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 Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 396 journals)
 'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones       (Followers: 2) ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano Agone Aisthema, International Journal Aisthesis Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico       (Followers: 1) Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies       (Followers: 5) Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte Alpha (Osorno) American Journal of Theology & Philosophy       (Followers: 27) American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal       (Followers: 3) Analecta Hermeneutica Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía Análisis filosófico Analysis       (Followers: 15) Analytic Philosophy       (Followers: 11) Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia) Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia       (Followers: 1) Annuaire du Collège de France       (Followers: 2) Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research Apuntes Universitarios       (Followers: 1) Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades       (Followers: 1) Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie       (Followers: 2) Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie       (Followers: 4) Areté : Revista de Filosofia Argos       (Followers: 2) Assuming Gender       (Followers: 3) Astérion       (Followers: 2) Australasian Catholic Record, The       (Followers: 5) Australasian Journal of Philosophy       (Followers: 218) Australian Humanist, The       (Followers: 2) Australian Journal of Parapsychology       (Followers: 1) Axiomathes       (Followers: 4) Between the Species       (Followers: 2) Bijdragen       (Followers: 1) Bioethics Research Notes       (Followers: 11) BioéthiqueOnline       (Followers: 1) Biology and Philosophy       (Followers: 12) Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter       (Followers: 2) Bollettino Filosofico British Journal for the History of Philosophy       (Followers: 24) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science       (Followers: 25) British Journal of Aesthetics       (Followers: 18) Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale       (Followers: 4) Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, The       (Followers: 3) Cadernos do PET Filosofia Cadernos Nietzsche Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman Canadian Journal of Philosophy       (Followers: 12) Childhood & Philosophy       (Followers: 2) Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin       (Followers: 1) Church Heritage       (Followers: 7) Cinta de Moebio Circe de clásicos y modernos Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija Cognitive Semiotics       (Followers: 1) Collingwood and British Idealism Studies       (Followers: 1) Comparative and Continental Philosophy       (Followers: 7) Comparative Philosophy       (Followers: 8) Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação Constellations       (Followers: 8) Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture       (Followers: 8) Contemporary Chinese Thought       (Followers: 6) Contemporary Political Theory       (Followers: 22) Contemporary Pragmatism       (Followers: 1) Continental Philosophy Review       (Followers: 16) Contributions to the History of Concepts       (Followers: 3) Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy       (Followers: 5) CR : The New Centennial Review       (Followers: 1) Critical Horizons       (Followers: 2) Cuadernos de Bioetica Cuestiones de Filosofía Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology       (Followers: 3) Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana Dao       (Followers: 4) Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal Design Philosophy Papers       (Followers: 4) Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie       (Followers: 1) Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie       (Followers: 1) Diánoia Dilemata Diogenes       (Followers: 7) Doctor virtualis       (Followers: 2) EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education       (Followers: 1) Eidos       (Followers: 1) Eleutheria       (Followers: 1) Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication       (Followers: 1) Endeavour       (Followers: 4) Environmental Ethics Episteme       (Followers: 9) Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook       (Followers: 3) Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Erkenntnis       (Followers: 13) Escritos Essays in Philosophy       (Followers: 1) Estudios de Filosofía Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas

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 Erkenntnis   [SJR: 0.621]   [H-I: 16]   [15 followers]  Follow         Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)    ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106    Published by Springer-Verlag  [2302 journals]
• The Multiple Uses of Proper Nouns
• Abstract: Abstract In this essay I will defend the thesis that proper nouns are primarily used as proper names—as atomic singular referring expressions—and different possible predicative uses of proper nouns are derived from this primary use or an already derived secondary predicative use of proper nouns. There is a general linguistic phenomenon of the derivation of new meanings from already existing meanings of an expression. This phenomenon has different manifestations and different linguistic mechanisms can be used to establish derived meanings of different kinds of expressions. One prominent variation of these mechanisms was dubbed in Nunberg. (Linguist Philos 3:143–184, 1979, J Semant 12:109–132, 1995, The handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell, Oxford, 2004 meaning transfer.) In the essay I will distinguish two different sub-varieties of this mechanism: occurrent and lexical meaning transfer. Nunberg conceives of meaning transfer as a mechanism that allows us to derive a new truth-conditional meaning of an expression from an already existing truth-conditional meaning of this expression. I will argue that most predicative uses of proper nouns can be captured by the mentioned two varieties of truth-conditional meaning transfer. But there are also important exceptions like the predicative use of the proper noun ‘Alfred’ in as sentence like ‘Every Alfred that I met was a nice guy’. I will try to show that we cannot make use of truth-conditional meaning transfer to account for such uses and I will argue for a the existence of second variant of meaning transfer that I will call use-conditional meaning transfer and that allows us also to capture these derived meanings of proper nouns. Furthermore, I will try to show that the proposed explanation of multiple uses of proper nouns is superior to the view supported by defenders of a predicative view on proper names.
PubDate: 2015-05-01

• Names as Devices of Explicit Co-reference
• Abstract: Abstract This essay examines the syntax of names. It argues that names are a syntactically and not just semantically distinctive class of expressions. Its central claim is that names are a distinguished type of anaphoric device—devices of explicit co-reference. Finally it argues that appreciating the true syntactic distinctiveness of names is the key to resolving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles that have long been thought to be of a semantic nature.
PubDate: 2015-05-01

• Proper Names: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives
• PubDate: 2015-05-01

• Using Proper Names as Intermediaries Between Labelled Entity
Representations
• Abstract: Abstract This paper studies the uses of proper names within a communication-theoretic setting, looking at both the conditions that govern the use of a name by a speaker and those involved in the correct interpretation of the name by her audience. The setting in which these conditions are investigated is provided by an extension of Discourse Representation Theory, MSDRT, in which mental states are represented as combinations of propositional attitudes and entity representations (ERs). The first half of the paper presents the features of this framework that are needed to understand its application to the account of names that follows. N-labelled entity representations, where N is a proper name, play a pivotal part in this account: A speaker must have an N-labelled ER in order to be in a position to use a name N, and the interpreter must either have such a representation, or else construct one as part of his interpretation. The paper distinguishes different types of name uses in terms of what they presuppose about the role of N-labelled ERs on the side of the interpreter.
PubDate: 2015-05-01

• Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-existent
Without Meinongian Metaphysics
• Abstract: Abstract Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what our relationship as thinkers is to them. However, I argue this assumption only holds if you think your language, and in particular that aspect of it to do with referring to entities works in a specific way. This is the specific way generally assumed by the discipline called ‘Semantics’. I sketch out an alternative, call it global expressivism, in which talk of referring is given an expressivist, speech-act theoretic treatment. If we accept that our talk of the non-existent works as the global expressivist tells us it does, then the question of the metaphysical nature of non-existent entities is utterly void. You might say that Pegasus is empty of any metaphysical nature. Since the non-existent lacks any metaphysical nature, the metaphysics of the non-existent, Meinongianism, as a form of inquiry, lacks a subject matter, despite the fact that we talk happily, and indeed unavoidably, of the non-existent.
PubDate: 2015-05-01

• The Other Francis Bacon: On Non-BARE Proper Names
• Abstract: Abstract In this paper I provide novel arguments for the predicative approach to proper names, which claims that argument proper names are definite descriptions containing a naming predicate (the individual called X). I first argue that modified proper names, such as the incomparable Maria Callas or the other Francis Bacon cannot be handled on the hypothesis that argument proper names have no internal structure and uniformly denote entities. I then discuss cases like every Adolf, which would normally be interpreted as every individual named Adolf and show that the predicative approach to proper names can straightforwardly account for the distribution of a detectable naming component in proper names. Finally, I address the issue of proper names used as common nouns (such as a Rembrandt or the new Madonna) and plural proper names (e.g., the Beatles) and demonstrate that they do not form a homogenous group yet can be clearly distinguished on both syntactic and semantic grounds from proper names involving a detectable naming component.
PubDate: 2015-05-01

• Reference, Binding, and Presupposition: Three Perspectives on the
Semantics of Proper Names
• Abstract: Abstract Linguistics and philosophy have provided distinct views on the nature of reference to individuals in language. In philosophy, in particular in the tradition of direct reference, the distinction is between reference and description. In linguistics, in particular in the tradition of generative grammar, the distinction is between pronouns and R-expressions. I argue for a third conception, grounded in dynamic semantics, in which the main watershed is between definites, which trigger presuppositions that want to be bound, and indefinites, which set up new discourse referents. On this view, proper names, indexicals, and definite descriptions are all analyzed as presupposition triggers.
PubDate: 2015-05-01

• Referentialism and Predicativism About Proper Names
• PubDate: 2015-05-01

• The Same Name
• Abstract: Abstract When are two tokens of a name tokens of the same name? According to this paper, the answer is a matter of the historical connections between the tokens. For each name, there is a unique originating event, and subsequent tokens are tokens of that name only if they derive in an appropriate way from that originating event. The conditions for a token being a token of a given name are distinct from the conditions for preservation of the reference of a name. Hence a name may change its reference. Defending the theory requires considerations about the identity of acts, and about empty names and disagreement. The upshot is a causal theory of the identity of names, but not what would normally be counted as a causal theory of the reference of names. Although reference is often transmitted causally, what determines semantic reference is conventionalized speaker-reference.
PubDate: 2015-05-01

• Evidence, Significance, and Counterfactuals: Schramm on the New Riddle of
Induction
• Abstract: Abstract In a recent paper in this journal, Schramm (Erkenntnis 79:571–591, 2014) presents what he takes to be an answer to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. His solution relies on the technical notion of evidential significance, which is meant to distinguish two ways that evidence may bear on a hypothesis: either via support or confirmation. As he puts his view in slogan form: “confirmation is support by significant evidence” (p. 571). Once we make this distinction, Schramm claims, we see that Goodman’s famous riddle is dissolved, and we are no longer forced into the “intolerable result” that anything confirms anything. Schramm makes a number of incisive observations in his paper, but I do not think he has solved the New Riddle. There are two reasons for this. First, Schramm has an overly narrow conception of what the Riddle amounts to; I would venture to guess that it is narrower than that of most contemporary philosophers. Thus his proposal does not address the primary concern. Second, Schramm’s notion of significant evidence relies on a counterfactual condition that bears more than a passing resemblance to that made famous by Jackson in his (J Philos 72:113–131, 1975) paper on the topic. However, Jackson’s proposal faces several well-known counterexamples (and even charges of petitio principii), some of which can be adapted into Schramm’s framework. Schramm’s solution thus inherits a number of outstanding problems from Jackson’s proposal, which he has not shown us how to handle.
PubDate: 2015-04-23

• Evaluating Test Cases for Probabilistic Measures of Coherence
• Abstract: Abstract How can we determine the adequacy of a probabilistic coherence measure? A widely accepted approach to this question besides formulating adequacy constraints is to employ paradigmatic test cases consisting of a scenario providing a joint probability distribution over some specified set of propositions coupled with a normative coherence assessment for this set. However, despite the popularity of the test case approach, a systematic evaluation of the proposed test cases is still missing. This paper’s aim is to change this. Using a custom written computer program for the necessary probabilistic calculations a large number of coherence measures in an extensive collection of test cases is examined. The result is a detailed overview of the test case performance of any probabilistic coherence measures proposed so far. It turns out that none of the popular coherence measures such as Shogenji’s, Glass’ and Olsson’s, Fitelson’s or Douven and Meijs’ but two rather unnoticed measures perform best. This, however, does not mean that the other measures can be rejected straightforwardly. Instead, the results presented here are to be understood as a contribution among others to the project of finding adequate probabilistic coherence measures.
PubDate: 2015-04-17

• Composition, Indiscernibility, Coreferentiality
• Abstract: Abstract According to strong composition as identity (CAI), the logical principles of one–one and plural identity can and should be extended to the relation between a whole and its parts. Otherwise, composition would not be legitimately regarded as an identity relation. In particular, several defenders of strong CAI have attempted to extend Leibniz’s Law to composition. However, much less attention has been paid to another, not less important feature of standard identity: a standard identity statement is true iff its terms are coreferential. We contend that, if coreferentiality is dropped, indiscernibility is no help in making composition a genuine identity relation. To this aim, we analyse as a case study Cotnoir’s theory of general identity, in which indiscernibility is obtained thanks to a revisionary semantics and true identity statements are allowed to connect non-coreferential terms. We extend Cotnoir’s strategy for indiscernibility to the relation of comaternity, and we show that, neither in the case of composition nor in that of comaternity, indiscernibility contibutes to show that they are genuine identity relations. Finally, we compare Cotnoir’s approach with other versions of strong CAI endorsed by Wallace, Bøhn, and Hovda, and canvass the extent to which they violate coreferentiality. The comparative analysis shows that, in order to preserve coreferentiality, strong CAI is forced to adopt a non-standard semantic treatment of the singular/plural distinction.
PubDate: 2015-04-09

• The Fitch-Church Paradox and First Order Modal Logic
• Abstract: Abstract Reformulation strategies for solving Fitch’s paradox of knowability date back to Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985). Their core assumption is that the formula $$p\rightarrow \Diamond Kp$$ , from which the paradox originates, does not correctly express the intended meaning of the verification thesis (VT), which should concern possible knowledge of actual truths, and therefore the contradiction does not represent a logical refutation of verificationism. Supporters of these solutions claim that (VT) can be reformulated in a way that blocks the derivation of the paradox. Unfortunately, these reformulation proposals come with other problems, on both the logical and the philosophical side (see Percival in Aust J Philos 69:82–97, 1991; Williamson in Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; Wright in Realism, meaning and truth, Blackwell, Oxford, 1987). We claim that in order to make the reformulation idea consistent and adequate one should analyze the paradox from the point of view of a quantified modal language. An approach in this line was proposed by, among others, Kvanvig (Nous 29:481–499, 1995; The knowability paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) but was not fully developed in its technical details. Here we approach the paradox by means of a first order hybrid modal logic (FHL), a tool that strikes us as more adequate to express transworld reference and the rigidification needed to consistently express this idea. The outcome of our analysis is ambivalent. Given a first order formula we are able to express the fact that it is knowable in a way which is both consistent and adequate. However, one must give up the possibility of formulating (VT) as a substitution free schema of the kind $$p\rightarrow \Diamond Kp$$ . We propose that one may instead formulate (VT) by means of a recursive translation of the initial formula, being aware that many alternative translations are possible.
PubDate: 2015-04-09

• The Problem of Satisfaction Conditions and the Dispensability of i -Desire
• Abstract: Abstract The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires—what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie’s argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine desires. To this aim I will show that the same sort of puzzling phenomenon involved in our responses to tragic fictions arises also in a non-fictional case, and I will offer a solution to the problem of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. The key to the explanation is in the notion of condition-dependent desires triggered by fictions.
PubDate: 2015-04-08

• Junky Non-Worlds
• Abstract: Abstract A mereological structure is junky if and only if each of its elements is a proper part of some other. The young literature on junk has focused on junky worlds and whether they are counterexamples to unrestricted composition. The present note defends the possibility of junky structures that are not worlds. This possibility complicates a recent attempt in the literature to render junk consistent with a weakened form of unrestricted composition. The upshot is that junky non-worlds threaten the weakened form of unrestricted composition as much as junky worlds threaten the traditional version.
PubDate: 2015-04-01

• Some Puzzles and Unresolved Issues About Quantum Entanglement
• Abstract: Abstract Schrödinger (Proc Camb Philos Soc 31:555–563, 1935) averred that entanglement is the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics. The first part of this paper is simultaneously an exploration of Schrödinger’s claim and an investigation into the distinction between mere entanglement and genuine quantum entanglement. The typical discussion of these matters in the philosophical literature neglects the structure of the algebra of observables, implicitly assuming a tensor product structure of the simple Type I factor algebras used in ordinary Quantum Mechanics (QM). This limitation is overcome by adopting the algebraic approach to quantum physics, which allows a uniform treatment of ordinary QM, relativistic quantum field theory, and quantum statistical mechanics. The algebraic apparatus helps to distinguish several different criteria of quantum entanglement and to prove results about the relation of quantum entanglement to two additional ways of characterizing the classical versus quantum divide, viz. abelian versus non-abelian algebras of observables, and the ability versus inability to interrogate the system without disturbing it. Schrödinger’s claim is reassessed in the light of this discussion. The second part of the paper deals with the relativity-to-ambiguity threat: the entanglement of a state on a system algebra is entanglement of the state relative to a decomposition of the system algebra into subsystem algebras; a state may be entangled with respect to one decomposition but not another; hence, unless there is some principled way to choose a decomposition, entanglement is a radically ambiguous notion. The problem is illustrated in terms a Realist versus Pragmatist debate, the former claiming that the decomposition must correspond to real as opposed to virtual subsystems, while the latter claims that the real versus virtual distinction is bogus and that practical considerations can steer the choice of decomposition. This debate is applied to the fraught problem of measuring entanglement for indistinguishable particles. The paper ends with some (intentionally inflammatory) remarks about claims in the philosophical literature that entanglement undermines the separability or independence of subsystems while promoting holism.
PubDate: 2015-04-01

• Obituary for Patrick Suppes
• PubDate: 2015-04-01

• On Special Relativity and Temporal Illusions
• Abstract: Abstract According to metaphysical tensism, there is an objective, albeit ever changing, present moment corresponding to our phenomenal experiences (Ludlow in Philosophy of language, Oxford handbook on tense and aspect. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Brogaard and Marlow in Analysis 73(4):635–642, 2013). One of the principle objections to metaphysical tensism has been Einstein’s argument from special relativity, which says that given that the speed of light is constant, there is no absolute simultaneity defined in terms of observations of light rays (Einstein in Ann Phys 17:891–921, 1905). In a recent paper, Brogaard and Marlow (Analysis 73(4):635–642, 2013) argue that this objection fails. We argue that Brogaard and Marlow’s argument fails to show that special relativity does not pose a threat to metaphysical tensism.
PubDate: 2015-04-01

• Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem
• Abstract: Abstract It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues that that view (A) is irrational and (B) manifests a well-documented cognitive illusion.
PubDate: 2015-04-01

• When Fodor Met Frege
• Abstract: Abstract In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem (Among Others)"—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT (the language-of-thought hypothesis) provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (Fodor, LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.
PubDate: 2015-04-01

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