for Journals by Title or ISSN
for Articles by Keywords
  Subjects -> ENGINEERING (Total: 1957 journals)
    - CHEMICAL ENGINEERING (150 journals)
    - CIVIL ENGINEERING (146 journals)
    - ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (84 journals)
    - ENGINEERING (1124 journals)
    - HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING (43 journals)
    - INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING (53 journals)
    - MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (73 journals)

ENGINEERING (1124 journals)            First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

MATEC Web of Conferences     Open Access  
Matériaux & Techniques     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Mathematical Problems in Engineering     Open Access   (4 followers)
Mathematics of Control, Signals, and Systems (MCSS)     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Mauerwerk     Hybrid Journal  
Measurement     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Measurement Science Review     Open Access   (1 follower)
Meccanica     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Mechatronics     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Medical and Biological Engineering and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (2 followers)
Medical Engineering & Physics     Hybrid Journal   (9 followers)
Membrane Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Membrane Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Memetic Computing     Hybrid Journal  
Metal Powder Report     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Metallurgist     Hybrid Journal   (2 followers)
Metaphysica     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Metascience     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Metrologia     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Microelectronic Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Microelectronics International     Hybrid Journal  
Microelectronics Journal     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Microelectronics Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (5 followers)
Microfluidics and Nanofluidics     Hybrid Journal   (9 followers)
Micromachines     Open Access   (1 follower)
MNASSA : Monthly Notes of the Astronomical Society of South Africa     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Modelling and Simulation in Engineering     Open Access   (4 followers)
Modern Applied Science     Open Access   (1 follower)
Molecular BioSystems     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Molecular Engineering     Hybrid Journal  
Molecular Pharmaceutics     Full-text available via subscription   (6 followers)
MRS Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (4 followers)
MRS Online Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Multiagent and Grid Systems     Hybrid Journal  
Multidimensional Systems and Signal Processing     Hybrid Journal  
NANO     Hybrid Journal   (6 followers)
Nano Letters     Full-text available via subscription   (37 followers)
Nano Research     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Nano Reviews     Open Access   (15 followers)
Nanopages     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Nanoscale and Microscale Thermophysical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Nanoscale Systems : Mathematical Modeling, Theory and Applications     Open Access  
Nanotechnologies in Russia     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Nanotechnology     Partially Free   (8 followers)
Nanotechnology Magazine, IEEE     Full-text available via subscription   (12 followers)
Nanotechnology Reviews     Full-text available via subscription   (4 followers)
Natural Hazards     Hybrid Journal   (99 followers)
Nature Nanotechnology     Full-text available via subscription   (41 followers)
Naval Engineers Journal     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
NDT & E International     Hybrid Journal   (10 followers)
Nexo Revista Científica     Open Access  
Nigerian Journal of Technological Research     Full-text available via subscription  
Nigerian Journal of Technology     Full-text available via subscription  
NIR news     Full-text available via subscription  
Nonlinear Dynamics     Hybrid Journal   (5 followers)
Nonlinear Engineering : Modeling and Application     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Nonlinearity     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Nova Scientia     Open Access  
NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Nuclear Engineering and Design     Hybrid Journal   (11 followers)
Numerical Algorithms     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part A: Applications: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Numerical Heat Transfer, Part B: Fundamentals: An International Journal of Computation and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (5 followers)
Ocean Science Journal     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Oil and Gas Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (10 followers)
Online Journal for Global Engineering Education     Open Access  
Open Journal of Fluid Dynamics     Open Access   (3 followers)
Open Journal of Safety Science and Technology     Open Access   (2 followers)
Operations Research Letters     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Optical Communications and Networking, IEEE/OSA Journal of     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Optimization and Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (2 followers)
Opto-Electronics Review     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
OR Spectrum     Hybrid Journal  
Organic Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Ozone Science & Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Papers In Regional Science     Hybrid Journal   (6 followers)
Particle & Particle Systems Characterization     Hybrid Journal  
Particulate Science and Technology: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Perspectives on Science     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Pesquisa Operacional     Open Access  
Pest Management Science     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Petroleum Science     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Phase Transitions: A Multinational Journal     Hybrid Journal  
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (7 followers)
Photonics Journal, IEEE     Full-text available via subscription   (5 followers)
Physica B: Condensed Matter     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Physica C: Superconductivity     Hybrid Journal  
Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Physics of Fluids     Hybrid Journal   (19 followers)
Planning News     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Plasma Devices and Operations     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Plasma Science and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Plasmonics     Hybrid Journal  
Platinum Metals Review     Open Access   (2 followers)
Polar Research     Open Access   (1 follower)
Polar Science     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Polímeros: Ciência e Tecnologia     Open Access   (1 follower)
Polish Maritime Research     Open Access  
Polymer Engineering & Science     Hybrid Journal   (12 followers)

  First | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Last

Process Safety Progress    [4 followers]  Follow    
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
     ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
     Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1594 journals]   [SJR: 0.366]   [H-I: 20]
  • Tips for the creation and application of effective operating procedures
    • Authors: Colin R. Scholtz; Steven T. Maher
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Specific requirements exist in all Safety Management Systems Requirements (e.g., Process Safety Management and Risk Management Program) for the creation, content, and periodic update of operating procedures (OP). However, the development and actual implementation of OP has challenges that often result in deficiencies, regulatory citations, and in some cases, unfortunate tragedies. Although OP concepts involve the straightforward documentation of specific steps for safe and effective operation, many process facilities struggle with: •securing the focus from operations personnel for the creation of quality procedures •securing feedback from operations personnel if procedural steps do not coincide with actual practices •ensuring the steps outlined in procedures avoid introducing additional process hazards •creating procedures that are in a user‐friendly format •identifying the most effective level of information and depth to include in the procedure •addressing all modes of operations, including defining appropriate responsibilities Good‐quality OP are critical for encapsulating operational best practices and also provide a basis for ensuring consistent quality assurance. The objective of this article is to convey an understanding of the challenges that must be considered with the development of OP and provide specific examples that will facilitate the creation and ongoing application of OP. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-23T23:35:32.457497-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11663
  • Process safety leading indicators survey–February 2013: Center for
           chemical process safety–white paper
    • Authors: Stevick Kenan; Shakeel Kadri
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: This article provides an update on the Chemical Industries use, direction, and effectiveness of leading indicators and provides recommended leading indicators to help drive performance in a common direction. As the use of leading indicators is in its nascent stages, it is anticipated that additional surveys and updates will be published on a biannual basis. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-23T00:01:11.915139-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11654
  • Addressing enablers in layers of protection analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) is used to evaluate the risk of individual hazard scenarios by combining initiating event frequencies with failure probabilities of protection layers. Some practitioners include events and conditions that enable the occurrence of hazard scenarios in the analysis, such as conditional modifiers, but sometimes they are excluded to ensure conservative results. However, these events and conditions, and other factors that enable scenarios, are often key parts of hazard scenarios and their exclusion from the analysis can result in overly conservative results. This article broadens the definition of enabling events and conditions to include other factors that can have a significant impact on the risk of hazard scenarios. Such other factors include management systems to account for inadequacies in, and failure to follow, policies, procedures, and work instructions; at‐risk factors to account for the time period in which a process is at risk; incident outcomes to represent different possible consequences for the same initiating event; and release conditions to account for different release conditions or circumstances. Their inclusion in LOPA studies is described with examples. The determination of adjustment factors to account for their effect on scenario risk is also demonstrated. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2014-01-22T23:55:26.127861-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11639
  • Using Failure Modes to Enhance What‐If Analysis
    • Authors: Robert L. Collins
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: What‐If Analysis is one of the most commonly used methods for performing a process hazards analysis (PHA) of a potentially hazardous chemical process. It is used so widely because it is perhaps the simplest and quickest way to perform a PHA. The speed of the PHA method often sacrifices quality by missing important scenarios simply because the right what‐if question was never asked. This article will show how the quality of a What‐If Analysis can be enhanced using failure modes for system component types without significantly increasing study time. A “smart” system using off‐the‐shelf computer software combined with specially designed subroutines or macros is used to demonstrate this process. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-15T04:30:48.289128-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11655
  • Modeling of time‐varying dispersion for releases including potential
    • Authors: Henk W.M. Witlox; Mike Harper
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Many commonly used atmospheric dispersion models cannot accurately simulate time‐varying releases of hazardous chemicals in the atmosphere. A new version of the Phast Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) has been developed to more accurately simulate time‐varying effects resulting from a decreasing discharge rate in a vessel or pipe and/or resulting from a time‐varying pool (following rainout or from direct spill). The new model includes effects of along‐wind diffusion which reduces concentrations in the far‐field. This is particularly relevant for toxic releases. The new formulation presumes a number of “observers” to be released at successive times from the point of discharge or the upwind edge of the pool. The UDM first carries out pseudo steady‐state calculations for each observer, where the release data correspond to the time at which the observer is released, and where the observer picks up vapor while traveling over the evaporating pool. Subsequently, effects of along‐wind diffusion are included by means of Gaussian integration of observer concentrations over the downwind distance. The above new UDM formulation has been verified against the time‐varying HGSYSTEM model HEGADAS‐T for the specific case of dispersion directly from a pool. Furthermore, it has been tested for more general cases including elevated releases with rainout. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-08T03:08:06.390607-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11652
  • So we all have been implementing process safety metrics—what
    • Authors: Shakeel Kadri; Glen Peters, James VanOmmeren, Kenneth Fegley, Martin Dennehy, Alvin Mateo
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Industry over the last two to three years has put a lot of effort into implementing Process Safety Metrics. This is a good practice but, now that we have metrics data, how are we utilizing them to improve process safety performance? Air Products has been monitoring process safety performance for the last five years using combined Center for Chemical Process Safety and American Petroleum Institute RP 754 metrics. This article will highlight the approach we have applied, both through our lagging and leading indicators, to drive our process safety performance improvement programs. It will review the programs we initiated, leading indicators we identified, and how it also helped to improve our process safety culture. This article will also look at the importance of measuring severity and its impact in driving leadership behaviors. We will also discuss future opportunities to improve process safety performance via metrics analysis and follow‐up initiatives. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-11-08T03:07:59.394473-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11645
  • Black swans, white swans, and 50 shades of grey: Remembering the lessons
           learned from catastrophic process safety incidents
    • Authors: John F. Murphy; James Conner
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Last year at the 8th Global Congress for Process Safety, we presented a paper entitled, “Beware of the Black Swan: The Limitations of Risk Analysis for Predicting the Extreme Impact of Rare Process Safety Incidents.” The paper discussed the difficulties of predicting black swan events—rare but catastrophic occurrences which continue to happen in the chemical processing industries despite the focus that has been brought to process safety over the past 30–40 years. Once black swan events occur, after investigations and development of lessons learned, they become white swans. By white swans, we mean these type of events become more predictable and as we do hazard identification and risk analysis we become cognizant of the similar potential scenarios in new plants and plant modifications—at least for a while. This article discusses how white swans slowly become greyer as time goes on if the lessons learned from black swan events are not kept fresh. Examples of black swans that become white swans and then become grey as time goes on will be discussed. Ideas of how to keep the white swans from becoming grey with time, including the key role of Management, will also be discussed. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-06T23:00:19.839913-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11651
  • Characteristics of companies with great process safety performance
    • Authors: Jack McCavit; Scott Berger, Louisa Nara
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: The Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS's) Vision 20/20 describes the characteristics of companies with great process safety performance in the future. This work is extremely important to the process industries and other industries that handle toxic, flammable, and explosive materials because it establishes targets to which companies will aspire for years to come. In developing the vision, it was also recognized that there are issues beyond the scope of individual companies that need to be addressed to enable improved process safety performance. Therefore, in Vision 20/20 there are activities that go well beyond any individual company, indeed beyond the industries. The purpose of this article is to share CCPS's Vision 20/20, begin the process of engaging the broader community in the vision and the steps to achieve it and provide an opportunity for companies to begin comparing their current characteristics to the vision. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-11-06T22:58:21.079987-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11647
  • Explosion from a smoldering silo fire
    • Authors: Russell A. Ogle; Scott E. Dillon, Mark Fecke
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Many organic granular materials are susceptible to self‐heating when stored in silos. Under the right environmental conditions self‐heating can lead to spontaneous ignition and smoldering combustion. This is a case study of an explosion that occurred in a grain storage silo with a smoldering fire. Although the hazards of combustible dust are relatively well recognized, the explosion hazard presented by a smoldering fire is less well known. There were two explosions in this incident: a primary explosion involving carbon monoxide and smoke generated by the smoldering fire, and a secondary explosion fueled by combustible dust. The explosion caused both injuries to personnel and significant property damage. This article discusses the causal factors for the explosion and the lessons learned for effectively monitoring and responding to a smoldering fire in a silo. The potential explosion hazard of the carbon monoxide and smoke generated by a smoldering fire is emphasized. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-11-06T22:58:18.894801-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11628
  • RAGAGEP 101
    • Authors: Lisa A. Long; James R. Lay, Michael L. Marshall, Jeffrey J. Wanko
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEPs) play an important role in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Process Safety Management standard (29 CFR 1910.119). Since 2007, OSHA issued numerous RAGAGEP‐related citations under the Petroleum Refinery Process Safety Management and PSM Covered Chemical Facility National Emphasis Programs. Even though the PSM standard became effective over 20 years ago, noncompliance with PSM's RAGAGEP requirements remains an issue. This article reviews RAGAGEP basics from OSHA's perspective, using examples from national emphasis program inspections to illustrate common RAGAGEP compliance problems. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2014
      PubDate: 2013-11-06T22:58:14.601691-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11637
  • Evaluation of safety performance in process industries
    • Authors: Yu‐Jung Liu; Jin‐Luh Chen, Shyh‐Yueh Cheng, Ming‐Tsai Hsu, Chen‐Hua Wang
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: By considering literature review, the management mechanisms of Taiwan Occupational Safety and Health Management System, and local regulations, the study proposes dimensions for the analysis of overall safety performance in the semiconductor industry, establishes three principal factors and 25 safety performance dimensions, and develops a questionnaire on safety performance. Three Taiwan semiconductor plants were selected as the subject for the quantitative analysis of the questionnaire and the current safety performance of the semiconductor industry was thoroughly investigated. The study extensively discusses a case study of three semiconductor plants showing highly significant differences in their “technical factor,” “organizational factor,” and “human factor” through an analysis of variance of safety performance. From the analysis, it was determined that 22 safety performance dimensions, with the exceptions of “self‐inspection,” “emergency response,” and “safety audit,” demonstrate significant differences. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-30T06:57:34.396216-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11644
  • Safety management systems at unregulated upstream oil and gas facilities
    • Authors: Kristin D. Norton; Michael B. Saura, Colin R. Scholtz
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Upstream oil and gas facilities are typically exempt from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Process Safety Management standard; however, in light of recent regulatory scrutiny on the safety of upstream operations, many operating companies have extended their safety management programs to their upstream facilities creating challenges for implementation. Many of these facilities have been operating without significant incidents for many years without proper Process Safety Information, Process Hazard Analyses, Management of Change programs, etc. making the challenge of accepting and implementing these programs difficult to embrace. This article is focused on providing insights and practical tips for the implementation of safety programs at upstream facilities to enhance the commitment to implementing process safety with limited resources. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-30T06:28:34.654043-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11653
  • A guide to the legal framework of the PSM standard for engineers
    • Authors: Christopher Cunio; Georges Melhem
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Compliance with the Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard is challenging for even the most sophisticated operators because of the broad scope and highly technical nature of the 14 PSM elements. This article provides guidance on how to comply with the three elements most frequently cited by OSHA—process safety information, process hazards analysis, and mechanical integrity—and the consequences of a failure to do so. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-30T06:28:32.101812-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11636
  • Snares to LOPA action items
    • Authors: Glenn Rozmus; Dustin J. Smith, Dick A. Baum
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Greater numbers of action items are being generated from the Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) process as it becomes increasingly utilized as a method for risk evaluation. The quantity and type of action items result from the combination of initiating events, conditional modifiers, and prescribed guidelines. The quality of the inputs determines whether the action items will actually provide any additional safety benefit. This article is not a procedure for performing a LOPA analysis but presents issues to be aware of when generating a list of initiating events, evaluation of the initiating event severities, and the influence of conditional modifiers. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-29T20:50:28.562218-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11643
  • Management discipline: Defining a process safety strategy
    • Authors: Jerry J. Forest
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: We often associate operational discipline with conduct of operations and define discipline as the tools to achieve repeatable results. While discipline in operations is primarily focused on the operator, engineers, and management contribute to the success in achieving consistent results. A Plan‐Do‐Check‐Act model, or Deming Cycle, can be used to represent the relationship among operational, engineering, and management disciplines. The management discipline part of the cycle involves making decisions (act) based on the output of the operations, and planning for success. This article describes a modified strategic business analysis (SBA) planning tool that managers can apply to process safety in order to achieve a desired vision and objective. Too often we are reactive to incidents and create activity lists from year to year in order to achieve objectives and goals. The process safety SBA tool is a structured approach of data analysis. It helps us to understand the company's internal and external environment in order to set strategic alternatives that will bring a company from its present state to the desired future state. By planning for and following a strategy, consistency in operations is achieved and repeatable results can be obtained. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-29T20:50:25.075985-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11642
  • Keeping the memory alive, preventing memory loss that contributes to
           process safety events
    • Authors: Barry Throness
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Recurring process safety events (PSEs) are a real concern to the energy industry. Contributing causes to these events are quite often very similar. It appears as though the learnings from past events are not retained in the memories of the workforce, setting the stage for accidents to repeat. Even with best practices available to prevent such recurring accidents, these events continue to happen again and again. It seems as if something is missing, in order to effectively use the knowledge gained from so many past disasters and near misses, to prevent further PSEs. It was desired to develop a tool to aid ConocoPhillips Canada (CPC) in preventing memory loss that is contributing to PSEs. Some of the world's worst process safety accidents were reviewed to gather common learnings, and investigation reports of CPC past PSEs were analyzed to determine how prevalent the issue of memory loss is within the company. Best practices to prevent such memory loss were researched and found to be readily available, and yet for some reason, memory loss issues are very widespread. The cognitive sciences were looked to for an answer on how memories are developed and effectively retained. The field of education was researched, to determine how leading educators effectively teach learning to achieve high levels of memory retention. Through this the taxonomy table, a tool that has been used by educators to enhance teaching and learning for many years, was discovered. Then, effective safety communication methods that target memory retention were explored. All researched information was finally tied together, into a learning curriculum, consisting of various activities. These activities were constructed to advance the learning process toward an objective that had been carefully developed using the taxonomy table guidelines. This objective was “for the workers to integrate past process safety learnings to prevent future process safety events.” © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-23T23:55:29.554418-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11635
  • Hazard effects of high‐speed flow from methane‐hydrogen
           premixed explosions
    • Authors: Qiuju Ma; Qi Zhang, Lei Pang
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Explosions are the main types of accidents causing casualties in underground mines. The high‐speed flow caused by gas expansion and inertia is a main damage factor in gas explosion accidents, but the issue has not yet received considerable attentions. In this study, the propagation of pressure wave and combustion wave from methane‐hydrogen premixed explosions were studied in a pipe with a close end and an open end. Analysis and comparison between pressure speeds and flame speeds were performed. On this basic, the hazard effects of dynamic pressure caused by high‐speed flow were investigated. The results show that the addition of hydrogen can speed up propagation of pressure waves and combustion waves and that detonation is achieved at high hydrogen contents but not for low hydrogen contents. Additionally, the high‐speed flow is a kind of high temperature airflow with a very high speed of dozens of meters even up to hundreds of meters per second. High‐speed airflows can bring about high dynamic pressures, which are on the same order of magnitude as statistic pressures, even higher than statistics pressure at the pipe opening end. Compared with impacts of blast pressure, the damages of high‐speed flow can last for a longer time. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 000: 000–000, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-15T10:45:59.070273-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11625
  • Safety controls, alarms, and interlocks as IPLs
    • Authors: Angela E. Summers
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Layers of Protection Analysis evaluates the sequence of events that first initiate and then propagate to a hazardous event. This semiquantitative risk assessment technique can expose the role that automation plays in causing initiating events and in responding to the resulting abnormal operation. Automation that is specifically designed to achieve or maintain a safe state of a process in response to a hazardous event is now referred to as safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI). Guidelines for Initiating Events and Independent Protection Layers addresses four basic types of SCAI: safety controls, safety alarms, safety interlocks, and safety instrumented systems. This article discusses the design, operation, maintenance, and testing practices necessary for SCAI to be considered as independent protection layers (IPL). It also provides guidance on claiming multiple layers of protection in the basic process control system. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 000: 000–000, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-11T22:43:46.757792-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11646
  • Initiating events, levels of causality, and process hazard analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: Process hazard analysis (PHA) is used to identify hazard scenarios for a process and determine if the risk from the scenarios is tolerable. Each scenario begins with an initiating event that is made up of one or more causes. These causes must be recorded in sufficient detail to allow the PHA team to determine the particulars of the scenarios and develop any needed risk reduction measures. There is a hierarchy of causality wherein there are immediate, basic, underlying, and root causes of events. A suitable level of causality must be used in PHA. This article describes the hierarchy, recommends the level that should be used in PHA, and provides guidelines for the information that should be recorded in a PHA worksheet for different types of causes. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 000: 000–000, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-11T22:43:00.520623-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11649
  • Editorial: Good decisions improve process safety management performance
    • Authors: J. F. Louvar
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      PubDate: 2013-10-07T23:35:19.502722-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11650
  • Process Safety Leading Indicators—A Perspective From Europe
    • Authors: Piet Knijff; Lee Allford, Peter Schmelzer
      Pages: n/a - n/a
      Abstract: In 2012, the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) published Making the case for leading indicators in process safety which is a pamphlet on the selection, development, and implementation of leading indicators for process safety. The document contains details on the type and spread of indicators which EPSC members have established within their own companies. In addition, EPSC provided several practical tips for the do's and don'ts of successful implementation including presentation of data and engagement of staff. This article is to develop these aspects further while exploring the relationship between leading indicators on a plant, business unit, and corporate level. Additionally, the interaction between leading and lagging indicators is to be highlighted alongside the management space which process safety indicators now inhabit with respect to monitoring and audit/review activities. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-07T01:58:34.677813-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11641
  • Case studies in process safety: Lessons learned from
           software‐related accidents
    • Authors: Terry L. Hardy
      Pages: 1 - 8
      Abstract: Software and automation can play a significant role with respect to safety in the chemical process and energy production industries. Because computing systems are increasingly used to control critical functions, software may directly contribute to an accident. On the other hand, software can also be used as part of the hazard control strategy to reduce risks, and computing systems can provide valuable information to help make safety decisions. The importance of including software as part of an organization's efforts to analyze and manage hazards and risks seems clear, but for many organizations software is not effectively incorporated into process safety efforts. This article reviews lessons learned from accidents and incidents to illustrate the potential for a software‐related accident even when process safety management tools and techniques are used. This discussion is intended to provide insights to help improve process safety and software safety efforts. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-30T06:29:29.465428-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11638
  • Promoting commitment to process safety
    • Authors: Russell A. Ogle; Andrew R. Carpenter, Sean J. Dee
      Pages: 319 - 321
      Abstract: Successful implementation of process safety management (PSM) typically requires the use of a combination of physical and procedural safeguards. Ideally, these safeguards must be maintained in a constant state of readiness throughout the life of the process facility. The management system provides the framework for maintaining and sustaining these safeguards, but the critical ingredient that ensures that the work gets done is the individual employee's commitment to PSM. Game theory provides a useful framework for understanding how an organization can foster cooperation between management and its employees toward the common goal of safety. Using a specific game‐theoretical model known as the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, it is shown how cooperative behavior is the natural consequence of a balanced system of rewards and penalties. Here, the term “balanced” means that both employees and their managers are subject to this system of rewards and penalties. By implementing a balanced framework for feedback, an organization can promote a commitment to process safety by fostering cooperation between both the employees and the managers. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 319–321, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-09-18T07:15:55.055134-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11633
  • Using near misses to improve risk management decisions
    • Authors: Sean J. Dee; Brenton L. Cox, Russell A. Ogle
      Pages: 322 - 327
      Abstract: In the process safety literature it is often claimed that the analysis of near‐miss incidents can improve process safety performance. However, empirical research has demonstrated that near miss events are interpreted as marginally successful, leading to riskier behavior due to lower perceived risk analyses. In other words, experiencing a near‐miss incident can result in the false conclusion that the original risk was over‐estimated. To be effective, the analysis of near‐misses must be grounded in an objective evaluation of the event, the outcome, and the severity of the alternative outcome's consequences. In this article, several examples are presented where a near‐miss incident preceded a serious incident with significant human injury or property damage. If the near‐miss had been investigated, properly evaluated, and appropriate corrective actions been implemented, the more severe incident would not have occurred. A recurring theme in these examples is the underestimation of consequence severity, that is, the misinterpretation of the near‐miss as a high probability, low‐consequence severity scenario rather than a narrowly averted low‐probability, high‐consequence severity scenario. A deliberate consideration of the lower probability, more severe consequence scenario would have facilitated a more thoughtful evaluation of corrective actions. A methodology based on game theory is presented for evaluating the impact of near‐misses on risk perception. A game‐theoretical model is used to demonstrate the need for shifting payoffs away from lagging process safety indicators and toward leading indicators. An equally important outcome of this analysis is the effective communication of the risk at operational and managerial levels of the organization. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 322–327, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-09-13T21:50:32.297941-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11632
  • Near misses—private or public concern?
    • Authors: Jay Brabson
      Pages: 328 - 331
      Abstract: Near miss incidents include those releases and/or fires that do not result in significant employee injury or costs. In many cases there are federal reporting requirements that include reports to the National Response Center. Loss of containment releases are often near misses for catastrophic incidents and provide evidence of process safety program weaknesses. Facilities have an interest in conducting incident investigations to find root causes, lessons learned, and make safety improvements. Small sites often do not have the expertise to conduct good investigations while some large sites may tend to blame operator error rather than admit management system errors or process design issues. This article explains 2002 amendments of the Delaware requirement to report releases. The amendment adds the reporting of flammable gas releases and expands the existing written follow up report requirements to explain the “facts and circumstances leading to the release and the measures proposed to prevent the future releases and remedy any deficiencies in the prevention program.” Having this “public” examination of near miss investigations puts pressure on both industry and our regulatory program to seek root causes and make practical improvements in site process safety programs—without adding any substantial regulatory burden to industry. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 328–331, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-09-02T19:46:14.121369-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11630
  • Normalization of process safety lagging metrics
    • Authors: Mengtian Wang; Ray A. Mentzer, Xiaodan Gao, Joshua Richardson, M. Sam Mannan
      Pages: 337 - 345
      Abstract: This article explores new process safety metrics for measuring process safety performance in the chemical processing industry. While Process Safety Management enables an operation to optimize their process safety programs and organizational risks, there is an emerging need to evaluate process safety implementation across an organization through measurement of key indicators. Lagging metrics utilize process safety incidents as the numerator and divide it by an appropriate process‐related denominator or “normalization factor.” Currently, work hours is used extensively as a normalization factor to evaluate safety performance in the process industries. However, this lagging metric does not directly reflect process safety information and may not accurately reflect the safety performance of the process. Modified denominators are explored in this study and compared with the existing time‐based denominator to validate the effectiveness and applicability of the new metrics. Each proposed normalization factor was validated using available industry data. A statistical unitization method has been used to convert incident rates of different ranges for the convenience of comparison. Results show that some proposed process‐related metrics have potential as alternatives, used along with the time‐based metric, to evaluate process safety performance within organizations. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 337–345, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-04-03T05:59:48.783953-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11574
  • The interface of functional safety with process safety and risk analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: 346 - 350
      Abstract: The fundamental requirement of the IEC 61511/ISA 84 standard on Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) is to establish the Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) required for Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) by evaluating process risks and comparing them to risk tolerance criteria. This article addresses issues that impact the determination of SILs for SIFs and their implications for use of the standard. The issues largely revolve around the interface of the standard with process safety and risk analysis. They include the justification for relative contributions to risk reduction from SIS and non‐SIS protection layers, use of appropriate risk tolerance criteria, difficulties with defining hazardous events consistently, the appropriateness of different SIL determination methods, the importance of fully considering common cause failures, the importance of addressing uncertainties, the need to verify risk reduction for non‐SIS as well as SIS protection layers, the role of systematic failures, and the need to ensure quality in supporting process hazard analysis studies. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 346–350, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-10-07T01:51:02.709758-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11640
  • Simplified uncertainty analysis of layer of protection analysis results
    • Authors: Raymond “Randy” Freeman
      Pages: 351 - 360
      Abstract: Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semiquantitative risk evaluation tool. The methodology is widely used in setting safety integrity level targets for safety instrumented systems. The methodology is often used to evaluate the adequacy of existing protective systems against corporate risk targets. The LOPA method is based on the use of conservative estimates of the failure probability of protective systems. Freeman previously presented a method for the quantification of uncertainty in a LOPA study based on the application of variance contribution analysis (VCA) techniques. The use of VCA to evaluate the uncertainty in a LOPA study requires the evaluation of the sensitivity of the LOPA equation to changes in each of the variables. Freeman used direct analytical computation of the partial derivatives of the LOPA equation for each of the uncertain variables. Faster and easier methods are needed if LOPA uncertainty analysis is to be applied by practicing engineers. This article explores the use of approximations to compute the required uncertainty information without the use of the partial derivative computations. Numerical approximations (perturbation methods) are found to allow for the estimate of the partial derivatives with a maximum error of 16%. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 351–360, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-06-03T23:01:24.213374-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11585
  • Treatment of multiple failures in process hazard analysis
    • Authors: Paul Baybutt
      Pages: 361 - 364
      Abstract: Process hazard analysis (PHA) is used to identify hazard scenarios. These hazard scenarios may be initiated by single or multiple failures. Other scenario events, such as the responses of safeguards, are also subject to multiple failure, and enabling events may combine with initiating events or other scenario events to produce a type of multiple failure. If multiple failures are not addressed in PHA, important scenarios may be missed, and the risks of scenarios may be underestimated. This article describes the meaning and types of multiple failures that are possible, discusses their importance, and provides an approach for addressing them in PHA. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 361–364, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-06-03T22:53:47.42434-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11601
  • Dynamic risk assessment and fault detection using a multivariate technique
    • Authors: O. Zadakbar; S. Imtiaz, F. Khan
      Pages: 365 - 375
      Abstract: In the context of process safety, significant improvements are needed in fault detection methods, especially, in the areas of early detection and warning. In this article, a multivariate risk‐based fault detection and diagnosis technique is proposed. The key elements of this technique are to eliminate faults that are not serious and to provide a dynamic process risk indication at each sampling instant. A multivariable residual generation process based on the Kalman filter has been combined with a risk assessment procedure. The use of the Kalman filter makes the method more robust to false alarms, which is an important aspect of any fault detection algorithm that targets the safety of a process. In addition, we consider significant differences in the severity of the faults associated with different process variables. We also take into account the varying intensity of damage caused by the increasing and decreasing rates of fault and the need to treat those cases differently. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 365–375, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-06-17T02:58:14.106378-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11609
  • Quantitative safety analysis of a laboratory‐scale bioreactor for
           hydrogen sulfide biotreatment using fault tree analysis
    • Authors: Mohamed A. Zytoon; Ahmed H. El‐Shazly, Madbuli H. Noweir, Abdulrahim A. Al‐Zahrani
      Pages: 376 - 386
      Abstract: Numerous research activities are conducted all over the world to study biological treatment of H2S in laboratory‐scale bioreactors. Important hazards associated with these bioreactor systems include the escape of H2S gas and leakage of chemical/biological liquids, which have severe adverse effects on the involved labors, equipment, and materials. The objective of this article is to present a quantitative safety analysis of a laboratory‐scale continuous bioreactor system for H2S gas biotreatment using the fault tree analysis approach. Three unwanted top events were determined as the most hazardous events, being H2S leakage inside the laboratory, H2S leakage to outdoor from bioreactor outlet, and leakage of liquid chemical/biological solutions. The minimal cut sets and the probability of the occurrence of each top event were determined. The importance of cut sets and basic events were calculated, and priorities for control measures were determined. The analysis allows better decision on priority of control measures, and maintenance or replacement schemes of the system components in an endeavor to minimize the probability of failure or hazard occurrence. The presented analysis proves the usefulness of fault tree analysis in making quantitative risk assessment and safety analysis, which are important elements in laboratory safety management system. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 376–386, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-04-28T23:04:20.976112-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11600
  • Using critical flame temperature for estimating lower flammable limits of
           a mixture
    • Authors: Tingguang Ma
      Pages: 387 - 392
      Abstract: Based on the thermal balance between quenching and heating potentials of each component (fuel/oxygen/diluent), a method of computing flame temperature is proposed. This method can be used to find the critical flame temperature at lower flammable limits or estimate the lower flammable limits with an assumed critical flame temperature. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 387–392, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-05-04T11:38:50.403508-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11603
  • A study of flare load reduction by a safety instrumented system based on a
           high integrity protection system
    • Authors: Inbok Lee; Taekeun Oh
      Pages: 393 - 400
      Abstract: In order to relieve the over‐pressure safely due to a process malfunction in the oil refineries and petrochemical plants, a flare system has been used in many cases. However, in some cases, it is not recommended to install an additional flare system because of various limitations such as environmental regulations and the lack of plant area. Moreover, it is also challenging to mitigate the increase of flare load due to the failure of instruments only by the existing flare system. So, the reduction of the flare load has been the center of attention. As a good solution to this problem, a safety instrumented system (SIS) can be used. The mitigation scheme for flare load by the SIS associated with the high integrity protection system has many advantages in theory, but several issues have to be checked before it is applied in reality. Thus, this study has suggested some technical basis and important factors to consider in the application to the actual safety design and operation process. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 393–400, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-06-03T22:56:48.966561-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11608
  • Safety & health news
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      Pages: 401 - 403
      PubDate: 2013-11-26T09:14:58.410587-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11656
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
Fax: +00 44 (0)131 4513327
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-2014