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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 551 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 32)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription  
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 14)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Colombia Forense     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 22)
Controvérsia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Estética     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 40)
Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)     Open Access  
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health     Full-text available via subscription  
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 10)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 50)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription  
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Filosofia e Educação     Open Access  
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
Filozofia Chrześcijańska     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Review of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Hegel-Jahrbuch     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Heidegger Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
HOPOS : The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Horizons philosophiques     Full-text available via subscription  
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Husserl Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
HYBRIS, Revista de Filosofí­a     Open Access  
Hypnos. Revista do Centro de Estudos da Antiguidade     Open Access  
Idealistic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Impact : The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain     Free   (Followers: 4)
Informal Logic     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Ingenium. Revista Electrónica de Pensamiento Moderno y Metodología en Historia de la Ideas     Open Access  
Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Intellèctus     Open Access  
Interações : Cultura e Comunidade     Open Access  
Interespe. Interdisciplinaridade e Espiritualidade na Educação     Open Access  
International Corporate Responsibility Series     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 46)
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Journal for Transformative Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Applied Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Engineering, Social Justice, and Peace     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of Philosophical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Philosophy Study     Open Access   (Followers: 5)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.699]   [H-I: 24]   [17 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2336 journals]
  • Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration
    • Authors: Valtteri Arstila
      Pages: 1151 - 1172
      Abstract: The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel’s claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties. If this is true, then the concepts we possess change the way things appear to us. The second candidate for cognitive penetration is Fiona Macpherson’s claim that, in addition to concepts, our beliefs can penetrate perceptual experiences. It is argued that neither candidate is a case of cognitive penetration. In doing so, I provide an explanation to both that is based on perceptual learning, a non-cognitive phenomenon where relatively slow and long-lasting modifications to an organism’s perceptual system bring about changes in perception. This explanation is theoretically more plausible and remains closer to the empirical data than the explanations based on cognitive penetration.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9785-3
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes
    • Authors: Claudio Calosi; Matteo Morganti
      Pages: 1173 - 1194
      Abstract: In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses (at least those who do not simply deny the metaphysical import of empirical data and their proposed interpretation) claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9789-z
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • 3D Cohabitation
    • Authors: Simon Langford
      Pages: 1195 - 1210
      Abstract: The cohabitation theory is a popular solution to the problem of personal fission. It affirms that all the people who result from fission were there cohabiting the pre-fission body all along. Adopting this solution is an uncontroversial move for four-dimensionalists, but is it open to three-dimensionalists too? Some have thought so, but Katherine Hawley, Mark Johnston, and Eric Olson have argued to the contrary. They claim three-dimensionalists simply cannot be cohabitation theorists. In this paper, I explain how they can.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9790-6
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering
    • Authors: Georg Brun
      Pages: 1211 - 1241
      Abstract: Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for purely practical reasons. Finally, three limitations which call for further development of the method of explication are discussed.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9791-5
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Restall’s Proof-Theoretic Pluralism and Relevance Logic
    • Authors: Teresa Kouri
      Pages: 1243 - 1252
      Abstract: Restall (Erkenntnis 79(2):279–291, 2014) proposes a new, proof-theoretic, logical pluralism. This is in contrast to the model-theoretic pluralism he and Beall proposed in Beall and Restall (Aust J Philos 78(4):475–493, 2000) and in Beall and Restall (Logical pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). What I will show is that Restall has not described the conditions on being admissible to the proof-theoretic logical pluralism in such a way that relevance logic is one of the admissible logics. Though relevance logic is not hard to add formally, one critical component of Restall’s pluralism is that the relevance logic that gets added must have connectives which mean the same thing as the connectives in the already admitted logic. This is what I will show is not possible.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9792-4
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal
    • Authors: David Ludwig
      Pages: 1253 - 1272
      Abstract: The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the basis of these premises, I argue that it is often neither possible nor desirable to evaluate scientific statements independently of non-epistemic values. Finally, I suggest that considerations of ontological choices do not only challenge the value-free ideal but also help to specify positive roles of non-epistemic values in an often neglected area of scientific practice.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9793-3
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Platonism, Alienation, and Negativity
    • Authors: David Ingram
      Pages: 1273 - 1285
      Abstract: A platonic theory of possibility states that truths about what’s possible are determined by facts about properties not being instantiated (or being ‘uninstantiated’). Recently, Matthew Tugby has argued in favour of this sort of theory, arguing that adopting a platonic theory of possibility allows us to solve a paradox concerning alien properties: properties that might have been instantiated, but aren’t actually. In this paper, I raise a worry for Tugby’s proposal (and the platonic theory, more generally)—that it commits us to negative facts playing an important truth-making role—and offer a strategy to avoid the objectionable negativity.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9794-2
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Divergent Mathematical Treatments in Utility Theory
    • Authors: Davide Rizza
      Pages: 1287 - 1303
      Abstract: In this paper I study how divergent mathematical treatments affect mathematical modelling, with a special focus on utility theory. In particular I examine recent work on the ranking of information states and the discounting of future utilities, in order to show how, by replacing the standard analytical treatment of the models involved with one based on the framework of Nonstandard Analysis, diametrically opposite results are obtained. In both cases, the choice between the standard and nonstandard treatment amounts to a selection of set-theoretical parameters that cannot be made on purely empirical grounds. The analysis of this phenomenon gives rise to a simple logical account of the relativity of impossibility theorems in economic theory, which concludes the paper.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9795-1
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • What Do We Mean When We Ask “Why is There Something Rather Than
           Nothing?”
    • Authors: Andrew Brenner
      Pages: 1305 - 1322
      Abstract: Let’s call the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” the Question. There’s no consensus, of course, regarding which proposed answer to the Question, if any, is correct, but occasionally there’s also controversy regarding the meaning of the Question itself. In this paper I argue that such controversy persists because there just isn’t one unique interpretation of the Question. Rather, the puzzlement expressed by the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” varies depending on the ontology implicitly or explicitly endorsed by the speaker. In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that other proposals according to which the Question has one uniquely adequate interpretation are false. Second, I give several examples of the way in which the meaning of the Question can vary depending on the ontology to which it is coupled. Third, I explore the implications of my thesis for the manner in which we should approach future attempts to answer the Question.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9796-0
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • On the Evolution of Truth
    • Authors: Jeffrey A. Barrett
      Pages: 1323 - 1332
      Abstract: This paper is concerned with how a simple metalanguage might coevolve with a simple descriptive base language in the context of interacting Skyrms–Lewis signaling games Lewis (Barrett and Skyrms in Br J Philos Sci, 2015; Lewis in Convention, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms in Signals evolution, learning, & information, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). We will first consider a metagame that evolves to track the successful and unsuccessful use of a coevolving base language, then we will consider a metagame that evolves a truth predicate for expressions in a coevolving base language. We will see how a metagame that tracks truth provides an endogenous way to break the symmetry between indicative and imperative interpretations of the base language. Finally, we will consider how composite signaling games provide a way to characterize alternative pragmatic notions of truth.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9797-z
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Truthmakers, Moral Responsibility, and an Alleged Counterexample to Rule A
    • Authors: Michael Robinson
      Pages: 1333 - 1339
      Abstract: Charles Hermes argues that the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility fails because one of the inference rules on which it relies, Rule A, is invalid. Rule A states that if a proposition p is broadly logically necessary, then p is true and no one is, or ever has been, even partly morally responsible for the fact that p. Hermes purports to offer a counterexample to Rule A which focuses on agents’ moral responsibility for disjunctions. Hermes’s objection is motivated by the idea that the logic of moral responsibility ought to be based on the logic of truthmakers rather than the logic of propositions. I show that the logic of moral responsibility does not track the logic of truthmakers and defend the validity of Rule A against Hermes’s objection.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9798-y
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Is the Universe As Large As It Can Be?
    • Authors: John Byron Manchak
      Pages: 1341 - 1344
      Abstract: In this note, we cast doubt on the requirement of spacetime inextendibility; it is not at all clear that our universe is “as large as it can be.”
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9799-x
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement
    • Authors: Remco Heesen; Pieter van der Kolk
      Pages: 1345 - 1368
      Abstract: In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers’ rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies—in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View—are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9800-8
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • The Moral Objection to Modal Realism
    • Authors: Bob Fischer
      Abstract: If David Lewis’s modal realism (MR) is true, then there are many, many people. According to Mark Heller, this is bad news. He takes MR to imply that “there are at least some cases in which it is permissible to let drowning children drown when it would be easy to save them.” But since he holds the reasonable view that this is never permissible, he thinks that MR is false. Here, I argue that Lewis needn’t be troubled by this objection: it provides no reason to reject MR for those who share Lewis’s moral outlook. Moreover, I argue that disagreement with common sense needn’t be severe if we can show both (a) that there’s a sense in which common sense is correct and (b) we have little reason to care about the sense in which common sense is mistaken.
      PubDate: 2016-11-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9856-0
       
  • Bent, Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for
           Eternalist Endurantism
    • Authors: Daniel Giberman
      Abstract: One premise in David Lewis’s well-known argument from temporary intrinsic properties in favor of temporal parts is the (putative) intuition that material objects exemplify such properties simpliciter, that is, without qualification. The argument has spawned a large critical literature, with commentators questioning the simpliciter premise’s motivation, content, dialectical force, and status as an intuition. The present essay has two chief goals: to provide a novel framework for clarifying Lewis’s simpliciter premise and to explain how the resulting clarification upends a wide range of attempts in the literature to evade his conclusion. Central to both goals is the observation that exemplification simpliciter best comports with our most fundamental notion of property exemplification, a notion that applies equally well to material and atemporal abstract objects.
      PubDate: 2016-11-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9852-4
       
  • Unjustified Defeaters
    • Authors: David Alexander
      Abstract: A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann (Justification without awareness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) and Pryor (Philos Issues 14:349–378, 2004). It then offers a revised version of Pryor’s account. On this proposal, an unjustified belief can be a defeater if it is rational, all things considered. If a belief is rational, all things considered, it can require one to abandon other beliefs with which it conflicts—even if it is unjustified. Finally, this paper shows that the proposed account of unjustified defeaters is one that can and should be embraced by leading accounts of justified belief as diverse as reliabilism and evidentialism.
      PubDate: 2016-11-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9849-z
       
  • Contextualism, Relativism and the Liar
    • Authors: Gil Sagi
      Abstract: Contextualist theories of truth appeal to context to solve the liar paradox: different stages of reasoning occur in different contexts, and so the contradiction is dispelled. The word ‘true’ is relativized by the contextualists to contexts of use. This paper shows that contextualist approaches to the liar are committed to a form of semantic relativism: that the truth value of some sentences depends on the context of assessment, as well as the context of use. In particular, it is shown how Simmons’s and Glanzberg’s contextualist approaches entail relativism. In both cases, the liar sentence gets different semantic evaluations as uttered in a fixed context of use but assessed from different contexts. Shift in context of use alone cannot provide the full explanation of the liar. These contextualist approaches, as originally presented, were thus mischaracterised and they should be re-evaluated according to their full implications.
      PubDate: 2016-11-02
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9850-6
       
  • Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions
    • Authors: Lorraine Juliano Keller
      Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions (hereafter, ‘NCP’) faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.
      PubDate: 2016-10-24
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9851-5
       
  • Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External
           Distinction
    • Authors: Sander Verhaegh
      Abstract: Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine’s own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine’s perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine’s position is much closer to Carnap’s than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects.
      PubDate: 2016-10-13
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9848-0
       
  • Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of
           Central Philosophical and Practical Importance
    • Authors: Gregg D. Caruso; Stephen G. Morris
      Abstract: Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense (see, e.g., Pereboom in Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001; Pereboom in Free will, agency, and meaning in life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; Strawson in Freedom and belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986; Strawson in Philos Stud 75(1):5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144(1):45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom and others that the compatibilist’s burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist’s burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility—which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity—and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility.
      PubDate: 2016-10-12
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9846-2
       
 
 
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