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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 565 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access  
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access  
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 29)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access  
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription  
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Budhi : A Journal of Ideas and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 19)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Controvérsia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Estética     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 38)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 8)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription  
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Filosofia e Educação     Open Access  
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Review of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Hegel Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription  
Hegel-Jahrbuch     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Heidegger Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences     Hybrid Journal  
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
HOPOS : The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Horizons philosophiques     Full-text available via subscription  
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Husserl Studies     Hybrid Journal  
HYBRIS, Revista de Filosofí­a     Open Access  
Hypnos. Revista do Centro de Estudos da Antiguidade     Open Access  
IAMURE International Journal of Literature, Philosophy & Religion     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Idealistic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Impact : The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain     Free   (Followers: 4)
Informal Logic     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Ingenium. Revista Electrónica de Pensamiento Moderno y Metodología en Historia de la Ideas     Open Access  
Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Intellèctus     Open Access  
Interações : Cultura e Comunidade     Open Access  
Interespe. Interdisciplinaridade e Espiritualidade na Educação     Open Access  
International Corporate Responsibility Series     Full-text available via subscription  
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 45)
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Journal for Transformative Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.621]   [H-I: 16]   [17 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2335 journals]
  • Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Logical Investigation
    • Abstract: Abstract From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why there is something rather than nothing (henceforth, the Question). Why-questions request a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version of the Question, namely ‘Why is there something contingent rather than nothing contingent?’ (except that possibility of answers with neutral free logic in the background is not explored). The categorial version of the Question, namely ‘Why is there something concrete rather than nothing concrete?’, is also discussed. The conclusion is reached that deductive explanations are question-begging, whether one works with classical logic or positive or negative free logic. I also look skeptically at the prospects of giving causal-counterfactual or probabilistic answers to the Question, although the discussion of the options is less comprehensive and the conclusions are more tentative. The meta-question, viz. ‘Should we not stop asking the Question’, is accordingly tentatively answered affirmatively.
      PubDate: 2016-07-20
       
  • Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper defends the view that perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees a cat” are sometimes intensional. I offer a range of examples of intensional perceptual ascriptions, respond to objections to intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions, and show how widely accepted semantic accounts of intensionality can explain the key features of intensional perceptual ascriptions.
      PubDate: 2016-07-14
       
  • “That Will Do”: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency
    • Abstract: Abstract We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency (often interpreted as obligation, resp. strong permission), as originally proposed in van Benthem (Bull Sect Log 8(1):36–41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of “obligation as weakest permission” from Anglberger et al. (Rev Symb Log 8(4):807–827, 2015).
      PubDate: 2016-07-11
       
  • Erratum to: Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive
           Penetration
    • PubDate: 2016-06-30
       
  • The Fragility of Common Knowledge
    • Abstract: Abstract Ordinary common knowledge is formally expressed by strong probabilistic common belief. How strong exactly? The question can be answered by drawing from the similar equivalence, recently explored, between plain and probabilistic individual beliefs. I argue that such a move entails that common knowledge displays a double fragility: as a description of a collective state and as a phenomenon, because it can respectively disappear as group size increases, or more worryingly as the epistemic context changes. I argue that despite this latter fragility, the effects of common knowledge on action are robust. Unfortunately, this in turn leads to a third fragility, that of the concept of common knowledge, which threatens to collapse on probabilistic common belief. This also reveals a disanalogy between the individual and the collective cases. I finally pinpoint the subtle difference entailed by the two concepts, expressed in terms of the attitude towards contrary evidence or of the agents’ awareness. As a result, common knowledge can be defended as a concept, which refers to a fragile yet distinct collective attitude.
      PubDate: 2016-06-30
       
  • Decision Theoretic Model of the Productivity Gap
    • Abstract: Abstract Using a decision theoretic model of scientists’ time allocation between potential research projects I explain the fact that on average women scientists publish less research papers than men scientists. If scientists are incentivised to publish as many papers as possible, then it is necessary and sufficient for a productivity gap to arise that women scientists anticipate harsher treatment of their manuscripts than men scientists anticipate for their manuscripts. I present evidence that women do expect harsher treatment and that scientists’ are incentivised to publish as many papers as possible, and discuss some epistemological consequences of this conjecture.
      PubDate: 2016-06-25
       
  • Probabilism, Representation Theorems, and Whether Deliberation Crowds Out
           Prediction
    • Abstract: Abstract Decision-theoretic representation theorems have been developed and appealed to in the service of two important philosophical projects: (a) in attempts to characterise credences in terms of preferences, and (b) in arguments for probabilism. Theorems developed within the formal framework that Savage developed have played an especially prominent role here. I argue that the use of these ‘Savagean’ theorems create significant difficulties for both projects, but particularly the latter. The origin of the problem directly relates to the question of whether we can have credences regarding acts currently under consideration and the consequences which depend on those acts; I argue that such credences are possible. Furthermore, I argue that attempts to use Jeffrey’s non-Savagean theorem (and similar theorems) in the service of these two projects may not fare much better.
      PubDate: 2016-06-16
       
  • Combining Analogical Support in Pure Inductive Logic
    • Abstract: Abstract We investigate the relative probabilistic support afforded by the combination of two analogies based on possibly different, structural similarity (as opposed to e.g. shared predicates) within the context of Pure Inductive Logic and under the assumption of Language Invariance. We show that whilst repeated analogies grounded on the same structural similarity only strengthen the probabilistic support this need not be the case when combining analogies based on different structural similarities. That is, two analogies may provide less support than each would individually.
      PubDate: 2016-06-15
       
  • Against the Complex versus Simple Distinction
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper examines three proposals on the difference between the complex and the simple view about personal identity: Parfit’s original introduction of the distinction, Gasser and Stefan’s definition, and Noonan’s recent proposal. I argue that the first two classify the paradigm cases of simplicity as complex, while Noonan’s proposal makes simplicity and complexity turn on features whose relevance for the distinction is questionable. Given these difficulties, I examine why we should be interested in whether a position is complex or simple. I describe two purposes of having a distinction, and show that extant accounts of the complex versus simple distinction fail to serve these. I argue that unless we find a satisfying account of the difference between complex and simple positions, we should not frame discourses on personal identity in these terms.
      PubDate: 2016-06-07
       
  • On Ian Hacking’s Notion of Style of Reasoning
    • Abstract: Abstract The analytical notion of ‘scientific style of reasoning’, introduced by Ian Hacking in the middle of the 1980s, has become widespread in the literature of the history and philosophy of science. However, scholars have rarely made explicit the philosophical assumptions and the research objectives underlying the notion of style: what are its philosophical roots? How does the notion of style fit into the area of research of historical epistemology? What does a comparison between the Hacking’s project on styles of thinking and other similar projects suggest? My aim in this paper is to answer these questions. Hacking has denied that his project of styles of thinking falls into the field of historical epistemology. I shall challenge his remark by tracing out the connections of the notion of style with historical epistemology and, more in general, with a tradition of thought born in France in the beginning of twentieth-century.
      PubDate: 2016-06-04
       
  • Material Constitution is Ad Hoc
    • Abstract: Abstract The idea that two objects can coincide—by sharing all their proper parts, or matter—yet be non-identical, results in the “Problem of Coincident Objects”: in what relation do objects stand if they are not identical but share all their proper parts? One solution is to introduce material constitution. In this paper, I argue that this is ad hoc since, first, this solution cannot be generalized to solve similar (real) problems, and, second, there are pseudo cases of coincidence that should not trigger the introduction of material constitution and these cannot be distinguished in any principled way from the allegedly real cases of coincidence.
      PubDate: 2016-06-03
       
  • Carnap’s Relevance Measure as a Probabilistic Measure of Coherence
    • Abstract: Abstract Tomoji Shogenji is generally assumed to be the first author to have presented a probabilistic measure of coherence. Interestingly, Rudolf Carnap in his Logical Foundations of Probability discussed a function that is based on the very same idea, namely his well-known relevance measure. This function is largely neglected in the coherence literature because it has been proposed as a measure of evidential support and still is widely conceived as such. The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate Carnap’s measure regarding its plausibility as a candidate for a probabilistic measure of coherence by comparing it to Shogenji’s. It turns out that both measures (i) satisfy and violate the same adequacy constraints, (ii) despite not being ordinally equivalent exhibit a strong correlation with each other in a Monte Carlo simulation and (iii) perform similarly in a series of test cases for probabilistic coherence measures.
      PubDate: 2016-06-02
       
  • Understanding the Intentions Behind the Referential/Attributive
           Distinction
    • Abstract: Abstract In his recently published John Locke Lectures, Saul Kripke attempts to capture Keith Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction for definite descriptions using a distinction between general and specific intentions. I argue that although Kripke’s own way of capturing the referential/attributive distinction is inadequate, we can use general and specific intentions to successfully capture the distinction if we also distinguish between primary and secondary intentions. An attributive use is characterized by the fact that the general intention is either the primary or only designative intention, whereas a referential use occurs when a specific intention is either the primary or only designative intention. Along the way, accounts of the referential/attributive distinction offered by John Searle and by Kepa Korta and John Perry come in for criticism as well, and we’ll also discuss Michael O’Rourke’s dual-aspect uses of definite descriptions.
      PubDate: 2016-06-02
       
  • Simon Friederich: Interpreting Quantum Theory: A Therapeutic Approach
    • PubDate: 2016-06-02
       
  • The Developmental Challenge to the Paradox of Pain
    • Abstract: Abstract People seem to perceive and locate pains in bodily locations, but also seem to conceive of pains as mental states that can be introspected. However, pains cannot be both bodily and mental, at least according to most conceptions of these two categories: mental states are not the kind of entities that inhabit body parts. How are we to resolve this paradox of pain (Aydede in Pain: new papers on its nature and the methodology of its study. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006a; Hill in Pain: new papers on its nature and the methodology of its study. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006)? In this paper, I put forward what I call the ‘Developmental Challenge’, tackling the second pillar of this paradox, i.e. the introspectionist (or mental-state) view of pain according to which (A) genuine pain reports are introspective reports. This view forms an inconsistent triad with two other widely held positions: (B) young children make genuine pain reports, and (C) young children do not make introspective reports. After introducing the paradox and the introspectionist view of pain in part 1, I present the developmental challenge, and defend both (B) and (C). I conclude that the inconsistent triad can only be resolved by reconsidering the introspectionist view of pain. In discussing three potential factors that lead to the puzzling intricacies of our concept of pain, I argue that the concept of pain might not be paradoxical after all.
      PubDate: 2016-06-02
       
  • Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of
           the Logic of Science
    • Abstract: Abstract Weight of evidence continues to be a powerful metaphor within formal approaches to epistemology. But attempts to construe the metaphor in precise and useful ways have encountered formidable obstacles. This paper shows that two quite different understandings of evidential weight can be traced back to one 1878 article by C.S. Peirce. One conception, often associated with I.J. Good, measures the balance or net weight of evidence, while the other, generally associated with J.M. Keynes, measures the gross weight of evidence. Conflations of these two notions have contributed to misunderstandings in the literature on weight. This paper shows why Peirce developed each conception of weight, why he distinguished them, and why they are easily mistaken for one another.
      PubDate: 2016-06-01
       
  • Tarski’s 1944 Polemical Remarks and Naess’ “Experimental
           Philosophy”
    • Abstract: Abstract Many of Tarski’s better known papers are either about or include lengthy discussions of how to properly define various concepts: truth, logical consequence, semantic concepts, or definability. In general, these papers identify two primary conditions for successful definitions: formal correctness and material (or intuitive) adequacy. Material adequacy requires that the concept expressed by the formal definition capture the intuitive content of truth. Our primary interest in this paper is to better understand Tarski’s thinking about material adequacy, and whether components of his view developed over time. More precisely, we are concerned with how Tarski’s understanding of the content of the common-sense, every-day usage of truth may have developed over time. We distinguish this concern from the character of the extensional criterion of adequacy Tarski proposes: that a materially adequate definition must entail all instances of Convention T. We will develop our reading of Tarski as follows: first, we will review the “Polemical Remarks,” focusing primarily on §§14 and 17, and Tarski’s references to Naess’ empirical research. Next, we will provide a summary and discussion of Naess’ work, especially his findings with respect to Tarski’s definition of truth and his research that suggests there is no single common or everyday concept of truth. Third, we will consider several possible objections to our interpretation of the Tarski–Naess dialectic. We will conclude that Tarski’s conception of material adequacy developed over time, potentially because of what he had learned through his interactions with Naess.
      PubDate: 2016-06-01
       
  • What it Means to Live in a Virtual World Generated by Our Brain
    • Abstract: Abstract Recent discussions in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind have defended a theory according to which we live in a virtual world akin to a computer simulation, generated by our brain. It is argued that our brain creates a model world from a variety of stimuli; this model is perceived as if it was external and perception-independent, even though it is neither of the two. The view of the mind, brain, and world, entailed by this theory (here called “virtual world theory”) has some peculiar consequences which have rarely been explored in detail. This paper sets out virtual world theory (1.1) and relates it to various central philosophical problems (indirect realism (1.2), the role of the perceiver (1.3) and the problem of the existence of the external world (1.4)). The second part suggests three interpretations of virtual world theory, two familiar ones (a strong and a weak one, 2.1) and a somewhat less familiar one (the irrealist interpretation, 2.2). The remainder of the paper argues that the irrealist interpretation is the one we should adopt (2.3–2.6).
      PubDate: 2016-06-01
       
  • Why We Cannot Learn from Minimal Models
    • Abstract: Abstract Philosophers of science have developed several accounts of how consideration of scientific models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In recent years, various authors advocated the thesis that consideration of so-called minimal models can prompt learning about such targets. In this paper, I draw on the philosophical literature on scientific modelling and on widely cited illustrations from economics and biology to argue that this thesis fails to withstand scrutiny. More specifically, I criticize leading proponents of such thesis for failing to explicate in virtue of what properties or features minimal models supposedly prompt learning and for substantially overstating the epistemic import of minimal models. I then examine and refute several arguments one may put forward to demonstrate that consideration of minimal models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In doing so, I illustrate the implications of my critique for the wider debate on the epistemology of scientific modelling.
      PubDate: 2016-06-01
       
  • Dispositions and Tricks
    • Abstract: Abstract According to the Simple Conditional Analysis of disposition ascriptions, disposition ascriptions are to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. The Simple Conditional Analysis is notoriously vulnerable to counterexamples. In this paper, I introduce a new sort of counterexample to the Simple Conditional Analysis of disposition ascriptions, which I call ‘tricks’. I then explore a number of possible strategies to modify the Simple Conditional Analysis so as to avoid tricks and conclude that, in order to avoid tricks, the associated counterfactual should be evaluated at the closest possible world(s) at which the manifestation of the (alleged) disposition does not obtain.
      PubDate: 2016-06-01
       
 
 
JournalTOCs
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