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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 560 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access  
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access  
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access  
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 27)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access  
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription  
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 33)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal  
Budhi : A Journal of Ideas and Culture     Full-text available via subscription  
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (Followers: 27)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 17)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dilemata     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access  
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Estética     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 35)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access  
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 7)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 45)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription  
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Filosofia e Educação     Open Access  
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Review of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Hegel Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription  
Hegel-Jahrbuch     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Heidegger Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences     Hybrid Journal  
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
HOPOS : The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Horizons philosophiques     Full-text available via subscription  
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
HYBRIS, Revista de Filosofí­a     Open Access  
Hypnos. Revista do Centro de Estudos da Antiguidade     Open Access  
IAMURE International Journal of Literature, Philosophy & Religion     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Idealistic Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Impact : The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain     Free   (Followers: 4)
Informal Logic     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Ingenium. Revista Electrónica de Pensamiento Moderno y Metodología en Historia de la Ideas     Open Access  
Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Intellèctus     Open Access  
Interações : Cultura e Comunidade     Open Access  
Interespe. Interdisciplinaridade e Espiritualidade na Educação     Open Access  
International Corporate Responsibility Series     Full-text available via subscription  
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 41)
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
International Journal for Transformative Research     Open Access  

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.621]   [H-I: 16]   [16 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2281 journals]
  • A New Semantics for Vagueness
    • Abstract: Abstract Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative semantics for classical proof theory. The key features of the account are: there is a single notion of truth—definite truth—and a single notion of validity; sentences can be true, false, or undetermined; all classical theorems and all classical inference rule are valid; the sorites argument is unsound; ‘definitely’ is treated as a meta-language predicate; higher-order vagueness is handled via semantic ascent.
      PubDate: 2016-04-28
       
  • At It Again: Time-Travel and the At–At Account of Motion
    • Abstract: Abstract According to Russell’s At–At Account of Motion, necessarily, something moves if and only if it’s at one place at one time, and at a distinct place at a distinct time. This, many believe, is all that motion consists in. However, if it is possible for an entity to be at more than one place at more than one time (that is, to persist while multiply located), the At–At Account will entail that the entity is in motion even if, intuitively, the entity is simply at rest in two places at once. I will argue that these cases, if possible, give us reason to reject the At–At Account, and that if we endorse the At–At Account as an analysis, even the analytic possibility of the cases will be problematic. Further, we have reason to reject the stronger claim of Motion Supervenience, on which the facts about the motion of an individual within an interval are wholly determined by facts about the object’s location within that interval together with identity facts about regions and times.
      PubDate: 2016-04-28
       
  • Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox
    • Abstract: Abstract The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude (or truthlikeness). More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of fallible belief, are briefly discussed in the final part of the paper.
      PubDate: 2016-04-20
       
  • Invariant Equivocation
    • Abstract: Abstract Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one’s evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agent-dependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one’s evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard to the probability function one should adopt as one’s belief function, Williamson advocates selecting the probability function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence while Masterton advocates selecting the expected probability function relative to the density function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence. In this paper we discuss the significant relative strengths of these two positions. In particular, Masterton’s original proposal is further developed and investigated to reveal its significant properties; including its equivalence to the centre of mass inference process and its ability to accommodate higher order evidence.
      PubDate: 2016-04-18
       
  • Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument
    • Abstract: Abstract According to the Dilemma Defense, it is question-begging against the incompatibilist defender of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) to assume that the agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) cannot do otherwise in light of causal determinism, but is nevertheless morally responsible. As a result, Fischer (Philos Rev 119:315–336, 2010; Analysis 73:489–496, 2013) attempts to undermine PAP in a different manner via a deterministic FSC. More specifically, Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent’s moral responsibility, it is not in virtue of its eliminating the agent’s alternative possibilities. I contend that, once we focus upon the distinction between entailment and explanation, the incompatibilist defender of PAP can successfully rebut Fischer’s argument. I argue for this claim while granting Fischer a number of assumptions that only render a defense of PAP more difficult. Additionally, I cast doubt upon Palmer’s (Synthese 191:3847–3864, 2014) critique of Fischer’s argument, which in turn renders my defense of PAP all the more critical.
      PubDate: 2016-04-09
       
  • The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity
    • Abstract: Abstract Panpsychism has often been motivated on the grounds that any attempt to account for experience and consciousness in organisms in purely physical, nonexperiential terms faces severe difficulties. The “combination problem” charges that attributing phenomenal properties to the basic constituents of organisms (“microphenomenal” properties), as panpsychism proposes, likewise fails to provide a satisfactory basis for experience in humans and other organisms. This paper evaluates a recent attempt to understand, and solve, the combination problem. This approach, due to Sam Coleman, is premised on a distinction between mere aggregates and genuine unities, and the purported inability of subjects to constitute a unity. In response, I first argue that it may not be incumbent upon the panpsychist to explain how microphenomenal properties could constitute a unity in the way that Coleman supposes. I then argue that even if such a burden does fall on the panpsychist, it is far from clear that a plurality subjects cannot constitute such a unity. Finally, I argue that if one adopts a functionalist account of macrosubjects, as Coleman does, there is little reason to think that a plurality of subjects could not constitute a macrosubject. In these ways, I argue that the force of the combination problem does not turn on whether microphenomenal properties require minds or subjects that have them.
      PubDate: 2016-04-07
       
  • On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to
           Steglich-Petersen
    • Abstract: Abstract In a recent paper in this journal (2014), we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Steglich-Petersen (Erkenntnis 1–9, 2014) claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • A New Problem with Mixed Decisions, Or: You’ll Regret Reading This
           Article, But You Still Should
    • Abstract: Abstract Andy Egan recently drew attention to a class of decision situations that provide a certain kind of informational feedback, which he claims constitute a counterexample to causal decision theory (CDT). Arntzenius and Wallace have sought to vindicate a form of CDT by describing a dynamic process of deliberation that culminates in a “mixed” decision. I show that, for many of the cases in question, this proposal depends on an incorrect way of calculating expected utilities, and argue that it is therefore unsuccessful. I then tentatively defend an alternative proposal by Joyce, which produces a similar process of dynamic deliberation but for a different reason.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Spreading the Credit: Virtue Reliabilism and Weak Epistemic
           Anti-Individualism
    • Abstract: Abstract Mainstream epistemologists have recently made a few isolated attempts to demonstrate the particular ways, in which specific types of knowledge are partly social. Two promising cases in point are Lackey’s (Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Goldberg’s (Relying on others: an essay in epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) process reliabilist treatment of testimonial and coverage-support justification. What seems to be missing from the literature, however, is a general approach to knowledge that could reveal the partly social nature of the latter anytime this may be the case. Indicatively, even though Lackey (Synthese 158(3):345–361, 2007) has recently launched an attack against the Credit Account of Knowledge (CAK) on the basis of testimony, she has not classified her view of testimonial knowledge into any of the alternative, general approaches to knowledge. Similarly, even if Goldberg’s attempt to provide a process reliabilist explanation of the social nature of testimonial knowledge is deemed satisfactory, his attempt to do the same in the case of coverage-support justification does not deliver the requisite result. This paper demonstrates that CAK can in fact provide, pace Lackey’s renunciation of the view, a promising account of the social nature of both testimonial and coverage-supported knowledge. Additionally, however, it can display further explanatory power by also revealing the social nature of knowledge produced on the basis of epistemic artifacts. Despite their disparities, all these types of knowledge count as partly social in nature, because in all these cases, according to CAK, the epistemic credit for the individual agent’s true belief must spread between the individual agent and certain parts of her epistemic community. Accordingly, CAK is a promising candidate for providing a unified approach to several and, perhaps all possible, instances of what we may call ‘weak epistemic anti-individualism’ within mainstream epistemology: i.e., the claim that the nature of knowledge can occasionally be both social and individual at the same time.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Extended Knowledge-How
    • Abstract: Abstract According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g. Stanley and Williamson in J Philos 411–44, 2001; Stanley in Know how. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Brogaard in Grazer Philos Stud 77(1):147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78(2):439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist (e.g. Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press , Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind (e.g. the extended mind thesis and the hypothesis of extended cognition), we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how (e.g. Ryle in Proc Aristot Soc 46, 1945; The concept of mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949) are a viable option, there is an overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active externalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper explores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowledge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in (on an anti-intellectualist construal) when one knows how to do something, and how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • The Ethics of Delusional Belief
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to (1) acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, (2) establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and (3) introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Colors, Dispositions, and Similarity
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, it is argued that those who claim that the dispositionalist theory of color has even a prima facie advantage over color physicalism in accommodating the similarity relations that seem to hold among the colors are mistaken. The appearance that dispositionalists can handle the relevant similarity claims (e.g. that red is more similar to orange than it is to green) stems from the unexamined assumption that the similarity of two dispositions is simply a matter of the similarity of the manifestations of those dispositions. A more careful treatment of the ways in which two dispositions can be similar to, or different from, one another must consider both the bases and the manifestation conditions of those dispositions in addition to their manifestations. After examining cases of dispositions from outside the domain of colors, it is argued that attention to conditions of manifestation provides a particularly strong reason for rejecting the assumption that similarity of manifestations entails similarity of dispositions. Without this assumption, dispositionalists about color are shown to be in the same position as non-dispositionalists regarding similarity relations among the colors. This way of responding to color dispositionalism is compared with two other responses [offered by Byrne (Philos Phenomenol Res 66(3):641–665, 2003) and McLaughlin (Consciousness: new philosophical perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003)], and shown to be a candidate to strengthen, rather than replace, either one.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Grounding and Supplementation
    • Abstract: Abstract Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. Both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric (and hence irreflexive) and transitive, and as such, are thought to be strict partial orders. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is often said to obey the weak supplementation principle. There is reason to wonder whether partial grounding, or, more precisely, proper partial grounding, obeys a ground-theoretic version of this principle. In what follows, I argue that it does not. The cases that cause problems for the supplementation principle for grounding also serve as counterexamples to another principle, minimality, defended by Paul Audi.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Stoljar’s Dilemma and Three Conceptions of the Physical: A Defence
           of the Via Negativa
    • Abstract: Abstract Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. But what does it mean to say that everything is physical? Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that no account of the physical is available which allows for a formulation of physicalism that is both possibly true and deserving of the name. As against this claim, I argue that a version of the via negativa—roughly, the view that the physical is to be characterised in terms of the nonmental—provides just such an account.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • The Epsilon-Reconstruction of Theories and Scientific Structuralism
    • Abstract: Abstract Rudolf Carnap’s mature work on the logical reconstruction of scientific theories consists of two components. The first is the elimination of the theoretical vocabulary of a theory in terms of its Ramsification. The second is the reintroduction of the theoretical terms through explicit definitions in a language containing an epsilon operator. This paper investigates Carnap’s epsilon-reconstruction of theories in the context of pure mathematics. The main objective here is twofold: first, to specify the epsilon logic underlying his suggested definition of theoretical terms and a suitable choice semantics for it. Second, to analyze whether Carnap’s approach is compatible with a structuralist conception of mathematics.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Local Supermajorities
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper explores two non-standard supermajority rules in the context of judgment aggregation over multiple logically connected issues. These rules set the supermajority threshold in a local, context sensitive way—partly as a function of the input profile of opinions. To motivate the interest of these rules, I prove two results. First, I characterize each rule in terms of a condition I call ‘Block Preservation’. Block preservation says that if a majority of group members accept a judgment set, then so should the group. Second, I show that one of these rules is, in a precise sense, a judgment aggregation analogue of a rule for connecting qualitative and quantitative belief that has been recently defended by Hannes Leitgeb. The structural analogy is due to the fact that Leitgeb sets thresholds for qualitative beliefs in a local, context sensitive way—partly as a function of the given credence function.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Quid Quidditism Est?
    • Abstract: Abstract Over the last decade or so, there has been a renewed interest in a view about properties known as quidditism. However, a review of the literature reveals that ‘quidditism’ is used to cover a range of distinct views. In this paper I explore the logical space of distinct types of quidditism. The first distinction noted is between quidditism as a thesis explicitly about property individuation and quidditism as a principle of unrestricted property recombination. The distinction recently drawn by Dustin Locke between extravagant quidditism and austere quidditism is a distinction between quidditisms of the first type. It is then argued that austere quidditism may itself be further sub-divided into what I call ‘extremely austere quidditism’ and ‘moderately austere quidditism’. Moderately austere quidditism is argued to be preferable to extremely austere quidditism and further to be able to address many of the arguments leveled against quidditism in general.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Atoms, Gunk, and the Limits of ‘Composition’
    • Abstract: Abstract It is customary practice to define ‘x is composed of the ys’ as ‘x is a sum of the ys and the ys are pairwise disjoint (i.e., no two of them have any parts in common)’. This predicate has played a central role in the debate on the special composition question and on related metaphysical issues concerning the mereological structure of objects. In this note we show that the customary characterization is nonetheless inadequate. We do so by constructing a mereological model where everything qualifies as composed of atoms even though some elements in the domain are gunky, i.e., can be divided indefinitely into smaller and smaller proper parts.
      PubDate: 2016-04-01
       
  • Necessary Connections in Context
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer’s semantics of modality. On the resulting view, causal claims quantify over restricted domains of possible worlds determined by two contextually determined parameters. I argue that this view can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of the way we use and evaluate causal language, including the difference between causing an effect and being a cause of it, the sensitivity of causal judgements to normative facts, and the semantics of causal disagreements.
      PubDate: 2016-03-07
       
  • Explanatory Asymmetries, Ground, and Ontological Dependence
    • Abstract: Abstract The notions of ground and ontological dependence have made a prominent resurgence in much of contemporary metaphysics. However, objections have been raised. On the one hand, objections have been raised to the need for distinctively metaphysical notions of ground and ontological dependence. On the other, objections have been raised to the usefulness of adding ground and ontological dependence to the existing store of other metaphysical notions. Even the logical properties of ground and ontological dependence are under debate. In this article, I focus on how to account for the judgements of non-symmetry in several of the cases that motivate the introduction of notions like ground and ontological dependence. By focusing on the notion of explanation relative to a theory, I conclude that we do not need to postulate a distinctively asymmetric metaphysical notion in order to account for these judgements.
      PubDate: 2016-02-22
       
 
 
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