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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 573 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-A'raf : Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat     Open Access  
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access  
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 33)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
At-Turats     Open Access  
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription  
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 50)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 15)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 36)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 22)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Controvérsia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dinika : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Estética     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 43)
Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)     Open Access  
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health     Full-text available via subscription  
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 10)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription  
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Filosofia e Educação     Open Access  
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
Filozofia Chrześcijańska     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Review of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Hegel-Jahrbuch     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Heidegger Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
HOPOS : The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Horizons philosophiques     Full-text available via subscription  
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Husserl Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
HYBRIS, Revista de Filosofí­a     Open Access  
Hypnos. Revista do Centro de Estudos da Antiguidade     Open Access  
Idealistic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Impact : The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain     Free   (Followers: 4)
Informal Logic     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Ingenium. Revista Electrónica de Pensamiento Moderno y Metodología en Historia de la Ideas     Open Access  
Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Intellèctus     Open Access  
Interações : Cultura e Comunidade     Open Access  
Interespe. Interdisciplinaridade e Espiritualidade na Educação     Open Access  
International Corporate Responsibility Series     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.699]   [H-I: 24]   [17 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2335 journals]
  • Identity and Sortals (and Caesar)
    • Authors: Ansten Klev
      Pages: 1 - 16
      Abstract: Abstract According to the sortal conception of the universe of individuals every individual falls under a highest sortal, or category. It is argued here that on this conception the identity relation is defined between individuals a and b if and only if a and b fall under a common category. Identity must therefore be regarded as a relation of the form \(x=_{Z}y\) , with three arguments x, y, and Z, where Z ranges over categories, and where the range of x and y depends on the value of Z. An identity relation of this kind can be made good sense of in Martin-Löf’s type theory. But identity so construed requires a reformulation of Hume’s Principle that makes this principle unfit for explaining the sortal concept of cardinal number. The Neo-Logicist can therefore not appeal to the sortal conception in tackling the Julius Caesar problem, as proposed by Hale and Wright (The reason’s proper study. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 335–396, 2001b).
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9801-2
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Explanatory Asymmetries, Ground, and Ontological Dependence
    • Authors: Lina Jansson
      Pages: 17 - 44
      Abstract: Abstract The notions of ground and ontological dependence have made a prominent resurgence in much of contemporary metaphysics. However, objections have been raised. On the one hand, objections have been raised to the need for distinctively metaphysical notions of ground and ontological dependence. On the other, objections have been raised to the usefulness of adding ground and ontological dependence to the existing store of other metaphysical notions. Even the logical properties of ground and ontological dependence are under debate. In this article, I focus on how to account for the judgements of non-symmetry in several of the cases that motivate the introduction of notions like ground and ontological dependence. By focusing on the notion of explanation relative to a theory, I conclude that we do not need to postulate a distinctively asymmetric metaphysical notion in order to account for these judgements.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9802-1
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Necessary Connections in Context
    • Authors: Alex Kaiserman
      Pages: 45 - 64
      Abstract: Abstract This paper combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer’s semantics of modality. On the resulting view, causal claims quantify over restricted domains of possible worlds determined by two contextually determined parameters. I argue that this view can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of the way we use and evaluate causal language, including the difference between causing an effect and being a cause of it, the sensitivity of causal judgements to normative facts, and the semantics of causal disagreements.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9805-y
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • A New Semantics for Vagueness
    • Authors: Joshua D. K. Brown; James W. Garson
      Pages: 65 - 85
      Abstract: Abstract Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative semantics for classical proof theory. The key features of the account are: there is a single notion of truth—definite truth—and a single notion of validity; sentences can be true, false, or undetermined; all classical theorems and all classical inference rule are valid; the sorites argument is unsound; ‘definitely’ is treated as a meta-language predicate; higher-order vagueness is handled via semantic ascent.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9806-x
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Nonclassical Probability and Convex Hulls
    • Authors: Seamus Bradley
      Pages: 87 - 101
      Abstract: Abstract It is well known that the convex hull of the classical truth value functions contains all and only the probability functions. Work by Paris and Williams has shown that this also holds for various kinds of nonclassical logics too. This note summarises the formal details of this topic and extends the results slightly.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9807-9
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument
    • Authors: Yishai Cohen
      Pages: 121 - 140
      Abstract: Abstract According to the Dilemma Defense, it is question-begging against the incompatibilist defender of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) to assume that the agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) cannot do otherwise in light of causal determinism, but is nevertheless morally responsible. As a result, Fischer (Philos Rev 119:315–336, 2010; Analysis 73:489–496, 2013) attempts to undermine PAP in a different manner via a deterministic FSC. More specifically, Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent’s moral responsibility, it is not in virtue of its eliminating the agent’s alternative possibilities. I contend that, once we focus upon the distinction between entailment and explanation, the incompatibilist defender of PAP can successfully rebut Fischer’s argument. I argue for this claim while granting Fischer a number of assumptions that only render a defense of PAP more difficult. Additionally, I cast doubt upon Palmer’s (Synthese 191:3847–3864, 2014) critique of Fischer’s argument, which in turn renders my defense of PAP all the more critical.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9809-7
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Invariant Equivocation
    • Authors: Jürgen Landes; George Masterton
      Pages: 141 - 167
      Abstract: Abstract Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one’s evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agent-dependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one’s evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard to the probability function one should adopt as one’s belief function, Williamson advocates selecting the probability function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence while Masterton advocates selecting the expected probability function relative to the density function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence. In this paper we discuss the significant relative strengths of these two positions. In particular, Masterton’s original proposal is further developed and investigated to reveal its significant properties; including its equivalence to the centre of mass inference process and its ability to accommodate higher order evidence.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9810-1
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox
    • Authors: Gustavo Cevolani
      Pages: 169 - 183
      Abstract: Abstract The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude (or truthlikeness). More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of fallible belief, are briefly discussed in the final part of the paper.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9811-0
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • At It Again: Time-Travel and the At–At Account of Motion
    • Authors: Shieva Kleinschmidt
      Pages: 185 - 198
      Abstract: Abstract According to Russell’s At–At Account of Motion, necessarily, something moves if and only if it’s at one place at one time, and at a distinct place at a distinct time. This, many believe, is all that motion consists in. However, if it is possible for an entity to be at more than one place at more than one time (that is, to persist while multiply located), the At–At Account will entail that the entity is in motion even if, intuitively, the entity is simply at rest in two places at once. I will argue that these cases, if possible, give us reason to reject the At–At Account, and that if we endorse the At–At Account as an analysis, even the analytic possibility of the cases will be problematic. Further, we have reason to reject the stronger claim of Motion Supervenience, on which the facts about the motion of an individual within an interval are wholly determined by facts about the object’s location within that interval together with identity facts about regions and times.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9812-z
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Intrinsic Interferers and the Epistemology of Dispositions
    • Authors: Sungho Choi
      Pages: 199 - 232
      Abstract: Abstract It is held by some philosophers that it is possible that x has a disposition D but, if the stimulus condition obtains, it won’t manifest D because of an intrinsic interference. I will criticize this position on the ground that it has a deeply sceptical consequence, for instance, that, assuming that I am not well informed of the micro-properties of a metal coin, I do not know that it is not water-soluble. But I urge that this is beyond the pale, especially in light of the weight of the practical considerations we take when we use dispositional concepts in everyday life or science. In doing so, further, I will formulate a type of belief-forming inference and claim that it confers justification on commonsensical dispositional beliefs like the one that a metal coin isn’t water-soluble.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9813-y
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • The Problem of Phantom Functions
    • Authors: Sune Holm
      Pages: 233 - 241
      Abstract: Abstract This paper discusses a recent solution to the problem of artifact phantom functions by Beth Preston. A phantom function is a function associated with a kind of artifact that it is structurally incapable of performing. Preston proposes a criterion of artifact proper function according to which phantom functions can be proper functions. This paper argues that Preston’s criterion cannot ground the teleological and normative aspects definitive of proper functions and that the proposed criterion is not consistent with Preston’s account of how copies of novel prototypes acquire proper functions. The paper defends an understanding of phantom functions suggested in earlier work by Preston.
      PubDate: 2017-02-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9814-x
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Inherent Dignity, Contingent Dignity and Human Rights: Solving the Puzzle
           of the Protection of Dignity
    • Authors: Jan-Willem van der Rijt
      Abstract: Abstract Dignity is often invoked as the basis of human rights. The precise relation between dignity and human rights remains objectionably obscure, however, and many appeals to dignity seem little more than hand-waving, as critics have pointed out. This vagueness is potentially damning for contemporary human rights accounts, as it calls into question whether dignity can truly serve as the foundation of human rights. In order to defend the view that human rights are grounded in human dignity, this paper presents a novel analysis of dignity that elucidates how human rights can be derived from dignity. Arguing that neither contingent nor inherent conceptions of dignity can, on their own, account for human rights, it develops a conceptualisation of dignity that combines inherent and contingent features in a coherent fashion. This, in turn, is shown to provide us with the means to explain how human rights are both grounded in and protective of dignity. Showing that the inherent features of dignity always generate a claim to the contingent features of dignity, the paper demonstrates that human rights derive directly from the inherent features of dignity, whilst what they protect are the contingent features of dignity. The paper closes with a discussion of the advantages of conceptualising dignity in the manner proposed, explicating the connection between dignity and nobility.
      PubDate: 2017-02-11
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9877-3
       
  • How the Modalities Come into the World
    • Authors: Wolfgang Spohn
      Abstract: Abstract The modalities come into the world by being projections or objectivizations of our epistemic constitution. Thus this paper is a statement of Humean projectivism. In fact, it goes beyond Simon Blackburn’s version. It is also designed as a comprehensive counter-program to David Lewis’ program of Humean supervenience. In detail, the paper explains: (1) Already the basic fact that the world is a world of states of affairs is due to the nature of our epistemic states. (2) Objects (and properties and relations), which figure in states of affairs and which embody metaphysical modality, are constitutable by their essential properties and in fact constituted by us according to our ontological policies. (3) What the facts are, to which the correspondence notion of truth refers, is determined by applying an epistemic or pragmatic notion of truth to the world. (4) Causation is a specific objectivization of our conditional beliefs. (5) Nomicity is a ‘habit of belief’ (Ramsey), a specific way of generalizing epistemic attitudes. This covers the basic metaphysical and natural modalities. The paper attempts to convey that talking of projection or objectivization is not just imagery, but a constructively realizable program.
      PubDate: 2017-02-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9874-y
       
  • Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency
    • Authors: Martine Nida-Rümelin
      Abstract: Abstract Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences (of oneself as active) and of perceptual experiences (of others as active) and argue that these veridicality conditions (a) are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they (b) imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The main purpose of the paper is to show that the view proposed about active behavior leads to a natural compromise between libertarianism and compatibilism, which avoids the flaws of both positions while preserving their central insights.
      PubDate: 2017-02-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9872-0
       
  • The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference
    • Authors: Mark Pinder
      Abstract: Abstract In a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich have presented a powerful critique of so-called arguments from reference, arguments that assume that a particular theory of reference is correct in order to establish a substantive conclusion. The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions supposedly undermining the standard methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption that a theory of reference is correct is unjustified. I argue that the many extant responses to Machery et al.’s critique do little for the proponent of an argument from reference, as they do not show how to justify the problematic assumption. I then argue that it can in principle be justified by an appeal to Carnapian explication. I show how to apply the explication defence to arguments from reference given by Andreasen (for the biological reality of race) and by Churchland (against the existence of beliefs and desires).
      PubDate: 2017-02-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9868-9
       
  • Non-literal Lies
    • Authors: Emanuel Viebahn
      Abstract: Abstract Many recent definitions of lying are based on the notion of what is said. This paper argues that says-based definitions of lying cannot account for lies involving non-literal speech, such as metaphor, hyperbole, loose use or irony. It proposes that lies should instead be defined in terms of assertion, where what is asserted need not coincide with what is said. And it points to possible implications this outcome might have for the ethics of lying.
      PubDate: 2017-02-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9880-8
       
  • A Note on Morato on Modality and Explanation
    • Authors: Nathan Wildman
      Abstract: Abstract This brief note critically assesses the central arguments in Morato’s (Erkenntnis 79:327–349, 2014) recent contribution to the growing literature on Blackburn’s dilemma about necessity. In particular, I demonstrate that (i) neither of Morato’s two novel reconstructions of the dilemma’s contingency horn succeed, since both turn on false premises; and, (ii) Morato fails to adequately motivate his own response to these reconstructions. The upshot is that Morato has set himself a pair of flawed problems, then offered a flawed solution.
      PubDate: 2017-02-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9853-3
       
  • An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism
    • Authors: Kevin McCain
      Abstract: Abstract Phenomenal conservatism as developed by some philosophers faces a previously unnoticed problem. The problem stems from the fact that, as some develop the view, phenomenal conservatism holds that seemings alone justify—sensations have no justificatory impact. Given this, phenomenal conservatism faces a problem analogous to the isolation objection to coherentism. As foundationalists, supporters of phenomenal conservatism will want to allow that the isolation objection is effective against coherentism, and yet claim that a similar objection is not effective against their view. Unfortunately, it appears that on most understandings of the nature of seemings phenomenal conservatism can only avoid its version of the isolation objection by sacrificing its internalist character.
      PubDate: 2017-02-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9881-7
       
  • Minds Within Minds: An Infinite Descent of Mentality in a Physical World
    • Authors: Christopher Devlin Brown
      Abstract: Abstract Physicalism is frequently understood as the thesis that everything depends upon a fundamental physical level. This standard formulation of physicalism has a rarely noted and arguably unacceptable consequence—it makes physicalism come out false in worlds which have no fundamental level, for instance worlds containing things which can infinitely decompose into smaller and smaller parts. If physicalism is false, it should not be for this reason. Thus far, there is only one proposed solution to this problem, and it comes from the so-called via negativa account of physicalism. Via negativa physicalism identifies the physical with the non-mental, such that if everything in the world ultimately depends only on non-mental things, then physicalism is true. To deal with the possibility of worlds without a fundamental level, this account says that physicalism is false in worlds with either a fundamental mental level or an infinite descent of mental levels. Here I argue that there could be a world with an infinite descent of all-mental levels, yet in which physicalism might plausibly be true—thus contradicting the sufficient-for-false condition meant to save physicalism from the threat of infinitely decomposable worlds. This leaves the need for a new dependence-based account of physicalism.
      PubDate: 2017-02-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9878-2
       
  • Deontic Modals: Why Abandon the Default Approach
    • Authors: André Fuhrmann
      Abstract: Abstract John Horty has proposed an approach to reasoning with ought-propositions which stands in contrast to the standard modal approach to deontic logic. Horty’s approach is based on default theories as known from the framework of Default Logic. It is argued that the approach cannot be extended beyond the most simple kinds of default theories and that it fails in particular to account for conditional obligations. The most plausible ways of straightening out the defects of the approach conform to a simple theory of default reasoning in standard deontic language.
      PubDate: 2017-02-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9879-1
       
 
 
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