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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 673 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
al-Afkar : Journal For Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Albertus Magnus     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Alter : Revue de phénoménologie     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 36)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Análisis     Open Access  
Análisis : Revista de investigación filosófica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Angewandte Philosophie / Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anuario Filosófico     Full-text available via subscription  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Augustiniana     Full-text available via subscription  
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 58)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 22)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 41)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Cahiers Droit, Sciences & Technologies     Open Access  
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Cilicia Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Claridades : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 14)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 24)
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Creativity Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Diagonal : Zeitschrift der Universität Siegen     Hybrid Journal  
Dialectic : A scholarly journal of thought leadership, education and practice in the discipline of visual communication design     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dirosat : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Doxa : Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
En Líneas Generales     Open Access  
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Estética     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 50)
Ethics & Bioethics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Études phénoménologiques : Phenomenological Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 10)
European Journal of Islamic Finance     Open Access  
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 60)
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
Filozofia Chrześcijańska     Open Access  
Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  

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Journal Cover
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.402
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 21  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1386-2820 - ISSN (Online) 1572-8447
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2350 journals]
  • On Love’s Robustness
    • Authors: Benjamin Ferguson
      Abstract: Abstract Recently Philip Pettit (2015) has claimed that attachment, virtue, and respect are robust goods. Robust goods require not only the actual provision of certain associated ‘thin’ goods, but also the modally robust provision of these thin goods across a range of counterfactual situations. I focus my attention on Pettit’s account of the robust good of love, which, for Pettit, is the modally robust provision of care. I argue Pettit’s account provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for love. In place of Pettit’s account, I suggest an alternative account of love that distinguishes loving dispositions from loving actions.
      PubDate: 2018-09-22
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9929-z
       
  • Editorial
    • Authors: Benjamin Sachs
      PubDate: 2018-09-20
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9930-6
       
  • Kieran Setiya: Practical Knowledge
    • Authors: István Zoltán Zárdai
      PubDate: 2018-09-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9928-0
       
  • Cheshire Calhoun, Doing Valuable Time: The Present, the Future, and
           Meaningful Living
    • Authors: Clemens Emanuel Schlink
      PubDate: 2018-09-11
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9927-1
       
  • Moral Uncertainty for Deontologists
    • Authors: Christian Tarsney
      Abstract: Abstract Defenders of deontological constraints in normative ethics face a challenge: how should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain whether some course of action would violate a constraint' One common response to this challenge proposes a threshold principle on which it is subjectively permissible to act iff the agent’s credence that her action would be constraint-violating is below some threshold t. But the threshold approach seems arbitrary and unmotivated: where does the threshold come from, and why should it take any one value rather than another' Threshold views also seem to violate “ought” agglomeration, since a pair of actions each of which is below the threshold for acceptable moral risk can, in combination, exceed that threshold. In this paper, I argue that stochastic dominance reasoning can vindicate and lend rigor to the threshold approach: given characteristically deontological assumptions about the moral value of acts, it turns out that morally safe options will stochastically dominate morally risky alternatives when and only when the likelihood that the risky option violates a moral constraint is greater than some precisely definable threshold (in the simplest case, .5). The stochastic dominance approach also allows a principled, albeit intuitively imperfect, response to the agglomeration problem. Thus, I argue, deontologists are better equipped than many critics have supposed to address the problems of decision-making under uncertainty.
      PubDate: 2018-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9924-4
       
  • Punishment, Consent and Value
    • Authors: David Alm
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a person. I then argue that the “power” of consenting to punishability does not fit that model, and is better explained as reflecting the value of other people, whom the offender has wronged. Hence the power of consenting is not involved in typical cases of wrongdoing.
      PubDate: 2018-08-29
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9926-2
       
  • Deane-Peter Baker: Citizen Killings; Liberalism, State Policy and Moral
           Risk
    • Authors: Kevin Lacourse; Peter Stone
      PubDate: 2018-08-28
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9914-6
       
  • Justification Incorporated: a Discursive Approach to Corporate
           Responsibility
    • Authors: Eva Buddeberg; Achim Hecker
      Abstract: Abstract Contrasting two standard models of corporate responsibility—the so-called “collectivist” and “individualist” model—this essay proposes a third option, namely, a discursive conception of responsibility and examines whether and how this conception can be applied to the corporate level. It does so by taking a careful look at one of the preconditions of individual discursive responsibility, i.e. discursive practical reason, and discussing how corporate agents can meet this precondition. Building on this new concept, the essay also offers a novel approach to justifying corporate responsibility by referring to an argument advanced by Rainer Forst stating that a fundamental human right to justification is the normative core of any kind of responsibility and combining it, in a second step, with an argument recently proposed by Philip Pettit and Christian List showing the impossibility of forming consistent group attitudes and beliefs as a function of the attitudes and beliefs of individual group members. Finally, this essay outlines certain preliminary conclusions about the incorporation of responsibility in a corporate context.
      PubDate: 2018-08-28
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9921-7
       
  • Korsgaard’s Other Argument for Interpersonal Morality: the Argument from
           the Sufficiency of Agency
    • Authors: Sem de Maagt
      Abstract: Abstract Christine Korsgaard’s (1996, 2009) argument for the claim that one should not only value one’s own humanity but also the humanity of all other persons, ‘the publicity of reasons argument’, has been heavily criticized and I believe rightly so. However, both in an early paper (1986) and in her most recent work (forthcoming), Korsgaard does not rely on controversial, Wittgensteinian ideas regarding the publicity of reasons, but instead she uses a different argument to justify interpersonal morality, which I will refer to as ‘the argument from the sufficiency of agency’. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether the argument from the sufficiency of agency can succeed where the publicity of reasons argument fails. I will argue that although the argument from the sufficiency of agency is potentially more promising, it fails to justify a categorical and universal principle of interpersonal morality. I argue, however, that this failure has less to do with the argument from the sufficiency of agency itself and more with Korsgaard’s specific version of it. This leaves open the possibility that other Kantian constructivist arguments from the sufficiency of agency might be more successful.
      PubDate: 2018-08-25
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9925-3
       
  • The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion
    • Authors: Mona Simion
      Abstract: Abstract In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p.
      PubDate: 2018-08-24
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6
       
  • Book Review: Leigh Oakes and Yael Peled, Normative Language Policy:
           Ethics, Politics, Principles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)
           
    • Authors: Matteo Bonotti
      PubDate: 2018-08-20
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9920-8
       
  • Judgment Internalism: an Argument from Self-Knowledge
    • Authors: Jussi Suikkanen
      Abstract: Abstract One of the most important metaethical debates concerns the relationship between evaluative judgments and motivation. The so-called judgment internalists claim that there is an internal modal connection between our evaluative judgments and motivation, whereas the so-called externalists believe that evaluative judgments are connected to desires only through contingent external facts. This debate has reached a standoff. My aim is to introduce a completely new argument for internalism, which does not rely on our intuitions about individual cases. I argue that the truth of internalism explains best why the so-called transparency method yields self-knowledge of what we desire.
      PubDate: 2018-08-18
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9923-5
       
  • Compunction, Second-Personal Morality, and Moral Reasons
    • Authors: Dale E. Miller
      Abstract: Abstract In The Second-Person Standpoint and subsequent essays, Stephen Darwall develops an account of morality that is “second-personal” in virtue of holding that what we are morally obligated to do is what others can legitimately demand that we do, i.e., what they can hold us accountable for doing through moral reactive attitudes like blame. Similarly, what it would be wrong for us to do is what others can legitimately demand that we abstain from doing. As part of this account, Darwall argues for the proposition that we have a distinctive “second-personal reason” to fulfill all of our obligations and to avoid all wrong-actions, an “authority-regarding” reason that derives from the legitimate demands the “moral community” makes of us. I show that Darwall offers an insufficient case for this proposition. My criticism of this aspect of Darwall’s account turns in part on the fact that we have compunction-based or “compunctive” reasons to fulfill all of our obligations and to avoid all wrong actions, a type of reason that Darwall seemingly overlooks.
      PubDate: 2018-08-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9918-2
       
  • The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy
    • Authors: Benjamin Rossi
      Abstract: Abstract Hypocrisy is widely thought to be morally objectionable in a way that undermines the hypocrite’s moral standing to blame others. To wit, we seem to intuitively accept the “Nonhypocrisy Condition:” R has the standing to blame S for some violation of a moral norm N only if R’s blaming S is not hypocritical. This claim has been the subject of intensifying philosophical investigation in recent years. However, we can only understand why hypocrisy is morally objectionable and has an effect on standing to blame if we can correctly characterize hypocrisy itself. Unfortunately, some recent discussions fail to do this, which fatally undermines subsequent arguments concerning the effect of hypocrisy on the standing to blame. This paper’s central aim is to develop and defend a better account of hypocrisy. The hope is that with such an account in hand, we can explain and perhaps justify our moral aversion to hypocrisy in general as well as the Nonhypocrisy Condition in particular.
      PubDate: 2018-08-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9917-3
       
  • Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons'
    • Authors: Andrew T. Forcehimes; Luke Semrau
      Abstract: Abstract A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.
      PubDate: 2018-08-14
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1
       
  • Robust Individual Responsibility for Climate Harms
    • Authors: Gianfranco Pellegrino
      Abstract: Abstract According to some scholars, while sets of greenhouse gases emissions generate harms deriving from climate change, which can be mitigated through collective actions, individual emissions and mitigation activities seem to be causally insufficient to cause harms. If so, single individuals are neither responsible for climate harms, nor they have mitigation duties. If this view were true, there would be collective responsibility for climate harms without individual responsibility and collective mitigation duties without individual duties: this is puzzling. This paper explores a way to solve this puzzle. First, it will be argued that individual emissions, though not proper and full-fledged causes, causally contribute to raise the probability of climate harms. As a consequence, individuals are in fact responsible for their expected contributions to climate harms – this is contributive responsibility for likely outcomes. Second, it will be argued that people have responsibility also for the possible impacts of their individual emissions on climate harms. People can plausibly be regarded as individually responsible for the possible outcomes of their actions in close possible alternative worlds – this is robust responsibility. Non-causal individual responsibility for climate harms is plausible, and the puzzle may be solved.
      PubDate: 2018-08-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9915-5
       
  • Review of Brake E. and Ferguson L. (eds.): Philosophical Foundations of
           Children’s and Family Law
    • Authors: Christopher Cowley
      PubDate: 2018-08-06
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9916-4
       
  • Over-Determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities
    • Authors: Björn Petersson
      Abstract: Abstract A popular strategy for meeting over-determination and pre-emption challenges to the comparative counterfactual conception of harm is Derek Parfit’s suggestion, more recently defended by Neil Feit, that a plurality of events harms A if and only if that plurality is the smallest plurality of events such that, if none of them had occurred, A would have been better off. This analysis of ‘harm’ rests on a simple but natural mistake about the relevant counterfactual comparison. Pluralities fulfilling these conditions make no difference to the worse for anyone in the over-determination cases that prompted the need for revising the comparative conception of harm to begin with. We may choose to call them harmful anyway, but then we must abandon the idea that making a difference to the worse for someone is essential to harming. I argue that we should hold on to the difference-making criterion and give up the plural harm principle. I offer an explanation of why Parfit’s and Feit’s plural harm approach seems attractive. Finally, I argue that the consequences of giving up the plural harm principle and holding on to the simple comparative counterfactual analysis of harm are less radical than we may think, in relation to questions about wrongness and responsibility.
      PubDate: 2018-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9913-7
       
  • The Problem of Justified Harm: a Reply to Gardner
    • Authors: Jens Johansson; Olle Risberg
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we critically examine Molly Gardner’s favored solution to what she calls “the problem of justified harm.” We argue that Gardner’s view is false and that her arguments in support of it are unconvincing. Finally, we briefly suggest an alternative solution to the problem which avoids the difficulties that beset Gardner’s proposal.
      PubDate: 2018-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9912-8
       
  • Harm and Discrimination
    • Authors: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen
      Abstract: Abstract Many legal, social, and medical theorists and practitioners, as well as lay people, seem to be concerned with the harmfulness of discriminative practices. However, the philosophical literature on the moral wrongness of discrimination, with a few exceptions, does not focus on harm. In this paper, I examine, and improve, a recent account of wrongful discrimination, which divides into (1) a definition of group discrimination, and (2) a characterisation of its moral wrong-making feature in terms of harm. The resulting account analyses the wrongness of discrimination in terms of intrapersonal comparisons of the discriminatee’s actual, and relevantly counterfactual, well-being levels. I show that the account faces problems from counterfactuals, which can be traced back specifically to the orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, welfarist - concept of harm. I argue that non-counterfactual and non-comparative harm concepts face problems of their own, and don’t fit easily with our best understanding of discrimination; hence they are unsuitable to replace the orthodox concept here. I then propose a non-orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, hybrid (partly welfarist, partly non-welfarist) - concept of harm, which relies on counterfactual comparisons of ways of being treated (rather than well-being levels). I suggest how such a concept can help us handle the problems from counterfactuals, at least for my account of discrimination. I also show that there are similar proposals in other harm-related debates. An upshot of the paper is thus to corroborate the case for a non-orthodox, hybrid concept of harm, which seems better able to fulfil its functional roles in a variety of contexts.
      PubDate: 2018-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9908-4
       
 
 
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