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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 361 journals)
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access  
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access  
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 127)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription  
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access  
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de Clásicos y Modernos     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (Followers: 19)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Full-text available via subscription  
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 13)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Diánoia     Open Access  
Dilemata     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 21)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Études de lettres     Open Access  
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 4)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 140)
Facta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
   [13 followers]  Follow    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
     ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
     Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2207 journals]   [SJR: 0.62]   [H-I: 14]
  • When Fodor Met Frege
    • Abstract: Abstract In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem (Among Others)"—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT (the language-of-thought hypothesis) provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (Fodor, LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.
      PubDate: 2014-07-23
       
  • Dependence, Justification and Explanation: Must Reality be
           Well-Founded?
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper is about metaphysical ‘infinitism’, the view that there are, or could be, infinite chains of ontological dependence. Its main aim is to show that, contrary to widespread opinion, metaphysical infinitism is a coherent position. On the basis of this, it is then additionally argued that metaphysical infinitism need not fare worse than the more canonical ‘foundationalist’ alternatives when it comes to formulating metaphysical explanations. In the course of the discussion, a rather unexplored parallel with the debate concerning infinitism about justification is suggested.
      PubDate: 2014-07-15
       
  • Equivocation for the Objective Bayesian
    • Abstract: Abstract According to Williamson (In defense of objective Bayesianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson’s prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson’s calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance hypotheses. The objective Bayesian equivocates between these calibrated density functions rather than between the calibrated probability functions themselves. The result is an objective Bayesianism that avoids the main problem afflicting Williamson’s original proposal.
      PubDate: 2014-07-15
       
  • Moral Valence and Semantic Intuitions
    • Abstract: Abstract Despite the swirling tide of controversy surrounding the work of Machery et al. (Cognition 92:B1–B12, 2004), the cross-cultural differences they observed in semantic intuitions about the reference of proper names have proven to be robust. In the present article, we report cross-cultural and individual differences in semantic intuitions obtained using new experimental materials. In light of the pervasiveness of the Knobe effect (Analysis 63:190–193, 2003, Philos Psychol 16:309–324, 2003, Behav Brain Sci 33:315–329, 2010; Pettit and Knobe in Mind Lang 24:586–604, 2009) and the fact that Machery et al.’s original materials incorporated elements of wrongdoing but did not control for their influence, we also examined the question of whether the moral valence of actions described in experimental materials might affect participants’ responses. Our results suggest that uncontrolled moral valence did not distort participants’ judgments in previous research. Our findings provide further confirmation of the robustness of cross-cultural and intra-cultural differences in semantic intuitions and strengthen the philosophical challenge that they pose.
      PubDate: 2014-07-09
       
  • On Special Relativity and Temporal Illusions
    • Abstract: Abstract According to metaphysical tensism, there is an objective, albeit ever changing, present moment corresponding to our phenomenal experiences (Ludlow in Philosophy of language, Oxford handbook on tense and aspect. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Brogaard and Marlow in Analysis 73(4):635–642, 2013). One of the principle objections to metaphysical tensism has been Einstein’s argument from special relativity, which says that given that the speed of light is constant, there is no absolute simultaneity defined in terms of observations of light rays (Einstein in Ann Phys 17:891–921, 1905). In a recent paper, Brogaard and Marlow (Analysis 73(4):635–642, 2013) argue that this objection fails. We argue that Brogaard and Marlow’s argument fails to show that special relativity does not pose a threat to metaphysical tensism.
      PubDate: 2014-07-03
       
  • Junky Non-Worlds
    • Abstract: Abstract A mereological structure is junky if and only if each of its elements is a proper part of some other. The young literature on junk has focused on junky worlds and whether they are counterexamples to unrestricted composition. The present note defends the possibility of junky structures that are not worlds. This possibility complicates a recent attempt in the literature to render junk consistent with a weakened form of unrestricted composition. The upshot is that junky non-worlds threaten the weakened form of unrestricted composition as much as junky worlds threaten the traditional version.
      PubDate: 2014-07-02
       
  • X-Phi and Carnapian Explication
    • Abstract: Abstract The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains.
      PubDate: 2014-06-14
       
  • Closure of A Priori Knowability Under A Priori Knowable Material
           Implication
    • Abstract: Abstract The topic of this article is the closure of a priori knowability under a priori knowable material implication: if a material conditional is a priori knowable and if the antecedent is a priori knowable, then the consequent is a priori knowable as well. This principle is arguably correct under certain conditions, but there is at least one counterexample when completely unrestricted. To deal with this, Anderson proposes to restrict the closure principle to necessary truths and Horsten suggests to restrict it to formulas that belong to less expressive languages. In this article it is argued that Horsten’s restriction strategy fails, because one can deduce that knowable ignorance entails necessary ignorance from the closure principle and some modest background assumptions, even if the expressive resources do not go beyond those needed to formulate the closure principle itself. It is also argued that it is hard to find a justification for Anderson’s restricted closure principle, because one cannot deduce it even if one assumes very strong modal and epistemic background principles. In addition, there is an independently plausible alternative closure principle that avoids all the problems without the need for restriction.
      PubDate: 2014-06-07
       
  • The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the        class="a-plus-plus">Divorce Thesis
    • Abstract: Abstract Stephen Hetherington has defended the tripartite analysis of knowledge (Hetherington in Philos Q 48:453–469, 1998; J Philos 96:565–587, 1999; J Philos Res 26:307–324, 2001a; Good knowledge, bad knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001b). His defence has recently come under attack (Madison in Australas J Philos 89(1):47–58, 2011; Turri in Synthese 183(3):247–259, 2012). I critically evaluate those attacks as well as Hetherington’s newest formulation of his defence (Hetherington in Philosophia 40(3):539–547, 2012b; How to know: A practicalist conception of knowledge, Wiley, Oxford, 2011a; Ratio 24:176–191, 2011b; Synthese 188:217–230, 2012a). I argue that his newest formulation is vulnerable to a modified version of Madison’s and Turri’s objection. However, I argue that Hetherington’s considerations lend support to a different, though also radical, thesis which can meet the objection. This thesis is what I call the Divorce thesis: the theory of epistemic justification is importantly independent of the theory of knowledge.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Beyond Verbal Disputes: The Compatibilism Debate Revisited
    • Abstract: Abstract The compatibilism debate revolves around the question whether moral responsibility and free will are compatible with determinism. Prima facie, this seems to be a substantial issue. But according to the triviality objection, the disagreement is merely verbal: compatibilists and incompatibilists, it is maintained, are talking past each other, since they use the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” in different senses. In this paper I argue, first, that the triviality objection is indeed a formidable one and that the standard replies to it are unconvincing. This, however, does not mean that the objection succeeds. Starting with the debate about moral responsibility, I attempt to show that there is an account of moral responsibility which enables us to defend the compatibilism debate against the charge of triviality—namely, the normative conception of moral responsibility. If “moral responsibility” is defined in normative terms, then we cannot distinguish between a compatibilist and an incompatibilist sense of “moral responsibility”, because such a disambiguation would be inconsistent with the essential action-guiding force of normative expressions. Finally, I examine how the normative conception of moral responsibility can help us to defend the free will debate against the triviality objection and draw some general conclusions.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Structural Realism for Secondary Qualities
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper outlines and defends a novel position in the color realism debate, namely structural realism. This position is novel in that it dissociates the veridicality of color attributions from the claim that physical objects are themselves colored. Thus, it is realist about color in both the semantic and epistemic senses, but not the ontic sense. The generality of this position is demonstrated by applying it to other “secondary qualities,” including heat, musical pitch, and odor. The basic argument proceeds by analogy with the theory of measurement. I argue that perceptual experiences are analogous to numerical structures in that they are suitable for measurement, but only report measured values after they have been linked to states of a measurement device via calibration. Since the calibration of our sensory apparatus varies with context, it is inappropriate to identify specific experiences with specific properties in the world. Rather, it is structural relations between possible experiences which represent relations between possible external properties, and it is at the level of these structural relationships that veridicality is appropriately assessed.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Montague’s Theorem and Modal Logic
    • Abstract: Abstract In the present piece we defend predicate approaches to modality, that is approaches that conceive of modal notions as predicates applicable to names of sentences or propositions, against the challenges raised by Montague’s theorem. Montague’s theorem is often taken to show that the most intuitive modal principles lead to paradox if we conceive of the modal notion as a predicate. Following Schweizer (J Philos Logic 21:1–31, 1992) and others we show this interpretation of Montague’s theorem to be unwarranted unless a further non trivial assumption is made—an assumption which should not be taken as a given. We then move on to showing, elaborating on work of Gupta (J Philos Logic 11:1–60, 1982), Asher and Kamp (Properties, types, and meaning. Vol. I: foundational issues, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 85−158, 1989), and Schweizer (J Philos Logic 21:1–31, 1992), that the unrestricted modal principles can be upheld within the predicate approach and that the predicate approach is an adequate approach to modality from the perspective of modal operator logic. To this end we develop a possible world semantics for multiple modal predicates and show that for a wide class of multimodal operator logics we may find a suitable class of models of the predicate approach which satisfies, modulo translation, precisely the theorems of the modal operator logic at stake.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • A Dual-Component View of Propositional Grasping
    • Abstract: Abstract On a traditional or default view of the grasping or understanding of a singular proposition by an individual, it is assumed to be a unitary or holistic activity. However, naturalistic views of cognition plausibly could analyze propositional thinking in terms of more than one distinctive functional stage of cognitive processing, suggesting at least the potential legitimacy of a non-unitary analysis of propositional grasping. We outline a novel dual-component view of this kind, and show that it is well supported by current cognitive science research.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue
    • Abstract: Abstract Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I shall consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. In the first section of this paper I prepare some ground for the argument. As much of it will depend on the notion of evidential significance, this concept will be defined and its introduction motivated. Further, I shall introduce and explain the distinction between support and confirmation: put in a slogan, ‘confirmation is support by significant evidence’. The second section deals with the Riddle itself. It will be shown that, given the provisions of the first section, not ‘anything confirms anything’: significant green-evidence confirms only green-hypotheses (and no grue-hypotheses), and significant grue-evidence confirms only grue-hypotheses (and no green-hypotheses), whichever terms we use for expressing these evidences or hypotheses. The third section rounds off my treatment. First I will show that Frank Jackson’s use of his counterfactual condition is unsuccessful. Further, I will argue that no unwanted consequences will result, if one starts from the other, ‘objective’, definition of ‘grue’, as it constitutes no more than a mere fact of logic that cannot do any harm. Finally, I present a grue-case involving both kinds of definition, where the exclusive confirmation of either the green- or the grue-hypothesis is shown.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Where Concepts Come from: Learning Concepts by Description and by
           Demonstration
    • Abstract: Abstract Jerry Fodor’s arguments against the possibility of concept learning, and the responses that have been offered in defense of the coherence of concept learning, have both by and large assumed that concept learning is a descriptive process. I offer an alternative, ostensive approach to concept learning and explain how descriptive concept learning can be explained as a version of ostensive concept learning. I argue that an ostensive view of concept learning offers an empirically plausible and philosophically adequate account of concept learning that is explanatorily superior to traditional descriptive views.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen
    • Abstract: Abstract In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Possibility, Necessity and Probability: A Meditation on Underdetermination
           and Justification
    • Abstract: Abstract After providing some historical and systematic background, I introduce the structure of a very natural and influential sceptical underdetermination argument. The argument assumes that it is metaphysically possible for a deceived subject to have the same evidence that a non-deceived subject has, and tries to draw consequences about justification from that assumption of metaphysical possibility. I first variously object to the transition from the assumption to its supposed consequences. In the central part of the paper, I then critically consider some influential ways of bridging the gap between the assumption and its supposed consequences, which generally consist in strengthening the assumption from one of metaphysical possibility into one of either counterfactual implication or entailment. The discussion indicates that epistemic facts are much more independent from metaphysically modal facts than the sceptical underdetermination argument requires.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • The Nought Belief Paradox
    • Abstract: Abstract A paradox is presented that the poses new problems for both the truth norm and the knowledge norm of belief.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Beauty and Generalized Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani
    • Abstract: Abstract Horgan and Mahtani (Erkenntnis 78: 333–351, 2013) present a new argument for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem resting on a principle for updating probabilities which they call “generalized conditionalization.” They allege that this new argument is immune to two attacks which have been recently leveled at other arguments for thirdism. I argue that their new argument rests on a probability distribution which is (a) no more justified than an alternative distribution favoring a different answer to the problem, and (b) ultimately unjustified. I go on to show that generalized conditionalization cannot be applied in the manner suggested, given the cogency of the aforementioned attacks on thirder arguments. Hence, the new argument fails to advance the case for the 1/3 answer.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
  • Assessing Theories: The Coherentist Approach
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper we show that the coherence measures of Olsson (J Philos 94:246–272, 2002), Shogenji (Log Anal 59:338–345, 1999), and Fitelson (Log Anal 63:194–199, 2003) satisfy the two most important adequacy requirements for the purpose of assessing theories. Following Hempel (Synthese 12:439–469, 1960), Levi (Gambling with truth, New York, A. A. Knopf, 1967), and recently Huber (Synthese 161:89–118, 2008) we require, as minimal or necessary conditions, that adequate assessment functions favor true theories over false theories and true and informative theories over true but uninformative theories. We then demonstrate that the coherence measures of Olsson, Shogenji, and Fitelson satisfy these minimal conditions if we confront the hypotheses with a separating sequence of observational statements. In the concluding remarks we set out the philosophical relevance, and limitations, of the formal results. Inter alia, we discuss the problematic implications of our precondition that competing hypotheses must be confronted with a separating sequence of observational statements, which also leads us to discuss theory assessment in the context of scientific antirealism.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
       
 
 
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