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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 611 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-A'raf : Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat     Open Access  
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 37)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 58)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 18)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 20)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 23)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Dinika : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dirosat : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access  
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Estética     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 47)
Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)     Open Access  
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 10)
European Journal of Islamic Finance     Open Access  
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 54)
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
Filozofia Chrześcijańska     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Grafía     Open Access  
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Review of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Hegel-Jahrbuch     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Heidegger Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
HOPOS : The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Horizons philosophiques     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Horyzonty Wychowania     Open Access  
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age     Open Access   (Followers: 6)

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Journal Cover Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
  [SJR: 0.525]   [H-I: 14]   [18 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1386-2820 - ISSN (Online) 1572-8447
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2355 journals]
  • Organized Crime and Preventive Justice
    • Authors: Tom Sorell
      Pages: 137 - 153
      Abstract: By comparison with the prevention of terrorism, the prevention of acts of organized crime might be thought easier to conceptualize precisely and less controversial to legislate against and police. This impression is correct up to a point, because it is possible to arrive at some general characteristics of organized crime, and because legislation against it is not obviously bedeviled by the risk of violating civil or political rights, as in the case of terrorism. But there is a significant residue of legal, moral and political difficulty: legislation against organized crime is hard to make effective; the harm of organized crime is not uniform, and so some preventive legislation seems too sweeping and potentially unjust. More fundamentally, the scale and rewards of organized crime are often dependent on mass public participation in markets for proscribed goods, which may point to a hidden public consensus in favour of some of what is criminalized. For all of these reasons, I argue that existing preventive policing and legislation against organized crime may be harder to justify than their counterparts in counter-terrorism, at least in the UK.
      PubDate: 2018-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9861-7
      Issue No: Vol. 21, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds
    • Authors: Andrés G. Garcia; Jakob Green Werkmäster
      Pages: 155 - 167
      Abstract: Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place is left largely unanswered. Here we explore the benefits of a positive interpretation which aims to address this oversight and make the framework more informative. This interpretation, which is inspired by the recent work of Schroeder (2007) and Sobel (2016), claims that the relevant sense in which value can be determined by attitudes is discovered by seeing how facts can be endowed with the normative property of being a reason. We argue that this interpretation significantly deepens our understanding of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism.
      PubDate: 2018-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9862-1
      Issue No: Vol. 21, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling'
    • Authors: Ewan Kingston; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
      Pages: 169 - 186
      Abstract: Our thesis is that there is no moral requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs) solely in order to enjoy oneself. Joyriding in a gas guzzler (joyguzzling) provides our paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from other more radical claims. We then review several different proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes to harm, has negative expected value, exceeds our fair share of global emissions, and undermines political duties. We show why none of these objections succeeds and conclude that no good reason has yet been proposed that shows why joyguzzling violates a moral requirement.
      PubDate: 2018-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1
      Issue No: Vol. 21, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Review David Sobel: From Valuing to Value
    • Authors: Tobias Gutmann
      Pages: 191 - 192
      PubDate: 2018-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9865-y
      Issue No: Vol. 21, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Allyn Fives and Keith Breen (eds.): Philosophy and Political Engagement.
           Reflection in the Public Sphere
    • Authors: Liam Farrell
      Pages: 193 - 195
      PubDate: 2018-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9868-8
      Issue No: Vol. 21, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Mark Alfano: Moral Psychology . An Introduction
    • Authors: Hanno Sauer
      PubDate: 2018-01-27
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9867-9
       
  • Relativism of Distance - a Step in the Naturalization of Meta-Ethics
    • Authors: Antonio Gaitán; Hugo Viciana
      Abstract: Bernard Williams proposed his relativism of distance based on the recognition “that others are at varying distances from us”. Recent work in moral psychology and experimental philosophy highlights the prevalence of folk relativism in relation to spatial and temporal distance. However, Williams’ relativism of distance as well as recent empirical findings which seem to support some of Williams’ main ideas on this issue have received scant attention. In this article, we would like to focus on the phenomenon of moral relativism regarding spatiotemporal distance as an entry point to the nature of folk moral relativism and the methodology of meta-ethics. To do so, we first introduce Williams’ relativism of distance. Then we compare Williams’ approach on this matter to recent experimental approaches on folk relativism. On this score the main result is that Williams’ proposal is consistent with several well-established insights on the experimental study of folk relativism. Williams’ relativism of distance is not only empirically plausible, but it is also of relevance for shaping the methodology of an empirically informed meta-ethics. We close this paper by stressing this methodological contribution.
      PubDate: 2018-01-22
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9864-z
       
  • Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski: Exemplarist Moral Theory
    • Authors: Sophia Vasalou
      PubDate: 2018-01-19
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9866-x
       
  • Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness
    • Authors: A. P. Duggan
      Abstract: It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. I argue that this alternative view offers all that the predominant blame-focused view offers, while also solving some puzzling features of moral responsibility. Specifically, it offers a compelling way to reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows those who do not understand what Darwall calls ‘second-personal’ reasons to be morally responsible for their immoral acts.
      PubDate: 2018-01-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9863-0
       
  • David Rönnegard: The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency
    • Authors: Wolfgang Malzkorn
      PubDate: 2018-01-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9848-4
       
  • What Pessimism about Moral Deference Means for Disagreement
    • Authors: James Fritz
      Abstract: Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others’ moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due to Alison Hills, uses pessimism about the former to argue for steadfastness about the latter. This paper reveals that this line of thinking, and others like it, are unsuccessful. There is no way to argue from a compelling version of pessimism about moral deference to the conclusion of steadfastness about moral disagreement. The most plausible versions of pessimism about moral deference have only very limited implications for moral disagreement.
      PubDate: 2018-01-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9860-8
       
  • The Good, the Bad, and the Uncertain: Intentional Action under Normative
           Uncertainty
    • Authors: Fabienne Peter
      Abstract: My focus in this paper is on a type of bad actions, namely actions that appear to be done for reasons that are not good reasons. I take such bad actions to be ubiquitous. But their ubiquity gives rise to a puzzle, especially if we assume that intentional actions are performed for what one believes or takes to be good reasons. The puzzle I aim to solve in this paper is: why do we seem to be getting it wrong so much of the time' I will argue that we can explain the ubiquity of bad action in light of the practical uncertainties that we face. My claim is not just that the more uncertainty we face as agents, the more likely we are to make a mistake about what counts as a good reason for action, although that is certainly one possible effect of practical uncertainty. My main claim is, rather, that practical uncertainty can have an impact on what counts as acting for a good reason for the agent.
      PubDate: 2017-12-04
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9852-8
       
  • The Guise of the Bad in Augustine’s Pear Theft
    • Authors: Hans Bernhard Schmid
      Abstract: In the second book of his Confessions, Augustine of Hippo presents his famous juvenile Pear Theft as an apparent case of acting under the guise of the bad. At least since Thomas Aquinas’ influential interpretation, scholars have usually taken Augustine’s detailed discussion of the case to be dispelling this “guise of the guise of the bad”, and to offer a solid “guise of the good”-explanation. This paper addresses an important challenge to this view: Augustine offers two different “guise of the good”-explanations in his text rather than just one, and the two explanations seem to be mutually exclusive. A number of more recent attempts to reconcile Augustine’s two lines of explanation are discussed and found wanting, and a new suggestion is made. The proposed solution focuses on the Pear Theft as a joint action, and it departs from the Aquinian interpretation in that it accounts for a way in which the “guise of the bad”-hypothesis survives the explanation.
      PubDate: 2017-12-02
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9854-6
       
  • Korsgaard’s Constitutivism and the Possibility of Bad Action
    • Authors: Herlinde Pauer-Studer
      Abstract: Neo-Kantian accounts which try to ground morality in the necessary requirements of agency face the problem of “bad action”. The most prominent example is Christine Korsgaard’s version of constitutivism that considers the categorical imperative to be indispensable for an agent’s self-constitution. In my paper I will argue that a constitutive account can solve the problem of bad action by applying the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules to the categorical imperative. The result is that an autonomous agent can violate the categorical imperative in so far as it amounts to a regulative rule of morality; however, an agent cannot call into question the categorical imperative as a constitutive rule of the practice of morality without losing her or his identity as a moral agent. The paper then compares this approach to bad action with the one Korsgaard provides and outlines also a new way of grounding the categorical imperative.
      PubDate: 2017-11-28
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9851-9
       
  • The Guise of the Guise of the Bad
    • Authors: Sergio Tenenbaum
      Abstract: It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good (GG). This paper identifies several distinct arguments in favour of the possibility that one can act under the guise of the bad. GG seems to face more serious difficulties when trying to answer three different, but related, arguments for the possibility of acting under the guise of the bad. The main strategies available to answer these objections end up either undermining the motivation for GG or failing to do full justice to the nature of perverse motivation. However, these difficulties turn out to be generated by focusing on a particular version of GG, what I call the “content version”. But we have independent reasons to prefer a different version of GG; namely, the “attitude version”. The attitude version allows for a much richer understanding of the possibility of acting on what we conceive to be bad. Drawing on an analogy with theoretical akrasia and theoretical perversion, I try to show how the attitude version can provide a compelling account of perverse actions.
      PubDate: 2017-11-28
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9855-5
       
  • Contractualism, Person-Affecting Wrongness and the Non-identity Problem
    • Authors: Corey Katz
      Abstract: A number of theorists have argued that Scanlon's contractualist theory both "gets around" and "solves" the non-identity problem. They argue that it gets around the problem because hypothetical deliberation on general moral principles excludes the considerations that lead to the problem. They argue that it solves the problem because violating a contractualist moral principle in one's treatment of another wrongs that particular other, grounding a person-affecting moral claim. In this paper, I agree with the first claim but note that all it shows is that the act is impersonally wrong. I then dispute the second claim. On Scanlon's contractualist view, one wrongs a particular other if one treats the other in a way that is unjustifiable to that other on reasons she could not reasonably reject. We should think of person-affecting wronging in terms of the reasons had by the actual agent and the actual person affected by the agent's action. In non-identity cases, interpersonal justifiability is therefore shaped both by the reason to reject the treatment provided by the bad suffered and the reason to affirm the treatment provided by the goods had as a result of existing. I argue it would be reasonable for the actual person to find the treatment justifiable, and so I conclude that Scanlon's contractualist metaethics does not provide a narrow person-affecting solution to the non-identity problem on its own terms. I conclude that the two claims represent a tension within Scanlon's contractualist theory itself.
      PubDate: 2017-11-27
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9857-3
       
  • Good, Evil, and the Necessity of an Act
    • Authors: Sebastian Rödl
      Abstract: Kant asserts that the formula of the schools “nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni” is undoubtedly certain when clearly expressed (KpV 177). Conversely, doubt reflects a failure clearly to express it. Once we comprehend the concepts of the formula, of the good (bonum) and of desire (appetitus), there is no doubting it. In recent times, the formula has fallen into doubt. If Kant is right, then this shows a lack of clarity with respect to the concepts the formula conjoins. I want to suggest that Kant is right: the formula of the schools is undoubtedly certain. I first explain in Kant’s own terms why there is no such thing as doubting the formula. Then I approach it from a different angle, provided by what I take to be the unclarity that affects current thought on the topic.
      PubDate: 2017-11-25
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9853-7
       
  • On Some Counter-Examples to the Guise of the Good-Thesis: Intelligibility
           without Desirability
    • Authors: Arto Laitinen
      Abstract: This paper argues that there are cases, which various guise of the good-theses concerning desires, intentions and actions would not allow. In these cases the agent acts for considerations that the agent does not regard as good reasons. The considerations render the actions intelligible but not desirable (where desirability and intelligibility can be objective or subjective). These cases are atypical, but nonetheless show that those guise of the good-theses which do not allow them, should be revised. In typical cases the intelligibility of desires, intentions and actions co-varies with their desirability: there are both unintelligible cases without suitable desirability characteristics and cases where desirability characteristics make the desire, intention and action intelligible. The claim here is that there are further more atypical and puzzling, but equally possible cases, where intelligibility and desirability come apart. The paper first introduces the Guise of the Good - debates about desires, intentions, and actions, and suggests distinguishing the category of “acting for a reason” from “acting for a consideration not taken to be a reason”. It then argues that while desirability entails intelligibility, and lack of intelligibility entails lack of desirability, these two cases leave conceptual room for a third category, which is that of intelligibility without desirability. This is so, whether we examine objective or subjective intelligibility and desirability. The claim is meant to apply mutatis mutandis to characteristics of desires, intentions and actions. The paper then provides possible cases of intelligibility without desirability, and defends the view against some objections.
      PubDate: 2017-11-23
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9850-x
       
  • Acting Under the Guise of the Bad – Editorial Introduction
    • Authors: Christoph Hanisch
      Abstract: I introduce the topic of the Special Issue and highlight the central themes that the six contributors address in their essays. The moral-philosophical problem of the possibility of bad action is situated within the broader context of its action-theoretical significance, that is, as the most important challenge to the influential idea that an intentional action is necessarily performed under the guise of the good. J. David Velleman’s discussion of the character of Milton’s Satan is mentioned to illustrate the Special Issue’s main question of whether instantiations of individual and collective agency are conceivable that deliberately act for the sake of the bad.
      PubDate: 2017-11-22
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9849-3
       
  • Iskra Fileva (ed.): Questions of Character
    • Authors: Emil Hallgren Christiansen
      PubDate: 2017-11-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9847-5
       
 
 
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