A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

        1 2 3 4 5        [Sort by number of followers]   [Restore default list]

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 849 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Advances in Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Agora     Full-text available via subscription  
Agora: papeles de Filosofía     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Ahkam : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Ajatus : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja     Open Access  
AJIS : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Akademos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
al-Afkar : Journal For Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-Fikra     Open Access  
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
AL-Qadissiya Magzine for Human Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Albertus Magnus     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Alter : Revue de phénoménologie     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 44)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
An-Nisbah : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anais de Filosofia Clássica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anais Eletrônicos do Congresso Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Análisis     Open Access  
Análisis : Revista de investigación filosófica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Analytica : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Andrews University Seminary Student Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
ANFUSINA : Journal of Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Angewandte Philosophie / Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal  
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anuario Filosófico     Full-text available via subscription  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Apuntes Filosóficos     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Astrolabio     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Augustiniana     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Aurora : papeles del Seminario María Zambrano     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Auslegung : A Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 64)
Australasian Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
BELAJEA : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethica     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 22)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bohemistyka     Open Access  
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 46)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 42)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Budhi : A Journal of Ideas and Culture     Full-text available via subscription  
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi NLU : Series : Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology     Open Access  
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Cahiers de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen     Open Access  
Cahiers Droit, Sciences & Technologies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Canadian Journal of Bioethics     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 23)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Ciência & Trópico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cilicia Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Civitas Augustiniana     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Claridades : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Clotho     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 14)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conatus : Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 25)
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Convivium : Revista de Filosophia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Cracow Indological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Creativity Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao : A Journal of Comparative Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Diagonal : Zeitschrift der Universität Siegen     Hybrid Journal  
Diakrisis Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy     Open Access  
Dialectic : A scholarly journal of thought leadership, education and practice in the discipline of visual communication design     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Diferencia(s)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dios y el Hombre     Open Access  
Dirosat : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Discusiones Filosóficas     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Disputatio     Open Access  
Dissonância : Revista de Teoria Crítica     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Doxa : Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
Elenchos     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
En Líneas Generales     Open Access  
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access   (Followers: 2)

        1 2 3 4 5        [Sort by number of followers]   [Restore default list]

Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.402
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 23  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1386-2820 - ISSN (Online) 1572-8447
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2626 journals]
  • Some Probably-Not-Very-Good Thoughts on Underconfidence
    • PubDate: 2020-05-29
       
  • Blaming the Intellectually Vicious: a Critical Discussion of Cassam’s
           Account of Blameworthiness and Reprehensibility for Epistemic Vice
    • Abstract: Abstract There is much of interest in Cassam’s ground-breaking Vices of the Mind (2019). This discussion focuses exclusively on one aspect of his view, namely, his account of what it takes to be properly criticisable or blameworthy for one’s epistemic vices. This critical discussion consists of two sections. The first provides an overview of Cassam’s account of responsibility and criticisability for intellectual vices. The second raises a problem for that account whose formulation is due to Battaly (2019) and proposes a solution which, at least in part, could also be adopted by Cassam himself if he were prepared to make some small changes to his view. This solution generates a highly disjunctive account of criticisability and responsibility for possessing an epistemic vice. Although such heterogeneity might seem wholly unsatisfactory, it receives a plausible explanation when the account is put within the context of a Strawsonian approach to the practice of holding people responsible for their epistemic vices.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28
       
  • Sanctuary Cities and Non-Refoulement
    • Abstract: Abstract More than two hundred cities in the United States have now declared themselves to be sanctuary cities. This declaration involves a commitment to non-compliance with federal law; the sanctuary city will refuse to use its own juridical power – including, more crucially, its own police powers – to assist the federal government in the deportation of undocumented residents. We will argue that the sanctuary city might be morally defensible, even if deportation is not always wrong, and even if the federal government is legally permitted to demand that states participate in the process of deportation. We defend this conclusion with reference to a simple, but powerful, norm of international law: that of non-refoulement. As we will discuss, this norm articulates the idea that no state may rightly use its coercive power to move a person into a position in which their basic rights are at risk. We take this norm as a morally defensible principle, and ask what could follow from its acceptance. We argue that this norm has implications for a variety of actors – especially when we notice that those who are facing unjust risks of death are, in general, entitled to use defensive violence against their aggressors. This simple fact, we argue, can help offer a novel defense of the sanctuary city.
      PubDate: 2020-05-22
       
  • Katherine Hawley: How to be Trustworthy
    • PubDate: 2020-05-18
       
  • Jan-Christoph Heilinger: Cosmopolitan Responsibility - Global Injustice,
           Relational Equality, and Individual Agency
    • PubDate: 2020-05-16
       
  • “Perspectives on and Standards of Life’s Meaningfulness: A
           Reply to Landau”
    • Abstract: Abstract In a recent article Iddo Landau has defended his distinction between perspectives on and standards of meaning in life to support his rebuttal of a familiar pessimistic objection to the meaningfulness of human life. According to that complaint, human life is meaningless when viewed from a detached, cosmic, or sub specie aeternitatis [SSA] perspective. Landau argues that a cosmic perspective need not entail a comparably high standard of meaningfulness. What counts on his view then is not the perspective, which is compatible with any number of possible standards for what constitutes an adequate amount of meaningfulness, but the standard that sets that threshold. In this article I argue that Landau has 1.a.) underestimated the severity of the pessimists’ critique of the availability of any standards for meaningfulness and has also 1.b.) misunderstood the pessimists to be saying that human lives are meaningless because they make an insufficient spatio-temporal impact. I argue further that 2.a.) Landau has left unexplained on what basis we would locate the standard of meaning, leaving a gap in his account. Finally, I maintain that 2.b.) by acknowledging that the ontological, normative, or theological content of the SSA perspective can influence the placing of that standard, Landau leaves himself open to the plausible alternative possibility that the meaning of a life is settled not by the standard itself but by the character attributed to the SSA perspective.
      PubDate: 2020-05-11
       
  • The Likelihood of Actions and the Neurobiology of Virtues: Veto and
           Consent Power
    • Abstract: Abstract An increasing number of studies indicate that virtues affect brain structure. These studies might shed new light on some neuroethical perspectives suggesting that our brain network activity determines the acquisition and permanence of virtues. According to these perspectives, virtuous behavior could be interpreted as the product of a brain mechanism supervised by genes and environment and not as the result of free choice. In this respect, the neural correlates of virtues would confirm the deterministic theory. In contrast, I maintain that these findings do not undermine the role of willpower and freedom while reinforcing an interactionist view of free will. If virtues affect our neural system, then the predictability of the virtuous behavior follows. The likelihood of our future (moral) actions is primarily virtue-dependent; therefore, the acquired naturality of virtuous behavior is a source of predictable behavioral patterns outlining expected actions, which I propose to call Hypotheses of Action (HAs). However, the predictability of an action indicates its likeliness and not its certainty or necessity. The neural traces of virtues can be interpreted as major indicators of HAs. It is always possible for the agents to depart from their more likely, virtue-induced actions, but their deviations from the virtuous behavioral pattern are rare, as it is rare for the vicious/non-virtuous person to behave well systematically. This implies a reaffirmation of the notions of veto and consent as they provide a universal practical power affecting the subject’s use of moral virtues.
      PubDate: 2020-05-09
       
  • Love, Reasons, and Desire
    • Abstract: Abstract This essay defends subjectivism about reasons of love. These are the normative reasons we have to treat those we love especially well, such as the reasons we have to treat our close friends or life partners better than strangers. Subjectivism about reasons of love is the view that every reason of love a person has is correctly explained by her desires. I formulate a version of subjectivism about reasons of love and defend it against three objections that have been made to this kind of view. Firstly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our focus when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism about those reasons. Secondly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our motivations when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism about those reasons. Thirdly, it has been argued that subjectivism about reasons of love has deeply counterintuitive implications about what our reasons of love are. I argue that none of these objections succeeds.
      PubDate: 2020-05-08
       
  • No need to get up from the armchair (if you’re interested in debunking
           arguments in metaethics)
    • Abstract: Abstract Several authors believe that metaethicists ought to leave their comfortable armchairs and engage with serious empirical research. This paper provides partial support for the opposing view, that metaethics is rightly conducted from the armchair. It does so by focusing on debunking arguments against robust moral realism. Specifically, the article discusses arguments based on the possibility that if robust realism is correct, then our beliefs are most likely insensitive to the relevant truths. These arguments seem at first glance to be dependent on empirical research to learn what our moral beliefs are sensitive to. It is argued, however, that this is not so. The paper then examines two thought experiments that have been thought to demonstrate that debunking arguments might depend on empirical details and argues that the conclusion is not supported.
      PubDate: 2020-05-07
       
  • Connie M. Ulrich & Christine Grady, Moral Distress in the Health
           Professions
    • PubDate: 2020-05-06
       
  • Sven Nyholm: Humans and Robots: Ethics, Agency, and Anthropomorphism
    • PubDate: 2020-04-20
       
  • Genetic Selective Abortion: Still a Matter of Choice
    • Abstract: Abstract Jeremy Williams has argued that if we are committed to a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex selective abortion. Here, I apply his reasoning to selective abortion based on other traits pregnant women may decide are undesirable. These include susceptibility to disease, level of intelligence, physical appearance, sexual orientation, religious belief and criminality—in fact any traits attributable to some degree to a genetic component. Firstly, I review Williams’ argument, which claims that if a woman is granted the right to abort based on fetal impairment, then by parity of reasoning she should also be granted the right to choose sex selective abortion. I show that these same considerations that entail the permissibility of sex selective abortion are also applicable to genetic selection abortion. I then examine the objections to sex selective abortion that Williams considers and rejects, and show that they also lack force against genetic selection abortion. Finally, I consider some additional objections that might be raised, and conclude that a liberal pro-choice stance on selective abortion for disability entails the permissibility of selective abortion for most genetic traits.
      PubDate: 2020-04-08
       
  • Rethinking the Foundations of Just War Theory
    • Abstract: Abstract Kai Draper’s War and Individual Rights: The Foundations of Just War Theory (2016) seeks to “give birth to an alternative approach” to traditional just war theory (pp. 2–3). This review seeks to analyse and evaluate this alternative approach. Draper’s approach to just war theory differs from other approaches in three ways. First, it is “highly individualistic.” Second, Draper’s approach avoids reliance upon the principle of double effect. Third, this approach is “largely rights-based”—it seeks “to understand the ethics of war mostly by way of understanding certain fundamental moral rights” (pp. 3). This review will argue that Draper succeeds in offering an alternative to traditional just war theory that is both rights-based and capable of dispensing with the needless complexities of the principle of double effect. However this review will argue that Draper falls short of his ultimate goal of refuting Rousseau’s claim that war is “a relationship between State and State, in which individuals are enemies only by accident” (1967, Social Contract, Book I, chapter IV).
      PubDate: 2020-03-29
       
  • Stefano Bartolini: The Political
    • PubDate: 2020-03-23
       
  • Learning from Failure: Shame and Emotion Regulation in Virtue as Skill
    • Abstract: Abstract On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your current limitations. A similar story applies to virtue acquisition, as moral failures will be a part of anyone’s life, and we will all have to learn from these experiences. However, despite the importance of being able to learn from our mistakes, this is very difficult in practice, given that failure of any kind can be distressing, and especially so for moral failure. The distress created by a recognition of moral failure often prompts responses of anger, avoidance, or defensiveness; rather than attempts to make amends and when necessary to work on self-improvement. The most potentially distressing response to moral failure is shame, as it is often associated with defensiveness. It is here where emotion regulation will be important to manage that distress, and I focus on the skill of emotion differentiation. I argue that emotion differentiation is a promising strategy for distinguishing the emotions we may experience in the wake of failure, including shame, and to encourage those emotions that motivate self-improvement. Thus, emotion regulation is important for virtue acquisition.
      PubDate: 2020-03-20
       
  • Objects or Others' Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of
           Testimonial Injustice
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper re-examines the debate between those who, with Miranda Fricker, diagnose the primary, non-contingent harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification and those who contend it is better thought of as a kind of epistemic othering. Defenders of the othering account of the primary harm have often argued for it by presenting cases of testimonial injustice in which the testifier’s epistemic agency is affirmed rather than denied, even while their credibility is unjustly impugned. In previous work, I have instead argued that such cases suggest that we need to enrich our conception of epistemic objectification in ways encouraged by Martha Nussbaum’s cluster analysis of objectification. Here I continue to make the case for this approach, and I consider the othering account in more detail. I focus in particular on Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.’s arguments for a version of the othering account in terms of the notion of derivatization, which turns on the idea that only such an account can enable us to properly understand the harms of testimonial injustice, in particular the ways in which it interferes with a subject’s epistemic agency and autonomy, and I’ll argue that such arguments should not sway us. Finally, I’ll further support my contention that it is illuminating and helpful to think of the primary harm of testimonial injustice in terms of epistemic objectification, though I will concede that the notion of epistemic othering may offer further helpful resources for understanding how subjects can be harmed by testimonial injustice.
      PubDate: 2020-03-14
       
  • Famine, Affluence, and Procreation: Peter Singer and Anti-Natalism Lite
    • Abstract: Abstract Peter Singer has argued that the affluent have very extensive duties to the world’s poor. His argument has some important implications for procreation, most of which have not yet been acknowledged. These implications are explicated in this paper. First, the rich should desist from procreation and instead divert to the poor those resources that would have been used to rear the children that would otherwise have been produced. Second, the poor (and possibly also the rich) should desist from procreation because doing so can prevent the very bad things that would otherwise have befallen the children they would have brought into existence. Third, the rich (and others) sometimes have a duty to prevent the poor from procreating. Fourth, the rich sometimes have a right to prevent the poor from reproducing. Although these implications may not amount to a categorical prohibition on all procreation, they do significantly restrict the permissibility of procreation. They are, in that sense, anti-natalist.
      PubDate: 2020-03-05
       
  • Assessing Recent Agent-Based Accounts of Right Action (and More)
    • Abstract: Abstract Agent-based virtue ethical theories must deal with the problem of right action: if an action is right just in case it expresses a virtuous motive, then how can an agent perform the right action but for the wrong reason, or from a vicious motive' Some recent agent-based accounts purport to answer this challenge and two other related problems. Here I assess these accounts and show them to be inadequate answers to the problem of right action (and one of the other problems for agent-basing). Overall, it is shown that the most recent and promising attempts at squaring agent-based virtue ethics with commonsense morality are flawed, and so, the case for agent-basing in general that much dimmer.
      PubDate: 2020-03-05
       
  • Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and “The Morality System”
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper explores one facet of Paul Russell’s unique “critical compatibilist” position on moral responsibility, which concerns his rejection of R. Jay Wallace’s “narrow construal” of moral responsibility as a concept tied exclusively to the Strawsonian reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. After explaining Russell’s critique of Wallace’s view, the paper considers a Wallace-inspired challenge based on the idea that questions of moral responsibility raise distinct issues of “fairness” that apply only to a narrow subset of the Strawsonian reactive attitudes. The paper offers a defense of Russell’s view against this challenge.
      PubDate: 2020-03-03
       
  • Mary Midgley: What is Philosophy For'
    • PubDate: 2020-02-26
       
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


Your IP address: 34.204.168.209
 
Home (Search)
API
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-