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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 382 journals)
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access  
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access  
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 26)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 196)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de Clásicos y Modernos     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Full-text available via subscription  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (Followers: 21)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Full-text available via subscription  
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 15)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Diánoia     Open Access  
Dilemata     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 22)
Éthique publique     Open Access  

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis     [SJR: 0.62]   [H-I: 14]
   [13 followers]  Follow    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2210 journals]
  • Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn
    • Abstract: Abstract In a paper in this journal, I (Erkenntnis 78:847–867, 2013) defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn (Erkenntnis 79:1355–1365, 2014) raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful.
      PubDate: 2015-01-28
       
  • On Knockdown Arguments
    • Abstract: Abstract Nathan Ballantyne (Erkenntnis 79, 2014) argues that the knockdown status of certain non-philosophical arguments can be transferred to arguments for substantive philosophical conclusions. Thus, if there are knockdown non-philosophical arguments, there are knockdown philosophical arguments. I show that Ballantyne’s argument is unsound, since arguments that are knockdown in non-philosophical contexts may become question-begging when used to argue for philosophical conclusions.
      PubDate: 2015-01-03
       
  • Genetic Models in Evolutionary Game Theory: The Evolution of Altruism
    • Abstract: Abstract While prior models of the evolution of altruism have assumed that organisms reproduce asexually, this paper presents a model of the evolution of altruism for sexually reproducing organisms using Hardy–Weinberg dynamics. In this model, the presence of reciprocal altruists allows the population to evolve to a stable polymorphic population where the majority of organisms are altruistic. Further, adding stochasticity leads to even larger numbers of altruists, while adding stochasticity to an analogous asexual model leads to more selfish organisms. The contrast between these outcomes demonstrates why it may be important to pay attention to the underlying genetics of a population.
      PubDate: 2015-01-01
       
  • Proper Names: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives
    • PubDate: 2014-12-30
       
  • The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited
    • Abstract: Abstract Duncan Pritchard has defended a version of epistemological disjunctivism which holds that in a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge, one knows that \(p\) in virtue of having the reflectively accessible reason that one sees that \(p\) . This view faces what is known as the basis problem: if seeing that \(p\) just is a way of knowing that \(p\) , then that one sees that \(p\) cannot constitute the rational basis in virtue of which one knows that \(p\) . To solve this problem, Pritchard has argued that seeing that \(p\) should be reduced to being in a good position to know that \(p\) rather than simply knowing that \(p\) . I argue that this proposal (a) can only be properly understood if the concept of knowledge is taken as primitive, and (b) is supported by an example that either fails to favor it over the alternative, or else backfires against the proposal itself. This leaves the new account of seeing that \(p\) unmotivated, thereby challenging the purported answer to the basis problem.
      PubDate: 2014-12-30
       
  • Obituary for Patrick Suppes
    • PubDate: 2014-12-30
       
  • Towards a Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper introduces a new approach to the theory of truthmaking. According to this approach, there are multiple forms of truthmaking. Here, I characterize and motivate a specific version of this approach, which I call a ‘Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking.’ It is suggested that truthmaking is a plural, variegated phenomenon wherein different kinds of truths, e.g., positive truths, negative truths, counterfactual truths, etc., are made true in different ways. While the paper only aims to lay the groundwork for a Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking, I show how the theory can be applied to positive and negative truths. The upshot of this application is that truthmaking pluralism allows us to provide negative truths with ‘non-suspicious’ truthmakers. Finally, it is argued that Truthmaker Maximalists would do well to endorse truthmaking pluralism, as it offers a new strategy for upholding Maximalism while diminishing controversial ontological commitments.
      PubDate: 2014-12-27
       
  • Logicism as Making Arithmetic Explicit
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper aims to shed light on the broader significance of Frege’s logicism (and hence the phenomenon of modern logic) against the background of discussing and comparing Wittgenstein’s ‘showing/saying’-distinction with Brandom’s idiom of logic as the enterprise of making the implicit rules of our linguistic practices (something we do) explicit (by something we say). The main thesis of this paper is that the problem of Frege’s logicism lies deeper than in its inconsistency (which has since turned out to be reparable, as the neologicists have shown): it lies in the basic idea that in arithmetic (and prospectively in language in general) one can, and should, express everything that is implicitly presupposed so that nothing is left unsaid. This, in fact, is the target of Wittgenstein’s critique. Rather than the Tractatus, with its claim that logicism attempts to say something that can only be shown (e.g. what ‘object’, ‘function’ or ‘number’ are), it is the Philosophical Investigations, with its argument by regress against the thesis that every rule which one can follow must be of an explicit nature, that is of real significance here.
      PubDate: 2014-12-23
       
  • Belief Retention: A Fregean Account
    • Abstract: Abstract Concerning cases involving temporal indexicals Kaplan has argued that Fregean thoughts cannot be the bearers of cognitive significance due to the alleged fact that one can think the same thought from one occasion to the next without realizing this—thus linking the issue of cognitive significance to that of belief retention. Kaplan comes up with his own version of the Fregean strategy for accounting for belief retention that does not face this kind of a problem; but he finds it deficient because it leads us to implausibly deny that one who is lost in time retains the beliefs one held before this occurred. I take issue with Kaplan though in conformity with his plausible demands about belief retention and argue that a situation does not arise in which one can fail to realize that one is thinking the same thought from one occasion to the next. I also argue that thoughts are the bearers of cognitive significance as well as explanatory of belief retention.
      PubDate: 2014-12-21
       
  • Heil’s Two-Category Ontology and Causation
    • Abstract: Abstract In his recent book, The Universe As We Find It, John Heil offers an updated account of his two-category (substance and property) ontology. One of his major goals is to avoid including relations in his basic ontology. While there can still be true claims positing relations, such as those of the form “x is taller than y” and “x causes y,” they will be true in virtue of substances and their monadic, non-relational properties. That is, Heil’s two-category ontology is deployed to provide non-relational truthmakers for relational truths. This paper challenges the success of Heil’s project with respect to causation. The arguments here are not entirely negative, however. An option is made available to Heil’s ontology so that it might, at least to some extent, regain non-relational causings.
      PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Social Construction, Mathematics, and the Collective Imposition of
           Function onto Reality
    • Abstract: Abstract Stereotypes of social construction suggest that the existence of social constructs is accidental and that such constructs have arbitrary and subjective features. In this paper, I explore a conception of social construction according to which it consists in the collective imposition of function onto reality and show that, according to this conception, these stereotypes are incorrect. In particular, I argue that the collective imposition of function onto reality is typically non-accidental and that the products of such imposition frequently have non-arbitrary and objective features. These conclusions are interesting in and of themselves since they debunk important aspects of our socially constructed conception of social construction. Yet, additionally, they have important implications for the viability of mathematical social constructivism since resistance to such constructivism is frequently grounded in the observation that mathematics is non-accidental, non-arbitrary, and objective. As a secondary focus, I explore these implications in this paper.
      PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars (Baker in Persons and bodies: a constitution view. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 22, 20; Lowe in Erkenntnis 65(1):5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent advocates of this view, Lynne Rudder Baker and E.J. Lowe, suggest that emergent particulars have physical properties in virtue of the relations they bear to physical particulars—they ‘inherit’ their physical properties. In Sect. 1, I argue that having a property F this way is not instantiating F. In Sect. 2, I raise concerns that if emergent particulars don’t instantiate physical properties, then facts about emergent particulars don’t explain intentional actions. I suggest that emergent dualism would be more attractive if it could avoid this apparent consequence. In Sect. 3, I propose a view according to which some instances of physical properties are instantiated by both an emergent particular and its body.
      PubDate: 2014-12-19
       
  • Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-existent
           Without Meinongian Metaphysics
    • Abstract: Abstract Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what our relationship as thinkers is to them. However, I argue this assumption only holds if you think your language, and in particular that aspect of it to do with referring to entities works in a specific way. This is the specific way generally assumed by the discipline called ‘Semantics’. I sketch out an alternative, call it global expressivism, in which talk of referring is given an expressivist, speech-act theoretic treatment. If we accept that our talk of the non-existent works as the global expressivist tells us it does, then the question of the metaphysical nature of non-existent entities is utterly void. You might say that Pegasus is empty of any metaphysical nature. Since the non-existent lacks any metaphysical nature, the metaphysics of the non-existent, Meinongianism, as a form of inquiry, lacks a subject matter, despite the fact that we talk happily, and indeed unavoidably, of the non-existent.
      PubDate: 2014-12-06
       
  • The Other Francis Bacon: On Non-BARE Proper Names
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper I provide novel arguments for the predicative approach to proper names, which claims that argument proper names are definite descriptions containing a naming predicate (the individual called X). I first argue that modified proper names, such as the incomparable Maria Callas or the other Francis Bacon cannot be handled on the hypothesis that argument proper names have no internal structure and uniformly denote entities. I then discuss cases like every Adolf, which would normally be interpreted as every individual named Adolf and show that the predicative approach to proper names can straightforwardly account for the distribution of a detectable naming component in proper names. Finally, I address the issue of proper names used as common nouns (such as a Rembrandt or the new Madonna) and plural proper names (e.g., the Beatles) and demonstrate that they do not form a homogenous group yet can be clearly distinguished on both syntactic and semantic grounds from proper names involving a detectable naming component.
      PubDate: 2014-12-06
       
  • CP-Law Statements as Vague, Self-Referential, Self-Locating, Statistical,
           and Perfectly in Order
    • Abstract: Abstract I propose understanding CP-law statements as statements that assert the existence of vague statistical laws, not by fully specifying the contents of those laws, but by picking them out via a description that is both self-referential and self-locating. I argue that this proposal validates many common assumptions about CP-laws and correctly classifies many examples of putative CP-laws. It does this while avoiding the most serious worries that motivate some philosophers to be skeptical of CP-laws, namely the worry that they lack non-trivial truth conditions and that it is impossible for empirical evidence to disconfirm them.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Thinking about Non-Universal Laws
    • Abstract: Abstract What are ceteris paribus (cp) laws? Which disciplines appeal to cp laws and which semantics, metaphysical underpinning, and epistemological dimensions do cp law statements have? Firstly, we give a short overview of the recent discussion on cp laws, which addresses these questions. Secondly, we suggest that given the rich and diverse literature on cp laws a broad conception of cp laws should be endorsed which takes into account the different ways in which laws can be non-universal (by being "non-strict", "inexact", "exception-ridden", "idealized" and so forth). Finally, we provide an overview of the special issue on that basis and describe the individual contributions to the special issue according to the issues they address: (a) the range of applications of cp laws as well as the (b) semantics, (c) metaphysics, and (d) epistemology pertaining to cp law statements.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception
    • Abstract: Abstract Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have alluded to this alternative before, but I provide a comprehensive account of the view, show how my account significantly differs from past claims, and offer a novel argument for the view. Finally, I show that my account puts us in a position to provide a new objection to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth
    • Abstract: Abstract A standard objection to the suggestion that the fundamental norm of assertion is the truth norm (i.e., one must not assert p unless p) is that this norm cannot explain why warrant requires knowledge-level evidence. In a recent paper, Whiting has defended the truth-first approach to the norms of assertion by appeal to a distinction between the warrant there is to assert and the warrant one has to assert. I shall argue that this latest defensive strategy is unsuccessful.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Charles R. Pigden (Ed.): Hume on Is and Ought
    • PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Radical Uncertainty: Beyond Probabilistic Models of Belief
    • PubDate: 2014-10-16
       
 
 
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