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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 521 journals)
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 31)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Análisis filosófico     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 56)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (Followers: 22)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 17)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access  
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)

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Journal Cover   Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.621]   [H-I: 16]   [14 followers]  Follow
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2276 journals]
  • Probability and Manipulation: Evolution and Simulation in Applied
           Population Genetics
    • Abstract: I define a concept of causal probability and apply it to questions about the role of probability in evolutionary processes. Causal probability is defined in terms of manipulation of patterns in empirical outcomes by manipulating properties that realize objective probabilities. The concept of causal probability allows us see how probabilities characterized by different interpretations of probability can share a similar causal character, and does so in such way as to allow new inferences about relationships between probabilities realized in different chance setups. I clarify relations between probabilities and properties defined in terms of them, and argue that certain widespread uses of computer simulations in evolutionary biology show that many probabilities relevant to evolutionary outcomes are causal probabilities. This supports the claim that higher-level properties such as biological fitness and processes such as natural selection are causal properties and processes, contrary to what some authors have argued.
      PubDate: 2015-11-23
  • Are Newtonian Gravitation and Geometrized Newtonian Gravitation
           Theoretically Equivalent?
    • Abstract: I argue that a criterion of theoretical equivalence due to Glymour (Noûs 11(3):227–251, 1977) does not capture an important sense in which two theories may be equivalent. I then motivate and state an alternative criterion that does capture the sense of equivalence I have in mind. The principal claim of the paper is that relative to this second criterion, the answer to the question posed in the title is “yes”, at least on one natural understanding of Newtonian gravitation.
      PubDate: 2015-11-16
  • How are Models and Explanations Related?
    • Abstract: Within the modeling literature, there is often an implicit assumption about the relationship between a given model and a scientific explanation. The goal of this article is to provide a unified framework with which to analyze the myriad relationships between a model and an explanation. Our framework distinguishes two fundamental kinds of relationships. The first is metaphysical, where the model is identified as an explanation or as a partial explanation. The second is epistemological, where the model produces understanding that is related to the explanation of interest. Our analysis reveals that the epistemological relationships are not always dependent on the metaphysical relationships, contrary to what has been assumed by many philosophers of science. Moreover, we identify several importantly different ways that scientific models instantiate these relationships. We argue that our framework provides novel insights concerning the nature of models, explanation, idealization, and understanding.
      PubDate: 2015-11-16
  • Safety, Closure, and the Flow of Information
    • Abstract: In his earlier writings, Fred Dretske proposed an anti-skeptical strategy that is based on a rejection of the view that knowledge is closed under known entailment. This strategy is seemingly congenial with a sensitivity condition for knowledge, which is often associated with Dretske’s epistemology. However, it is not obvious how Dretske’s early account meshes with the information-theoretic view developed in Knowledge and the Flow of Information. One aim of this paper is to elucidate the connections between these accounts. First I argue that, contrary to an objection raised by Christoph Jäger, the information-theoretic account is compatible with Dretske’s anti-skeptical strategy based on the rejection of closure. This strategy invokes the notion of channel conditions, which are roughly speaking those conditions that are necessary and jointly sufficient for a signal to carry information. I propose an interpretation of the account that is based on the idea that a signal’s carrying information requires that the channel conditions are stable. It is shown that the resulting account incorporates both a sensitivity condition and a safety condition for knowledge. Finally, I demonstrate how this proposal allows for knowledge of modally robust propositions without making its acquisition too easy, as simple safety accounts do. I end with a suggestion concerning the direction that future research should take, based on the fact that in its present form the information-theoretic account does not capture inferential knowledge.
      PubDate: 2015-11-14
  • Inverted Earth Revisited
    • Abstract: By considering another version of the Inverted Earth thought experiment in which the protagonist is informed that she is implanted with inverting lenses behind her eyes, I argue that the thought experiment doesn’t successfully pose a challenge to representationalism because after many years, the protagonist’s visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth would simply represent it as blue.
      PubDate: 2015-11-14
  • Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes
    • Abstract: In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses (at least those who do not simply deny the metaphysical import of empirical data and their proposed interpretation) claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence.
      PubDate: 2015-11-14
  • Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration
    • Abstract: The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel’s claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties. If this is true, then the concepts we possess change the way things appear to us. The second candidate for cognitive penetration is Fiona Macpherson’s claim that, in addition to concepts, our beliefs can penetrate perceptual experiences. It is argued that neither candidate is a case of cognitive penetration. In doing so, I provide an explanation to both that is based on perceptual learning, a non-cognitive phenomenon where relatively slow and long-lasting modifications to an organism’s perceptual system bring about changes in perception. This explanation is theoretically more plausible and remains closer to the empirical data than the explanations based on cognitive penetration.
      PubDate: 2015-11-14
  • Causal Exclusion and Downward Counterfactuals
    • Abstract: One of the main line of responses to the infamous causal exclusion problem has been based on the counterfactual account of causation. However, arguments have begun to surface to the effect that the counterfactual theory is in fact ill-equipped to solve the exclusion problem due to its commitment to downward causation. This argumentation is here critically analysed. An analysis of counterfactual dependence is presented and it is shown that if the semantics of counterfactuals is taken into account carefully enough, the counterfactual notion of causation does not need to be committed to downward causation. However, it is a further question whether this is eventually enough to solve the exclusion problem for the analysis shows how the problem itself can take various different forms.
      PubDate: 2015-10-27
  • Design Explanation and Idealization
    • Abstract: In this paper we assess the explanatory role of idealizations in ‘design explanations’, a type of functional explanation used in biology. In design explanations, idealizations highlight which factors make a difference to phenomena to be explained: hypothetical, idealized, organisms are invoked to make salient which traits of extant organisms make a difference to organismal fitness. This result negates the view that idealizations serve only pragmatic benefits, and complements the view that idealizations highlight factors that do not make a difference. This analysis in particular strengthens the perspective that idealizations are means to highlight difference making factors, and identifies a novel, more direct role for idealizations in doing so. It thus offers a novel argument why in some explanatory contexts idealizations are in-eliminable.
      PubDate: 2015-10-26
  • Unified Grounding
    • Abstract: This paper offers a unification and systematization of the grounding approaches to truth, denotation, classes and abstraction. Its main innovation is a method for “kleenifying” bivalent semantics so as to ensure that the trivalent semantics used for various linguistic elements are perfectly analogous to the semantics used by Kripke, rather than relying on intuition to achieve similarity. The focus is on generalizing strong Kleene semantics, but one section is devoted to supervaluation, and the unification method also extends to weak Kleene semantics.
      PubDate: 2015-10-20
  • Reply to Kim’s “Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty”
    • Abstract: I begin by discussing a conundrum that arises when Bayesian models attempt to assess the relevance of one claim to another. I then explain how my formal modeling framework (the “Certainty Loss Framework”) manages this conundrum. Finally, I apply my modeling methodology to respond to Namjoong Kim’s objection to my framework.
      PubDate: 2015-10-10
  • The Paradox of Exploitation
    • Abstract: The concept of exploitation brings many of our ordinary moral intuitions into conflict. Exploitation—or to use the commonly accepted ordinary language definition, taking unfair advantage—is often thought to be morally impermissible. In order to be permissible, transactions must not be unfair. The claim that engaging in mutually beneficial transactions is morally better than not transacting is also quite compelling. However, when combined with the claim that morally permissible transactions are better than impermissible transactions, these three imply the counterintuitive claim that it is obligatory to engage in mutually beneficial transactions. In this paper I outline the conditions that comprise this ‘paradox of exploitation’ along with a solution that involves replacing one of the original conditions with a condition I call Weak Non-worseness. The solution captures the priority of our concerns about exploitation by making a concern for the fairness of a transaction subsidiary to a concern for the welfare of the would-be exploited.
      PubDate: 2015-10-08
  • Was There an Ice Cube There or Am I Just Remembering It?: Does the
           Reversibility Argument Really Imply Scepticism About Records?
    • Abstract: It is commonly thought that the statistical mechanical reversibility objection implies that our putative records of the past are more likely to have arisen as spontaneous fluctuations from equilibrium states than through causal processes that correctly indicate past states of affairs. Hence, so the story goes, without some further assumption that solves the reversibility objection, such as the past hypothesis, all our beliefs about the past would almost surely be false. This claim is disputed and it is argued that at least some of our records of the past can and should be thought to be veridical because the intentional contents of records are not included as part of their statistical mechanical description. The fact that the present state of the world around us coheres so well with the way we would expect it to be if our records were veridical provides good evidence for the claim that they are produced via a common causal structure.
      PubDate: 2015-10-05
  • A Situationalist Solution to the Ship of Theseus Puzzle
    • Abstract: This paper outlines a novel solution to the Ship of Theseus puzzle. The solution relies on situations, a philosophical tool used in natural language semantics among other places. The core idea is that what is true is always relative to the situation under consideration. I begin by outlining the problem before briefly introducing situations. I then present the solution: in smaller situations (containing only one of the candidate ships for identity with Theseus’s ship) the candidate is identical to Theseus’s ship. But in larger situations containing both candidates these identities are neither true nor false. Finally, I discuss some worries for the view that arise from the nature of identity, and suggest responses. It is concluded that the solution, and the theory that underpins it, are worth further investigation.
      PubDate: 2015-10-03
  • Curie’s Hazard: From Electromagnetism to Symmetry Violation
    • Abstract: Pierre Curie claimed that a symmetry of a cause must be found in the produced effects. This paper shows why this principle works in Curie’s example of the electrostatics of central fields, but fails in many others. The failure of Curie’s claim is then shown to be of special empirical interest, in that this failure underpins the experimental discovery of parity violation and of CP violation in the twentieth century.
      PubDate: 2015-10-03
  • On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs
    • Abstract: According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri (Philos Phenomenol Res 80:312–326, 2010a) argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common epistemological positions that afford one propositional justification in the absence of an ability to acquire doxastic justification (e.g., common forms of evidentialism, conservatism, and closure principles). In what follows I show Turri’s novel position to be problematic and go on to suggest a more modest revision to orthodoxy. The first section presents the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification and Turri’s counterexample to it. The second section introduces Turri’s novel view of that relationship and draws out some of its epistemological implications. The third section gives counterexamples to Turri’s proposal. The fourth section defends a modest revision to orthodoxy.
      PubDate: 2015-10-01
  • The Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Two Puzzles Resolved
    • Abstract: In a recent paper in this journal (forthcoming), Carter and Peterson raise two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for anyone aspiring to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle trades on an application of epistemic contextualism to the precautionary principle; the second puzzle concerns the compatibility of the precautionary principle with the de minimis rule. In this note, I argue that neither puzzle should worry defenders of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle can be shown to be an instance of the familiar but conceptually harmless challenge of adjudicating between relevant interests to reach assessments of threats when applying the precautionary principle. The second puzzle can be shown to rely on a subtle but crucial misrepresentation of the relevant probabilities at play when applying the precautionary principle.
      PubDate: 2015-10-01
  • A Regress Objection to Thagard’s Theory of Deductive Coherence
    • Abstract: Paul Thagard’s theory of deductive coherence, as set out in his Coherence in Thought and Action, faces a regress objection. Thagard’s method of solving deductive coherence problems presupposes some notion of logical consequence. The problem of specifying which logic to use to this end is itself a deductive coherence problem, so we would expect Thagard’s theory to be able to solve it. However, on pain of regress, the theory of deductive coherence cannot reach such a solution.
      PubDate: 2015-10-01
  • Presentism and Einstein’s Train of Thought: Reply to Brogaard and
    • Abstract: It has been widely held that presentism cannot easily accommodate Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (SR) account of the relativity of simultaneity because presentism privileges successively unique times ontologically. Recently Brogaard and Marlow (Analysis 73:635–642, 2013) argued that presentism does not deserve the attribution of this defect because it may well be that Einstein’s account of the relativity of simultaneity is defective, leaving it open to establishing a view of absolutist simultaneity friendlier to presentism. Specifically Brogaard and Marlow present an argument against one of Einstein’s most famous accounts of the relativity of simultaneity, and moreover raise doubts about whether Einstein availed himself of absolutist frames in some of his explanations of relativity. I will dismiss both of these charges, and thus argue that the complaint against presentism from SR stands.
      PubDate: 2015-10-01
  • Heil’s Two-Category Ontology and Causation
    • Abstract: In his recent book, The Universe As We Find It, John Heil offers an updated account of his two-category (substance and property) ontology. One of his major goals is to avoid including relations in his basic ontology. While there can still be true claims positing relations, such as those of the form “x is taller than y” and “x causes y,” they will be true in virtue of substances and their monadic, non-relational properties. That is, Heil’s two-category ontology is deployed to provide non-relational truthmakers for relational truths. This paper challenges the success of Heil’s project with respect to causation. The arguments here are not entirely negative, however. An option is made available to Heil’s ontology so that it might, at least to some extent, regain non-relational causings.
      PubDate: 2015-10-01
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