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  Subjects -> PSYCHOLOGY (Total: 934 journals)
Showing 1 - 174 of 174 Journals sorted alphabetically
Acción Psicológica     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Acta Colombiana de Psicología     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Acta Comportamentalia     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Acta de Investigación Psicológica     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Acta Psychologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Activités     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Actualidades en Psicologia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Ad verba Liberorum : Journal of Linguistics & Pedagogy & Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Addictive Behaviors Reports     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
ADHD Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorders     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
ADHD Report The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 43)
Advances in Mental Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 73)
Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Advances in Physiotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 62)
Advances in Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 59)
Advances in the Study of Behavior     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 29)
African Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology and Sport Facilitation     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Aggression and Violent Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 432)
Aggressive Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
Ágora - studies in psychoanalytic theory     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Aletheia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
American Behavioral Scientist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
American Imago     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
American Journal of Applied Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 43)
American Journal of Community Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
American Journal of Health Behavior     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 23)
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
American Journal of Psychoanalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
American Journal of Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 32)
American Psychologist     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 193)
Anales de Psicología     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Análise Psicológica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Análisis y Modificación de Conducta     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Analitika : Jurnal Magister Psikologi Uma     Open Access  
Analysis     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Annual Review of Clinical Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 72)
Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 33)
Annual Review of Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 239)
Anuario de investigaciones (Facultad de Psicología. Universidad de Buenos Aires)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuario de Psicología / The UB Journal of Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuario de Psicología Jurídica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anxiety, Stress & Coping: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Applied and Preventive Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Applied Cognitive Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 74)
Applied Neuropsychology : Adult     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
Applied Neuropsychology : Child     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Applied Psycholinguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Applied Psychological Measurement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Applied Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 163)
Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 50)
Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Archive for the Psychology of Religion / Archiv für Religionspychologie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
Archives of Scientific Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Asia Pacific Journal of Counselling and Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Asia-Pacific Psychiatry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Asian American Journal of Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Asian Journal of Behavioural Studies     Open Access  
Asian Journal of Business Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Assessment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Attachment: New Directions in Psychotherapy and Relational Psychoanalysis     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Attention, Perception & Psychophysics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Australasian Journal of Organisational Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Australian and Aotearoa New Zealand Psychodrama Association Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Australian Educational and Developmental Psychologist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Australian Journal of Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Australian Journal of Rehabilitation Counseling     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Psychologist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Autism Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Autism Research and Treatment     Open Access   (Followers: 25)
Autism's Own     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Autism-Open Access     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Avaliação Psicológica     Open Access  
Avances en Psicologia Latinoamericana     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Balint Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Barbaroi     Open Access  
Basic and Applied Social Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 41)
Behavior Analysis in Practice     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Behavior Analysis: Research and Practice     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Behavior Analyst     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Behavior Modification     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Behavior Research Methods     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Behavior Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 50)
Behavioral Development Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription  
Behavioral Interventions     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Behavioral Neuroscience     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 54)
Behavioral Sciences & the Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Behavioral Sleep Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Behaviormetrika     Hybrid Journal  
Behaviour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Behaviour Change     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Behaviour Research and Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 139)
Behavioural Processes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Biofeedback     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
BioPsychoSocial Medicine     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
BMC Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 17)
Body, Movement and Dance in Psychotherapy: An International Journal for Theory, Research and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Boletim Academia Paulista de Psicologia     Open Access  
Boletim de Psicologia     Open Access  
Brain Informatics     Open Access  
British Journal of Clinical Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 150)
British Journal of Developmental Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 37)
British Journal of Educational Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
British Journal of Health Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 46)
British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 21)
British Journal of Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 61)
British Journal of Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 69)
British Journal of Social Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 34)
Buletin Psikologi     Open Access  
Burnout Research     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Cadernos de psicanálise (Rio de Janeiro)     Open Access  
Cadernos de Psicologia Social do Trabalho     Open Access  
Canadian Art Therapy Association     Hybrid Journal  
Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
Canadian Psychology / Psychologie canadienne     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Case Studies in Sport and Exercise Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Castalia : Revista de Psicología de la Academia     Open Access  
Cendekia : Jurnal Kependidikan dan Kemasyarakatan     Open Access  
Child Development Perspectives     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
Child Development Research     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Ciencia Cognitiva     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Ciencia e Interculturalidad     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Ciências & Cognição     Open Access  
Ciencias Psicológicas     Open Access  
Clínica y Salud     Open Access  
Clinical Medicine Insights : Psychiatry     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Clinical Practice in Pediatric Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Clinical Psychological Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Clinical Psychologist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 71)
Clinical Psychology and Special Education     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Clinical Psychology Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 41)
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Clinical Schizophrenia & Related Psychoses     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Coaching : Theorie & Praxis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Coaching Psykologi - The Danish Journal of Coaching Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cogent Psychology     Open Access  
Cógito     Open Access  
Cognition & Emotion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
Cognitive Behaviour Therapist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Cognitive Neuropsychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
Cognitive Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 72)
Cognitive Research : Principles and Implications     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Consciousness and Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32)
Construção Psicopedagógica     Open Access  
Consulting Psychology Journal : Practice and Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Contemporary Educational Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Contemporary School Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Contextos Clínicos     Open Access  
Counseling et spiritualité / Counselling and Spirituality     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Counseling Outcome Research and Evaluation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Counseling Psychologist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Counseling Psychology and Psychotherapy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Counselling and Psychotherapy Research : Linking research with practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Counselling and Values     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Counselling Psychology Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Couple and Family Psychoanalysis     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Couple and Family Psychology : Research and Practice     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Creativity Research Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Creativity. Theories - Research - Applications     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Criminal Justice Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Cuadernos de Neuropsicología     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Psicologia del Deporte     Open Access  
Cuadernos de Psicopedagogía     Open Access  
Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Culturas Psi     Open Access  
Culture and Brain     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Current Addiction Reports     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Current Behavioral Neuroscience Reports     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Current Directions In Psychological Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 57)
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Current Opinion in Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Current Psychological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Current Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Current psychology letters     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Current Research in Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 17)
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Decision     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Depression and Anxiety     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Depression Research and Treatment     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
Development and Psychopathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience     Open Access   (Followers: 18)
Developmental Neuropsychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Developmental Psychobiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Developmental Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 44)
Diagnostica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Dialectica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Discourse     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Diversitas : Perspectivas en Psicologia     Open Access  
Drama Therapy Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Dreaming     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)

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Journal Cover Cognitive Psychology
  [SJR: 3.356]   [H-I: 92]   [72 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 0010-0285 - ISSN (Online) 1095-5623
   Published by Elsevier Homepage  [3177 journals]
  • The role of domain-general cognitive resources in children’s
           construction of a vitalist theory of biology
    • Authors: Igor Bascandziev; Nathan Tardiff; Deborah Zaitchik; Susan Carey
      Pages: 1 - 28
      Abstract: Publication date: August 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 104
      Author(s): Igor Bascandziev, Nathan Tardiff, Deborah Zaitchik, Susan Carey
      Some episodes of learning are easier than others. Preschoolers can learn certain facts, such as “my grandmother gave me this purse,” only after one or two exposures (easy to learn; fast mapping), but they require several years to learn that plants are alive or that the sun is not alive (hard to learn). One difference between the two kinds of knowledge acquisition is that hard cases often require conceptual construction, such as the construction of the biological concept alive, whereas easy cases merely involve forming new beliefs formulated over concepts the child already has (belief revision, a form of knowledge enrichment). We asked whether different domain-general cognitive resources support these two types of knowledge acquisition (conceptual construction and knowledge enrichment that supports fast mapping) by testing 82 6-year-olds in a pre-training/training/post-training study. We measured children’s improvement in an episode involving theory construction (the beginning steps of acquisition of the framework theory of vitalist biology, which requires conceptual change) and in an episode involving knowledge enrichment alone (acquisition of little known facts about animals, such as the location of crickets’ ears and the color of octopus blood). In addition, we measured children’s executive functions and receptive vocabulary to directly compare the resources drawn upon in the two episodes of learning. We replicated and extended previous findings highlighting the differences between conceptual construction and knowledge enrichment, and we found that Executive Functions predict improvement on the Vitalism battery but not on the Fun Facts battery and that Receptive Vocabulary predicts improvement the Fun Facts battery but not on the Vitalism battery. This double dissociation provides new evidence for the distinction between the two types of knowledge acquisition, and bears on the nature of the learning mechanisms involved in each.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.03.002
      Issue No: Vol. 104 (2018)
       
  • Dynamic cognitive models of intertemporal choice
    • Authors: Junyi Dai; Timothy J. Pleskac; Thorsten Pachur
      Pages: 29 - 56
      Abstract: Publication date: August 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 104
      Author(s): Junyi Dai, Timothy J. Pleskac, Thorsten Pachur
      Traditionally, descriptive accounts of intertemporal choice have relied on static and deterministic models that assume alternative-wise processing of the options. Recent research, by contrast, has highlighted the dynamic and probabilistic nature of intertemporal choice and provided support for attribute-wise processing. Currently, dynamic models of intertemporal choice—which account for both the resulting choice and the time course over which the construction of a choice develops—rely exclusively on the framework of evidence accumulation. In this article, we develop and rigorously compare several candidate schemes for dynamic models of intertemporal choice. Specifically, we consider an existing dynamic modeling scheme based on decision field theory and develop two novel modeling schemes—one assuming lexicographic, noncompensatory processing, and the other built on the classical concepts of random utility in economics and discrimination thresholds in psychophysics. We show that all three modeling schemes can accommodate key behavioral regularities in intertemporal choice. When empirical choice and response time data were fit simultaneously, the models built on random utility and discrimination thresholds performed best. The results also indicated substantial individual differences in the dynamics underlying intertemporal choice. Finally, model recovery analyses demonstrated the benefits of including both choice and response time data for more accurate model selection on the individual level. The present work shows how the classical concept of random utility can be extended to incorporate response dynamics in intertemporal choice. Moreover, the results suggest that this approach offers a successful alternative to the dominating evidence accumulation approach when modeling the dynamics of decision making.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.03.001
      Issue No: Vol. 104 (2018)
       
  • Learning physical parameters from dynamic scenes
    • Authors: Tomer D. Ullman; Andreas Stuhlmüller; Noah D. Goodman; Joshua B. Tenenbaum
      Pages: 57 - 82
      Abstract: Publication date: August 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 104
      Author(s): Tomer D. Ullman, Andreas Stuhlmüller, Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum
      Humans acquire their most basic physical concepts early in development, and continue to enrich and expand their intuitive physics throughout life as they are exposed to more and varied dynamical environments. We introduce a hierarchical Bayesian framework to explain how people can learn physical parameters at multiple levels. In contrast to previous Bayesian models of theory acquisition (Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011), we work with more expressive probabilistic program representations suitable for learning the forces and properties that govern how objects interact in dynamic scenes unfolding over time. We compare our model to human learners on a challenging task of estimating multiple physical parameters in novel microworlds given short movies. This task requires people to reason simultaneously about multiple interacting physical laws and properties. People are generally able to learn in this setting and are consistent in their judgments. Yet they also make systematic errors indicative of the approximations people might make in solving this computationally demanding problem with limited computational resources. We propose two approximations that complement the top-down Bayesian approach. One approximation model relies on a more bottom-up feature-based inference scheme. The second approximation combines the strengths of the bottom-up and top-down approaches, by taking the feature-based inference as its point of departure for a search in physical-parameter space.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.05.006
      Issue No: Vol. 104 (2018)
       
  • Modeling 2-alternative forced-choice tasks: Accounting for both magnitude
           and difference effects
    • Authors: Roger Ratcliff; Chelsea Voskuilen; Andrei Teodorescu
      Pages: 1 - 22
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 103
      Author(s): Roger Ratcliff, Chelsea Voskuilen, Andrei Teodorescu
      We present a model-based analysis of two-alternative forced-choice tasks in which two stimuli are presented side by side and subjects must make a comparative judgment (e.g., which stimulus is brighter). Stimuli can vary on two dimensions, the difference in strength of the two stimuli and the magnitude of each stimulus. Differences between the two stimuli produce typical RT and accuracy effects (i.e., subjects respond more quickly and more accurately when there is a larger difference between the two). However, the overall magnitude of the pair of stimuli also affects RT and accuracy. In the more common two-choice task, a single stimulus is presented and the stimulus varies on only one dimension. In this two-stimulus task, if the standard diffusion decision model is fit to the data with only drift rate (evidence accumulation rate) differing among conditions, the model cannot fit the data. However, if either of one of two variability parameters is allowed to change with stimulus magnitude, the model can fit the data. This results in two models that are extremely constrained with about one tenth of the number of parameters than there are data points while at the same time the models account for accuracy and correct and error RT distributions. While both of these versions of the diffusion model can account for the observed data, the model that allows across-trial variability in drift to vary might be preferred for theoretical reasons. The diffusion model fits are compared to the leaky competing accumulator model which did not perform as well.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.02.002
      Issue No: Vol. 103 (2018)
       
  • The role of sensorimotor processes in social group contagion
    • Authors: Emiel Cracco; Marcel Brass
      Pages: 23 - 41
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 103
      Author(s): Emiel Cracco, Marcel Brass
      Although it is well known that action observation triggers an imitative response, not much is known about how these responses develop as a function of group size. Research on social contagion suggests that imitative tendencies initially increase but then stabilize as groups become larger. However, these findings have mainly been explained in terms of interpretative processes. Across seven experiments (N = 322), the current study investigated the contribution of sensorimotor processes to social group contagion by looking at the relation between group size and automatic imitation in a task that involved minimal interpretation. The results of Experiments 1–2 revealed that automatic imitation increased with group size according to an asymptotic curve on congruent trials but a linear curve on incongruent trials. The results of Experiments 3–7 showed that the asymptote on congruent trials disappeared when no control was needed, namely in the absence of incongruent trials. This suggests that the asymptote in the relation between group size and automatic imitation can be explained in terms of strategic control mechanisms that aim to prevent unintended imitative responses. The findings of the current study are in close correspondence with previous research in the social domain and as such support the hypothesis that sensorimotor processes contribute to the relation between group size and social contagion.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.02.001
      Issue No: Vol. 103 (2018)
       
  • Beyond Markov: Accounting for independence violations in causal reasoning
    • Authors: Bob Rehder
      Pages: 42 - 84
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 103
      Author(s): Bob Rehder
      Although many theories of causal cognition are based on causal graphical models, a key property of such models—the independence relations stipulated by the Markov condition—is routinely violated by human reasoners. This article presents three new accounts of those independence violations, accounts that share the assumption that people’s understanding of the correlational structure of data generated from a causal graph differs from that stipulated by causal graphical model framework. To distinguish these models, experiments assessed how people reason with causal graphs that are larger than those tested in previous studies. A traditional common cause network ( Y 1 ← X → Y 2 ) was extended so that the effects themselves had effects ( Z 1 ← Y 1 ← X → Y 2 → Z 2 ). A traditional common effect network ( Y 1 → X ← Y 2 ) was extended so that the causes themselves had causes ( Z 1 → Y 1 → X ← Y 2 ← Z 2 ). Subjects’ inferences were most consistent with the beta-Q model in which consistent states of the world—those in which variables are either mostly all present or mostly all absent—are viewed as more probable than stipulated by the causal graphical model framework. Substantial variability in subjects’ inferences was also observed, with the result that substantial minorities of subjects were best fit by one of the other models (the dual prototype or a leaky gate models). The discrepancy between normative and human causal cognition stipulated by these models is foundational in the sense that they locate the error not in people’s causal reasoning but rather in their causal representations. As a result, they are applicable to any cognitive theory grounded in causal graphical models, including theories of analogy, learning, explanation, categorization, decision-making, and counterfactual reasoning. Preliminary evidence that independence violations indeed generalize to other judgment types is presented.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.01.003
      Issue No: Vol. 103 (2018)
       
  • Subjective randomness as statistical inference
    • Authors: Thomas L. Griffiths; Dylan Daniels; Joseph L. Austerweil; Joshua B. Tenenbaum
      Pages: 85 - 109
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 103
      Author(s): Thomas L. Griffiths, Dylan Daniels, Joseph L. Austerweil, Joshua B. Tenenbaum
      Some events seem more random than others. For example, when tossing a coin, a sequence of eight heads in a row does not seem very random. Where do these intuitions about randomness come from' We argue that subjective randomness can be understood as the result of a statistical inference assessing the evidence that an event provides for having been produced by a random generating process. We show how this account provides a link to previous work relating randomness to algorithmic complexity, in which random events are those that cannot be described by short computer programs. Algorithmic complexity is both incomputable and too general to capture the regularities that people can recognize, but viewing randomness as statistical inference provides two paths to addressing these problems: considering regularities generated by simpler computing machines, and restricting the set of probability distributions that characterize regularity. Building on previous work exploring these different routes to a more restricted notion of randomness, we define strong quantitative models of human randomness judgments that apply not just to binary sequences – which have been the focus of much of the previous work on subjective randomness – but also to binary matrices and spatial clustering.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.02.003
      Issue No: Vol. 103 (2018)
       
  • Young infants expect an unfamiliar adult to comfort a crying baby:
           Evidence from a standard violation-of-expectation task and a novel
           infant-triggered-video task
    • Authors: Kyong-sun Jin; Jessica L. Houston; Renée Baillargeon; Ashley M. Groh; Glenn I. Roisman
      Pages: 1 - 20
      Abstract: Publication date: May 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 102
      Author(s): Kyong-sun Jin, Jessica L. Houston, Renée Baillargeon, Ashley M. Groh, Glenn I. Roisman
      Do infants expect individuals to act prosocially toward others in need, at least in some contexts' Very few such expectations have been uncovered to date. In three experiments, we examined whether infants would expect an adult alone in a scene with a crying baby to attempt to comfort the baby. In the first two experiments, 12- and 4-month-olds were tested using the standard violation-of-expectation method. Infants saw videotaped events in which a woman was performing a household chore when a baby nearby began to cry; the woman either comforted (comfort event) or ignored (ignore event) the baby. Infants looked significantly longer at the ignore than at the comfort event, and this effect was eliminated if the baby laughed instead of cried. In the third experiment, 8-month-olds were tested using a novel forced-choice violation-of-expectation method, the infant-triggered-video method. Infants faced two computer monitors and were first shown that touching the monitors triggered events: One monitor presented the comfort event and the other monitor presented the ignore event. Infants then chose which event they wanted to watch again by touching the corresponding monitor. Infants significantly chose the ignore over the comfort event, and this effect was eliminated if the baby laughed. Thus, across ages and methods, infants provided converging evidence that they expected the adult to comfort the crying baby. These results indicate that expectations about individuals’ actions toward others in need are already present in the first year of life, and, as such, they constrain theoretical accounts of early prosociality and morality.

      PubDate: 2018-02-05T03:45:22Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.12.004
      Issue No: Vol. 102 (2018)
       
  • The speed of memory errors shows the influence of misleading information:
           Testing the diffusion model and discrete-state models
    • Authors: Jeffrey J. Starns; Chad Dubé; Matthew E. Frelinger
      Pages: 21 - 40
      Abstract: Publication date: May 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 102
      Author(s): Jeffrey J. Starns, Chad Dubé, Matthew E. Frelinger
      In this report, we evaluate single-item and forced-choice recognition memory for the same items and use the resulting accuracy and reaction time data to test the predictions of discrete-state and continuous models. For the single-item trials, participants saw a word and indicated whether or not it was studied on a previous list. The forced-choice trials had one studied and one non-studied word that both appeared in the earlier single-item trials and both received the same response. Thus, forced-choice trials always had one word with a previous correct response and one with a previous error. Participants were asked to select the studied word regardless of whether they previously called both words “studied” or “not studied.” The diffusion model predicts that forced-choice accuracy should be lower when the word with a previous error had a fast versus a slow single-item RT, because fast errors are associated with more compelling misleading memory retrieval. The two-high-threshold (2HT) model does not share this prediction because all errors are guesses, so error RT is not related to memory strength. A low-threshold version of the discrete state approach predicts an effect similar to the diffusion model, because errors are a mixture of responses based on misleading retrieval and guesses, and the guesses should tend to be slower. Results showed that faster single-trial errors were associated with lower forced-choice accuracy, as predicted by the diffusion and low-threshold models.

      PubDate: 2018-02-05T03:45:22Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.01.001
      Issue No: Vol. 102 (2018)
       
  • How people learn about causal influence when there are many possible
           causes: A model based on informative transitions
    • Authors: Cory Derringer; Benjamin Margolin Rottman
      Pages: 41 - 71
      Abstract: Publication date: May 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 102
      Author(s): Cory Derringer, Benjamin Margolin Rottman
      Four experiments tested how people learn cause-effect relations when there are many possible causes of an effect. When there are many cues, even if all the cues together strongly predict the effect, the bivariate relation between each individual cue and the effect can be weak, which can make it difficult to detect the influence of each cue. We hypothesized that when detecting the influence of a cue, in addition to learning from the states of the cues and effect (e.g., a cue is present and the effect is present), which is hypothesized by multiple existing theories of learning, participants would also learn from transitions – how the cues and effect change over time (e.g., a cue turns on and the effect turns on). We found that participants were better able to identify positive and negative cues in an environment in which only one cue changed from one trial to the next, compared to multiple cues changing (Experiments 1A, 1B). Within a single learning sequence, participants were also more likely to update their beliefs about causal strength when one cue changed at a time (‘one-change transitions’) than when multiple cues changed simultaneously (Experiment 2). Furthermore, learning was impaired when the trials were grouped by the state of the effect (Experiment 3) or when the trials were grouped by the state of a cue (Experiment 4), both of which reduce the number of one-change transitions. We developed a modification of the Rescorla-Wagner algorithm to model this ‘Informative Transitions’ learning processes.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.01.002
      Issue No: Vol. 102 (2018)
       
  • Planning to speak in L1 and L2
    • Authors: Agnieszka E. Konopka; Antje Meyer; Tess A. Forest
      Pages: 72 - 104
      Abstract: Publication date: May 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 102
      Author(s): Agnieszka E. Konopka, Antje Meyer, Tess A. Forest
      The leading theories of sentence planning – Hierarchical Incrementality and Linear Incrementality – differ in their assumptions about the coordination of processes that map preverbal information onto language. Previous studies showed that, in native (L1) speakers, this coordination can vary with the ease of executing the message-level and sentence-level processes necessary to plan and produce an utterance. We report the first series of experiments to systematically examine how linguistic experience influences sentence planning in native (L1) speakers (i.e., speakers with life-long experience using the target language) and non-native (L2) speakers (i.e., speakers with less experience using the target language). In all experiments, speakers spontaneously generated one-sentence descriptions of simple events in Dutch (L1) and English (L2). Analyses of eye-movements across early and late time windows (pre- and post-400 ms) compared the extent of early message-level encoding and the onset of linguistic encoding. In Experiment 1, speakers were more likely to engage in extensive message-level encoding and to delay sentence-level encoding when using their L2. Experiments 2–4 selectively facilitated encoding of the preverbal message, encoding of the agent character (i.e., the first content word in active sentences), and encoding of the sentence verb (i.e., the second content word in active sentences) respectively. Experiment 2 showed that there is no delay in the onset of L2 linguistic encoding when speakers are familiar with the events. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the delay in the onset of L2 linguistic encoding is not due to speakers delaying encoding of the agent, but due to a preference to encode information needed to select a suitable verb early in the formulation process. Overall, speakers prefer to temporally separate message-level from sentence-level encoding and to prioritize encoding of relational information when planning L2 sentences, consistent with Hierarchical Incrementality.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.12.003
      Issue No: Vol. 102 (2018)
       
  • Some inferences still take time: Prosody, predictability, and the speed of
           scalar implicatures
    • Authors: Yi Ting Huang; Jesse Snedeker
      Pages: 105 - 126
      Abstract: Publication date: May 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 102
      Author(s): Yi Ting Huang, Jesse Snedeker
      Experimental pragmatics has gained many insights from understanding how people use weak scalar terms (like some) to infer that a stronger alternative (like all) is false. Early studies found that comprehenders initially interpret some without an upper bound, but later results suggest that this inference is sometimes immediate (e.g., Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010). The present paper explores whether rapid inferencing depends on the prosody (i.e., summa rather than some of) or predictability of referring expressions (e.g., consistently using some to describe subsets). Eye-tracking experiments examined looks to subsets (2-of-4 socks) and total sets (3-of-3 soccer balls) following some and found early preferences for subsets in predictable contexts but not in less predictable contexts (Experiment 1 and 2). In contrast, there was no reliable prosody effect on inferencing. Changes in predictability did not affect judgments of the naturalness of some, when a discourse context was available (Experiment 3). However, predictable contexts reduced variability in speakers’ descriptions of subsets and total sets (Experiment 4). Together, these results demonstrate that scalar inferences are often delayed during comprehension, but reference restriction is rapid when set descriptions can be formulated beforehand.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.01.004
      Issue No: Vol. 102 (2018)
       
  • Heuristics as Bayesian inference under extreme priors
    • Authors: Paula Parpart; Matt Jones; Bradley C. Love
      Pages: 127 - 144
      Abstract: Publication date: May 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 102
      Author(s): Paula Parpart, Matt Jones, Bradley C. Love
      Simple heuristics are often regarded as tractable decision strategies because they ignore a great deal of information in the input data. One puzzle is why heuristics can outperform full-information models, such as linear regression, which make full use of the available information. These “less-is-more” effects, in which a relatively simpler model outperforms a more complex model, are prevalent throughout cognitive science, and are frequently argued to demonstrate an inherent advantage of simplifying computation or ignoring information. In contrast, we show at the computational level (where algorithmic restrictions are set aside) that it is never optimal to discard information. Through a formal Bayesian analysis, we prove that popular heuristics, such as tallying and take-the-best, are formally equivalent to Bayesian inference under the limit of infinitely strong priors. Varying the strength of the prior yields a continuum of Bayesian models with the heuristics at one end and ordinary regression at the other. Critically, intermediate models perform better across all our simulations, suggesting that down-weighting information with the appropriate prior is preferable to entirely ignoring it. Rather than because of their simplicity, our analyses suggest heuristics perform well because they implement strong priors that approximate the actual structure of the environment. We end by considering how new heuristics could be derived by infinitely strengthening the priors of other Bayesian models. These formal results have implications for work in psychology, machine learning and economics.

      PubDate: 2018-04-11T20:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.11.006
      Issue No: Vol. 102 (2018)
       
  • The detour problem in a stochastic environment: Tolman revisited
    • Authors: Pegah Fakhari; Arash Khodadadi; Jerome R. Busemeyer
      Pages: 29 - 49
      Abstract: Publication date: March 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 101
      Author(s): Pegah Fakhari, Arash Khodadadi, Jerome R. Busemeyer
      We designed a grid world task to study human planning and re-planning behavior in an unknown stochastic environment. In our grid world, participants were asked to travel from a random starting point to a random goal position while maximizing their reward. Because they were not familiar with the environment, they needed to learn its characteristics from experience to plan optimally. Later in the task, we randomly blocked the optimal path to investigate whether and how people adjust their original plans to find a detour. To this end, we developed and compared 12 different models. These models were different on how they learned and represented the environment and how they planned to catch the goal. The majority of our participants were able to plan optimally. We also showed that people were capable of revising their plans when an unexpected event occurred. The result from the model comparison showed that the model-based reinforcement learning approach provided the best account for the data and outperformed heuristics in explaining the behavioral data in the re-planning trials.

      PubDate: 2018-02-05T03:45:22Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.12.002
      Issue No: Vol. 101 (2018)
       
  • Conditionals and inferential connections: A hypothetical inferential
           theory
    • Authors: Igor Douven; Shira Elqayam; Henrik Singmann; Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink
      Pages: 50 - 81
      Abstract: Publication date: March 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 101
      Author(s): Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam, Henrik Singmann, Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink
      Intuition suggests that for a conditional to be evaluated as true, there must be some kind of connection between its component clauses. In this paper, we formulate and test a new psychological theory to account for this intuition. We combined previous semantic and psychological theorizing to propose that the key to the intuition is a relevance-driven, satisficing-bounded inferential connection between antecedent and consequent. To test our theory, we created a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were presented with a soritical series of objects, notably colored patches (Experiments 1 and 4) and spheres (Experiment 2), or both (Experiment 3), and were asked to evaluate related conditionals embodying non-causal inferential connections (such as “If patch number 5 is blue, then so is patch number 4”). All four experiments displayed a unique response pattern, in which (largely determinate) responses were sensitive to parameters determining inference strength, as well as to consequent position in the series, in a way analogous to belief bias. Experiment 3 showed that this guaranteed relevance can be suppressed, with participants reverting to the defective conditional. Experiment 4 showed that this pattern can be partly explained by a measure of inference strength. This pattern supports our theory’s “principle of relevant inference” and “principle of bounded inference,” highlighting the dual processing characteristics of the inferential connection.

      PubDate: 2018-02-05T03:45:22Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.09.002
      Issue No: Vol. 101 (2018)
       
  • Enabling spontaneous analogy through heuristic change
    • Authors: Thomas C. Ormerod; James N. MacGregor
      Pages: 1 - 16
      Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 99
      Author(s): Thomas C. Ormerod, James N. MacGregor
      Despite analogy playing a central role in theories of problem solving, learning and education, demonstrations of spontaneous analogical transfer are rare. Here, we present a theory of heuristic change for spontaneous analogical transfer, tested in four experiments that manipulated the experience of failure to solve a source problem prior to attempting a target problem. In Experiment 1, participants solved more source problems that contained an additional financial constraint designed to signal the inappropriateness of moves that maximized progress towards the goal. This constraint also led to higher rates of spontaneous analogical transfer to a superficially similar problem. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the effects of this constraint extend to superficially and structurally different analogs. Experiment 4 generalized the finding to a non-analogous target problem that also benefitted from inhibiting maximizing moves. The results indicate that spontaneous transfer can arise through experience during the solution of a source problem that alters the heuristic chosen for solving both analogical and non-analogical target problems.

      PubDate: 2017-10-25T13:14:55Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.09.001
      Issue No: Vol. 99 (2017)
       
  • Children’s representation of abstract relations in relational/array
           match-to-sample tasks
    • Authors: Jean-Rémy Hochmann; Arin S. Tuerk; Sophia Sanborn; Rebecca Zhu; Robert Long; Meg Dempster; Susan Carey
      Pages: 17 - 43
      Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 99
      Author(s): Jean-Rémy Hochmann, Arin S. Tuerk, Sophia Sanborn, Rebecca Zhu, Robert Long, Meg Dempster, Susan Carey
      Five experiments compared preschool children’s performance to that of adults and of non-human animals on match to sample tasks involving 2-item or 16-item arrays that varied according to their composition of same or different items (Array Match-to-Sample, AMTS). They establish that, like non-human animals in most studies, 3- and 4-year-olds fail 2-item AMTS (the classic relational match to sample task introduced into the literature by Premack, 1983), and that robust success is not observed until age 6. They also establish that 3-year-olds, like non-human animal species, succeed only when they are able to encode stimuli in terms of entropy, a property of an array (namely its internal variability), rather than relations among the individuals in the array (same vs. different), whereas adults solve both 2-item and 16-item AMTS on the basis of the relations same and different. As in the case of non-human animals, the acuity of 3- and 4-year-olds’ representation of entropy is insufficient to solve the 2-item same-different AMTS task. At age 4, behavior begins to contrast with that of non-human species. On 16-item AMTS, a subgroup of 4-year-olds induce a categorical rule matching all-same arrays to all-same arrays, while matching other arrays (mixed arrays of same and different items) to all-different arrays. These children tend to justify their choices using the words “same” and “different.” By age 4 a number of our participants succeed at 2-item AMTS, also justifying their choices by explicit verbal appeals using words for same and different. Taken together these results suggest that the recruitment of the relational representations corresponding to the meaning of these words contributes to the better performance over the preschool years at solving array match-to-sample tasks.

      PubDate: 2017-11-15T21:09:29Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.11.001
      Issue No: Vol. 99 (2017)
       
  • Compositional inductive biases in function learning
    • Authors: Eric Schulz; Joshua B. Tenenbaum; David Duvenaud; Maarten Speekenbrink; Samuel J. Gershman
      Pages: 44 - 79
      Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 99
      Author(s): Eric Schulz, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David Duvenaud, Maarten Speekenbrink, Samuel J. Gershman
      How do people recognize and learn about complex functional structure' Taking inspiration from other areas of cognitive science, we propose that this is achieved by harnessing compositionality: complex structure is decomposed into simpler building blocks. We formalize this idea within the framework of Bayesian regression using a grammar over Gaussian process kernels, and compare this approach with other structure learning approaches. Participants consistently chose compositional (over non-compositional) extrapolations and interpolations of functions. Experiments designed to elicit priors over functional patterns revealed an inductive bias for compositional structure. Compositional functions were perceived as subjectively more predictable than non-compositional functions, and exhibited other signatures of predictability, such as enhanced memorability and reduced numerosity. Taken together, these results support the view that the human intuitive theory of functions is inherently compositional.

      PubDate: 2017-12-13T01:04:35Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.11.002
      Issue No: Vol. 99 (2017)
       
  • Diversity not quantity in caregiver speech: Using computational modeling
           to isolate the effects of the quantity and the diversity of the input on
           vocabulary growth
    • Authors: Gary Jones; Caroline F. Rowland
      Pages: 1 - 21
      Abstract: Publication date: November 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 98
      Author(s): Gary Jones, Caroline F. Rowland
      Children who hear large amounts of diverse speech learn language more quickly than children who do not. However, high correlations between the amount and the diversity of the input in speech samples makes it difficult to isolate the influence of each. We overcame this problem by controlling the input to a computational model so that amount of exposure to linguistic input (quantity) and the quality of that input (lexical diversity) were independently manipulated. Sublexical, lexical, and multi-word knowledge were charted across development (Study 1), showing that while input quantity may be important early in learning, lexical diversity is ultimately more crucial, a prediction confirmed against children’s data (Study 2). The model trained on a lexically diverse input also performed better on nonword repetition and sentence recall tests (Study 3) and was quicker to learn new words over time (Study 4). A language input that is rich in lexical diversity outperforms equivalent richness in quantity for learned sublexical and lexical knowledge, for well-established language tests, and for acquiring words that have never been encountered before.

      PubDate: 2017-09-01T19:49:32Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.07.002
      Issue No: Vol. 98 (2017)
       
  • Putting old tools to novel uses: The role of form accessibility in
           semantic extension
    • Authors: Zara Harmon; Vsevolod Kapatsinski
      Pages: 22 - 44
      Abstract: Publication date: November 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 98
      Author(s): Zara Harmon, Vsevolod Kapatsinski
      An increase in frequency of a form has been argued to result in semantic extension (Bybee, 2003; Zipf, 1949). Yet, research on the acquisition of lexical semantics suggests that a form that frequently co-occurs with a meaning gets restricted to that meaning (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007). The current work reconciles these positions by showing that – through its effect on form accessibility – frequency causes semantic extension in production, while at the same time causing entrenchment in comprehension. Repeatedly experiencing a form paired with a specific meaning makes one more likely to re-use the form to express related meanings, while also increasing one’s confidence that the form is never used to express those meanings. Recurrent pathways of semantic change are argued to result from a tug of war between the production-side pressure to reuse easily accessible forms and the comprehension-side confidence that one has seen all possible uses of a frequent form.

      PubDate: 2017-09-01T19:49:32Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.08.002
      Issue No: Vol. 98 (2017)
       
  • Multi-attribute, multi-alternative models of choice: Choice, reaction
           time, and process tracing
    • Authors: Andrew L. Cohen; Namyi Kang; Tanya L. Leise
      Pages: 45 - 72
      Abstract: Publication date: November 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 98
      Author(s): Andrew L. Cohen, Namyi Kang, Tanya L. Leise
      The first aim of this research is to compare computational models of multi-alternative, multi-attribute choice when attribute values are explicit. The choice predictions of utility (standard random utility & weighted valuation), heuristic (elimination-by-aspects, lexicographic, & maximum attribute value), and dynamic (multi-alternative decision field theory, MDFT, & a version of the multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator, MLBA) models are contrasted on both preferential and risky choice data. Using both maximum likelihood and cross-validation fit measures on choice data, the utility and dynamic models are preferred over the heuristic models for risky choice, with a slight overall advantage for the MLBA for preferential choice. The response time predictions of these models (except the MDFT) are then tested. Although the MLBA accurately predicts response time distributions, it only weakly accounts for stimulus-level differences. The other models completely fail to account for stimulus-level differences. Process tracing measures, i.e., eye and mouse tracking, were also collected. None of the qualitative predictions of the models are completely supported by that data. These results suggest that the models may not appropriately represent the interaction of attention and preference formation. To overcome this potential shortcoming, the second aim of this research is to test preference-formation assumptions, independently of attention, by developing the models of attentional sampling (MAS) model family which incorporates the empirical gaze patterns into a sequential sampling framework. An MAS variant that includes attribute values, but only updates the currently viewed alternative and does not contrast values across alternatives, performs well in both experiments. Overall, the results support the dynamic models, but point to the need to incorporate a framework that more accurately reflects the relationship between attention and the preference-formation process.

      PubDate: 2017-09-01T19:49:32Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.08.001
      Issue No: Vol. 98 (2017)
       
  • Accent modulates access to word meaning: Evidence for a speaker-model
           account of spoken word recognition
    • Authors: Zhenguang G. Cai; Rebecca A. Gilbert; Matthew H. Davis; M. Gareth Gaskell; Lauren Farrar; Sarah Adler; Jennifer M. Rodd
      Pages: 73 - 101
      Abstract: Publication date: November 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 98
      Author(s): Zhenguang G. Cai, Rebecca A. Gilbert, Matthew H. Davis, M. Gareth Gaskell, Lauren Farrar, Sarah Adler, Jennifer M. Rodd
      Speech carries accent information relevant to determining the speaker’s linguistic and social background. A series of web-based experiments demonstrate that accent cues can modulate access to word meaning. In Experiments 1–3, British participants were more likely to retrieve the American dominant meaning (e.g., hat meaning of “bonnet”) in a word association task if they heard the words in an American than a British accent. In addition, results from a speeded semantic decision task (Experiment 4) and sentence comprehension task (Experiment 5) confirm that accent modulates on-line meaning retrieval such that comprehension of ambiguous words is easier when the relevant word meaning is dominant in the speaker’s dialect. Critically, neutral-accent speech items, created by morphing British- and American-accented recordings, were interpreted in a similar way to accented words when embedded in a context of accented words (Experiment 2). This finding indicates that listeners do not use accent to guide meaning retrieval on a word-by-word basis; instead they use accent information to determine the dialectic identity of a speaker and then use their experience of that dialect to guide meaning access for all words spoken by that person. These results motivate a speaker-model account of spoken word recognition in which comprehenders determine key characteristics of their interlocutor and use this knowledge to guide word meaning access.

      PubDate: 2017-09-07T20:05:50Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.08.003
      Issue No: Vol. 98 (2017)
       
  • An associative account of the development of word learning
    • Authors: Vladimir M. Sloutsky; Hyungwook Yim; Xin Yao; Simon Dennis
      Pages: 1 - 30
      Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 97
      Author(s): Vladimir M. Sloutsky, Hyungwook Yim, Xin Yao, Simon Dennis
      Word learning is a notoriously difficult induction problem because meaning is underdetermined by positive examples. How do children solve this problem' Some have argued that word learning is achieved by means of inference: young word learners rely on a number of assumptions that reduce the overall hypothesis space by favoring some meanings over others. However, these approaches have difficulty explaining how words are learned from conversations or text, without pointing or explicit instruction. In this research, we propose an associative mechanism that can account for such learning. In a series of experiments, 4-year-olds and adults were presented with sets of words that included a single nonsense word (e.g. dax). Some lists were taxonomic (i.,e., all items were members of a given category), some were associative (i.e., all items were associates of a given category, but not members), and some were mixed. Participants were asked to indicate whether the nonsense word was an animal or an artifact. Adults exhibited evidence of learning when lists consisted of either associatively or taxonomically related items. In contrast, children exhibited evidence of word learning only when lists consisted of associatively related items. These results present challenges to several extant models of word learning, and a new model based on the distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic associations is proposed.

      PubDate: 2017-06-21T18:39:34Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.06.001
      Issue No: Vol. 97 (2017)
       
  • Parallel interactive retrieval of item and associative information from
           event memory
    • Authors: Gregory E. Cox; Amy H. Criss
      Pages: 31 - 61
      Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 97
      Author(s): Gregory E. Cox, Amy H. Criss
      Memory contains information about individual events (items) and combinations of events (associations). Despite the fundamental importance of this distinction, it remains unclear exactly how these two kinds of information are stored and whether different processes are used to retrieve them. We use both model-independent qualitative properties of response dynamics and quantitative modeling of individuals to address these issues. Item and associative information are not independent and they are retrieved concurrently via interacting processes. During retrieval, matching item and associative information mutually facilitate one another to yield an amplified holistic signal. Modeling of individuals suggests that this kind of facilitation between item and associative retrieval is a ubiquitous feature of human memory.

      PubDate: 2017-07-03T09:16:09Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.05.004
      Issue No: Vol. 97 (2017)
       
  • The role of incremental parsing in syntactically conditioned word learning
    • Authors: Jeffrey Lidz; Aaron Steven White; Rebecca Baier
      Pages: 62 - 78
      Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 97
      Author(s): Jeffrey Lidz, Aaron Steven White, Rebecca Baier
      In a series of three experiments, we use children’s noun learning as a probe into their syntactic knowledge as well as their ability to deploy this knowledge, investigating how the predictions children make about upcoming syntactic structure change as their knowledge changes. In the first two experiments, we show that children display a developmental change in their ability to use a noun’s syntactic environment as a cue to its meaning. We argue that this pattern arises from children’s reliance on their knowledge of verbs’ subcategorization frame frequencies to guide parsing, coupled with an inability to revise incremental parsing decisions. We show that this analysis is consistent with the syntactic distributions in child-directed speech. In the third experiment, we show that the change arises from predictions based on verbs’ subcategorization frame frequencies.

      PubDate: 2017-09-01T19:49:32Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.06.002
      Issue No: Vol. 97 (2017)
       
  • Clear evidence for item limits in visual working memory
    • Authors: Kirsten C.S. Adam; Edward K. Vogel; Edward Awh
      Pages: 79 - 97
      Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 97
      Author(s): Kirsten C.S. Adam, Edward K. Vogel, Edward Awh
      There is a consensus that visual working memory (WM) resources are sharply limited, but debate persists regarding the simple question of whether there is a limit to the total number of items that can be stored concurrently. Zhang and Luck (2008) advanced this debate with an analytic procedure that provided strong evidence for random guessing responses, but their findings can also be described by models that deny guessing while asserting a high prevalence of low precision memories. Here, we used a whole report memory procedure in which subjects reported all items in each trial and indicated whether they were guessing with each response. Critically, this procedure allowed us to measure memory performance for all items in each trial. When subjects were asked to remember 6 items, the response error distributions for about 3 out of the 6 items were best fit by a parameter-free guessing model (i.e. a uniform distribution). In addition, subjects’ self-reports of guessing precisely tracked the guessing rate estimated with a mixture model. Control experiments determined that guessing behavior was not due to output interference, and that there was still a high prevalence of guessing when subjects were instructed not to guess. Our novel approach yielded evidence that guesses, not low-precision representations, best explain limitations in working memory. These guesses also corroborate a capacity-limited working memory system – we found evidence that subjects are able to report non-zero information for only 3–4 items. Thus, WM capacity is constrained by an item limit that precludes the storage of more than 3–4 individuated feature values.

      PubDate: 2017-07-23T18:44:41Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.07.001
      Issue No: Vol. 97 (2017)
       
  • From information processing to decisions: Formalizing and comparing
           psychologically plausible choice models
    • Authors: Daniel W. Heck; Benjamin E. Hilbig; Morten Moshagen
      Pages: 26 - 40
      Abstract: Publication date: August 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 96
      Author(s): Daniel W. Heck, Benjamin E. Hilbig, Morten Moshagen
      Decision strategies explain how people integrate multiple sources of information to make probabilistic inferences. In the past decade, increasingly sophisticated methods have been developed to determine which strategy explains decision behavior best. We extend these efforts to test psychologically more plausible models (i.e., strategies), including a new, probabilistic version of the take-the-best (TTB) heuristic that implements a rank order of error probabilities based on sequential processing. Within a coherent statistical framework, deterministic and probabilistic versions of TTB and other strategies can directly be compared using model selection by minimum description length or the Bayes factor. In an experiment with inferences from given information, only three of 104 participants were best described by the psychologically plausible, probabilistic version of TTB. Similar as in previous studies, most participants were classified as users of weighted-additive, a strategy that integrates all available information and approximates rational decisions.

      PubDate: 2017-06-11T23:01:46Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.05.003
      Issue No: Vol. 96 (2017)
       
  • Evolution of word meanings through metaphorical mapping: Systematicity
           over the past millennium
    • Authors: Yang Xu; Barbara C. Malt; Mahesh Srinivasan
      Pages: 41 - 53
      Abstract: Publication date: August 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 96
      Author(s): Yang Xu, Barbara C. Malt, Mahesh Srinivasan
      One way that languages are able to communicate a potentially infinite set of ideas through a finite lexicon is by compressing emerging meanings into words, such that over time, individual words come to express multiple, related senses of meaning. We propose that overarching communicative and cognitive pressures have created systematic directionality in how new metaphorical senses have developed from existing word senses over the history of English. Given a large set of pairs of semantic domains, we used computational models to test which domains have been more commonly the starting points (source domains) and which the ending points (target domains) of metaphorical mappings over the past millennium. We found that a compact set of variables, including externality, embodiment, and valence, explain directionality in the majority of about 5000 metaphorical mappings recorded over the past 1100years. These results provide the first large-scale historical evidence that metaphorical mapping is systematic, and driven by measurable communicative and cognitive principles.

      PubDate: 2017-06-11T23:01:46Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.05.005
      Issue No: Vol. 96 (2017)
       
  • Diagnostic causal reasoning with verbal information
    • Authors: Björn Meder; Ralf Mayrhofer
      Pages: 54 - 84
      Abstract: Publication date: August 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 96
      Author(s): Björn Meder, Ralf Mayrhofer
      In diagnostic causal reasoning, the goal is to infer the probability of causes from one or multiple observed effects. Typically, studies investigating such tasks provide subjects with precise quantitative information regarding the strength of the relations between causes and effects or sample data from which the relevant quantities can be learned. By contrast, we sought to examine people’s inferences when causal information is communicated through qualitative, rather vague verbal expressions (e.g., “X occasionally causes A”). We conducted three experiments using a sequential diagnostic inference task, where multiple pieces of evidence were obtained one after the other. Quantitative predictions of different probabilistic models were derived using the numerical equivalents of the verbal terms, taken from an unrelated study with different subjects. We present a novel Bayesian model that allows for incorporating the temporal weighting of information in sequential diagnostic reasoning, which can be used to model both primacy and recency effects. On the basis of 19,848 judgments from 292 subjects, we found a remarkably close correspondence between the diagnostic inferences made by subjects who received only verbal information and those of a matched control group to whom information was presented numerically. Whether information was conveyed through verbal terms or numerical estimates, diagnostic judgments closely resembled the posterior probabilities entailed by the causes’ prior probabilities and the effects’ likelihoods. We observed interindividual differences regarding the temporal weighting of evidence in sequential diagnostic reasoning. Our work provides pathways for investigating judgment and decision making with verbal information within a computational modeling framework.

      PubDate: 2017-06-16T18:33:14Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.05.002
      Issue No: Vol. 96 (2017)
       
  • Breaking the rules in perceptual information integration
    • Authors: Maxim A. Bushmakin; Ami Eidels; Andrew Heathcote
      Pages: 1 - 16
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 95
      Author(s): Maxim A. Bushmakin, Ami Eidels, Andrew Heathcote
      We develop a broad theoretical framework for modelling difficult perceptual information integration tasks under different decision rules. The framework allows us to compare coactive architectures, which combine information before it enters the decision process, with parallel architectures, where logical rules combine independent decisions made about each perceptual source. For both architectures we test the novel hypothesis that participants break the decision rules on some trials, making a response based on only one stimulus even though task instructions require them to consider both. Our models take account of not only the decisions made but also the distribution of the time that it takes to make them, providing an account of speed-accuracy tradeoffs and response biases occurring when one response is required more often than another. We also test a second novel hypothesis, that the nature of the decision rule changes the evidence on which choices are based. We apply the models to data from a perceptual integration task with near threshold stimuli under two different decision rules. The coactive architecture was clearly rejected in favor of logical-rules. The logical-rule models were shown to provide an accurate account of all aspects of the data, but only when they allow for response bias and the possibility for subjects to break those rules. We discuss how our framework can be applied more broadly, and its relationship to Townsend and Nozawa’s (1995) Systems-Factorial Technology.

      PubDate: 2017-04-11T03:11:39Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.03.001
      Issue No: Vol. 95 (2017)
       
  • Learning to allocate limited time to decisions with different expected
           outcomes
    • Authors: Arash Khodadadi; Pegah Fakhari; Jerome R. Busemeyer
      Pages: 17 - 49
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 95
      Author(s): Arash Khodadadi, Pegah Fakhari, Jerome R. Busemeyer
      The goal of this article is to investigate how human participants allocate their limited time to decisions with different properties. We report the results of two behavioral experiments. In each trial of the experiments, the participant must accumulate noisy information to make a decision. The participants received positive and negative rewards for their correct and incorrect decisions, respectively. The stimulus was designed such that decisions based on more accumulated information were more accurate but took longer. Therefore, the total outcome that a participant could achieve during the limited experiments’ time depended on her “decision threshold”, the amount of information she needed to make a decision. In the first experiment, two types of trials were intermixed randomly: hard and easy. Crucially, the hard trials were associated with smaller positive and negative rewards than the easy trials. A cue presented at the beginning of each trial would indicate the type of the upcoming trial. The optimal strategy was to adopt a small decision threshold for hard trials. The results showed that several of the participants did not learn this simple strategy. We then investigated how the participants adjusted their decision threshold based on the feedback they received in each trial. To this end, we developed and compared 10 computational models for adjusting the decision threshold. The models differ in their assumptions on the shape of the decision thresholds and the way the feedback is used to adjust the decision thresholds. The results of Bayesian model comparison showed that a model with time-varying thresholds whose parameters are updated by a reinforcement learning algorithm is the most likely model. In the second experiment, the cues were not presented. We showed that the optimal strategy is to use a single time-decreasing decision threshold for all trials. The results of the computational modeling showed that the participants did not use this optimal strategy. Instead, they attempted to detect the difficulty of the trial first and then set their decision threshold accordingly.

      PubDate: 2017-04-24T19:47:02Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.03.002
      Issue No: Vol. 95 (2017)
       
  • Grounding principles for inferring agency: Two cultural perspectives
    • Authors: bethany l. ojalehto; Douglas L. Medin; Salino G. García
      Pages: 50 - 78
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 95
      Author(s): bethany l. ojalehto, Douglas L. Medin, Salino G. García
      The present research investigates cultural variation in grounding principles for inferring agency in order to address an important theoretical debate: does cultural diversity in agency concepts reflect an animistic overextension of (universal) folkpsychology, as many have argued, or an alternative theory of folkcommunication based on relational principles? In two experiments, mind perception measures were adapted to assess beliefs concerning the agency of non-animal kinds (plants, abiotic kinds, complex artifacts) among Indigenous Ngöbe adults in Panama and US college students. Agency attributions varied systematically, with Ngöbe ascribing greater agency to non-animal natural kinds and US college participants ascribing greater agency to complex artifacts. Analysis of explanations revealed divergent interpretations of agency as a prototypically human capacity requiring consciousness (US), versus a relational capacity expressed in directed interactions (Ngöbe). Converging measures further illuminated the inferential principles underlying these agency attributions. (1) An experimental relational framing of agency probes facilitated Ngöbe but not US agency attributions. (2) Further analysis showed that three key dimensions of agency attribution (experience, cognition, animacy) are organized differently across cultures. (3) A Bayesian approach to cultural consensus modeling confirmed the presence of two distinct consensus models rather than variations on a single (universal) model. Together, these results indicate that conceptual frameworks for agency differ across US college and Ngöbe communities. We conclude that Ngöbe concepts of agency derive from a distinct theory of folkcommunication based on an ecocentric prototype rather than overextensions of an anthropocentric folkpsychology. These observations suggest that folkpsychology and mind perception represent culture specific frameworks for agency, with significant implications for domain-specificity theory and our understanding of cognitive diversity.

      PubDate: 2017-04-24T19:47:02Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.04.001
      Issue No: Vol. 95 (2017)
       
  • Comparing different kinds of words and word-word relations to test an
           habituation model of priming
    • Authors: Cory A. Rieth; David E. Huber
      Pages: 79 - 104
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 95
      Author(s): Cory A. Rieth, David E. Huber
      Huber and O'Reilly (2003) proposed that neural habituation exists to solve a temporal parsing problem, minimizing blending between one word and the next when words are visually presented in rapid succession. They developed a neural dynamics habituation model, explaining the finding that short duration primes produce positive priming whereas long duration primes produce negative repetition priming. The model contains three layers of processing, including a visual input layer, an orthographic layer, and a lexical-semantic layer. The predicted effect of prime duration depends both on this assumed representational hierarchy and the assumption that synaptic depression underlies habituation. The current study tested these assumptions by comparing different kinds of words (e.g., words versus non-words) and different kinds of word-word relations (e.g., associative versus repetition). For each experiment, the predictions of the original model were compared to an alternative model with different representational assumptions. Experiment 1 confirmed the prediction that non-words and inverted words require longer prime durations to eliminate positive repetition priming (i.e., a slower transition from positive to negative priming). Experiment 2 confirmed the prediction that associative priming increases and then decreases with increasing prime duration, but remains positive even with long duration primes. Experiment 3 replicated the effects of repetition and associative priming using a within-subjects design and combined these effects by examining target words that were expected to repeat (e.g., viewing the target word ‘BACK' after the prime phrase ‘back to'). These results support the originally assumed representational hierarchy and more generally the role of habituation in temporal parsing and priming.

      PubDate: 2017-05-01T23:30:54Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.04.002
      Issue No: Vol. 95 (2017)
       
  • Cue combination in human spatial navigation
    • Authors: Xiaoli Chen; Timothy P. McNamara; Jonathan W. Kelly; Thomas Wolbers
      Pages: 105 - 144
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 95
      Author(s): Xiaoli Chen, Timothy P. McNamara, Jonathan W. Kelly, Thomas Wolbers
      This project investigated the ways in which visual cues and bodily cues from self-motion are combined in spatial navigation. Participants completed a homing task in an immersive virtual environment. In Experiments 1A and 1B, the reliability of visual cues and self-motion cues was manipulated independently and within-participants. Results showed that participants weighted visual cues and self-motion cues based on their relative reliability and integrated these two cue types optimally or near-optimally according to Bayesian principles under most conditions. In Experiment 2, the stability of visual cues was manipulated across trials. Results indicated that cue instability affected cue weights indirectly by influencing cue reliability. Experiment 3 was designed to mislead participants about cue reliability by providing distorted feedback on the accuracy of their performance. Participants received feedback that their performance with visual cues was better and that their performance with self-motion cues was worse than it actually was or received the inverse feedback. Positive feedback on the accuracy of performance with a given cue improved the relative precision of performance with that cue. Bayesian principles still held for the most part. Experiment 4 examined the relations among the variability of performance, rated confidence in performance, cue weights, and spatial abilities. Participants took part in the homing task over two days and rated confidence in their performance after every trial. Cue relative confidence and cue relative reliability had unique contributions to observed cue weights. The variability of performance was less stable than rated confidence over time. Participants with higher mental rotation scores performed relatively better with self-motion cues than visual cues. Across all four experiments, consistent correlations were found between observed weights assigned to cues and relative reliability of cues, demonstrating that the cue-weighting process followed Bayesian principles. Results also pointed to the important role of subjective evaluation of performance in the cue-weighting process and led to a new conceptualization of cue reliability in human spatial navigation.

      PubDate: 2017-05-08T07:53:40Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.04.003
      Issue No: Vol. 95 (2017)
       
  • Some consequences of normal aging for generating conceptual explanations:
           A case study of vitalist biology
    • Authors: Nathan Tardiff; Igor Bascandziev; Kaitlin Sandor; Susan Carey; Deborah Zaitchik
      Pages: 145 - 163
      Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 95
      Author(s): Nathan Tardiff, Igor Bascandziev, Kaitlin Sandor, Susan Carey, Deborah Zaitchik
      Accumulating evidence suggests that not only diseases of old age, but also normal aging, affect elderly adults’ ability to draw on the framework theories that structure our abstract causal-explanatory knowledge, knowledge that we use to make sense of the world. One such framework theory, the cross-culturally universal vitalist biology, gives meaning to the abstract concepts life and death. Previous work shows that many elderly adults are animists, claiming that active, moving entities such as the sun and the wind are alive (Zaitchik & Solomon, 2008). Such responses are characteristic of young children, who, lacking an intuitive theory of biology, distinguish animals from non-animals on the basis of a theory of causal and intentional agency. What explains such childlike responses? Do the elderly undergo semantic degradation of their intuitive biological theory? Or do they merely have difficulty deploying their theory of biology in the face of interference from the developmentally prior agency theory? Here we develop an analytic strategy to answer this question. Using a battery of vitalist biology tasks, this study demonstrates—for the first time—that animism in the elderly is due to difficulty in deployment of the vitalist theory, not its degradation. We additionally establish some powerful downstream consequences of theory deployment difficulties, demonstrating that the elderly’s use of the agency theory is not restricted to animist judgments—rather, it pervades their explicit reasoning about animates and inanimates. Extending the investigation, we identify specific cognitive mechanisms implicated in adult animism, finding that differences between young and elderly adults are mediated and moderated by differences in inhibition and shifting mechanisms. The analytic strategy developed here could help adjudicate between degradation and deployment in other conceptual domains and other populations.

      PubDate: 2017-05-13T02:29:47Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.04.004
      Issue No: Vol. 95 (2017)
       
  • The impact of object type on the spatial analogies in Korean preschoolers
    • Authors: Youjeong Park; Marianella Casasola
      Pages: 53 - 66
      Abstract: Publication date: May 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 94
      Author(s): Youjeong Park, Marianella Casasola
      We tested young children’s spatial reasoning in a match-to-sample task, manipulating the objects in the task (abstract geometric shapes, line drawings of realistic objects, or both). Korean 4- and 5-year-old children (N =161) generalized the target spatial configuration (i.e., on, in, above) more easily when the sample used geometric shapes and the choices used realistic objects than the reverse (i.e., realistic-object sample to geometric-shape choices). With within-type stimuli (i.e., sample and choices were both geometric shapes or both realistic objects), 5-year-old, but not 4-year-old, children generalized the spatial relations more easily with geometric shapes than realistic objects. In addition, children who knew more locative terms (e.g., “in”, “on”) performed better on the task, suggesting a link to children’s spatial vocabulary. The results demonstrate an advantage of geometric shapes over realistic objects in facilitating young children’s performance on a match-to-sample spatial reasoning task.

      PubDate: 2017-03-03T19:01:38Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.02.001
      Issue No: Vol. 94 (2017)
       
  • The elimination of positive priming with increasing prime duration
           reflects a transition from perceptual fluency to disfluency rather than
           bias against primed words
    • Authors: Kevin W. Potter; Chris Donkin; David E. Huber
      Pages: 1 - 28
      Abstract: Publication date: March 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 101
      Author(s): Kevin W. Potter, Chris Donkin, David E. Huber
      With immediate repetition priming of forced choice perceptual identification, short prime durations produce positive priming (i.e., priming the target leads to higher accuracy, while priming the foil leads to lower accuracy). Many theories explain positive priming following short duration primes as reflecting increased perceptual fluency for the primed target (i.e., decreased identification latency). However, most studies only examine either accuracy or response times, rather than considering the joint constraints of response times and accuracy to properly address the role of decision biases and response caution. This is a critical oversight because several theories propose that the transition to negative priming following a long duration prime reflects a decision strategy to compensate for the effect of increased perceptual fluency. In contrast, the nROUSE model of Huber and O’Reilly (2003) explains this transition as reflecting perceptual habituation, and thus a change to perceptual disfluency. We confirmed this prediction by applying a sequential sampling model (the diffusion race model) to accuracy and response time distributions from a new single item same-different version of the priming task. In this way, we measured strategic biases and perceptual fluency in each condition for each subject. The nROUSE model was only applied to accuracy from the original forced-choice version of the priming task. This application of nROUSE produced separate predictions for each subject regarding the degree of fluency and disfluency in each condition, and these predictions were confirmed by the drift rate parameters (i.e., fluency) from the response time model in contrast to the threshold parameters (i.e., bias).

      PubDate: 2017-12-13T01:04:35Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.11.004
      Issue No: Vol. 101 (2017)
       
  • The action is in the task set, not in the action
    • Authors: Maria M. Robinson; John Clevenger; David E. Irwin
      Pages: 17 - 42
      Abstract: Publication date: February 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 100
      Author(s): Maria M. Robinson, John Clevenger, David E. Irwin
      In 7 experiments we contrasted two accounts for novel sources of attentional bias. According to the action-based account, executing a motor response towards an object causes people to allocate attention preferentially towards properties of that object in a subsequent task even when properties of the acted-on object are task irrelevant. This remarkable view entails that motor processing is in itself sufficient to affect later attentional processing, in the absence of stimulus evaluation and motor preparation. In contrast, the attentional template matching account posits that observing an external object that matches one’s prior attentional settings increases processing of that object even when properties of the item are no longer task relevant. Our findings indicate that when properties of a stimulus are task irrelevant, acting towards that object does not produce priming effects over and above what is observed from passive viewing of the object. Furthermore, when properties of the stimulus are task relevant, effects on attention are observed only when participants have sufficient information to generate a task based attentional template of the upcoming stimulus, regardless of whether they act towards the stimulus or not. Finally, effects on attention are found under conditions when participants are likely to experience an attentional template match but do not produce a response. Collectively, these results reveal that previously reported motor-based effects on attention instead reflect the effects of attentional bias towards objects that serve as prior targets. Our findings thus provide strong support for the attentional template view and no support for the action-based view.

      PubDate: 2017-12-13T01:04:35Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.11.005
      Issue No: Vol. 100 (2017)
       
  • A neural model of retrospective attention in visual working memory
    • Authors: Paul M. Bays; Robert Taylor
      Pages: 43 - 52
      Abstract: Publication date: February 2018
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 100
      Author(s): Paul M. Bays, Robert Taylor
      An informative cue that directs attention to one of several items in working memory improves subsequent recall of that item. Here we examine the mechanism of this retro-cue effect using a model of short-term memory based on neural population coding. Our model describes recalled feature values as the output of an optimal decoding of spikes generated by a tuned population of neurons. This neural model provides a better account of human recall data than an influential model that assumes errors can be described as a mixture of normally distributed noise and random guesses. The retro-cue benefit is revealed to be consistent with a higher firing rate of the population encoding the cued versus uncued items, with no difference in tuning specificity. Additionally, a retro-cued item is less likely to be swapped with another item in memory, an effect that can also be explained by greater activity of the underlying population. These results provide a parsimonious account of the effects of retrospective attention on recall and demonstrate a principled method for investigating neural representations with behavioral tasks.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T00:30:35Z
      DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.12.001
      Issue No: Vol. 100 (2017)
       
  • Where do hypotheses come from?
    • Authors: Ishita Dasgupta; Eric Schulz Samuel Gershman
      Abstract: Publication date: August 2017
      Source:Cognitive Psychology, Volume 96
      Author(s): Ishita Dasgupta, Eric Schulz, Samuel J. Gershman
      Why are human inferences sometimes remarkably close to the Bayesian ideal and other times systematically biased? In particular, why do humans make near-rational inferences in some natural domains where the candidate hypotheses are explicitly available, whereas tasks in similar domains requiring the self-generation of hypotheses produce systematic deviations from rational inference. We propose that these deviations arise from algorithmic processes approximating Bayes’ rule. Specifically in our account, hypotheses are generated stochastically from a sampling process, such that the sampled hypotheses form a Monte Carlo approximation of the posterior. While this approximation will converge to the true posterior in the limit of infinite samples, we take a small number of samples as we expect that the number of samples humans take is limited. We show that this model recreates several well-documented experimental findings such as anchoring and adjustment, subadditivity, superadditivity, the crowd within as well as the self-generation effect, the weak evidence, and the dud alternative effects. We confirm the model’s prediction that superadditivity and subadditivity can be induced within the same paradigm by manipulating the unpacking and typicality of hypotheses. We also partially confirm our model’s prediction about the effect of time pressure and cognitive load on these effects.

      PubDate: 2017-06-07T10:33:43Z
       
 
 
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