for Journals by Title or ISSN
for Articles by Keywords
help

 A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

        1 2 3        [Sort by number of followers]   [Restore default list]

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 585 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-A'raf : Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat     Open Access  
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 35)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
At-Turats     Open Access  
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 55)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 22)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dinika : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access  
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Estética     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 45)
Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)     Open Access  
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 11)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 53)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription  
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
Filozofia Chrześcijańska     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Grafía     Open Access  
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Review of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Hegel-Jahrbuch     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Heidegger Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
HOPOS : The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Horizons philosophiques     Full-text available via subscription  
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Husserl Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Hypnos. Revista do Centro de Estudos da Antiguidade     Open Access  
IBDA' : Jurnal Kebudayaan Islam     Open Access  
Idealistic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Impact : The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain     Free   (Followers: 4)
Indonesian Journal of Islamic Literature and Muslim Society     Open Access  
Informal Logic     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Ingenium. Revista Electrónica de Pensamiento Moderno y Metodología en Historia de la Ideas     Open Access  
Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Intellèctus     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Interações : Cultura e Comunidade     Open Access  

        1 2 3        [Sort by number of followers]   [Restore default list]

Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.699]   [H-I: 24]   [18 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2353 journals]
  • Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism
    • Authors: Daniel Enrique Kalpokas
      Pages: 715 - 738
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection (only an accepted content can be a reason), that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9840-8
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated
    • Authors: Colin R. Caret
      Pages: 739 - 760
      Abstract: Abstract According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9841-7
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Boltzmannian Immortality
    • Authors: Christian Loew
      Pages: 761 - 776
      Abstract: Abstract Plausible assumptions from Cosmology and Statistical Mechanics entail that it is overwhelmingly likely that there will be exact duplicates of us in the distant future long after our deaths. Call such persons “Boltzmann duplicates,” after the great pioneer of Statistical Mechanics. In this paper, I argue that if survival of death is possible at all, then we almost surely will survive our deaths because there almost surely will be Boltzmann duplicates of us in the distant future that stand in appropriate relations to us to guarantee our survival.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9842-6
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • A Multiply Qualified Conditional Analysis of Disposition Ascription:
           Mapping the Conceptual Topography of Ceteris Paribus
    • Authors: Jesse R. Steinberg; Alan M. Steinberg
      Pages: 777 - 793
      Abstract: Abstract Given that an analysis of disposition ascription cannot be made in terms of a simple subjunctive conditional, we present a multiply qualified conditional analysis that places disposition ascription within an implicit fundamental causal conceptual typography within which a disposition ascription is embedded, framed, and understood. By placing the multiply qualified analysis within an implicit causal matrix involving a focal cause, pathway of influence, mechanism of action (via the intrinsic property responsible for the disposition), contributing/partial cause, mediator (i.e., transmitting agent), extrinsic moderator, (protective factor, inhibitory factor), intrinsic moderator, and manifestation (causal consequence), we show how this analysis evades counterexamples and arguments raised against the simple conditional analysis. We then indicate how the causal conceptual landscape provides a roadmap for unpacking and explicating parameters of the ceteris paribus qualifier to acquit the analysis of charges of being vacuous or irredeemably vague.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9843-5
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Time Scales and Levels of Organization
    • Authors: James DiFrisco
      Pages: 795 - 818
      Abstract: Abstract The concept of levels of organization, despite its widespread scientific currency, has recently been criticized by a number of philosophers of science. This paper diagnoses the main source of problems facing theories of levels. On this basis, the problems with the usual criteria for distinguishing levels are evaluated: compositional relations, organizational types, and spatial scales. Drawing on some work on hierarchies in ecology, I argue in favor of an alternative conception of levels defined by the criterion of rates or time scales of processes.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9844-4
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • An Argument for Shape Internalism
    • Authors: Jan Almäng
      Pages: 819 - 836
      Abstract: Abstract This paper is a defense of an internalist view of the perception of shapes. A basic assumption of the paper is that perceptual experiences have certain parts which account both for the phenomenal character associated with perceiving shapes—phenomenal shapes—and for the intentional content presenting shapes—intentional shapes. Internalism about perceptions of shapes is defined as the claim that phenomenal shapes determine the intentional shapes. Externalism is defined as the claim that perceptual experiences represent whatever shape the phenomenal shape reliably tracks. The argument against externalism proceeds in three steps. First, it is argued that phenomenal shapes are modality specific, such that a phenomenal shape that features in a visual perceptual experience cannot feature in a haptic perceptual experience, and vice versa. Second, it is argued that intentional shapes are amodal. Third, it is argued that externalism is incompatible with the fact that phenomenal shapes are modality specific and intentional shapes amodal.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9845-3
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of
           Central Philosophical and Practical Importance
    • Authors: Gregg D. Caruso; Stephen G. Morris
      Pages: 837 - 855
      Abstract: Abstract Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense (see, e.g., Pereboom in Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001; Pereboom in Free will, agency, and meaning in life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; Strawson in Freedom and belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986; Strawson in Philos Stud 75(1):5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144(1):45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom and others that the compatibilist’s burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist’s burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility—which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity—and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9846-2
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Counting on Strong Composition as Identity to Settle the Special
           Composition Question
    • Authors: Joshua Spencer
      Pages: 857 - 872
      Abstract: Abstract Strong Composition as Identity (SCAI) is the thesis that necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are non-distributively identical to y. Some have argued against this view as follows: if some many things are non-distributively identical to one thing, then what’s true of the many must be true of the one. But since the many are many in number whereas the one is not, the many cannot be identical to the one. Hence (SCAI) is mistaken. Although I am sympathetic to this objection, in this paper, I present two responses on behalf of the (SCAI) theorist. I also show that once the defender of (SCAI) accepts one of these two responses, that defender will be able to answer The Special Composition Question.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9847-1
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External
           Distinction
    • Authors: Sander Verhaegh
      Pages: 873 - 890
      Abstract: Abstract Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine’s own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine’s perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine’s position is much closer to Carnap’s than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9848-0
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Unjustified Defeaters
    • Authors: David Alexander
      Pages: 891 - 912
      Abstract: Abstract A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann (Justification without awareness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) and Pryor (Philos Issues 14:349–378, 2004). It then offers a revised version of Pryor’s account. On this proposal, an unjustified belief can be a defeater if it is rational, all things considered. If a belief is rational, all things considered, it can require one to abandon other beliefs with which it conflicts—even if it is unjustified. Finally, this paper shows that the proposed account of unjustified defeaters is one that can and should be embraced by leading accounts of justified belief as diverse as reliabilism and evidentialism.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9849-z
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Contextualism, Relativism and the Liar
    • Authors: Gil Sagi
      Pages: 913 - 928
      Abstract: Abstract Contextualist theories of truth appeal to context to solve the liar paradox: different stages of reasoning occur in different contexts, and so the contradiction is dispelled. The word ‘true’ is relativized by the contextualists to contexts of use. This paper shows that contextualist approaches to the liar are committed to a form of semantic relativism: that the truth value of some sentences depends on the context of assessment, as well as the context of use. In particular, it is shown how Simmons’s and Glanzberg’s contextualist approaches entail relativism. In both cases, the liar sentence gets different semantic evaluations as uttered in a fixed context of use but assessed from different contexts. Shift in context of use alone cannot provide the full explanation of the liar. These contextualist approaches, as originally presented, were thus mischaracterised and they should be re-evaluated according to their full implications.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9850-6
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions
    • Authors: Lorraine Juliano Keller
      Pages: 929 - 946
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions (hereafter, ‘NCP’) faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9851-5
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing'
    • Authors: Katherine Dormandy
      Abstract: Abstract Sometimes it is epistemically beneficial to form a belief on authority. When you do, what happens to other reasons you have for that belief' Linda Zagzebski’s total-preemption view says that these reasons are “preempted”: you still have them, but you do not use them to support your belief. I argue that this situation is problematic, because having reasons for a belief while not using them forfeits you doxastic justification. I present an alternative account of belief on authority, the proper-basing view, which enables the agent to base her belief on as many reasons as she has. A salient result is that the notion of a preemptive reason, useful though it may be in accounting for acting on authority, does not have any place in an account of believing on authority or in epistemology more generally.
      PubDate: 2017-07-19
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9913-3
       
  • The Reality of Field’s Epistemological Challenge to Platonism
    • Authors: David Liggins
      Abstract: Abstract In the introduction to his Realism, mathematics and modality (1989), and in earlier papers included in that collection, Hartry Field offered an epistemological challenge to platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. Justin Clarke-Doane (in: Fabrice Pataut (ed.) Truth, objects, infinity: New perspectives on the philosophy of Paul Benacerraf, 2016) argues that Field’s challenge is an illusion: it does not pose a genuine problem for platonism. My aim is to show that Clarke-Doane’s argument relies on a misunderstanding of Field’s challenge.
      PubDate: 2017-07-18
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9925-z
       
  • Neuropsychology and the Criminal Responsibility of Psychopaths:
           Reconsidering the Evidence
    • Authors: Marko Jurjako; Luca Malatesti
      Abstract: Abstract Recently it has been argued that certain neuropsychological findings on the decision-making, instrumental learning, and moral understanding in psychopathic offenders offer reasons to consider them not criminally responsible, due to certain epistemic and volitional impairments. We reply to this family of arguments, that collectively we call the irresponsibility of the psychopath argument (IPA for short). This type of argument has a premise that describes or prescribes the deficiencies that grant or should grant partial or complete criminal exculpation. The other premise contends that neuropsychological evidence shows that psychopaths have incapacitates that are sufficient to ascribe complete or partially exculpatory deficiencies. The focus of our criticism is this latter premise. We argue that it requires that psychopathy should correlate significantly with certain rational incapacities that manifest across contexts. We show that the available neuropsychological data do not support the claim that psychopaths have such general exculpatory incapacities.
      PubDate: 2017-07-13
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9924-0
       
  • Size and Function
    • Authors: Bruno Whittle
      Abstract: Abstract Are there different sizes of infinity' That is, are there infinite sets of different sizes' This is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the infinite. But it is of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results, such as Cantor’s theorem, to the effect that there are infinite sets without bijections (i.e. one-to-one correspondences) between them. These results (which I of course do not dispute) settle the question, given an almost universally accepted principle relating size to the existence of functions. The principle is: for any sets A and B, if A is the same size as B, then there is a bijection from A to B. The aim of the paper, however, is to argue that this question is in fact wide open: to argue that we are not in a position to know the answer, because we are not in one to know the principle. The aim, that is, is to argue that for all we know there is only one size of infinity.
      PubDate: 2017-07-12
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9917-z
       
  • Normal Causes for Normal Effects: Reinvigorating the Correspondence
           Hypothesis About Judgments of Actual Causation
    • Authors: Totte Harinen
      Abstract: Abstract There have been several recent attempts to model ordinary intuitions about actual causation by combining a counterfactual definition of the causal relation with an abnormality-based account of causal judgments. In these models, the underlying psychological theory is that people automatically focus on abnormal events when judging the actual causes of an effect. This approach has enabled authors such as Halpern and Hitchcock (Br J Philos Sci axt050, 2014) to capture an impressive array of ordinary causal intuitions. However, in this paper I demonstrate how these abnormality-based accounts still systematically fail to predict ordinary causal judgments in specific types of scenarios: those in which the effect is normal. I will argue that the reason for this is that the underlying psychological theory is wrong: the idea that intuitive actual causes are abnormal events is only partially correct. To model ordinary judgments more realistically, researchers working in this area must adopt a more plausible underlying psychological theory: the correspondence hypothesis about judgments of actual causation. One of the consequences of this correspondence hypothesis is that normal effects are judged to have normal causes.
      PubDate: 2017-07-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9876-4
       
  • Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics
    • Authors: H. Orri Stefánsson
      Abstract: Abstract It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’.
      PubDate: 2017-07-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9918-y
       
  • Disquotation and Infinite Conjunctions
    • Authors: Lavinia Picollo; Thomas Schindler
      Abstract: Abstract One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called ‘infinite conjunctions’. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational (transparent), which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with a truth predicate and argue that they fail to support the necessity of transparency for that purpose. Second, we show that, with the aid of some regimentation, many expressive functions of the truth predicate can actually be performed using truth principles that are consistent in classical logic. Finally, we suggest a reconceptualisation of deflationism, according to which the principles that govern the use of the truth predicate in natural language are largely irrelevant for the question of what formal theory of truth we should adopt. Many philosophers think that the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationists; we will argue, on the contrary, that deflationists are in a much better position to deal with the paradoxes than their opponents.
      PubDate: 2017-07-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9919-x
       
  • Hempel, Grue and the Logical Empiricist Baseline
    • Authors: Mathew Coakley
      Abstract: Abstract A logical empiricist “baseline statement” can formalize some propositions established by a body of evidence or set of observations. However, it may not necessarily capture, of two propositions it entails, whether all the subsets of the evidence that establish one proposition also establish the other, vice versa, or neither. Yet, according to this paper, which obtains should sometimes matter for confirmation. It illustrates by showing how this “evidential dependence” can be used to address problems with generalizations of grue-like predicates, and do so still within a very simple broadly Hempelian framework.
      PubDate: 2017-07-07
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9922-2
       
 
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
Fax: +00 44 (0)131 4513327
 
Home (Search)
Subjects A-Z
Publishers A-Z
Customise
APIs
Your IP address: 54.92.170.142
 
About JournalTOCs
API
Help
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-2016