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-17T23:25:33.181123-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11833
  • Experimental investigation of the innovative foaming device using gas as
           the sole power for firefighting
    • Authors: Zhilin Xi
      Abstract: Foam is used as an efficient means of firefighting. The innovative foaming device using gas as the sole power is designed to replace the previous foam generating system using two or three power sources, and appropriate size of the new foaming device can be made to control dust and fire in households or companies based on the actual need. The results of the experimental investigation on the new device in three cases are as follows: in the first case, the minimum working pressure is 0.4 MPa and the working flow range is: 8.0858 m3/h ≤ qa ≤ 48.45 m3/h and qL ≤ 0.4532 m3/h. In the second case, the maximum working time of the new foaming device is 109 s and the minimum working pressure of the storage tank II is 0.26 Mpa. In the third case, the maximum working time of the new device is 205 s and the minimum working pressure values of the storage tanks I and II are 0.26 Mpa and 0.3 Mpa respectively. The fire extinguishing experiment is explained in this article, and the results show that the foam generated by the new foaming device is more effective and efficient than the ABC powder fire extinguisher. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-15T05:31:12.815552-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11834
  • Parametric generation of explosion scenarios for quantitative risk
           assessment of gas explosion in offshore plants
    • Authors: YeongAe Heo; Inwon Lee
      Abstract: In this study, probabilistic risk assessment has been carried out for the prediction of gas explosion loads due to hydrocarbon leaks and subsequent explosions in the topside of offshore platforms. In the initial phase of the risk assessment, the effect of various scenario parameters on the annual probability of gas explosion was quantified via a MATLAB code. For calculating the gas explosion frequency, the hydrocarbon leak frequencies and the ignition probabilities were derived from the HCR (HydroCarbon Release) database from the Health & Safety Executive (HSE, UK), and the IP (Ignition Probability) report from UKOOA (UK Offshore Operators Association), respectively. The MATLAB code has the algorithm to cope with the varying design practice in either Front End Engineering Design phase or detailed design phase. User‐definable parameter setup and spreadsheet data input provide the user with the flexibility in selecting relevant level of elaboration for such design parameters as the leak size distribution, the hydrocarbon composition, etc. These features of the code enable controlling the number of explosion scenarios without any parameter range remaining unaccounted for. The present MATLAB code has been applied to generate hydrocarbon leak scenarios and corresponding explosion probability for the topside process modules of a specific oil Floating Production, Storage and Offloading. Varying the number of cases for each parameter leads to the variation of the number of explosion scenarios selected, which are either 48 or 24 in the particular case. For each explosion scenario, the gas leak and explosion simulation was carried out using the FLame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) commercial S/W package, giving rise to the annual probability of exceedance for the explosion overpressure. Discussion of the influence of explosion scenario selection method on the change of the overpressure exceedance curves is made. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-04T06:21:04.534931-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11832
  • Beyond HAZOP and LOPA: Four different company approaches
    • Authors: Jerry Wayne Chastain; Paul Delanoy, Chris Devlin, Thomas Mueller, Karen Study
      Abstract: For operations where application of standards, regulations, and/or Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices may not be sufficient to address a particular company's risk, several options exist. For qualitative assessment of process hazards, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) and What‐If reviews are two of the most common petrochemical industry methods used. Up to 80% of a company's process hazard analysis (PHA) may consist of HAZOP and What‐If reviews (Nolan, Application of HAZOP and What‐If Safety Reviews to the Petroleum, Petrochemical and Chemical Industries, William Andrew Publishing/Noyes, 1994, p. 1). After the PHA, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is commonly used throughout industry to evaluate the required safety integrity level for instrumented protection layers in a semiquantitative manner (Dowell, International Conference and Workshop on Risk Analysis in Process Safety, CCPS/AIChE, 1997). HAZOP, What‐If, and LOPA are all straightforward methods and are relatively easy to perform. However, much like a hammer, they are not always the best or most appropriate tool for a given job. At times, more advanced methodologies such as Fault Tree Analysis, Quantitative Risk Assessment, Event Tree, Failure Mode, and Effects Analysis and Human Reliability Analysis are necessary to properly assess risk. However, these more advanced tools come with a price. They are often more expensive, time consuming, and require a higher level of expertise. The decision to use these higher level methodologies is not taken lightly and different companies use different criteria for determining when to take this next step. This article will present approaches by four companies, BASF, Celanese, The Dow Chemical Company, and Eastman Chemical Company. Each company will outline criteria used to determine when to go beyond HAZOP, What‐If, and LOPA and will present examples where more advanced techniques were used. The intent of this article is to provide readers with real world examples that demonstrate the appropriate application of the “right” tool and to illustrate what criteria can be used to make informed decisions regarding selection of a PHA methodology. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-06-21T06:15:32.067724-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11831
  • Dynamic risk‐based maintenance for offshore processing facility
    • Authors: Jyoti Bhandari; Ehsan Arzaghi, Rouzbeh Abbassi, Vikram Garaniya, Faisal Khan
      Abstract: Processing facilities in a marine environment may not remain safe and available if they are not well maintained. Dynamic risk‐based maintenance (RBM) methodology is a tool for maintenance planning and decision making, used to enhance the safety and availability of the equipment. It also assists in identifying and prioritizing the maintenance of equipment based on the level of risk. This article discusses an advanced methodology for the design of an optimum maintenance program integrating a dynamic risk‐based approach with a maintenance optimization technique. In this study, Bayesian Network (BN) is employed to develop a new dynamic RBM methodology that is capable of using accident precursor information in order to revise the risk profile. The use of this methodology is based on its failure prediction capability which optimizes the cost of maintenance. The developed methodology is applied to a case study involving a failure of a separator system in the offshore oil and gas production platform considering marine environments. The result shows it is essential that the valve system in the separator needs to be planned for maintenance once every 25 days; however, the cooler system can be planned for repairs once only biennially. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted to study the criticality of the operating system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-05-06T23:55:28.973882-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11829
  • Risk assessment on chemical plants by the method of safety checklist
    • Authors: Zhang Xiaoliang; Shen Qian, Zhao Daoliang, Zhang Zhikai, He Rui, Song Huijuan
      Abstract: In this article, 46 chemical plants were investigated and assessed by Safety Department of Shanghai Institute of Technology in China. The safety management and technology ability and level were evaluated by the method of Safety Checklist Analysis (SCA) under the perspective of Safety Specialty Engineer. The risk levels of the overall of 46 plants were got. The SCA assessment presents the visible and invisible risks of the plants quantitatively and plainly. The results show that a majority of the plants have not fully implemented either on the good safety management or the reliable safety practice technology. The level of the overall risk indicate that about 35% of the plants reach the level of A (Scores ≥90), and others both lower than A, even 2 plants in the level of E, with total disregard for their health, safety, and well‐being. Otherwise, 23 items were surveyed and judged one by one in safety assessment by SCA, and put forward suggestions for rectify and reform, which helps the plants recognize the reality of the situation and make better in the future. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-20T04:18:03.998042-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11827
  • Process safety: A wicked problem?
    • Authors: James Moseman
      Abstract: The nature of process accidents is discussed, and the relevant definition of Horst Rittel's social phenomenon, “wicked problems,” is examined. Existing accident models are reviewed for inclusion of social drivers thought to dominate process accidents. A suggested method, new to process safety and termed morphological analysis, is offered to uncover unacknowledged drivers. Give the purported fit of process safety as a wicked problem, an assessment of the US Chemical Safety Board's “Most Wanted” is made doubting its potential reduction in accidents. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-15T04:15:39.086593-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11826
  • Interrelations between process safety management elements
    • Authors: Hanida Abdul Aziz; Azmi Mohd Shariff, Risza Rusli
      Abstract: OSHA PSM standard has been established with 14 elements that define the management principles to control process hazards and protect the workplace. One of the key factors to the success of Process Safety Management (PSM) implementation is that each element comes as a component in an integrated PSM program. Although various kind of integrated safety management systems have been introduced, direct integration system between PSM elements was not extensively studied due to vague concept on interrelation between PSM elements. This also hampers efforts in designing and developing integrated system for PSM. In this study, the interrelation of critical PSM elements was analyzed based on objectives and information functional of the elements stipulated in OSHA PSM regulations. From the conducted analysis, all the critical elements are interrelated at least with other seven PSM elements. Among the elements, Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity were identified to have the highest interrelations comprising of 12 interrelated PSM elements. The developed PSM matrix has systematically showed the interrelation of critical PSM elements that useful for the development of Integrated PSM system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:49.613016-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11824
  • Lower explosion limit/minimum explosible concentration testing for hybrid
           mixtures in the Godbert‐Greenwald furnace
    • Authors: Emmanuel Kwasi Addai; Dieter Gabel, Ulrich Krause
      Abstract: Experimental investigations of the lower explosion limits (LEL) of three‐component hybrid mixtures of six combustible dusts, three gases, and four solvents were performed in the modified Godbert‐Greenwald furnace. The test protocol was in accordance with European standard EN 50281‐2‐1 which is originally used to determine the minimum ignition temperature of dusts. Modification was done on the equipment to test for the explosion limits for dusts, gases, solvents, and hybrid mixtures. In order to prove the validity of our experimental procedure, the LEL for pure gases were initially tested and the results were compared with values found in literature obtained from the standard procedure which show very good agreement. The experimental results demonstrated a significant decrease of the explosion limits of gas, solvent, or dust and an increase in the likelihood of explosion when a small amount of dust was mixed with gas or solvent and vice versa. For example, the minimum explosible concentration (MEC) of high density polyethylene (HDPE) of 174 g/m3 decreased to 130 g/m3 upon addition of methane the concentration of which itself was below the LEL. The MEC of HDPE further decreased to 65 g/m3 when a nonexplosible concentration of hexane was added. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:31.061074-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11825
  • The effect of an obstacle on methane‐air explosions in a spherical
           vessel connected to a pipeline
    • Authors: Qingqing Zuo; Zhirong Wang, Yaya Zhen, Shangfeng Zhang, Yiqing Cui, Juncheng Jiang
      Abstract: A series of experiments are carried out to reveal the effect of an obstacle on the explosion intensity of a methane‐air mixture in a spherical vessel connected to a pipeline. Results show that obstacle presence, blockage ratio, and position play significant roles in explosion intensity. The oscillation amplitude of pressure both in the vessel and at the pipeline terminus weakens when an obstacle exists in the pipeline. The effects of the blockage ratio on explosion intensity are different when obstacle position changes. Explosive intensity decreases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is set at the intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline and in the middle section of the pipeline. Moreover, when the blockage ratio is ∼56%, the minimum explosion intensity is obtained when the obstacle is set at the middle section of the pipeline. Explosion intensity increases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus. The most dangerous case is when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus, especially when the blockage ratio is 75% or greater. The maximum pressure and the rate of pressure increase at the point of intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline are higher than at the middle section. The conclusions provide an important reference for designing explosion venting safety systems and explosion‐resistant designs. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-31T06:25:59.078642-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11823
  • Learning from incidents at a Norwegian and a Polish refinery
    • Authors: Kirsti Russell Vastveit; Monika Orszak, Ove Njå, Andrzej Kraslawski
      Abstract: Today companies are expected to learn from incidents in the form of accidents and near misses to improve safety at their facilities. In this article, we examine how two refineries located in Poland and Norway work to learn from incidents. We address the nature of their classification systems and how they select incidents for particularly thorough analysis or investigation, methods for analysis of less severe and severe incidents as well as participation in activities, the nature of follow up activities at the refineries and who these are directed at, as well as learning among contractors who carry out maintenance and projects at the refineries. For each of the stages of incident treatment, we consider the similarities and differences between the refineries and how the practices that are used may affect learning. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-21T01:46:01.5195-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11822
  • Fire extinguishment behaviors of liquid fuel using liquid nitrogen jet
    • Authors: Bobo Shi; Fubao Zhou
      Abstract: Liquid nitrogen for liquid fuel fires extinguishing is still a new and hot topic. Fire extinguishment behaviors of liquid nitrogen are not yet fully understood, and the related research is still in its infancy. In this article, a flexible liquid nitrogen jet system was set up to examine the process of liquid nitrogen interacting with the pool fire in an open space. The main objective of this article is to compare the extinguishment behaviors of vertical/horizontal jet of liquid nitrogen for extinguishing oil pool fires by the measurements of weight, thermocouples temperature, and infrared thermal image. As a result, experiment discovered that liquid nitrogen has a satisfactory performance for the pool firefighting. And the horizontal jet of liquid nitrogen is more effective than the vertical jet in terms of fire extinguishing time and the required amount of liquid nitrogen. The shape of fire flame during the period of horizontal liquid nitrogen jet was completely different from that during the period of vertical liquid nitrogen jet. The fire extinguishing mechanism of vertical/horizontal liquid nitrogen jet was revealed, respectively. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-22T07:54:28.113214-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11815
  • Evaluation of uncertainty in safety integrity level calculations
    • Authors: Raymond “Randy” Freeman; Angela Summers
      Abstract: The evaluation of the safety integrity level (SIL) of a new or existing safety instrumented system (SIS) requires detailed calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance‐testing cycle for the system. The failure rates of the devices are taken from standard failure rate tabulations of equipment. The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant experience. The quantitative evaluation determines the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a demand mode SIS and yields the SIL of the SIS. All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain. This article explores the impact of uncertainty on the PFD calculation for a SIS. The “70%” rule of thumb from IEC 61508 is compared to results obtained using probability theory such as variance contribution analysis (VCA). A proposed methodology for handling the uncertainty in the PFD calculations is presented based on the application of the VCA method. An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2016-01-23T03:46:39.298403-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11805
  • Consequence modeling of dynamic source terms
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: While several dispersion modeling tools provide modeling tools for static situations, it is challenging to model conditions when there are several variables continually changing. This article discusses several modeling approaches to solve the source term of a release event, including: tracking the concentration of vapor inside of a structure; accounting for heat of solution of a leak of strong acid while deluge is applied; and modeling the output from a scrubber given a dynamic input stream.Upon development of the source term, a method for applying the source term to common dispersion modeling packages is explained. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2016-01-09T05:50:04.193687-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11804
  • Calorimetric study of the exothermic decomposition of dimethyl sulfoxide
    • Authors: B. Todd Brandes; Daniel K. Smith
      Abstract: Dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) is a widely used solvent often employed for a variety of organic syntheses. It is stable at room temperature, can dissolve many types of organic materials, and is miscible in water. However, upon heating in a closed system under conditions typically achievable in a commercial chemical plant, DMSO undergoes significantly exothermic and hazardous decomposition which could realistically lead to a pressure vessel explosion unless adequate protection layers were installed, possibly including a pressure relief system. This study provides calorimetry data from several apparatus and methods to characterize the decomposition to aid in assessing hazards and designing protection systems. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-01-06T05:50:25.602191-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11802
  • The US Chemical Safety Board: Moving forward to continually drive chemical
           safety change
    • Authors: Vanessa A. Sutherland
      Pages: 306 - 311
      Abstract: Over the course of my first year as Chairperson's of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), I have overseen the release of several incident investigations, deployed to a number of accident sites, increased the CSB's outreach initiatives and evaluated our organizational processes to more effectively and productively achieve our critical mission. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 306–311, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-11-10T03:07:00.491077-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11856
  • Dangerously close: The CSB's investigation into the fatal fire and
           explosion in west, Texas
    • Authors: Johnnie Banks
      Pages: 312 - 316
      Abstract: This article will focus on the fatal explosion and fire which occurred on April 17, 2013, at West Fertilizer in West, Texas, resulting in 15 fatalities, more than 260 injuries, and widespread community damage. The deadly fire and explosion occurred when about 30 tons of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate exploded after being heated by a fire at the storage and distribution facility. The US Chemical Safety Board deployed an investigative team to examine the incident and conducted a thorough root cause investigation of the massive fire and explosion. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 312–316, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-11-10T03:07:04.844774-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11857
  • Identify SIF and specify necessary SIL, and other IPLs, as part of
           PHA/HAZOP – or - why it is not necessary to “boldly go beyond HAZOP
           and LOPA”
    • Authors: William G. Bridges; Arthur M. Dowell
      Pages: 349 - 359
      Abstract: This article shows how to apply the qualitative definition of IPLs within the setting of a process hazard analysis (PHA) to get most of the gain from Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) without doing a LOPA (without using numerical values). The article includes an implementation path to develop PHA leader competencies to guide the qualitative approach. We also show the way we use a PHA team to identify when a SIF is needed and to select the proper target safety integrity level (SIL). This portion of the SIL evaluation and the identification and labeling of the IPLs during the PHA/hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) does not take any longer than a normal PHA/HAZOP, once the right habits are established. Note that this approach eliminates the need for a separate SIL Evaluation Study to identify the SIFs and select the target SIL. Finally, the article ties together these two specific topics, along with the topic of making risk judgments, to show there is less than 5% need to go beyond HAZOP, and less than 0.01% need to go beyond LOPA. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 349–359, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-11-10T03:07:01.645255-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11853
  • Safety improvements in a Methanation reactor
    • Authors: Mike Walton; Tony Southerton, Paul Sharp
      Abstract: A 35‐year‐old Methanator vessel required replacement due to High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA). The opportunity was taken to upgrade the over temperature protection system to meet the requirements of IEC 61511. An additional Layer of Protection was added to reduce demand on the High Temperature Trip system. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009
      PubDate: 2009-05-06T00:00:00-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.10325
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