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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 803 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Advances in Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Agora     Full-text available via subscription  
Agora: papeles de Filosofía     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Ahkam : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Ajatus : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja     Open Access  
AJIS : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Akademos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
al-Afkar : Journal For Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-Fikra     Open Access  
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Albertus Magnus     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Alter : Revue de phénoménologie     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 43)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
An-Nisbah : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anais Eletrônicos do Congresso Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Análisis     Open Access  
Análisis : Revista de investigación filosófica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Angewandte Philosophie / Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal  
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anuario Filosófico     Full-text available via subscription  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Apuntes Filosóficos     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Augustiniana     Full-text available via subscription  
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 62)
Australasian Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
BELAJEA : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 21)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bohemistyka     Open Access  
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 46)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Budhi : A Journal of Ideas and Culture     Full-text available via subscription  
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi NLU : Series : Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology     Open Access  
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Cahiers de philosophie de l’université de Caen     Open Access  
Cahiers Droit, Sciences & Technologies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 21)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Cilicia Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Civitas Augustiniana     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Claridades : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 14)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 46)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 25)
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Cracow Indological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Creativity Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao : A Journal of Comparative Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Diagonal : Zeitschrift der Universität Siegen     Hybrid Journal  
Diakrisis Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy     Open Access  
Dialectic : A scholarly journal of thought leadership, education and practice in the discipline of visual communication design     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Diferencia(s)     Open Access  
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dios y el Hombre     Open Access  
Dirosat : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Discusiones Filosóficas     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Disputatio     Open Access  
Dissonância : Revista de Teoria Crítica     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Doxa : Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
Elenchos     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
En Líneas Generales     Open Access  
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Episteme NS     Open Access  
Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia     Open Access  
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Estética     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  

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Similar Journals
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.402
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 23  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1386-2820 - ISSN (Online) 1572-8447
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2570 journals]
  • Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist
    • Abstract: Moral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren’t. I argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, (2017) work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error theorists use to advance their conceptual claim apply in the epistemic domain also. This prohibits the error theorist from adopting epistemic reductionism. I use Jonas Olson’s work as exemplary of moral error theory. I demonstrate that Olson’s (2014) argument that the rhetorical authority of moral claims is best explained by the error theorist’s conceptual claim applies equally in the epistemic case. Olson (2018) attempts to avoid this by claiming that epistemic claims are reducible to claims about whether our doxastic attitudes live up to their functions. There are two problems with Olson’s (2018) argument. Firstly, functional reasons are a species of a common genus – standards reasons – and since Olson’s authority argument against moral reductionism applies to standards reasons, it applies to functional reasons. Secondly, Olson’s (2018) claim that we cannot also cast moral reasons as functional is under-supported. I suggest that there is plausible evidence that we can and undermine his arguments against this claim. I do not argue that the epistemic companions in guilt strategy demonstrates the falsity of moral error theory. Rather, I argue that the Disparity Response to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy fails.
      PubDate: 2020-01-21
       
  • On the Limitations of Moral Exemplarism: Socio-Cultural Values and Gender
    • Abstract: In this paper, I highlight and discuss two significant limitations of Zagzebski’s (in Exemplarist moral theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) exemplarist moral theory. Although I focus on Zagzebski’s theory, I argue that these limitations are not unique to her approach but also feature in previous versions of moral exemplarism. The first limitation I identify is inspired by MacIntyre’s (in After virtue, Duckworth, London, 1981) understanding of the concept of virtue and stems from the realization that the emotion of admiration, through which agents identify exemplars, should not be examined in vacuo. Scholars working on moral exemplarism have failed to note that admiration is substantially influenced by prevailing socio-cultural norms and values. I show that ‘the admirable’ varies across cultures and time; and the employment of one’s own emotion of admiration in order to derive the meaning of terms such as virtue and duty would only result in a culture-specific understanding of morality. The second limitation, inspired by Butler’s (in Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity, Routledge, London, 1990) social constructivist understanding of gender, rests on the realization that several features and characteristics of the agent influence their perception of moral excellence. I focus on the issue of gender and highlight that exemplarist theories justify (and perpetuate) a counter-intuitive gender-specific understanding of morality.
      PubDate: 2020-01-13
       
  • Feeling Badly Is Not Good Enough: a Reply to Fritz and Miller
    • Abstract: Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller’s (2019) reply to my (2018) article helpfully clarifies their position and our main points of disagreement. Their view is that those who blame hypocritically lack the right to blame for a violation of some moral norm N in virtue of having an unfair disposition to blame others, but not themselves, for violations of N. This view raises two key questions. First, are there instances of hypocritical blame that do not involve an unfair differential blaming disposition' Second, if the answer to the first question is Yes, do hypocritical blamers of this kind lack the right to blame' In this paper, I argue that the answer to the first question is Yes. Given this, Fritz and Miller’s account faces serious problems regardless of whether the answer to the second question is Yes or No.
      PubDate: 2020-01-11
       
  • How to (dis)solve the Gamer’s Dilemma
    • Abstract: The Gamer’s Dilemma challenges us to find a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Without such a distinction, we are forced to conclude that either both actions are morally acceptable or that both should be morally illicit. This paper argues that the best way to solve the dilemma is, in one sense, to dissolve it. The Gamer’s Dilemma rests on a misunderstanding in the sense that it does not distinguish between the effects that the form of a simulation can have on moral judgment apart from its surface content. A greater appreciation of the way structural features of a simulation affect subject experience will help us see why only simulations of murder and pedophilia generating virtually real experiences are likely to be seen as wrong. I argue that a simulation’s structural elements powerfully affect how subjects experience simulated content and hence is an important, and previously neglected, variable necessary to dissolve the Gamer’s Dilemma. Properly understood, virtually real simulations of murder and pedophilia are both likely to be treated by players as morally wrong. Similarly, virtually unreal murder and pedophilia will be less likely to be judged as wrong. Subject judgments are thus consistent once a simulation’s structural variables are accounted for. The Gamer’s Dilemma dissolves as a dilemma once we acknowledge these structural features of simulations and how they affect experience and moral judgment.
      PubDate: 2020-01-11
       
  • Anti-Immigration Backlashes as Constraints
    • Abstract: Migration often causes what I refer to in this paper as ‘anti-immigration backlashes’ in receiving countries. Such reactions have substantial costs in terms of the undermining of national solidarity and the diffusion of political distrust. In short, anti-immigration backlashes can threaten the social and political stability of receiving countries. Do such risks constitute a reason against permissive immigration policies which are otherwise desirable' I argue that a positive answer may depend on a skeptical view based on the alleged constraints that certain political facts - especially facts about human nature - pose on political intervention. This view does not stand conceptual and empirical scrutiny in the case of anti-immigration backlashes, where feasibility comes in degree. Yet focusing on the recalcitrance to change of these facts is practically important when devising action plans. This pragmatic core of the skeptical view yields a gradualist and naturalistic way of thinking about constraints in political theorising about migration, and elsewhere.
      PubDate: 2020-01-10
       
  • Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts
    • Abstract: Are words like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals' Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles' Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism, floated by Jennifer Saul and defended by Esa Diaz-Leon, doesn’t exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political practices concerning our uses of these words. I then propose the view that terms like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology.
      PubDate: 2020-01-08
       
  • Managing Vice
    • PubDate: 2020-01-03
       
  • Saba Bazargan-Forward & Samuel C. Rickless (eds.): The Ethics of
           War: Essays
    • Abstract: This review of the book The Ethics of War: Essays provides a general description of the book and some brief commentary on several of its chapters.
      PubDate: 2020-01-03
       
  • Morality and Interpretation: the Principle of Phronetic Charity
    • Abstract: The recent discussions on the unity of virtue (or lack thereof) suffer from a lack of reference to the processes through which we interpret each other as moral agents. In the present paper it is argued that much light can be thrown on that crucial issue by appealing to a version of Donald Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which we call “Principle of Phronetic Charity”. The idea is that in order to treat somebody as a moral agent, one has first to attribute to them, at least pro tempore, a significant degree of practical wisdom (intended as ethical expertise) and, then, to assess and rationally adjust such attribution of competence via actual engagement with them – a process that may lead to different responses on the part of the interpreter (i.e., the confirmation, upgrading, or withdrawing of the preliminary interpretation). After expounding and defending the Principle of Phronetic Charity and the interpretive practices connected with it, we discuss the repercussions of our account on the issue of the epistemic access to virtue. We will show, in particular, that some important components of both disunitarianism and unitarianism have to be retained: in accordance with the former, we stress the role of concrete experience over pure speculation and, up to a point, the idea that virtues tend to form variegated ensembles; in accordance with the latter, we accept the claim that virtues are not attributed to moral agents in isolation. Ultimately, however, the account developed here rejects both the atomism of the disunitarian view and the holism of the “Unity of the Virtues”, since it is in fact a form of molecularism, according to which virtues come neither individually nor as a whole, but rather as clusters.
      PubDate: 2020-01-02
       
  • Out of Proportion' On Surveillance and the Proportionality Requirement
    • Abstract: In this article, we critically scrutinize the principle of proportionality when used in the context of security and government surveillance. We argue that McMahan’s distinction from just warfare between narrow proportionality (cases in which a threatener is liable to suffer the harms inflicted upon him in the course of surveillance) and wide proportionality (involving harms inflicted on non-liable individuals) can generally apply to the context of surveillance. We argue that narrow proportionality applies more or less directly to cases in which the surveilled is liable and that the wide proportionality principle applies to cases characterized by ‘collateral intrusion’. We argue, however, that a more demanding criterion than the lesser-evil justification that wide proportionality frequently entails is necessary in cases characterized by intentional intrusion upon non-liable individuals (e.g. some cases of mass surveillance). The distinction between foreseeing and intending intrusion into the lives of individuals who are not liable has not previously been specifically addressed in discussions concerning surveillance ethics. This specification is thus increasingly important due to the general growing tendency for adherence to the precautionary principle and policies aimed at anticipating criminal acts before they are committed. Preventive surveillance of non-liable actors is considered an important instrument for obtaining this aim and thus calls for moral scrutiny in terms of permissibility and proportionality. We suggest the concept ‘wide proportionality +’ which applies to cases of intentional intrusion of non-liable individuals.
      PubDate: 2020-01-02
       
  • Motivation and the Virtue of Honesty: Some Conceptual Requirements and
           Empirical Results
    • Abstract: The virtue of honesty has been stunningly neglected in contemporary philosophy, with only two papers appearing in the last 40 years. The first half of this paper is a conceptual exploration of one aspect of the virtue, namely the honest person’s motivational profile. I argue that egoistic motives for telling the truth or not cheating are incompatible with honest motivation. At the same time, there is no one specific motive that is required for a person to be motivated in a virtuously honest way. Instead I advance a pluralistic theory of honest motivation, which allows for motives of caring, fairness, and virtue, among others. The second half of the paper then turns briefly to the empirical literature in psychology and behavioral economics on cheating, to see to what extent honest motives appear to be operative. The upshot is that we have good preliminary evidence for the claim that most people are not virtuously honest.
      PubDate: 2020-01-02
       
  • Candice Delmas: A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil
    • PubDate: 2019-12-26
       
  • First-Personal Moral Testimony: a Defence
    • Abstract: Several authors have discussed and defended what is sometimes called the Asymmetry Thesis in social epistemology: that while reliance on testimony is essentially incontrovertible in epistemology, it is uniquely problematic for moral knowledge. This conclusion results, I argue, from considering the wrong sort of moral testimony: namely, ‘third-personal’ rather than ‘first-personal’ testimony. First-personal moral testimony is an inescapable part of the constitution of legitimate moral norms, and its role cannot be deflated as a form of mere information to be taken up in private deliberation. The consequences of this argument for forms of hypothetical contractualism, in particular, are profound.
      PubDate: 2019-12-10
       
  • Russell on Naturalism and Practical Reason
    • Abstract: This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion.
      PubDate: 2019-12-10
       
  • The Nature of Punishment Revisited: Reply to Wringe
    • Abstract: This paper continues a debate about the following claim: an agent punishes someone only if she aims to harm him. In a series of papers, Bill Wringe argues that this claim is false, I criticize his arguments, and he replies. Here, I argue that his reply fails.
      PubDate: 2019-12-09
       
  • A Life Plan Principle of Voting Rights
    • Abstract: Who should have a right to participate in a polity’s decision-making' Although the answers to this ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory remain controversial, it is widely believed that the enfranchisement of tourists and children is unacceptable. Yet, the two most prominent inclusion principles in the literature – Robert Goodin’s ‘all (possibly) affected interests’-principle and the ‘all subjected to law’-principle – both enfranchise those groups. Unsurprisingly, democratic theorists have therefore offered several reasons for nonetheless exempting tourists and children from the franchise. In this paper, I argue that their attempts fail. None of the proposed rationales can do the job without having unacceptable implications for the voting rights of other groups. I then develop a new specification of the affected interests-view, one that avoids such problems. According to my life plan-principle, a person is entitled to participate in a polity’s decision-making if and only if its decisions will actually affect her autonomously chosen life plans, or prevent her from developing or revising plans of that kind. I show that this principle straightforwardly avoids enfranchising tourists and children, and thus improves upon its two prominent rivals. The paper ends by considering and rejecting two objections to my new principle.
      PubDate: 2019-12-09
       
  • Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity
    • Abstract: While possessing moral understanding is agreed to be a core epistemic and moral value, it remains a matter of dispute whether it can be acquired via testimony and whether it involves an ability to engage in moral reasoning. This paper addresses both issues with the aim of contributing to the current debates on moral understanding in moral epistemology and virtue ethics. It is argued that moral epistemologists should stop appealing to the argument from the transmissibility of moral understanding to make a case for their favorite view of moral understanding. It is also argued that proponents of exemplarist moral theories cannot remain neutral on whether the ability to engage in moral reasoning is a necessary component of moral understanding.
      PubDate: 2019-12-09
       
  • Virtue Measurement: Theory and Applications
    • Abstract: Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory (WTT) from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms (cognitive/affective/motivational processes and dispositions) are triggered by the perception of trait-relevant stimuli in a person’s external and/or internal environment. Moving from this starting point, we discuss our conception of a virtue and respects in which it both aligns with and diverges from Aristotle’s conception. We discuss roles for practical wisdom and motivation in our conception of virtue, and highlight respects in which WTT provides an amenable empirical framework into which key Aristotelian elements can be integrated. We conclude with brief remarks about our conception as an empirically adequate and measurable account.
      PubDate: 2019-12-06
       
  • Vices of Other Minds
    • PubDate: 2019-12-04
       
  • Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered
    • Abstract: Many contemporary ethicists use case-based reasoning to reach consistent beliefs about ethical matters. The idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, which provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. However, most proponents of case-based moral reasoning are not very explicit about how they resolve inconsistencies and how they abstract principles from judgments about particular cases. The aim of this article is to outline a methodology—called Consistency Reasoning Casuistry—for case-based reasoning in ethics. This methodology draws on Richmond Campbell and Victor Kumar’s naturalistic model for the resolution of inconsistencies between the content of intuitions about particular cases. I argue that reasons similar to those that motivate their model also support a more abstract form of moral reasoning that goes beyond mere resolutions of inconsistencies between case judgments and demands the formulation of more abstract moral norms. Consistency Reasoning Casuistry, it is argued, is a good candidate for a methodology for case-based moral reasoning that is in harmony with paradigms of contemporary moral psychology and that can accommodate the methodology implicit in the work of many contemporary ethicists.
      PubDate: 2019-11-01
       
 
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