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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 532 journals)
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 36)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Análisis filosófico     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal  
Budhi : A Journal of Ideas and Culture     Full-text available via subscription  
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (Followers: 25)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 17)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access  

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.621]   [H-I: 16]   [15 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2280 journals]
  • The Fitch-Church Paradox and First Order Modal Logic
    • Abstract: Abstract Reformulation strategies for solving Fitch’s paradox of knowability date back to Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985). Their core assumption is that the formula \(p\rightarrow \Diamond Kp\) , from which the paradox originates, does not correctly express the intended meaning of the verification thesis (VT), which should concern possible knowledge of actual truths, and therefore the contradiction does not represent a logical refutation of verificationism. Supporters of these solutions claim that (VT) can be reformulated in a way that blocks the derivation of the paradox. Unfortunately, these reformulation proposals come with other problems, on both the logical and the philosophical side (see Percival in Aust J Philos 69:82–97, 1991; Williamson in Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; Wright in Realism, meaning and truth, Blackwell, Oxford, 1987). We claim that in order to make the reformulation idea consistent and adequate one should analyze the paradox from the point of view of a quantified modal language. An approach in this line was proposed by, among others, Kvanvig (Nous 29:481–499, 1995; The knowability paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) but was not fully developed in its technical details. Here we approach the paradox by means of a first order hybrid modal logic (FHL), a tool that strikes us as more adequate to express transworld reference and the rigidification needed to consistently express this idea. The outcome of our analysis is ambivalent. Given a first order formula we are able to express the fact that it is knowable in a way which is both consistent and adequate. However, one must give up the possibility of formulating (VT) as a substitution free schema of the kind \(p\rightarrow \Diamond Kp\) . We propose that one may instead formulate (VT) by means of a recursive translation of the initial formula, being aware that many alternative translations are possible.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Overdetermination Underdetermined
    • Abstract: Abstract Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Reconstruction of Contraction Operators
    • Abstract: Abstract An operator of belief change is reconstructible as another such operator if and only if any outcome that can be obtained with the former can also be obtained with the latter (not necessarily using the same input). Two operators are mutually reconstructible if they generate exactly the same set of outcomes. The relations of reconstructibility among fifteen operators of contraction, including the common AGM contraction operators, are completely characterized. Furthermore, the additional such relations are characterized that arise if all belief sets are required to be finite-based or if the language is finite. These results are significant for the choice of a formal model to represent how real-world agents change their beliefs. In particular, if two contraction operators are mutually reconstructible, then that limits the types of considerations that can legitimately be invoked in favour of one over the other.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Composition, Indiscernibility, Coreferentiality
    • Abstract: Abstract According to strong composition as identity (CAI), the logical principles of one–one and plural identity can and should be extended to the relation between a whole and its parts. Otherwise, composition would not be legitimately regarded as an identity relation. In particular, several defenders of strong CAI have attempted to extend Leibniz’s Law to composition. However, much less attention has been paid to another, not less important feature of standard identity: a standard identity statement is true iff its terms are coreferential. We contend that, if coreferentiality is dropped, indiscernibility is no help in making composition a genuine identity relation. To this aim, we analyse as a case study Cotnoir’s theory of general identity, in which indiscernibility is obtained thanks to a revisionary semantics and true identity statements are allowed to connect non-coreferential terms. We extend Cotnoir’s strategy for indiscernibility to the relation of comaternity, and we show that, neither in the case of composition nor in that of comaternity, indiscernibility contibutes to show that they are genuine identity relations. Finally, we compare Cotnoir’s approach with other versions of strong CAI endorsed by Wallace, Bøhn, and Hovda, and canvass the extent to which they violate coreferentiality. The comparative analysis shows that, in order to preserve coreferentiality, strong CAI is forced to adopt a non-standard semantic treatment of the singular/plural distinction.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Evaluating Test Cases for Probabilistic Measures of Coherence
    • Abstract: Abstract How can we determine the adequacy of a probabilistic coherence measure? A widely accepted approach to this question besides formulating adequacy constraints is to employ paradigmatic test cases consisting of a scenario providing a joint probability distribution over some specified set of propositions coupled with a normative coherence assessment for this set. However, despite the popularity of the test case approach, a systematic evaluation of the proposed test cases is still missing. This paper’s aim is to change this. Using a custom written computer program for the necessary probabilistic calculations a large number of coherence measures in an extensive collection of test cases is examined. The result is a detailed overview of the test case performance of any probabilistic coherence measures proposed so far. It turns out that none of the popular coherence measures such as Shogenji’s, Glass’ and Olsson’s, Fitelson’s or Douven and Meijs’ but two rather unnoticed measures perform best. This, however, does not mean that the other measures can be rejected straightforwardly. Instead, the results presented here are to be understood as a contribution among others to the project of finding adequate probabilistic coherence measures.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • The Recycling Problem for Event Individuation
    • Abstract: Abstract If the wedding had taken place an hour later, it would have been rained out. When we make counterfactual claims like this, we indicate that events are not terribly fragile things. That is, we typically think of events as particulars which can survive small changes in nearby possible worlds, such that one and the same event could have occurred under slightly different circumstances. I argue, however, that any account of “non-fragile” event individuation is subject to what is known as the recycling problem. This was a problem initially raised against origin essentialism, or the view that individuals are individuated by their origins, and is roughly the difficulty that arises in cases where the criteria of individuation for a particular individual are duplicated. I then examine a potential solution, which takes its cue from predecessor essentialism, the leading response to the recycling problem in the origins literature. I argue that the predecessor essentialist’s solution yields unacceptably counter-intuitive results when applied to the recycling problem for event individuation, and conclude that, if events have qualitative individuating essences, then they must be—contrary to intuition—modally fragile entities. I then suggest three alternatives to qualitative essentialism which could accommodate our intuitions about the modal non-fragility of events.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper objects to internalist theories of justification from testimony on the grounds that they can’t accommodate intuitions about a pair of cases. The pair of cases involved is a testimonial version of the cases involved in the New Evil Demon Argument. The role of New Evil Demon cases in motivating contemporary internalist theories of knowledge and justification notwithstanding, it is argued here that testimonial cases make an intuitive case against internalist theories of justification from testimony.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • The Problem of Satisfaction Conditions and the Dispensability of i -Desire
    • Abstract: Abstract The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires—what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie’s argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine desires. To this aim I will show that the same sort of puzzling phenomenon involved in our responses to tragic fictions arises also in a non-fictional case, and I will offer a solution to the problem of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. The key to the explanation is in the notion of condition-dependent desires triggered by fictions.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Reasons, Causes, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper we develop a novel argument against the extended mind hypothesis. Our argument constitutes an advance in the debate, insofar as we employ only premises that are acceptable to a coarse-grained functionalist, and we do not rely on functional disanalogies between putative examples of extended minds and ordinary human beings that are just a matter of fine detail or degree. Thus, we beg no questions against proponents of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather, our argument consists in making use of the following necessary condition on holding a belief for a reason: To believe something for a reason, one must come to believe it in virtue of attitudes that epistemically rationalize the belief that is formed, and one must come to believe in virtue of the fact that these attitudes epistemically rationalize the new belief. We show that many external objects that defenders of the extended mind hypothesis have claimed are (in conjunction with an internal cognitive system) beliefs cannot (even partly) constitute a belief had for a reason, as they necessarily fail to satisfy the necessary condition. Our first thesis, then, is that beliefs had for reasons cannot be extended in the most interesting way specified by the extended mind hypothesis. Furthermore, if we add to our argument the premise that every token belief is something that could have been had for a reason, we can derive the stronger thesis that no beliefs can be extended in this way.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Erratum to: Overdetermination Underdetermined
    • PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge and Practical Reasoning
    • Abstract: Abstract Epistemic contrastivism is the view that knowledge is a ternary relation between a person, a proposition and a set of contrast propositions. This view is in tension with widely shared accounts of practical reasoning: be it the claim that knowledge of the premises is necessary for acceptable practical reasoning based on them or sufficient for the acceptability of the use of the premises in practical reasoning, or be it the claim that there is a looser connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. Given plausible assumptions, epistemic contrastivism implies that we should cut all links between knowledge and practical reasoning. However, the denial of any such link requires additional and independent arguments; if such arguments are lacking, then all the worse for epistemic contrastivism.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Evidence, Significance, and Counterfactuals: Schramm on the New Riddle of
           Induction
    • Abstract: Abstract In a recent paper in this journal, Schramm (Erkenntnis 79:571–591, 2014) presents what he takes to be an answer to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. His solution relies on the technical notion of evidential significance, which is meant to distinguish two ways that evidence may bear on a hypothesis: either via support or confirmation. As he puts his view in slogan form: “confirmation is support by significant evidence” (p. 571). Once we make this distinction, Schramm claims, we see that Goodman’s famous riddle is dissolved, and we are no longer forced into the “intolerable result” that anything confirms anything. Schramm makes a number of incisive observations in his paper, but I do not think he has solved the New Riddle. There are two reasons for this. First, Schramm has an overly narrow conception of what the Riddle amounts to; I would venture to guess that it is narrower than that of most contemporary philosophers. Thus his proposal does not address the primary concern. Second, Schramm’s notion of significant evidence relies on a counterfactual condition that bears more than a passing resemblance to that made famous by Jackson in his (J Philos 72:113–131, 1975) paper on the topic. However, Jackson’s proposal faces several well-known counterexamples (and even charges of petitio principii), some of which can be adapted into Schramm’s framework. Schramm’s solution thus inherits a number of outstanding problems from Jackson’s proposal, which he has not shown us how to handle.
      PubDate: 2016-02-01
       
  • Fundamentality and the Mind-Body Problem
    • Abstract: Abstract In the recent metaphysics literature, a number of philosophers have independently endeavoured to marry sparse ontology to abundant truth. The aim is to keep ontological commitments minimal, whilst allowing true sentences to quantify over a vastly greater range of entities than those which they are ontologically committed to. For example, an ontological commitment only to concrete, microscopic simples might be conjoined with a commitment to truths such as ‘There are twenty people working in this building’ and ‘There are prime numbers greater than 5.’ I argue that a significant challenge to this project comes from the philosophy of mind. As Theodore Sider has pointed out, anti-physicalism is consistent with a sparse ontology. However, I will try to show that the premises of the standard anti-physicalist arguments can be used to form an argument to the conclusion that sentences which quantify over subjects of experience ontologically commit us to subjects of experience. Truths about consciousness cannot be bought more cheaply than their superficial grammar suggests.
      PubDate: 2016-01-27
       
  • Identity and Sortals (and Caesar)
    • Abstract: Abstract According to the sortal conception of the universe of individuals every individual falls under a highest sortal, or category. It is argued here that on this conception the identity relation is defined between individuals a and b if and only if a and b fall under a common category. Identity must therefore be regarded as a relation of the form \(x=_{Z}y\) , with three arguments x, y, and Z, where Z ranges over categories, and where the range of x and y depends on the value of Z. An identity relation of this kind can be made good sense of in Martin-Löf’s type theory. But identity so construed requires a reformulation of Hume’s Principle that makes this principle unfit for explaining the sortal concept of cardinal number. The Neo-Logicist can therefore not appeal to the sortal conception in tackling the Julius Caesar problem, as proposed by Hale and Wright (The reason’s proper study. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 335–396, 2001b).
      PubDate: 2016-01-21
       
  • A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers’ rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies—in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View—are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.
      PubDate: 2016-01-19
       
  • Is the Universe As Large As It Can Be?
    • Abstract: Abstract In this note, we cast doubt on the requirement of spacetime inextendibility; it is not at all clear that our universe is “as large as it can be.”
      PubDate: 2016-01-04
       
  • Truthmakers, Moral Responsibility, and an Alleged Counterexample to Rule A
    • Abstract: Abstract Charles Hermes argues that the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility fails because one of the inference rules on which it relies, Rule A, is invalid. Rule A states that if a proposition p is broadly logically necessary, then p is true and no one is, or ever has been, even partly morally responsible for the fact that p. Hermes purports to offer a counterexample to Rule A which focuses on agents’ moral responsibility for disjunctions. Hermes’s objection is motivated by the idea that the logic of moral responsibility ought to be based on the logic of truthmakers rather than the logic of propositions. I show that the logic of moral responsibility does not track the logic of truthmakers and defend the validity of Rule A against Hermes’s objection.
      PubDate: 2016-01-04
       
  • What Do We Mean When We Ask “Why is There Something Rather Than
           Nothing?”
    • Abstract: Abstract Let’s call the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” the Question. There’s no consensus, of course, regarding which proposed answer to the Question, if any, is correct, but occasionally there’s also controversy regarding the meaning of the Question itself. In this paper I argue that such controversy persists because there just isn’t one unique interpretation of the Question. Rather, the puzzlement expressed by the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” varies depending on the ontology implicitly or explicitly endorsed by the speaker. In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that other proposals according to which the Question has one uniquely adequate interpretation are false. Second, I give several examples of the way in which the meaning of the Question can vary depending on the ontology to which it is coupled. Third, I explore the implications of my thesis for the manner in which we should approach future attempts to answer the Question.
      PubDate: 2015-12-17
       
  • On the Evolution of Truth
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper is concerned with how a simple metalanguage might coevolve with a simple descriptive base language in the context of interacting Skyrms–Lewis signaling games Lewis (Barrett and Skyrms in Br J Philos Sci, 2015; Lewis in Convention, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms in Signals evolution, learning, & information, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). We will first consider a metagame that evolves to track the successful and unsuccessful use of a coevolving base language, then we will consider a metagame that evolves a truth predicate for expressions in a coevolving base language. We will see how a metagame that tracks truth provides an endogenous way to break the symmetry between indicative and imperative interpretations of the base language. Finally, we will consider how composite signaling games provide a way to characterize alternative pragmatic notions of truth.
      PubDate: 2015-12-15
       
  • 3D Cohabitation
    • Abstract: Abstract The cohabitation theory is a popular solution to the problem of personal fission. It affirms that all the people who result from fission were there cohabiting the pre-fission body all along. Adopting this solution is an uncontroversial move for four-dimensionalists, but is it open to three-dimensionalists too? Some have thought so, but Katherine Hawley, Mark Johnston, and Eric Olson have argued to the contrary. They claim three-dimensionalists simply cannot be cohabitation theorists. In this paper, I explain how they can.
      PubDate: 2015-12-15
       
 
 
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