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Journal Cover Process Safety Progress
  [SJR: 0.387]   [H-I: 22]   [6 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1066-8527 - ISSN (Online) 1547-5913
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1598 journals]
  • Application of a liquid nitrogen direct jet system to the extinguishment
           of oil pool fires in open space
    • Authors: Bobo Shi; Fubao Zhou
      Abstract: Liquid fuel fires occurring during industrial processes are serious safety concerns around the world due to their devastating impact on lives, the environment and property. In this study, a liquid nitrogen delivery system was set up to extinguish the oil pool fires in open space. Effects of liquid nitrogen flow rate, pipe diameter, and liquid nitrogen release distance on the suppression process were analyzed according to the mass loss, burning rate and temperature variations. When liquid nitrogen release distance was 0.50 m and pipe diameter was 0.04 m, fire extinguishing time was the shortest 1.6 s and the temperature decrease rate above the liquid fuel surface reached 275°C/s. Fuel surface cooling and blow off process were revealed through the experiments as two kinds of fire extinguishing mechanisms. Based on the flame images captured by high speed camera, the flame expansion phenomenon might occur early in liquid nitrogen injection, especially the situation of the higher flow rate of liquid nitrogen. Three approaches (ground fixed system, moving transportation, and directional transportation of liquid nitrogen) are provided for fire extinguishment of large scale fires. The results obtained provide important reference for the conduct of fire extinguishment for fires. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-08-16T02:36:38.239568-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11840
       
  • RAGAGEP considerations for relief and flare systems
    • Authors: Georges A. Melhem; Casey Houston
      Abstract: Recent emphasis on Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) increased the scope of relief systems risk factors that require evaluation to develop complete and compliant Pressure Relief and Flare Systems documentation. Failure to comply with RAGAGEP ((d)(3)(ii)) is the most cited element of the Process Safety Management requirements. This paper discusses how RAGAGEP considerations now require evaluation and proper documentation of risk factors that are often overlooked including but not limited to: dispersion analysis, thermal radiation, noise, vibration risk, reaction forces and structural supports, metal cold temperatures due to expansion cooling and two phase flow, hot temperatures due to fire exposure and/or runaway reactions, PRV stability, chemical reaction systems, and loss of high pressure/low pressure interface. Important RAGAGEP considerations for these additional risk factors are highlighted and discussed. Recommendations are provided on how to best address these factors in the evaluation and documentation of design basis. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-08-11T05:00:37.871146-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11839
       
  • Human Error in Process Plant Design and Operations, a Practitioner's
           Guide, a Review (2016) By J. Robert Taylor, CR Press, Taylor & Francis
           Group, Boca Raton, FL, 290 pages, $99.95, ISBN:
           978‐1‐4987‐3885‐9
    • Authors: John Murphy
      PubDate: 2016-08-09T06:05:44.398434-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11841
       
  • Anatomy of Tianjin Port fire and explosion: Process and causes
    • Authors: Gui Fu; Jianhao Wang, Mingwei Yan
      Abstract: An investigation was performed into the Tianjin Port fire and explosion accident. It mainly focused on the process and causes. Initially, nitrocellulose burned spontaneously and the fire resulted in two major explosions of hazardous chemicals (mainly ammonium nitrate). Rough handling during the moving, loading and unloading of nitrocellulose directly resulted in the spontaneous combustion. Specifically, stacking various hazardous chemicals in the same area and storing ammonium nitrate in the port without permission caused the spread of the fire and the two major explosions. The implementation of Ruihai Company's management system (e.g., the safety training, safety supervision, etc.) for storage and transport of hazardous chemicals was deficient, and they neglected the importance of safety during production. Periodic safety inspection (e.g., the hazard identification, storage plan of hazardous chemicals, management system weaknesses, etc.) from local government agencies was not adequate and rigorous. Following accidents, casualties can be reduced or even avoided through adequate evacuation and rescue. Lessons can be learned from this disaster to avoid similar mistakes within the industry in the future. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-26T08:46:47.676428-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11837
       
  • When it comes to ammonium nitrate, the initiator is free
    • Authors: Ronald J. Willey
      PubDate: 2016-07-26T08:46:05.809435-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11838
       
  • Fall 2016 safety & health news
    • Authors: John F. Murphy
      PubDate: 2016-07-19T05:41:00.572128-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11836
       
  • The eye opener: Preparing for and performing facility siting to best
           communicate with upper management
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: Upon completion of a facility siting study, a major step in the critical path for implementation is acceptance from upper management on the remediation plan. Communicating with upper management occurs at the end of several steps which can be strategically mapped in order to maximize upper management's understanding of the needs of a site's remediation requirements. Using an example chemical plant, this paper will detail the process of initiating a facility siting study, provide a novel approach to prioritizing building remediation requirements, and discuss how the resulting information can best be framed and communicated to upper management. In addition to discussing strategies for effective communication with upper management on proposed facility siting strategies, the paper also details an online system that could be used for keeping facility siting data evergreen after the study is completed. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-17T23:25:41.39118-05:0
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11835
       
  • Expanded Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW4) for determining chemical
           compatibility, past, present, and future
    • Authors: James Farr; Dave Gorman, Dan Sliva, Al Hielscher, Trong Nguyen, George Baran, Brenton Drake, Emory Ford, Dave Frurip, Kirk Mulligan, John W. Ryan, Dalina Viveros
      Abstract: Chemical compatibility is a key consideration throughout the chemical industry wherever two or more chemicals have the potential to mix, either inadvertently or by design. One of the most comprehensive tools available for determining chemical compatibility, the NOAA Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW), has gained significant traction since the release of the third version (CRW3) in 2012. In 3 years, this free software has been downloaded >200,000 times and has become the chemical compatibility tool of choice at many organizations. As a result of an ongoing partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), The Dow Chemical Company, The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Materials Technology Institute (MTI) and other industrial/academic/government volunteers, a fourth version of the CRW (CRW4) has been developed. The expanded capabilities of this new version include a materials of construction section, improved import/exporting/data sharing capabilities, additional reactive groups to aid in determining compatibility decisions, several user interface enhancements, along with the correction of minor issues found in the CRW3. This article will describe past development, the new features included in the CRW4, followed by a brief discussion of future development plans for the software tool. Such developments should solidify this tool's position as the gold standard within the chemical industry for determining chemical hazards. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-17T23:25:33.181123-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11833
       
  • Experimental investigation of the innovative foaming device using gas as
           the sole power for firefighting
    • Authors: Zhilin Xi
      Abstract: Foam is used as an efficient means of firefighting. The innovative foaming device using gas as the sole power is designed to replace the previous foam generating system using two or three power sources, and appropriate size of the new foaming device can be made to control dust and fire in households or companies based on the actual need. The results of the experimental investigation on the new device in three cases are as follows: in the first case, the minimum working pressure is 0.4 MPa and the working flow range is: 8.0858 m3/h ≤ qa ≤ 48.45 m3/h and qL ≤ 0.4532 m3/h. In the second case, the maximum working time of the new foaming device is 109 s and the minimum working pressure of the storage tank II is 0.26 Mpa. In the third case, the maximum working time of the new device is 205 s and the minimum working pressure values of the storage tanks I and II are 0.26 Mpa and 0.3 Mpa respectively. The fire extinguishing experiment is explained in this article, and the results show that the foam generated by the new foaming device is more effective and efficient than the ABC powder fire extinguisher. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-15T05:31:12.815552-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11834
       
  • Parametric generation of explosion scenarios for quantitative risk
           assessment of gas explosion in offshore plants
    • Authors: YeongAe Heo; Inwon Lee
      Abstract: In this study, probabilistic risk assessment has been carried out for the prediction of gas explosion loads due to hydrocarbon leaks and subsequent explosions in the topside of offshore platforms. In the initial phase of the risk assessment, the effect of various scenario parameters on the annual probability of gas explosion was quantified via a MATLAB code. For calculating the gas explosion frequency, the hydrocarbon leak frequencies and the ignition probabilities were derived from the HCR (HydroCarbon Release) database from the Health & Safety Executive (HSE, UK), and the IP (Ignition Probability) report from UKOOA (UK Offshore Operators Association), respectively. The MATLAB code has the algorithm to cope with the varying design practice in either Front End Engineering Design phase or detailed design phase. User‐definable parameter setup and spreadsheet data input provide the user with the flexibility in selecting relevant level of elaboration for such design parameters as the leak size distribution, the hydrocarbon composition, etc. These features of the code enable controlling the number of explosion scenarios without any parameter range remaining unaccounted for. The present MATLAB code has been applied to generate hydrocarbon leak scenarios and corresponding explosion probability for the topside process modules of a specific oil Floating Production, Storage and Offloading. Varying the number of cases for each parameter leads to the variation of the number of explosion scenarios selected, which are either 48 or 24 in the particular case. For each explosion scenario, the gas leak and explosion simulation was carried out using the FLame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) commercial S/W package, giving rise to the annual probability of exceedance for the explosion overpressure. Discussion of the influence of explosion scenario selection method on the change of the overpressure exceedance curves is made. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-07-04T06:21:04.534931-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11832
       
  • Beyond HAZOP and LOPA: Four different company approaches
    • Authors: Jerry Wayne Chastain; Paul Delanoy, Chris Devlin, Thomas Mueller, Karen Study
      Abstract: For operations where application of standards, regulations, and/or Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices may not be sufficient to address a particular company's risk, several options exist. For qualitative assessment of process hazards, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) and What‐If reviews are two of the most common petrochemical industry methods used. Up to 80% of a company's process hazard analysis (PHA) may consist of HAZOP and What‐If reviews (Nolan, Application of HAZOP and What‐If Safety Reviews to the Petroleum, Petrochemical and Chemical Industries, William Andrew Publishing/Noyes, 1994, p. 1). After the PHA, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is commonly used throughout industry to evaluate the required safety integrity level for instrumented protection layers in a semiquantitative manner (Dowell, International Conference and Workshop on Risk Analysis in Process Safety, CCPS/AIChE, 1997). HAZOP, What‐If, and LOPA are all straightforward methods and are relatively easy to perform. However, much like a hammer, they are not always the best or most appropriate tool for a given job. At times, more advanced methodologies such as Fault Tree Analysis, Quantitative Risk Assessment, Event Tree, Failure Mode, and Effects Analysis and Human Reliability Analysis are necessary to properly assess risk. However, these more advanced tools come with a price. They are often more expensive, time consuming, and require a higher level of expertise. The decision to use these higher level methodologies is not taken lightly and different companies use different criteria for determining when to take this next step. This article will present approaches by four companies, BASF, Celanese, The Dow Chemical Company, and Eastman Chemical Company. Each company will outline criteria used to determine when to go beyond HAZOP, What‐If, and LOPA and will present examples where more advanced techniques were used. The intent of this article is to provide readers with real world examples that demonstrate the appropriate application of the “right” tool and to illustrate what criteria can be used to make informed decisions regarding selection of a PHA methodology. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-06-21T06:15:32.067724-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11831
       
  • Dynamic risk‐based maintenance for offshore processing facility
    • Authors: Jyoti Bhandari; Ehsan Arzaghi, Rouzbeh Abbassi, Vikram Garaniya, Faisal Khan
      Abstract: Processing facilities in a marine environment may not remain safe and available if they are not well maintained. Dynamic risk‐based maintenance (RBM) methodology is a tool for maintenance planning and decision making, used to enhance the safety and availability of the equipment. It also assists in identifying and prioritizing the maintenance of equipment based on the level of risk. This article discusses an advanced methodology for the design of an optimum maintenance program integrating a dynamic risk‐based approach with a maintenance optimization technique. In this study, Bayesian Network (BN) is employed to develop a new dynamic RBM methodology that is capable of using accident precursor information in order to revise the risk profile. The use of this methodology is based on its failure prediction capability which optimizes the cost of maintenance. The developed methodology is applied to a case study involving a failure of a separator system in the offshore oil and gas production platform considering marine environments. The result shows it is essential that the valve system in the separator needs to be planned for maintenance once every 25 days; however, the cooler system can be planned for repairs once only biennially. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted to study the criticality of the operating system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-05-06T23:55:28.973882-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11829
       
  • Risk assessment on chemical plants by the method of safety checklist
           analysis
    • Authors: Zhang Xiaoliang; Shen Qian, Zhao Daoliang, Zhang Zhikai, He Rui, Song Huijuan
      Abstract: In this article, 46 chemical plants were investigated and assessed by Safety Department of Shanghai Institute of Technology in China. The safety management and technology ability and level were evaluated by the method of Safety Checklist Analysis (SCA) under the perspective of Safety Specialty Engineer. The risk levels of the overall of 46 plants were got. The SCA assessment presents the visible and invisible risks of the plants quantitatively and plainly. The results show that a majority of the plants have not fully implemented either on the good safety management or the reliable safety practice technology. The level of the overall risk indicate that about 35% of the plants reach the level of A (Scores ≥90), and others both lower than A, even 2 plants in the level of E, with total disregard for their health, safety, and well‐being. Otherwise, 23 items were surveyed and judged one by one in safety assessment by SCA, and put forward suggestions for rectify and reform, which helps the plants recognize the reality of the situation and make better in the future. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-20T04:18:03.998042-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11827
       
  • Process safety: A wicked problem?
    • Authors: James Moseman
      Abstract: The nature of process accidents is discussed, and the relevant definition of Horst Rittel's social phenomenon, “wicked problems,” is examined. Existing accident models are reviewed for inclusion of social drivers thought to dominate process accidents. A suggested method, new to process safety and termed morphological analysis, is offered to uncover unacknowledged drivers. Give the purported fit of process safety as a wicked problem, an assessment of the US Chemical Safety Board's “Most Wanted” is made doubting its potential reduction in accidents. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-15T04:15:39.086593-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11826
       
  • Interrelations between process safety management elements
    • Authors: Hanida Abdul Aziz; Azmi Mohd Shariff, Risza Rusli
      Abstract: OSHA PSM standard has been established with 14 elements that define the management principles to control process hazards and protect the workplace. One of the key factors to the success of Process Safety Management (PSM) implementation is that each element comes as a component in an integrated PSM program. Although various kind of integrated safety management systems have been introduced, direct integration system between PSM elements was not extensively studied due to vague concept on interrelation between PSM elements. This also hampers efforts in designing and developing integrated system for PSM. In this study, the interrelation of critical PSM elements was analyzed based on objectives and information functional of the elements stipulated in OSHA PSM regulations. From the conducted analysis, all the critical elements are interrelated at least with other seven PSM elements. Among the elements, Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity were identified to have the highest interrelations comprising of 12 interrelated PSM elements. The developed PSM matrix has systematically showed the interrelation of critical PSM elements that useful for the development of Integrated PSM system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:49.613016-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11824
       
  • Lower explosion limit/minimum explosible concentration testing for hybrid
           mixtures in the Godbert‐Greenwald furnace
    • Authors: Emmanuel Kwasi Addai; Dieter Gabel, Ulrich Krause
      Abstract: Experimental investigations of the lower explosion limits (LEL) of three‐component hybrid mixtures of six combustible dusts, three gases, and four solvents were performed in the modified Godbert‐Greenwald furnace. The test protocol was in accordance with European standard EN 50281‐2‐1 which is originally used to determine the minimum ignition temperature of dusts. Modification was done on the equipment to test for the explosion limits for dusts, gases, solvents, and hybrid mixtures. In order to prove the validity of our experimental procedure, the LEL for pure gases were initially tested and the results were compared with values found in literature obtained from the standard procedure which show very good agreement. The experimental results demonstrated a significant decrease of the explosion limits of gas, solvent, or dust and an increase in the likelihood of explosion when a small amount of dust was mixed with gas or solvent and vice versa. For example, the minimum explosible concentration (MEC) of high density polyethylene (HDPE) of 174 g/m3 decreased to 130 g/m3 upon addition of methane the concentration of which itself was below the LEL. The MEC of HDPE further decreased to 65 g/m3 when a nonexplosible concentration of hexane was added. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-04-01T02:16:31.061074-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11825
       
  • The effect of an obstacle on methane‐air explosions in a spherical
           vessel connected to a pipeline
    • Authors: Qingqing Zuo; Zhirong Wang, Yaya Zhen, Shangfeng Zhang, Yiqing Cui, Juncheng Jiang
      Abstract: A series of experiments are carried out to reveal the effect of an obstacle on the explosion intensity of a methane‐air mixture in a spherical vessel connected to a pipeline. Results show that obstacle presence, blockage ratio, and position play significant roles in explosion intensity. The oscillation amplitude of pressure both in the vessel and at the pipeline terminus weakens when an obstacle exists in the pipeline. The effects of the blockage ratio on explosion intensity are different when obstacle position changes. Explosive intensity decreases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is set at the intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline and in the middle section of the pipeline. Moreover, when the blockage ratio is ∼56%, the minimum explosion intensity is obtained when the obstacle is set at the middle section of the pipeline. Explosion intensity increases with blockage ratio when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus. The most dangerous case is when the obstacle is positioned near the pipeline terminus, especially when the blockage ratio is 75% or greater. The maximum pressure and the rate of pressure increase at the point of intersection of the spherical vessel and the pipeline are higher than at the middle section. The conclusions provide an important reference for designing explosion venting safety systems and explosion‐resistant designs. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-31T06:25:59.078642-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11823
       
  • Effect of pipe length on methane explosion in interconnected vessels
    • Authors: Kai Zhang; Zhirong Wang, Juncheng Jiang, Wei Sun, Mingwei You
      Abstract: A series of experiments have been conducted to study the influence of pipe length on methane‐air mixture explosion in linked vessels. Two kinds of setups, that is, a spherical vessel connected to a pipe and two spherical vessels connected by a pipe, are used. The characteristics of explosion pressure and flame propagation speed in linked vessels are obtained. The influence of flame propagation direction and the ignition position on explosion pressure and the flame propagation speed are also analyzed under different pipe lengths. The experimental results show that the maximum explosion pressure and the pressure rising rate in the secondary vessel increase with pipe length. The maximum explosion pressure and pressure rising rate increase most obviously when the small vessel is used as the secondary vessel. Moreover, the pressure oscillation is more violent. However, the primary vessel explosion pressure changes a little when pipe length changed. The flame propagation speed from the primary vessel to the secondary vessel increased with pipe length, but the flame propagation acceleration decreased with pipe length. When the pipe diameter and length is constant, bigger primary vessel causes higher initial flame propagation speed; smaller secondary vessel causes stronger blocking effect during the flame propagation. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-31T06:25:40.650789-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11819
       
  • The great commandment of process safety
    • Authors: Milos Ferjencik; Aline Cardoso Anastacio, Jindrich Masin
      PubDate: 2016-03-24T05:31:06.765705-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11821
       
  • Learning from incidents at a Norwegian and a Polish refinery
    • Abstract: Today companies are expected to learn from incidents in the form of accidents and near misses to improve safety at their facilities. In this article, we examine how two refineries located in Poland and Norway work to learn from incidents. We address the nature of their classification systems and how they select incidents for particularly thorough analysis or investigation, methods for analysis of less severe and severe incidents as well as participation in activities, the nature of follow up activities at the refineries and who these are directed at, as well as learning among contractors who carry out maintenance and projects at the refineries. For each of the stages of incident treatment, we consider the similarities and differences between the refineries and how the practices that are used may affect learning. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-21T01:46:01.5195-05:00
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11822
       
  • Create a firm process safety foundation for your new facilities
    • Authors: Victor H. Edwards
      Abstract: Documented here is the acceptance speech of the 2015 Norton H. Walton‐Russell L. Miller Award of the Safety and Health Division of AIChE. The award was presented to Dr. Victor H. Edwards at the annual division banquet at the Global Congress on Process Safety in Austin, TX on April 28, 2015. The speech emphasizes the crucial role that process safety should play in the concept, siting, and design of process plants. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-18T01:00:39.574686-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11820
       
  • Lessons in process safety management learned in the Kaohsiung gas
           explosion accident in Taiwan
    • Abstract: A series of explosions attributed to leakage of propylene from an underground pipeline resulted in 32 fatalities and 321 injuries in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, in 2014. An analysis of this gas explosion indicated that such an accident could have been prevented, or the consequences might not have been as severe if certain elements of process safety management (PSM) had been applied. Proper execution of PSM, including management of change, mechanical integrity, process hazard analysis (PHA), process safety information (PSI), and training, can prevent the occurrence of such explosion accidents. The impact of this explosion could have been reduced had these PSM elements, particularly PHA, operating procedures, training, PSI, and emergency planning and response, been executed. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-17T01:45:41.537162-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11818
       
  • Anatomy of explosives spontaneous combustion accidents in the Chinese
           underground coal mine: Causes and prevention
    • Authors: Jianhao Wang; Jiangshi Zhang, Kai Zhu, Lin Zhou
      Abstract: Explosives spontaneous combustion accidents in underground coal mines have not been taken seriously in China despite serious casualties and property losses. In order to avoid disasters of this sort, anatomy on eight accidents were performed, mainly involving the process of the occurrence and development, characteristics of casualties, causes and prevention. Improper storage and use of shoddy explosives were the primary reasons for these accidents. Toxic gases and smoke were generated in the explosives' smoldering or burning, so the poisoning and suffocation were the main types of casualties. Besides, unsafe acts of different staff, which resulted in the occurrence of accidental events and the expansion of casualties (i.e., affecting the evacuation and rescue), were analyzed emphatically, and almost all of them were violations. The senior manager and middle manager were the main producers of unsafe acts, which can provide the guidance for employees' targeted training and supervision. Overall, eliminating unsafe acts is an effective way to prevent this kind of accidents, and casualties can be reduced or even avoided through the proper evacuation and rescue. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-03-16T00:35:45.636859-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11816
       
  • Fire extinguishment behaviors of liquid fuel using liquid nitrogen jet
    • Authors: Bobo Shi; Fubao Zhou
      Abstract: Liquid nitrogen for liquid fuel fires extinguishing is still a new and hot topic. Fire extinguishment behaviors of liquid nitrogen are not yet fully understood, and the related research is still in its infancy. In this article, a flexible liquid nitrogen jet system was set up to examine the process of liquid nitrogen interacting with the pool fire in an open space. The main objective of this article is to compare the extinguishment behaviors of vertical/horizontal jet of liquid nitrogen for extinguishing oil pool fires by the measurements of weight, thermocouples temperature, and infrared thermal image. As a result, experiment discovered that liquid nitrogen has a satisfactory performance for the pool firefighting. And the horizontal jet of liquid nitrogen is more effective than the vertical jet in terms of fire extinguishing time and the required amount of liquid nitrogen. The shape of fire flame during the period of horizontal liquid nitrogen jet was completely different from that during the period of vertical liquid nitrogen jet. The fire extinguishing mechanism of vertical/horizontal liquid nitrogen jet was revealed, respectively. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-22T07:54:28.113214-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11815
       
  • How does “deviation” become “normal”?
    • Authors: Jennifer F. Mize
      Abstract: How does deviation from established safe practices become institutionalized within an organization? Conducting day‐to‐day and routine operations in a manner inconsistent with documented policies, procedures, and practices can lead to failure to appropriately identify and manage hazards. A continued tolerance for “getting the job done” when the methods used do not follow established instructions can lead to the normalization of deviation, especially when employees are rewarded for taking initiative. This article will present examples of deviations that have occurred due to failure to acknowledge change, resource constraints, and other factors. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-02-05T05:31:31.409152-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11803
       
  • Evaluation of uncertainty in safety integrity level calculations
    • Abstract: The evaluation of the safety integrity level (SIL) of a new or existing safety instrumented system (SIS) requires detailed calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance‐testing cycle for the system. The failure rates of the devices are taken from standard failure rate tabulations of equipment. The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant experience. The quantitative evaluation determines the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a demand mode SIS and yields the SIL of the SIS. All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain. This article explores the impact of uncertainty on the PFD calculation for a SIS. The “70%” rule of thumb from IEC 61508 is compared to results obtained using probability theory such as variance contribution analysis (VCA). A proposed methodology for handling the uncertainty in the PFD calculations is presented based on the application of the VCA method. An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2016-01-23T03:46:39.298403-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11805
       
  • Consequence modeling of dynamic source terms
    • Authors: Michael James
      Abstract: While several dispersion modeling tools provide modeling tools for static situations, it is challenging to model conditions when there are several variables continually changing. This article discusses several modeling approaches to solve the source term of a release event, including: tracking the concentration of vapor inside of a structure; accounting for heat of solution of a leak of strong acid while deluge is applied; and modeling the output from a scrubber given a dynamic input stream. Upon development of the source term, a method for applying the source term to common dispersion modeling packages is explained. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2016-01-09T05:50:04.193687-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11804
       
  • Calorimetric study of the exothermic decomposition of dimethyl sulfoxide
    • Authors: B. Todd Brandes; Daniel K. Smith
      Abstract: Dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) is a widely used solvent often employed for a variety of organic syntheses. It is stable at room temperature, can dissolve many types of organic materials, and is miscible in water. However, upon heating in a closed system under conditions typically achievable in a commercial chemical plant, DMSO undergoes significantly exothermic and hazardous decomposition which could realistically lead to a pressure vessel explosion unless adequate protection layers were installed, possibly including a pressure relief system. This study provides calorimetry data from several apparatus and methods to characterize the decomposition to aid in assessing hazards and designing protection systems. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2016
      PubDate: 2016-01-06T05:50:25.602191-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11802
       
  • Table of contents
    • Pages: 213 - 213
      PubDate: 2016-08-08T09:47:21.166856-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11774
       
  • Application of microfluidics technology in chemical engineering for
           enhanced safety
    • Authors: Bing Sun; Jie Jiang, Ning Shi, Wei Xu
      Abstract: The unique virtues of microfluidic technology have earned it an important place in a variety of chemical engineering applications. Among advantages including improved selectivity or yield, one crucial yet often neglected one is enhanced safety. Herein, we have critically reviewed latest progress in the study of using microreactors to reduce associated risk when performing experiments. Related research results have been carefully selected and categorized based on the major consideration to employ microfluidic technology, for example, fast heat/mass transfer, tolerance to high pressure, and confinement of toxic materials. Frontiers and remaining challenge of the field have been addressed at the end of this review as well. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-12-22T08:08:30.195101-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11801
       
  • Environmental risk assessment of a biogas station
    • Abstract: This article investigates the environmental risk assessment of a biogas station, in particular an example attached to a wastewater treatment plant. Such analysis focused on assessing the environmental risk presented by leakage of liquid material from the biogas reactor into a neighboring river. The risk methodology proposed herein is based on the principle of risk assessment regarding a major incident within the petrochemical industry. The threat of environmental damage from biogas production is low, when compared with the petrochemical industry, but represents a branch of industry worthy of heightened health, safety, and risk methodologies. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-30T04:52:29.411044-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11799
       
  • PSM auditing: Thinking beyond compliance
    • Authors: Stephen Gill
      Abstract: The process safety management (PSM) rule requires a “compliance audit” at least every 3 years. This description implies that the purpose of the audit is to ensure that legal requirements are met. Thoughtful companies recognize that meeting the minimum legal requirements may not be sufficient, and also audit for conformance with their internal company standards and procedures. However, in audit programs designed to check compliance with either legal or legal + internal requirements, there is an implicit assumption that conformance will result in an acceptable process safety performance. In other words, if all of the “inputs” are right (i.e., there is compliance with the standards and procedures), then process safety is being managed effectively—and the desired “outputs” will follow. This assumption may not be valid! In reality, managing process safety requires the meshing or connecting of several related work processes or activities in order to effectively deliver the desired results. Checking each activity for compliance with standards does not necessarily ensure that the sum of the connected activities is delivering what was intended. Take, for example, the identification and control of major risk scenarios. The PSM intention is that risk scenarios are identified in either the initial Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) or subsequent revalidation, sufficient controls are provided to meet the corporate risk criteria, the controls are maintained throughout the operating life, the operating, technical, and management teams are trained in and understand the scenarios and the scenarios are well documented in the operating procedures. Compliance auditing typically checks that all of the individual activities are “compliant” (PHA conducted on time and actions closed, trip system testing completed per schedule, training records complete, operating procedures updated on time, etc.). Such an approach does not typically track that the content is carried consistently through the collection of processes, and that the knowledge and controls for the identified scenarios are in place and robust. This article proposes an audit approach which checks both that the organization is compliant with the prescribed activities and procedures, and that the activities and procedures are effectively delivering the intended results. The main focus is on applying this approach to the aspects of PSM that address specific risk scenarios and their associated controls. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-26T06:13:07.041016-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11797
       
  • Cracking the code of process safety culture with organizational network
           analysis
    • Authors: Keith O. Hunter; Elliot M. Wolf
      Abstract: Organizations in the chemical process industry invest considerable amounts of time and resources managing change and implementing best practices to maintain safe operations and achieve operational objectives. Consequently, most executives and senior managers responsible for performance rely on formal organizational structure to achieve these objectives. However, front line employees responsible for ensuring safe operation of hazardous chemical processes are often influenced more by the informal than the formal organization in their daily activities. The dynamics of informal networks among workers are critical determinants of strong operational discipline (OD), process safety culture, and business performance. Yet, organizational social networks are often overlooked or not well understood by management. We discuss how organizational network analysis may improve our understanding of process safety culture. We also share results from our exploratory study that used a novel survey instrument to measure OD at the individual level in conjunction with a social network survey indicating interaction for the exchange of job task information and process safety advice, respectively. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-23T02:31:49.695466-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11793
       
  • Analysis of effects of detonation of explosive substances on humans from
           characteristic curves explosive mass–distance from the origin of the
           explosion
    • Abstract: The serious consequences of explosions justify the efforts in prevention. The inherent danger of the phenomenon and the possibility of causing other concatenated accidents (domino effect) can increase the damage. To assess the damage and plan the emergency, it is necessary to determine the possible scope of dangerous magnitudes of the explosion (high pressure, mechanical impulse, and range of the fragments). It is important to consider that the peak overpressure of explosive detonation is relatively high and impulse width short near the source. Both parameters (overpressure and impulse) decrease with the distance but the decrease is not uniform, so that the ratio of contributions of overpressure and impulse to damage of receptors differ. In this work, the TNT equivalence method has been selected to determine the overpressure and impulse of the wave when detonation of high explosives occurs outdoors and the most recognized PROBIT functions to estimate the consequences of such accidents on humans. Combining both methodologies for each type of damage, graphical relationships of the primary parameters were obtained. Previously existing relationships have been parameterized to facilitate its implementation in software and to provide intuitive information to use it in studies of risk analysis of these accidents. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:55:35.601145-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11794
       
  • Why are major accidents still occurring?
    • Authors: Elisio Carvalho Silva
      Abstract: The loss of technological knowledge is an important contributing factor to a major accident occurs. This article analyzed several major accident reports to corroborate to this premise. The more an organization moves further away from a known technology, the risk of an accident occurring considerably increases. This work discusses three ways in which technological knowledge can be lost: (1) new technology; (2) loss of knowledge due to inadequate training, procedures, and information; and (3) the failure to incorporate new knowledge (e.g., the lessons learned). For each means of technological knowledge loss, this article refers to an important major accident and shows how it contributed to the accident. It also addresses the types of failures and the concept of independent protection layers to help explain how to reduce the possibility of a major accident occurs. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:55:07.775901-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11795
       
  • Dependent, independent, and pseudo‐independent protection layers in
           risk analysis
    • Authors: Hui Jin; Angela Summers
      Abstract: Risk analysis is an important tool to provide support for various risk management decisions in hazardous industries. For the last decade, the semiquantitative Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has been the dominating risk analysis technique in the US process industry. One basic assumption in LOPA is that all the protection layers are independent from each other and from the initiating cause; otherwise, no risk reduction credit should be taken in the LOPA. However, many processes do have protection layers, which are dependent to some extent. For these systems, assuming independency may be too optimistic, whereas disregarding the partial risk reduction afforded from a partially dependent protection layer is pessimistic. This article considers processes with dependent protection layers (with a shared component), independent protection layers, and pseudo‐independent protection layers (subject to common cause failure). A long distance gas pipeline system is used as an example. Using reduced Event Trees for incident scenario modeling, Fault Trees for protection layers, and solving them in a coupled calculation, this article shows how protection layer dependencies are treated in risk analysis to obtain the overall risk reduction without being too optimistic or pessimistic. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-14T02:54:51.497428-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11796
       
  • Evacuation simulation of confined spaces in petrochemical facilities
    • Authors: Zhen Wang; Peg Wilson, Qingsheng Wang
      Abstract: With the growth of the petrochemical industry, confined space evacuation has been a major safety issue due to the potential fatalities and injuries caused by inadequate emergency response. In this work, two existing software, BuildingEXODUS and FDS+Evac, were used to simulate the required safe egress time (RSET) in different evacuation environments. Vertical and horizontal storage tanks were constructed using these two simulation software. Then, different parameters such as occupant load, with and without internal obstruction, and exit size were studied in different simulation scenarios. The simulation results from the software have shown good agreement with those from field experiments. It was found that the RSET of a vertical storage tank is nearly half of that of a horizontal storage tank. The work has demonstrated that the fire safety software could be used to simulate evacuations from confined spaces in petrochemical facilities. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-11-05T08:00:27.737301-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11792
       
  • Risk assessment for fire and explosion accidents of steel oil tanks using
           improved AHP based on FTA
    • Authors: Miao Zhang; Wenhua Song, Zhen Chen, Ji Wang
      Abstract: The fire and explosion accidents of steel oil tanks is an extreme threat for crude oil storage, and they are considerably difficult to extinguish and easy to spread. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) are often used for the risk assessment of such accidents. The probabilities of basic events are very different to obtain. For example, the failure probabilities of most components in industrial are related to their service time, work environment, operating, and some probabilities of human factors are more difficult to establish. So, there are no sufficient data for FTA to make accurate quantitative assessments, whereas the AHP relies on expert judgment and scoring, which have great subjectivity. Both the structural importance of the basic events for FTA and the weight of the index layer for the AHP significantly affect the top event. A new approach is proposed to improve the AHP method. The judgment matrices of AHP are developed based on the basic events, structural importance of FTA, and the expert scoring of AHP. In addition, the new method reconciles the differences of FTA and AHP by combining the weighting factors, and has been tested and validated by applying for fire and explosion accidents of different types of steel oil tanks. Finally, the risk of boilover fire in tank park and its influencing factors are discussed. The results provide valuable information for the decision maker to improve the safety performance and to set up an effective firefighting strategy. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2015
      PubDate: 2015-10-31T04:50:08.254596-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11780
       
  • Paradigm Shift in the Regulatory Application of Safety Management Systems
           to Offshore Facilities
    • Authors: Steven T. Maher; George D. Long, Ramine S. Cromartie, Ian S. Sutton, Mark R. Steinhilber
      Abstract: The April 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and release from the Macondo Well resulted in a re‐examination of the existing regulatory framework, significant modifications to the structure and function of key regulatory agencies, and the application of new safety management system (SMS) requirements to offshore facilities in United States waters. Late‐2010 witnessed the evolution of both prescriptive and performance‐based regulations designed to address the direct and underlying causes of this tragedy. The objective of this article is to briefly review these new regulatory requirements and illustrate how they are related to the application of other SMSs, for both offshore and onshore facilities. The common themes, objectives, and overlaps of specific onshore and offshore SMS elements was examined, and tips on how these overlaps can be used to more effectively (and sensibly) implement these programs is discussed. This article also outlined successful SMS programs that are being applied by various state agencies to onshore and offshore coastal facilities, and derived lessons‐learned from these programs that may assist in the implementation of related federal programs. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013
      PubDate: 2013-02-08T07:41:45.364026-05:
      DOI: 10.1002/prs.11558
       
 
 
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