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Journal Cover Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.359]   [H-I: 28]   [6 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1580 journals]
  • Pressure relief valve inspection interval
    • Authors: Thiago Trotta; Charles Kashou, Nancy Faulk
      Abstract: Determining the correct interval for pressure relief valve inspection, testing, and maintenance remains a major challenge for facilities covered by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Process Safety Management Standard. To this end, guidance is provided by API Standard 510, Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: In-Service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration, by API Recommended Practice 576, Inspection of Pressure-relieving Devices, by API Standard 520, Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices, Part II-Installation, and by NB-23, National Board Inspection Code—Part 2 Inspection. Furthermore, ASME BPVC, Sections I and VIII, provide general guidelines for the repair of pressure relief valves.However, the testing and inspection interval listed, up to ten years, is the maximum time span between shop inspections and overhaul. Further direction is often requested for determining the proper interval for valves in typical process services, especially in cases of PRV chattering. Recent API STD 520 Part II guidance on performing engineering analyses for PRV installations, based on service and specific installation, is included here.In this paper, a decision-making approach to determining these intervals based on a combined understanding of risk-based inspection, quality assurance, engineering analyses, and facility experience is presented. The approach provides process operators and managers with additional assistance in making this determination. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-04-20T04:02:00.195582-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11892
       
  • Dynamic safety risk modeling of process systems using bayesian network
    • Authors: Esmaeil Zarei; Ali Azadeh, Mostafa Mirzaei Aliabadi, Iraj Mohammadfam
      Abstract: Process complex systems in particular oil and gas plants due to dealing with hazardous materials at severe process conditions are much prone to catastrophic accidents. In this context, safety risk analysis is a crucial tool to develop effective strategies to prevent accident and provide mitigative measures. Dynamic risk analysis (DRA) is one of the most practical approaches for risk analysis that helps provide safer operations of complex process systems. The present work is aimed at demonstrating the application of an integrated DRA approach to comprehensive quantitative modeling and analysis of the both aspects of risk, that is, probability and consequence assessments. In this approach, first, the worst case scenario is identified and then a robust tool is developed for dynamic accident scenario modeling and risk assessment by means of Bayesian Network. This approach is applied to risk analysis of a flammable liquid storage system at a gas refinery. The work provides valuable information on the identification and comprehensive analysis of worst case accident scenarios, their main consequences, critical basic events, and minimal cut sets which lead to accident scenarios and also for dynamic updating of probabilities and risk. The obtained results are more appropriate and rigorous to developing preventive and mitigative strategies for potential accident scenarios and thus increase the safety level in the complex process systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-04-12T01:40:52.94895-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11889
       
  • Pipeline risk assessment using artificial intelligence: A case from the
           colombian oil network
    • Authors: Alexander Guzman Urbina; Atsushi Aoyama
      Abstract: Currently, in order to make decisions regarding the safety of pipelines, the risk values and risk targets are becoming relevant points for discussion. However, the challenge is the reliability of the models employed to get the risk data. Such models usually involve a large number of variables and deal with high amounts of uncertainty. Therefore, there is a strong need for a powerful tool to cope with that uncertainty, and one of the best tools dealing with uncertainty is the implementation of artificial intelligence methods using fuzzy logic.Hence, this study aims to present an artificial intelligence inference system that minimizes the uncertainty of traditional approaches of risk assessment in pipelines. Also, in order to show the applicability of the model developed, this study presents a case from the Colombian oil transportation network. Besides that, this study presents an uncertainty analysis for the risk values, comparing the results of the inference system with traditional approach. The results show that the inference system performs better since the magnitude of the average error and its standard deviation are less than the traditional approach. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-04-09T02:00:27.561449-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11890
       
  • A new insight into the accident investigation: A case study of Tianjin
           Port fire and explosion in China
    • Authors: Zhou Aitao; Fan Lingpeng
      Abstract: By figuring out the cause and learning the lessons, accident investigation serves to avoid the like accidents effectively. Incident Management is one of the twelve key factors among China's process safety management system (PSMS), while accident investigation is central to Incident Management. This paper selected “Tianjin Port 8.12 fire and explosion accident” (“Tianjin 8.12 Accident”) as an investigation case. Three core components: cause analysis, affixing the responsibility and corrective suggestions, were unfolded. Problems were analyzed from process safety and accident development point of view. A process analysis approach, which is based on event sequence-barrier failed, was employed for accident investigation. Affixing responsibility process based on failed analysis was used for accident investigating and affixing. In order to give corrective suggestions, safety information-based corrective suggestions are proposed by starting from systematic and interconnected perspective and combining with finding failed behaviors and an in-depth analysis of the causes behind the behaviors. Subsequently, an integral accident investigation approach, which consists of cause analysis based on event sequence-barrier failed, affixing responsibility process based on failed analysis and systematic corrective measures based on safety information, can effectively render scientific theoretical guidance to investigation and analysis of an accident. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-04-08T07:56:58.241613-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11891
       
  • The physics and Metaphysics of the sensitivity of calorimetric instruments
           and human senses
    • Authors: Dilip K. Das
      Abstract: The onset temperature for a reaction detected by an apparatus in an experimental study is an overestimated value compared with the actual value existing within large batches. Models are used to estimate the “actual value” for large batches. The onset temperature is dependent on the Phi-factor (thermal inertia), adiabaticity, and detection sensitivity of the calorimeter. It is therefore advisable to penalize the detected onset temperature by an arbitrary number, such as 50°C for Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC), to arrive at the recommended (Adjusted) onset decomposition or reaction temperature for the purpose of setting control parameters in operations.The influence of Phi-factor and detection- sensitivity of the Heat-Wait-Search mode in the ARC on the detected onset temperature is discussed. A parallel is drawn between the instrumental sensitivity in the phenomenal world and the mental sensitivity in the noumenal world. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T08:03:14.763256-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11871
       
  • New model for predicting thermal radiation from flares and high pressure
           jet fires for hydrogen and syngas
    • Authors: Derek Miller
      Abstract: Current flare and jet fire models used in the process industry are primarily based on hydrocarbon gases and have been found not to be particularly effective for low luminosity gases such as hydrogen and syngas mixtures. This article presents a new model for such gases, for low to high pressure releases in both vertical and horizontal orientations. The model, which predicts flame geometry and thermal radiation, allowing for jet momentum, buoyancy, wind and flame radiant fraction, is based on extension of established models, with the addition of several new correlations. Validation against existing published data and new previously unpublished test data collected at both pilot and full scale is presented. This article provides the complete set of equations for the model. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-03-13T02:11:13.628487-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11867
       
  • Method for CFD facilitated pressure rise calculation due to deflagration
           in heat recovery steam generator
    • Authors: Wei Zhou; Manuel Cardenas, David Moyeda
      Abstract: For combined cycle operations, especially during startup and shutdown, safety concerns have always been the top priority. Residual fuels can escape to and accumulate in the downstream heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) if appropriate purge is not taken, which may cause deflagration, an explosion at subsonic condition, during startup when heat source exists. Residual fuel deflagration will lead to pressure rise and therefore, structural and or tube damages depending on the level of pressure increase. Therefore, a careful study of the residual fuel distribution in HRSG and the pressure rise due to possible deflagration is wanted.Historically, thermodynamics relationships and chemical equilibrium calculations are used to estimate the pressure rise. These approaches either assume that all fuel energy is converted into heat, or make assumptions on the amount of fuel in chemical equilibrium that contributes to the pressure rise. These assumptions tend to overestimate the pressure rise. With the development of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation, a more accurate prediction of the fuel concentration in HRSG during transient startup and/or shutdown process is possible. The local fuel concentrations can now be calculated and therefore, how much fuel that are within the explosion limits and contribute to the pressure rise can be detected readily.This article presents the transient CFD modeling results of residual fuel concentration in a typical HRSG configuration during a gas turbine/combined cycle startup failure process. The article then refines the adiabatic mixing model with the predicted local fuel concentrations to provide a better estimation of the pressure rise due to deflagration. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-03-09T01:46:35.814418-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11887
       
  • Process safety education and training academic education as a foundation
           for other process safety initiatives on education
    • Authors: Geert Boogaerts; Jan Degrève, Geert Vercruysse
      Abstract: Commitment to process safety is fundamental to the process industry. Governance, promotion, and participation in academic and related educational programs are testament to the industry's commitment and stakeholder reach. Process safety education and training is a very broad topic. Industry-academic collaboration is essential when developing high level education and training on process safety. This article looks at the development of educational and training programmes for students in Advanced Master programmes in the European master network and for experienced industry workers. The Advanced Master Safety Engineering developed at the University has a proven track record in realizing the intended learning outcomes along with a high level of academic and professional orientation as well as international orientation. The results related to the learning outcomes are very satisfying, which implies that there is a good relationship between the intended learning outcomes, the programme and the evaluation tests. The associated Advanced Master Class on process safety has a very satisfying overall trainee satisfaction (Level 1) and learning gains (Level 2) evaluation in the Kirkpatrick's Model. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-03-01T03:55:36.363538-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11885
       
  • Introduction to functional safety assessments of safety controls, alarms,
           and interlocks: How efficient are your functional safety projects?
    • Authors: Eloise Roche; Monica Hochleitner, Angela Summers
      Abstract: The return on investment (ROI) for safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI) can be significantly impacted by human error, which can occur during any lifecycle activity and be committed by competent workers. Design, installation, testing, maintenance, and operational practices are often repeated throughout a site, lowering the ROI with each flawed installation. A functional safety assessment (FSA) is a tool used to identify and correct defects before a simple human error allows an incident to propagate in spite of the capital spent on the installed SCAI equipment.Significant efficiency can be gained when FSAs are periodically conducted during the SCAI lifecycle, so that critical information is gathered when needed. This article will discuss the internationally endorsed five-stage approach to FSA. The purpose and content of each FSA stage is reviewed and execution timing is suggested that focuses project resources to maximize FSA benefit to project cost and schedule. Finally, a case study illustrates how lack of effective and timely FSA contributed to the occurrence of a costly and catastrophic loss event. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-03-01T03:55:34.665064-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11886
       
  • Instructions to Authors
    • PubDate: 2017-02-27T23:31:44.992698-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11888
       
  • Why DDT is the only way to explain some vapor cloud explosions
    • Authors: D.M. Johnson; V.H.Y. Tam
      Abstract: The possibility that Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) occurs in vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) in industrial accidents has generally only been recognized for very reactive fuels such as hydrogen and ethylene. Assessment of the explosion hazards and risks associated with less reactive fuels such as propane and other alkanes has generally been based around the assumption that, in practice, only a deflagration can occur. This has the benefit that the magnitude of the maximum hazard to surrounding areas is defined by the physical parameters of any congested process region and not by the extent of the vapor cloud, as would be the case if there was a sustained detonation. However, following the Buncefield incident in the UK in 2005, a considerable amount of effort was expended in explaining the major VCE that occurred. This initially involved gathering and interpreting the evidence from the incident but then extended to experimental and theoretical research over two phases and lasting five years. Further research since showed that DDT can be achieved within dense vegetation and regions of pipework with a relatively small extent (of the order of a few meters). The results from this project will be summarized, indicating why the only explanation that is consistent with all of the evidence is a DDT soon after ignition of the cloud, with a sustained detonation then propagating through the majority of the cloud. Reference will be made to other incidents where similar evidence was observed. Awareness of the significance of such evidence will be important in the investigation of future VCEs. In addition, the possibility of DDT needs to be recognized in the methodologies used to assess VCE hazards. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-24T02:20:44.786149-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11874
       
  • Using social network theory to analyze the effectiveness of environment,
           safety and health management for two petrochemical companies
    • Authors: Jao-Jia Horng; Kuang-Yu Liao, Shun-Yeng Wang
      Abstract: The social network analysis theory was used to explore two domestic petrochemical companies on their environmental, safety, and health (ESH) management system and operation effectiveness. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses by NodeXL and statistical tools were applied through the survey questionnaires to observe the results of social network among two management systems. From the background information of those individuals, parameters and network diagrams, we could identify three kinds of specialized network personnel: Central persons, marginal men and information agents, in order to understand the organization work, and information flows and influence patterns. Two companies showed differences in their International Standard Organization (ISO) based management systems and actual functioning systems. The centrality parameter indicated that some managers lack network connections to others and some members' knowledge could not be adequately used owing to the faults in organization structures. These problems would lower the effectiveness of management systems. Our analysis also showed positive correlations between the trustworthiness among members as well as the recognition networks. This study showed that the network analysis could be a good reference for the high-level managers to understand their ESH system, to evaluate the organization efficiency and to analyze their future development and operation needs. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-02-22T01:00:34.587723-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11865
       
  • Atmospheric tank failures: Mechanisms and an unexpected case study
    • Authors: Michael S. Schmidt
      Abstract: The literature on catastrophic failures of low-pressure tanks focuses on the ignition of explosive mixtures in the vapor space of those tanks, and rightly so, because most catastrophic failures of atmospheric tanks involve explosions of such mixtures. Moreover, there is a general sense in the industry that other than explosions of flammable mixtures, the only other hazard associated with low-pressure tanks is the occasional dramatic implosion of a vessel that is inadequately protected against vacuum.In fact, there are a number of mechanisms that can lead to the catastrophic failure of a low-pressure tank that have nothing to do with combustion or unprotected vacuum. Under certain circumstances, even a tank equipped with an atmospheric vent and containing nothing other than salt water can explode, with disastrous impacts.This article reviews the mechanisms for catastrophic failure of low pressure tanks, both implosion and explosion, and serves as a reminder for experienced process safety practitioners and as a tutorial for new process safety practitioners of what to look for during a hazard review. It also includes a case study of an atmospheric caustic tank explosion that resulted from a previously unreported mechanism that involved neither combustion nor vacuum. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:52.316894-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11881
       
  • A technique to control major hazards of the coal gasification process
           developed from critical events and safety barriers
    • Authors: Feng Sun; Wei Xu, Guangjian Wang, Bing Sun
      Abstract: Many coal gasification related accidents happened in China recently. Investigations of the accidents show that the performance of safety barriers and the risk influence factors contributing to it plays an important role. Lack of attention on the performance of safety barriers and associated risk influence factors hinder the thorough understanding of these accidents and, therefore, needs to be addressed by providing a new analysis methodology. Herein, we developed an approach from critical events and safety barriers to control the major hazards during the coal gasification process. The method consists of process hazard identification based on critical events, barrier performance evaluation based on barrier diagrams, and quantification of risk influence factors based on Bayesian network. The application of the method indicates that it is suitable for controlling major hazards of the coal gasification process as well as other chemical processes. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:42.185681-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11880
       
  • Modeling and validation of dispersion following an instantaneous vapor or
           two-phase release from a pressurized vessel
    • Authors: Henk W.M. Witlox; Mike Harper, David Webber
      Abstract: This article presents a new model for the initial dispersion phase of energetic instantaneous expansion following a catastrophic vessel rupture. This model has been implemented as a new sub-model in the Phast dispersion model and is based on more sound physical principles than the old Phast sub-model. It allows for both vapor and two-phase releases. In the case of two-phase releases, droplets are assumed to expand radially, potentially leading to time-varying droplet rainout and the formation of a spreading evaporating liquid pool. For ground-level vapor or two-phase releases the correctness of the numerical predictions is confirmed against an analytical solution. The model has been validated against previously published experimental data for pressurized releases with and without rainout. This includes ground-level releases for nitrogen vapor and flashing liquid propylene, and elevated flashing liquid releases for Freon 11, Freon 12, propane and butane. Overall the old model tends to under-predict the cloud radius and cloud speed versus time, while the new model more closely agrees with small-scale experimental data. Therefore the new model produces smaller concentrations and doses, and is less conservative. For two-phase releases the new model predicts an increased amount of rainout, which is more in line with the experimental data. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:38.916611-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11876
       
  • Auditing management systems for safety controls, alarms, and interlocks:
           How effective are your instrumented protective systems?
    • Authors: Monica Hochleitner; Eloise Roche
      Abstract: Functional safety audits evaluate the performance of the management systems and procedures required to keep safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI) working effectively. Organizations invest thousands, sometimes millions, of dollars installing automation systems in safety applications to minimize the risk of their enterprise. Return on investment in SCAI systems, and the achieved degree of risk reduction, can be negatively impacted by human error, such as inadequate installation, testing, maintenance, or operation of the automation systems. Administrative controls and organizational discipline are needed to identify and correct these errors. This article will provide an introduction to the purpose, key content, and planning of a functional safety audit. The case studies presented will illustrate how safety system effectiveness could have been improved if a detailed audit of the implemented SCAI had been conducted and the findings addressed in a timely fashion. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:32.656454-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11875
       
  • One company's observations on the implementation of LOPA
    • Authors: Anne Bertelsmann
      Abstract: Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has gained popularity as a semi-quantitative risk assessment tool, but often unexpected difficulties are encountered when rolling out LOPA. This article discusses the practical aspects of LOPA implementation in Marathon Petroleum Company LP's Refining Organization (MPC Refining). Specifically, it shows how scenarios are selected from a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and how they are organized for conducting LOPA efficiently, and it discusses whether to conduct LOPA concurrently or after the HAZOP. The article also compares the [cause consequence] or [consequence cause] methodology and addresses the implications of combining multiple causes in a single scenario.Another key aspect of LOPA implementation is the set of numerical values used for frequencies, modifiers and risk-reduction factors. The article shows how numerical values should be tied to the risk matrix and how internal consistency is achieved through the use of standardized values and restrictions on the use of frequency modifiers. It discusses potential solutions for cases where the LOPA outcome does not meet the risk target. Finally, the article shows how the use of application standards can supplement LOPA by defining minimum protections and providing standard LOPA scenarios. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:29.452056-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11873
       
  • Chinese process safety management core elements and control measures
    • Authors: Aitao Zhou; Lingpeng Fan, Mingfei Ma, Bo Tao
      Abstract: With the popularization and application of chemical process safety management (PSM) systems in the chemical industry, the use of such systems in China has become the focus of a large volume of research. In this article, 12 elements included in the current Chinese PSM system are divided into four stages from a structural point of view. This division will be helpful in the follow-up analysis. After a careful analysis of the evaluation results for one PSM pilot study in Nanjing, some correlations have been found between the results of the elemental evaluation. Small- and medium-sized chemical plants make up a large proportion of Chinese chemical plants and many chemical accidents take place in these plants, so a simplified PSM system in practical operation need to be found. Based on a previous PSM structural analysis, the secondary elements of the PSM system can be removed. This allows researchers to avoid the traditional method of analyzing PSM elements individually. In the concrete analysis process, a theoretical analysis of the correlation degree between elements can be combined with the results of accident investigations. The simplified Chinese PSM system consists of four core elements: Process safety information, process hazard analysis, training, and emergency management. Based on the current applications of these four core elements in China, a consideration of correlations between these elements is used to make several suggestions for improving China's PSM systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-01-22T11:20:24.826483-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11878
       
  • Issue Information-TOC
    • Pages: 1 - 1
      PubDate: 2017-02-27T23:31:46.047825-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11843
       
  • Smartphones and process safety
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      Pages: 3 - 3
      PubDate: 2017-02-06T04:35:40.051872-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11883
       
  • Smartphone use in process safety
    • Authors: Deborah Pano; Christina Baulch
      Pages: 4 - 9
      Abstract: Every development in technology brings the opportunity to build a safer future, in process safety and beyond. In the age of smartphones, this opportunity comes in the form of safety applications, education, and communication through social media. Because the majority of those in the workforce own smartphones, these devices may act as valuable tools for engineers, and are a possible medium for sending alerts and notifications. Because we live in the age of information, applications have been developed specifically to cater to the unmet needs of engineers. Technology has allowed us to have the information we need in the palm of our hand at a moment's notice, and access to this information will lead us to a safer tomorrow. Note that in some facilities, cell phones may be monitored or even prohibited. Always abide by the facility's rules to ensure everyone's safety, particularly in relation to cell phone use. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 4–9, 2017
      PubDate: 2017-02-08T01:21:10.970195-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11884
       
  • Practical Leadership Skills for Safety Professionals and Project
           Engineers, A Review (2016) By Gary L. Winn, PhD, CRC Press, Taylor &
           Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL 33487, 330 pages, $67.46, ISBN-9781498758222
           (Hardback)
    • Authors: John Murphy
      Pages: 109 - 109
      PubDate: 2017-01-17T03:37:16.666582-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11872
       
  • Safety & health news spring 2017
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      Pages: 110 - 114
      PubDate: 2017-02-09T00:50:25.164063-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11879
       
  • Erratum: Dangerously close: The CSB's investigation into the fatal fire
           and explosion in west, Texas
    • Pages: 115 - 115
      PubDate: 2017-02-07T02:16:39.510015-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11882
       
 
 
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