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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 598 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-A'raf : Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat     Open Access  
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 35)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 57)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 22)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dinika : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dirosat : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access  
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Estética     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 46)
Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)     Open Access  
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 11)
European Journal of Islamic Finance     Open Access  
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy     Open Access  
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription  
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
Filozofia Chrześcijańska     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Grafía     Open Access  
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Review of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Hegel-Jahrbuch     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Heidegger Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
HOPOS : The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Horizons philosophiques     Full-text available via subscription  
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Husserl Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Hypnos. Revista do Centro de Estudos da Antiguidade     Open Access  
IBDA' : Jurnal Kebudayaan Islam     Open Access  
Idealistic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.699]   [H-I: 24]   [18 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2352 journals]
  • The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated
    • Authors: Colin R. Caret
      Pages: 739 - 760
      Abstract: Abstract According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9841-7
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Time Scales and Levels of Organization
    • Authors: James DiFrisco
      Pages: 795 - 818
      Abstract: Abstract The concept of levels of organization, despite its widespread scientific currency, has recently been criticized by a number of philosophers of science. This paper diagnoses the main source of problems facing theories of levels. On this basis, the problems with the usual criteria for distinguishing levels are evaluated: compositional relations, organizational types, and spatial scales. Drawing on some work on hierarchies in ecology, I argue in favor of an alternative conception of levels defined by the criterion of rates or time scales of processes.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9844-4
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of
           Central Philosophical and Practical Importance
    • Authors: Gregg D. Caruso; Stephen G. Morris
      Pages: 837 - 855
      Abstract: Abstract Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense (see, e.g., Pereboom in Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001; Pereboom in Free will, agency, and meaning in life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; Strawson in Freedom and belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986; Strawson in Philos Stud 75(1):5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144(1):45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom and others that the compatibilist’s burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist’s burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility—which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity—and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9846-2
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Counting on Strong Composition as Identity to Settle the Special
           Composition Question
    • Authors: Joshua Spencer
      Pages: 857 - 872
      Abstract: Abstract Strong Composition as Identity (SCAI) is the thesis that necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are non-distributively identical to y. Some have argued against this view as follows: if some many things are non-distributively identical to one thing, then what’s true of the many must be true of the one. But since the many are many in number whereas the one is not, the many cannot be identical to the one. Hence (SCAI) is mistaken. Although I am sympathetic to this objection, in this paper, I present two responses on behalf of the (SCAI) theorist. I also show that once the defender of (SCAI) accepts one of these two responses, that defender will be able to answer The Special Composition Question.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9847-1
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Unjustified Defeaters
    • Authors: David Alexander
      Pages: 891 - 912
      Abstract: Abstract A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann (Justification without awareness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) and Pryor (Philos Issues 14:349–378, 2004). It then offers a revised version of Pryor’s account. On this proposal, an unjustified belief can be a defeater if it is rational, all things considered. If a belief is rational, all things considered, it can require one to abandon other beliefs with which it conflicts—even if it is unjustified. Finally, this paper shows that the proposed account of unjustified defeaters is one that can and should be embraced by leading accounts of justified belief as diverse as reliabilism and evidentialism.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9849-z
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions
    • Authors: Lorraine Juliano Keller
      Pages: 929 - 946
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions (hereafter, ‘NCP’) faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9851-5
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Reconciling Contrastive and Non-contrastive Explanation
    • Authors: Victor Gijsbers
      Abstract: Abstract Two apparently mutually exclusive ideas about the relation between contrastive and non-contrastive explanations can be found in the literature. According to contrastivists, all explanation is contrastive explanation and the supposed existence of non-contrastive explanations can be revealed to be an illusion. According to non-contrastivists, on the other hand, contrastive explanation can be fully analysed in terms of non-contrastive explanation, and is thus not of fundamental importance. In the current article, I discuss the main arguments in favour of and against each of the two positions. This discussion leads to the idea that contrastive explanations are to be understood as parts of a bigger, more complete non-contrastive explanation; but that all actual explanations explain only a limited set of contrasts. I conclude that, once the relation between contrastive and non-contrastive explanations is understood correctly, there remains no substantial issue to divide contrastivism and non-contrastivism.
      PubDate: 2017-09-30
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9937-8
       
  • Balint’s Syndrome, Visual Motion Perception, and Awareness of Space
    • Authors: Bartek Chomanski
      Abstract: Abstract Kant, Wittgenstein, and Husserl all held that visual awareness of objects requires visual awareness of the space in which the objects are located. There is a lively debate in the literature on spatial perception whether this view is undermined by the results of experiments on a Balint’s syndrome patient, known as RM. I argue that neither of two recent interpretations of these results is able to explain RM’s apparent ability to experience motion. I outline some ways in which each interpretation may respond to this challenge, and suggest which way of meeting the challenge is preferable. I conclude that RM retains some awareness of the larger space surrounding the objects he sees.
      PubDate: 2017-09-27
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9940-0
       
  • Mathematical Explanations that are Not Proofs
    • Authors: Marc Lange
      Abstract: Abstract Explanation in mathematics has recently attracted increased attention from philosophers. The central issue is taken to be how to distinguish between two types of mathematical proofs: those that explain why what they prove is true and those that merely prove theorems without explaining why they are true. This way of framing the issue neglects the possibility of mathematical explanations that are not proofs at all. This paper addresses what it would take for a non-proof to explain. The paper focuses on a particular example of an explanatory non-proof: an argument that mathematicians regard as explaining why a given theorem holds regarding the derivative of an infinite sum of differentiable functions. The paper contrasts this explanatory non-proof with various non-explanatory proofs (and non-explanatory nonproofs) of the same theorem. The paper offers an account of what makes the given non-proof explanatory. This account is motivated by investigating the difficulties that arise when we try to extend Mark Steiner’s influential account of explanatory proofs to cover this explanatory non-proof.
      PubDate: 2017-09-25
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9941-z
       
  • Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming
    • Authors: Michael Otsuka
      Abstract: Abstract According to philosophers who ground your anticipation of future experiences in psychological continuity and connectedness, it is rational to anticipate the experiences of someone other than yourself, such as a self that is the product of fission or of replication. In this article, I concur that it is rational to anticipate the experiences of the product of fission while denying the rationality of anticipating the experiences of a replica. In defending my position, I offer the following explanation of why you have good reason to anticipate the experiences of your post-fission successor but not your replica: in the former case, you become (i.e., substantially change into) somebody else, whereas, in the latter case, you are merely replaced by somebody else.
      PubDate: 2017-09-22
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9938-7
       
  • Comments on Stephen Yablo’s Aboutness
    • Authors: Katharina Felka
      Abstract: Abstract This paper concerns Yablo’s theory of asserted content as it is developed in his new book Aboutness. Yablo’s central idea is that in order to specify the asserted content of a sentence, we have to subtract those parts of its full semantic content that concern irrelevant subject matters. The paper argues that it is doubtful whether Yablo’s account successfully deals with its most basic envisaged application: to account for a difference of apparent truth value in cases of ordinary presupposition failure. In addition, some doubts are raised concerning the success of the extension of Yablo’s account to fictional talk, the informativeness of identity statements, and ontological commitments of number talk.
      PubDate: 2017-09-19
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9935-x
       
  • The Sense and Reality of Personal Identity
    • Authors: Thomas Sattig
      Abstract: Abstract The vast majority of philosophers of personal identity since John Locke have been convinced that the persistence of persons is not grounded in bodily continuity. Why' As numerous ‘textbooks’ on personal identity attest, their conviction rests, to a large extent, on an objection to the bodily approach, which concerns episodic memory. The objection invites us to a thought experiment in which we meet a person who experientially remembers events from the past of a person with a different body. The nature of such first-personal memory-links is viewed as strongly suggesting that the rememberer is identical with the remembered, and hence, given the possibility of such a case, as suggesting that a person can transgress its bodily limits. The memory objection is as influential as it gets in the metaphysics of personal identity. Textbooks often portray it as the starting point of the contemporary debate about personal identity. And it has been widely perceived as a success. As everyone who has taught an introductory course on personal identity knows, the recognition of episodic-memory links in body-switching cases has the power to turn any group of novice students against bodily criteria of personal identity. In this essay, I shall specify and undermine the memory objection. I shall attempt to establish two theses. The first thesis (Sects. 1, 2) is that the memory objection is only viable if construed as resting on the view that episodic memory contains a sense of personal identity, which teaches us about the reality of personal identity. The second thesis (Sects. 3, 4) is that there is no such sense of personal identity, that episodic memory teaches us nothing at all about personal identity.
      PubDate: 2017-09-18
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9933-z
       
  • What is Wrong with Self-Grounding'
    • Authors: David Mark Kovacs
      Abstract: Abstract Many philosophers embrace grounding, supposedly a central notion of metaphysics. Grounding is widely assumed to be irreflexive, but recently a number of authors have questioned this assumption: according to them, it is at least possible that some facts ground themselves. The primary purpose of this paper is to problematize the notion of self-grounding through the theoretical roles usually assigned to grounding. The literature typically characterizes grounding as at least playing two central theoretical roles: a structuring role and an explanatory role. Once we carefully spell out what playing these roles includes, however, we find that any notion of grounding that isn’t irreflexive fails to play these roles when they are interpreted narrowly, and is redundant for playing them when they are interpreted more broadly. The upshot is that no useful notion of grounding can allow a fact to ground itself.
      PubDate: 2017-09-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9934-y
       
  • No Interpretation of Probability
    • Authors: Wolfgang Schwarz
      Abstract: Abstract I argue that none of the usual interpretations of probability provide an adequate interpretation of probabilistic theories in science. Assuming that the aim of such theories is to capture noisy relationships in the world, I suggest that we do not have to give them classical truth-conditional content at all: their probabilities can remain uninterpreted. Indirectly, this account turns out to explain what is right about the frequency interpretation, the best-systems interpretation, and the epistemic interpretation.
      PubDate: 2017-09-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9936-9
       
  • Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects
    • Authors: Graham Clay
      Abstract: Abstract There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell’s argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps between causes and effects. It is argued that whether one accepts or denies this condition, one is implicated in taking on substantial and wide-ranging philosophical positions. Therefore, it is not a trivial necessary condition of causal relations and it merits further inquiry.
      PubDate: 2017-09-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9939-6
       
  • Epistemic Modals and Alternative Possibilities
    • Authors: John Turri
      Abstract: Abstract Indicative judgments pertain to what is true. Epistemic modal judgments pertain to what must or might be true relative to a body of information. A standard view is that epistemic modals implicitly quantify over alternative possibilities, or ways things could turn out. On this view, a proposition must be true just in case it is true in all the possibilities consistent with the available information, and a proposition might be true just in case it is true in at least one possibility consistent with the available information. I report three experiments testing this view of epistemic modals. The results show that although modal judgments are sensitive to information about alternative possibilities, the standard quantification theory mischaracterizes the ordinary meaning of modals. I then report two more experiments testing the hypothesis that epistemic modals express willingness to attribute knowledge based on the available information. The results support this hypothesis. The results also show that the difference between “inside” and “outside” probabilistic information, familiar from the judgment and decision-making literature, affects epistemic modal judgments.
      PubDate: 2017-08-11
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9929-8
       
  • Explication, H-D Confirmation, and Simplicity
    • Authors: Lukáš Bielik
      Abstract: Abstract Explication usually plays the role of the method of language revision. The paper sticks to the Carnapian project of explication and develops some of the formal requirements imposed on the explicatum. However, it departs from Carnap’s view when it comes to how to construe the simplicity condition. It is suggested that in some cases the simplicity condition, which in the Carnapian project plays the derived role with respect to the other three conditions—the similarity, exactness, and fruitfulness conditions—may be substantive for the overall evaluation of explications. Based on a case study of three different explications of the H-D concept of confirmation (provided by Schurz in Erkenntnis 35(1-3):391–437, 1991; Erkenntnis 41:183–188, 1994; Gemes in Philos Sci 60(3):477–487, 1993; Erkenntnis 49(1):1–20, 1998; Sprenger in Philos Compass 6(7):497–508, 2011), we show that there are cases where competing explicata of a common explicandum satisfy the first three conditions equally well. In those cases, then, the simplicity condition is supposed to make the difference. However, instead of using Carnap’s construal of simplicity, we suggest a Principle of instrumental simplicity according to which, ceteris paribus, the simpler the explicatum is, the more likely is its ‘survival’ in competition with other explicata. Moreover, it is suggested that whereas the similarity, exactness and fruitfulness conditions are, in some sense, formal criteria, the simplicity condition is rather tested empirically.
      PubDate: 2017-08-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9930-2
       
  • Perspectival Tenses and Dynamic Tenses
    • Authors: Giuliano Torrengo
      Abstract: Abstract As far as our experience goes, we live in a dynamic present. Those two phenomenal features of experience—presentness and dynamism—are obviously connected. However, how they are connected is not obvious at all. In this paper, I criticise the view according to which the former can explain the latter, which I call sophisticated representationalism. My criticism will be based on an ambiguity in the notion of tense found in the philosophical literature, that between the perspectival understanding and the dynamic understanding of tenses. The distinction is not just of independent interest, but it has a role in providing indirect evidence for the claim that the feeling of passage of time should be understood in non-representationalist terms.
      PubDate: 2017-08-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9928-9
       
  • Constitution and Identity
    • Authors: John Biro
      Abstract: Abstract A widely held view has it that sometimes there is more than one thing in exactly the same place, as is the case, allegedly, with a clay statue. There is the statue, but there also is a piece of clay—both obviously in the same place yet distinct in virtue of their differing properties, if only modal ones. Those holding this view—pluralists—often describe the relation between such objects as one of constitution, with the piece of clay being said to constitute the statue. In the first part of this paper I consider ways in which the supposed relation of constitution may be understood. I conclude that the only coherent interpretation of ‘x constitutes y’ is one on which it is presupposed that x and y are identical. While this does not, by itself, show that pluralism is false, it is something that should make us suspicious of it. In the second part of the paper I propose a simple way with the temporal and modal facts the pluralist appeals to, showing that they do not force us into accepting his puzzling doctrine.
      PubDate: 2017-08-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9932-0
       
  • What Makes Evolution a Defeater'
    • Authors: Matt Lutz
      Abstract: Abstract Evolutionary Debunking Arguments purport to show that our moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge because these beliefs are “debunked” by the fact that our moral beliefs are, in some way, the product of evolutionary forces. But there is a substantial gap in this argument between its main evolutionary premise and the skeptical conclusion. What is it, exactly, about the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs that would create problems for realist views in metaethics' I argue that evolutionary debunking arguments are best understood as offering up defeaters for our moral beliefs. Moreover, the defeater in question is a paradigmatic instance of undercutting defeat. If anything is an undercutting defeater, then learning about the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs is a defeater for those beliefs.
      PubDate: 2017-08-07
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9931-1
       
 
 
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