for Journals by Title or ISSN
for Articles by Keywords
help

 A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

        1 2 3 4 | Last

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 350 journals)
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (2 followers)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (3 followers)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access  
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (1 follower)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (2 followers)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (19 followers)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (1 follower)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (12 followers)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access  
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (1 follower)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (1 follower)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (1 follower)
Ars Disputandi     Open Access   (1 follower)
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (2 followers)
Astérion     Open Access   (2 followers)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (77 followers)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription  
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (5 followers)
Between the Species     Open Access   (2 followers)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (5 followers)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (1 follower)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (7 followers)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (18 followers)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (16 followers)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (13 followers)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, The     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (12 followers)
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access  
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (9 followers)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de Clásicos y Modernos     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (4 followers)
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (8 followers)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (5 followers)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (5 followers)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (17 followers)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Full-text available via subscription  
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (14 followers)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (2 followers)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (2 followers)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (2 followers)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Diánoia     Open Access  
Dilemata     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (8 followers)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (2 followers)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription  
Eidos     Open Access   (1 follower)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (3 followers)
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (5 followers)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (7 followers)
Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (11 followers)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (4 followers)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (7 followers)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (21 followers)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Études de lettres     Open Access  
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access  
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (4 followers)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (98 followers)

        1 2 3 4 | Last

Erkenntnis    [13 followers]  Follow    
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
     ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
     Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2187 journals]   [SJR: 0.62]   [H-I: 14]
  • Bowtie Structures, Pathway Diagrams, and Topological Explanation
    • Abstract: Abstract While mechanistic explanation and, to a lesser extent, nomological explanation are well-explored topics in the philosophy of biology, topological explanation is not. Nor is the role of diagrams in topological explanations. These explanations do not appeal to the operation of mechanisms or laws, and extant accounts of the role of diagrams in biological science explain neither why scientists might prefer diagrammatic representations of topological information to sentential equivalents nor how such representations might facilitate important processes of explanatory reasoning unavailable to scientists who restrict themselves to sentential representations. Accordingly, relying upon a case study about immune system vulnerability to attacks on CD4+ T-cells, I argue that diagrams group together information in a way that avoids repetition in representing topological structure, facilitate identification of specific topological properties of those structures, and make available to controlled processing explanatorily salient counterfactual information about topological structures, all in ways that sentential counterparts of diagrams do not.
      PubDate: 2014-01-21
       
  • A Continuum-Valued Logic of Degrees of Probability
    • Abstract: Abstract Leibniz seems to have been the first to suggest a logical interpretation of probability, but there have always seemed formidable mathematical and interpretational barriers to implementing the idea. De Finetti revived it only, it seemed, to reject it in favour of a purely decision-theoretic approach. In this paper I argue that not only is it possible to view (Bayesian) probability as a continuum-valued logic, but that it has a very close formal kinship with classical propositional logic.
      PubDate: 2014-01-17
       
  • What’s Right with a Syntactic Approach to Theories and Models?
    • Abstract: Abstract Syntactic approaches in the philosophy of science, which are based on formalizations in predicate logic, are often considered in principle inferior to semantic approaches, which are based on formalizations with the help of structures. To compare the two kinds of approach, I identify some ambiguities in common semantic accounts and explicate the concept of a structure in a way that avoids hidden references to a specific vocabulary. From there, I argue that contrary to common opinion (i) unintended models do not pose a significant problem for syntactic approaches to scientific theories, (ii) syntactic approaches can be at least as language-independent as semantic ones, and (iii) in syntactic approaches, scientific theories can be as well connected to the world as in semantic ones. Based on these results, I argue that syntactic and semantic approaches fare equally well when it comes to (iv) ease of application, (v) accommodating the use of models in the sciences, and (vi) capturing the theory-observation relation.
      PubDate: 2014-01-17
       
  • A Constitutive Account of ‘Rationality Requires’
    • Abstract: Abstract The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree of subjective coherence.
      PubDate: 2014-01-16
       
  • Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of
           Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence
    • Abstract: Abstract If we think, as Ramsey did, that a degree of belief that P is a stronger or weaker tendency to act as if P, then it is clear that not only uncertainty, but also vagueness, gives rise to degrees of belief. If I like hot coffee and do not know whether the coffee is hot or cold, I will have some tendency to reach for a cup; if I like hot coffee and know that the coffee is borderline hot, I will have some tendency to reach for a cup. Suppose that we take degrees of belief arising from uncertainty to obey the laws of probability and that we model vagueness using degrees of truth. We then encounter a problem: it does not look as though degrees of belief arising from vagueness should obey the laws of probability. One response would be to countenance two different sorts of degrees of belief: degrees of belief arising from uncertainty, which obey the laws of probability; and degrees of belief arising from vagueness, which obey a different set of laws. I argue, however, that if a degree of belief that P is a stronger or weaker tendency to act as if P, then this option is not open. Instead, I propose an account of the behaviour of degrees of belief that integrates subjective probabilities and degrees of truth. On this account, degrees of belief are expectations of degrees of truth. The account explains why degrees of belief behave in accordance with the laws of probability in cases involving only uncertainty, while also allowing degrees of belief to behave differently in cases involving only vagueness, and in mixed cases involving both uncertainty and vagueness. Justifications of the account are given both via Dutch books and in terms of epistemic accuracy.
      PubDate: 2014-01-09
       
  • The Discrimination Argument: A Reply to Dierig
    • Abstract: Abstract Boghossian’s discrimination argument aims to show that content externalism undermines the privileged access thesis. Simon Dierig has recently proposed a new objection to Boghossian’s argument according to which having a “twater thought” is not an alternative, and a fortiori not a relevant alternative, to possessing a “water thought”. Dierig also considers, and criticizes, a modified version of the discrimination argument which would be immune to his objection. I shall argue, first, that he fails to advance a successful objection to the original version of the argument; and, second, that his criticism of the modified version is misconceived.
      PubDate: 2014-01-09
       
  • Scientific w-Explanation as Ampliative, Specialized Embedding: A
           Neo-Hempelian Account
    • Abstract: Abstract The goal of this paper is to present and defend an empiricist, neo-Hempelian account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding. The proposal aims to preserve what I take to be the core of Hempel’s empiricist account, by weakening it in some respects and strengthening it in others, introducing two new conditions that solve most of Hempel’s problems without abandoning his empiricist strictures. According to this proposal, to explain a phenomenon is to make it expectable by introducing new conceptual/ontological machinery and using special, and non-ad hoc, non-accidental regularities. The new conditions are elaborated making essential use of two central structuralist ideas, namely T-theoreticity and specialization. I first introduce and qualify the project, then present the new account in detail and assess it vis-à-vis its rivals, and finally discuss some possible objections, concluding that the account fares better than its monistic rivals and well enough to qualify as a promising neo-Hempelian account. Even for those unpersuaded by its monistic goals, it has the merit of calling attention to two new necessary conditions not explicitly emphasized thus far and showing how they serve to answer many of the criticisms addressed against Hempel’s account.
      PubDate: 2013-12-25
       
  • Scientific Processes and Social Processes
    • Abstract: Abstract We clarify the notions scientific process and social process with structuralist means. Three questions are formulated, and answered in the structuralistic, set-theoretic framework. What is a scientific process, and a process in science? What can be meant by a non-social process? In which sense a non-social process can be a part of a scientific process in social science? We are specifically interested in social processes. Our answers use the notion of the generalized subset relation applied to set-theoretical structures, and the set of structuralistically reconstructed empirical theories.
      PubDate: 2013-12-24
       
  • The Problem of Artificial Precision in Theories of Vagueness: A Note on
           the Rôle of Maximal Consistency
    • Abstract: Abstract The problem of artificial precision is a major objection to any theory of vagueness based on real numbers as degrees of truth. Suppose you are willing to admit that, under sufficiently specified circumstances, a predication of “is red” receives a unique, exact number from the real unit interval [0, 1]. You should then be committed to explain what is it that determines that value, settling for instance that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321. In this note I revisit the problem in the important case of Łukasiewicz infinite-valued propositional logic that brings to the foreground the rôle of maximally consistent theories. I argue that the problem of artificial precision, as commonly conceived of in the literature, actually conflates two distinct problems of a very different nature.
      PubDate: 2013-12-24
       
  • Structuralism and Quantitative Science Studies: Exploring First Links
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, the potentials of systematically linking philosophy of science with bibliometrics are investigated by exploring whether concepts developed within the structuralist theory of science can be used as interpretative basis for author co-citation studies. It is argued that clusters of co-cited authors cannot be interpreted straightforwardly as scientific communities nor as scientific generations. The first reason is that the respective constituents differ (authors vs. scientists), the second is that the co-citation relation generates non-Kuhnian communities, i.e. communities not sharing a paradigm/theory-core. Instead, co-citation clusters can more adequately be taken to represent communities of common (epistemic) interest. Hence, the concepts of interest community and of discourse community are introduced into the structuralist framework making use of the notion of intended application. All in all, it becomes clear that a full-fledged theory of publication is the still missing prerequisite for further linking bibliometrics and philosophy of science at a large scale.
      PubDate: 2013-12-19
       
  • Basic Concepts of Structuralism
    • Abstract: Abstract Primarily addressed to readers unfamiliar with the structuralist approach in philosophy of science, we introduce the basic concepts that the contributions to this special issue presuppose. By means of examples, we briefly review set-theoretic structures and predicates, the potential and actual models of an empirical theory, intended applications, as well as links and specializations that are applied, among others, in reconstructing the empirical claim associated with a theory element.
      PubDate: 2013-12-14
       
  • Carnapian Structuralism
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper aims to set forth Carnapian structuralism, i.e., a syntactic view of the structuralist approach which is deeply inspired by Carnap’s dual level conception of scientific theories. At its core is the axiomatisation of a metatheoretical concept AE(T) which characterises those extensions of an intended application that are admissible in the sense of being models of the theory-element T and that satisfy all links, constraints and specialisations. The union of axiom systems of AE(T) (where T is an element of the theory-net N) will allow us to present scientific theories in an axiomatic fashion so that deductive reasoning in science can be formalised. Thereupon defeasible and paraconsistent means of reasoning will be introduced. The logical study of scientific reasoning is the key motivation of Carnapian structuralism. A further motivation is to help overcome the syntactic-semantic split in the philosophy of science.
      PubDate: 2013-12-14
       
  • Empiricism and/or Instrumentalism?
    • Abstract: Abstract Elliott Sober is both an empiricist and an instrumentalist. His empiricism rests on a principle called actualism, whereas his instrumentalism violates this. This violation generates a tension in his work. We argue that Sober is committed to a conflicting methodological imperative because of this tension. Our argument illuminates the contemporary debate between realism and empiricism which is increasingly focused on the application of scientific inference to testing scientific theories. Sober’s position illustrates how the principle of actualism drives a wedge between two conceptions of scientific inference and at the same time brings to the surface a deep conflict between empiricism and instrumentalism.
      PubDate: 2013-12-13
       
  • Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability
    • Abstract: Abstract Although there has been a recent swell of interest in theories of truth that attempt solutions to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes affecting our concept of truth, many of these theories have been criticized for generating new paradoxes, called revenge paradoxes. The criticism is that the theories of truth in question are inadequate because they only work for languages lacking in the resources to generate revenge paradoxes. Theorists facing these objections offer a range of replies, and the matter seems now to be at a standoff. I aim, first, to bolster the revenge objections by considering a relation, internalizability, between languages and theories of truth. A theory of truth is internalizable for a language iff there is an extension of that language in which the theory is expressible and for which the theory provides an accurate and complete assignment of semantic values. There are good reasons to think that acceptable theories of truth are internalizable for any language. With this internalizability requirement in hand, I argue that properly formulated revenge objections are decisive and that the replies to them are inadequate. Second, I show that the internalizability requirement can be met by a certain theory of truth. The central claim of this theory is that truth is an inconsistent concept and should be replaced with a pair of consistent concepts that can then be used to provide a semantics for our truth predicates. This theory is compatible with classical logic, does not give rise to revenge paradoxes of any kind, and satisfies the internalizability requirement.
      PubDate: 2013-12-13
       
  • Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information?
    • Abstract: Abstract In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is that whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information that one has or lacks. My paper raises doubts about whether there is a non-circular way to distinguish important information from unimportant information. I argue that there is no way to distinguish important information from unimportant information without ultimately making reference to knowledge; thus, Foley’s new theory of knowledge does not achieve its goals.
      PubDate: 2013-12-13
       
  • Pereboom’s Robust Non-reductive Physicalism
    • Abstract: Abstract Derk Pereboom has recently elaborated a formulation of non-reductive physicalism in which supervenience does not play the central role and realization plays no role at all; he calls his formulation “robust non-reductive physicalism”. This paper argues that for several reasons robust non-reductive physicalism is inadequate as a formulation of physicalism: it can only rule out fundamental laws of physical-to-mental emergence by stipulating that there are no such laws; it fails to entail the supervenience of the mental on the physical; it appeals to two relations that are physicalistically unacceptable; and it rules out certain epistemically possible ways that the world might turn out to be according to current physics. This paper further argues that the difficulties faced by Pereboom’s robust non-reductive physicalism can all be avoided if physicalism is instead formulated by appeal to a carefully-defined relation of realization.
      PubDate: 2013-12-12
       
  • Seven Misconceptions About the Mereological Fallacy: A Compilation for the
           Perplexed
    • Abstract: Abstract If someone commits the mereological fallacy, then he ascribes psychological predicates to parts of an animal that apply only to the (behaving) animal as a whole. This incoherence is not strictly speaking a fallacy, i.e. an invalid argument, since it is not an argument but an illicit predication. However, it leads to invalid inferences and arguments, and so can loosely be called a fallacy. However, discussions of this particular illicit predication, the mereological fallacy, show that it is often misunderstood. Many misunderstandings concern the use of this illicit predication in the course of discussions of understanding the mind/body problem. Our aim here is to provide an accessible overview through discussing common misconceptions of the fallacy. We also discuss how conceptual investigations of the relation between living organisms and their parts fit within the framework of modern evolutionary theory, i.e. inclusive fitness theory.
      PubDate: 2013-12-11
       
  • Conditionalization and not Knowing that One Knows
    • Abstract: Abstract Bayesian Conditionalization is a widely used proposal for how to update one’s beliefs upon the receipt of new evidence. This is in part because of its attention to the totality of one’s evidence, which often includes facts about what one’s new evidence is and how one has come to have it. However, an increasingly popular position in epistemology holds that one may gain new evidence, construed as knowledge, without being in a position to know that one has gained this evidence. These are cases of KK-Failure, cases where one knows p but is not in a position to know that one knows p. This paper assumes that certain KK-Failures are possible and argues that Conditionalization goes wrong in those cases.
      PubDate: 2013-12-11
       
  • Perspectives on Structuralism
    • PubDate: 2013-12-07
       
  • Criteria of Theoreticity: Bridging Statement and Non-Statement View
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper I reconstruct and compare criteria of theoreticity that have been developed by Carnap, Sneed and proponents of the Munich school of structuralist philosophy of science. For this purpose I develop a unified framework in which one can transform model-theoretic theory representations into linguistic ones, and vice versa. This bridges the gap between statement and non-statement view and allows a precise comparison of linguistic and model-theoretic criteria of theoreticity. In the final part I suggest a system of improved definitions of theoreticity and pre-theoreticity.
      PubDate: 2013-12-07
       
 
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
Fax: +00 44 (0)131 4513327
 
About JournalTOCs
API
Help
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-2014