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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 661 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Albertus Magnus     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 35)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Análisis     Open Access  
Análisis : Revista de investigación filosófica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Angewandte Philosophie / Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal  
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anuario Filosófico     Full-text available via subscription  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Augustiniana     Full-text available via subscription  
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 55)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 21)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Claridades : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 23)
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Creativity Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Diagonal : Zeitschrift der Universität Siegen     Hybrid Journal  
Dialectic : A scholarly journal of thought leadership, education and practice in the discipline of visual communication design     Open Access  
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dirosat : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
En Líneas Generales     Open Access  
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Estética     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 49)
Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Études phénoménologiques : Phenomenological Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 10)
European Journal of Islamic Finance     Open Access  
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 53)
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
Filozofia Chrześcijańska     Open Access  
Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.699
  Citation Impact (citeScore): 24
  Number of Followers: 18  
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2350 journals]
  • Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning
    • Authors: Rush T. Stewart; Ignacio Ojea Quintana
      Pages: 369 - 389
      Abstract: We explore which types of probabilistic updating commute with convex IP pooling (Stewart and Ojea Quintana 2017). Positive results are stated for Bayesian conditionalization (and a mild generalization of it), imaging, and a certain parameterization of Jeffrey conditioning. This last observation is obtained with the help of a slight generalization of a characterization of (precise) externally Bayesian pooling operators due to Wagner (Log J IGPL 18(2):336–345, 2009). These results strengthen the case that pooling should go by imprecise probabilities since no precise pooling method is as versatile.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9894-2
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Emergence, Dependence, and Fundamentality
    • Authors: Olley Pearson
      Pages: 391 - 402
      Abstract: In a recent paper Barnes proposes to characterize ontological emergence by identifying the emergent entities with those entities which are both fundamental and dependent. Barnes offers characterizations of the notions of fundamentality and dependence, but is cautious about committing to the specifics of these notions. This paper argues that Barnes’s characterization of emergence is problematic in several ways. Firstly, emergence is a relation, and merely delimiting relata of this relation tells us little about it. Secondly, the group of entities delimited as dependent and fundamental do not appear to be the group of emergent entities. Rather, some entities appear to be dependent and fundamental and not emergent, whilst other entities appear to be emergent and not dependent and fundamental. The moral drawn is that in order to provide a characterization of emergence one must go beyond what Barnes says explicitly. It is also shown that a potentially fruitful way of doing this would be to further specify the notion of dependence at issue revealing it to be asymmetric and perhaps merely nomological.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9895-1
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Actuality, Tableaux, and Two-Dimensional Modal Logics
    • Authors: Fabio Lampert
      Pages: 403 - 443
      Abstract: In this paper we present tableau methods for two-dimensional modal logics. Although models for such logics are well known, proof systems remain rather unexplored as most of their developments have been purely axiomatic. The logics herein considered contain first-order quantifiers with identity, and all the formulas in the language are doubly-indexed in the proof systems, with the upper indices intuitively representing the actual or reference worlds, and the lower indices representing worlds of evaluation—first and second dimensions, respectively. The tableaux modulate over different notions of validity such as local, general, and diagonal, besides being general enough for several two-dimensional logics proposed in the literature. We also motivate the introduction of a new operator into two-dimensional languages and explore some of the philosophical questions raised by it concerning the relations there are between actuality, necessity, and the a priori, that seem to undermine traditional intuitive interpretations of two-dimensional operators.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9896-0
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Objectivity, Historicity, Taxonomy
    • Authors: Joeri Witteveen
      Pages: 445 - 463
      Abstract: In Objectivity (2007), Daston and Galison argue that scientific objectivity has a history. Objectivity emerged as a distinct nineteenth-century “epistemic virtue,” flanked in time by other epistemic virtues. The authors trace the origins of scientific objectivity by identifying changes in images from scientific atlases from different periods, but they emphasize that the same history could be narrated using different sorts of scientific objects. One could, for example, focus on the changing uses of “type specimens” in biological taxonomy. Daston (Crit Inq 31(1):153–182, 2004) indeed provides a detailed account of the history of the type specimen which purports to show this. I argue that this attempt hinges on a conceptual confusion and therefore fails. I show that the actual history of the type specimen does not reinforce the account of epistemic virtues from Objectivity, but rather threatens to subvert it.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9897-z
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity
    • Authors: Matthew Tugby
      Pages: 465 - 476
      Abstract: The Platonic account of modality says, roughly, that truths about alien possibilities are grounded in uninstantiated universals. Recently, Ingram has raised a problem for this kind of view, which is that it apparently requires negative facts to play a truthmaking role. Ingram offers an alternative Platonic account which makes use of modal instantiation relations. In this paper, I highlight some of the costs of Ingram’s new account and argue that a more appealing version of Platonism—and modal theory in general—is one that is supplemented with an ontology of totality facts.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9898-y
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Who is Afraid of Commitment' On the Relation of Scientific Evidence
           and Conceptual Theory
    • Authors: Steffen Steinert; Joachim Lipski
      Pages: 477 - 500
      Abstract: Can scientific evidence prompt us to revise philosophical theories or folk theoretical accounts of phenomena of the mind' We will argue that it can—but only under the condition that they make a so-called ‘ontological commitment’ to something that is actually subject to empirical inquiry. In other words, scientific evidence pertaining to neuroanatomical structure or causal processes only has a refuting effect if philosophical theories and folk notions subscribe to either account. We will illustrate the importance of ‘ontological commitment’ with the ‘neuroanatomical approach’ to amusement as proposed in a recent paper by Palencik (Dialogue 46(3):419–434, 2007). We will show that the scientific evidence presented in said neuroanatomical approach has no bearing on the conceptual issues, in that the philosophical theories and folk distinction that are criticized do not subscribe to any account of the underlying neuroanatomical structure or causal processes. Our suggestions in this paper are not limited to philosophical accounts of humor but apply to the relationship of philosophy, common sense and science in general.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9899-x
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • The Problem of Error: The Moral Psychology Argument for Atheism
    • Authors: John Jung Park
      Pages: 501 - 516
      Abstract: The problem of error is an old argument for atheism that can be found in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Although it is not widely discussed in the contemporary literature in the Philosophy of Religion, I resurrect it and give it a modern spin. By relying on empirical studies in moral psychology that demonstrate that moral judgments from human beings are generally susceptible to certain psychological biases, such as framing and order effects, I claim that if God is responsible for making human beings such that we have these biases, this means that God is not a perfect being. The findings in empirical moral psychology create a problem for the existence of God, traditionally conceived.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9900-8
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • The Moral Agency of Group Agents
    • Authors: Christopher Thompson
      Pages: 517 - 538
      Abstract: Christian List and Philip Pettit have recently developed a model of group agency on which an autonomous group agent can be formed, by deductive inference, from the beliefs and preferences of the individual group members. In this paper I raise doubts as to whether this type of group agent is a moral agent. The sentimentalist approach to moral responsibility sees a constitutive role for moral emotions, such as blame, guilt, and indignation, in our practices of attributing moral responsibility. These moral emotions are important for the alignment of moral understandings, and for valuing other members of the moral community. I argue that while the intentional objects of beliefs and preferences are propositions, the intentional objects of moral emotions are other agents. Because agents are not subject to rules of inference, we cannot generate group agent emotions—such as guilt—in the same way as we can generate group agent beliefs and preferences. And because the group agents lack moral emotions, we have reason to resist treating them as moral agents.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9901-7
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Derivational Robustness and Indirect Confirmation
    • Authors: Aki Lehtinen
      Pages: 539 - 576
      Abstract: Derivational robustness may increase the degree to which various pieces of evidence indirectly confirm a robust result. There are two ways in which this increase may come about. First, if one can show that a result is robust, and that the various individual models used to derive it also have other confirmed results, these other results may indirectly confirm the robust result. Confirmation derives from the fact that data not known to bear on a result are shown to be relevant when it is shown to be robust. Second, robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly confirmed if it increases the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms it. This may happen when it strengthens the connection between the core and the robust result by showing that auxiliaries are not responsible for the result.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9902-6
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Persons, Stages, and Tensed Belief
    • Authors: Nicholas Rimell
      Pages: 577 - 593
      Abstract: Perdurantists hold that we persons—just like other ordinary objects—persist by perduring, by having temporal parts, or stages, located over time. Perdurantists also standardly endorse the B-theory of time. And, in light of this endorsement, they typically characterize our tensed beliefs as self-ascriptions of properties, made not by us but by our stages. For instance, for me to believe that Angela Merkel is currently the chancellor of Germany is for my now-located stage to self-ascribe the property of being simultaneous with Merkel’s chancellorship. The problem with this way of understanding tensed belief is that it undermines—if not outright contradicts—the perdurantist’s best options for resisting the Too Many Thinkers objection. In what follows, I show why this is. I then consider what I take to be the perdurantist’s most promising alternative account of tensed belief. I argue that this alternative either leaves perdurantists no better off with respect to the Too Many Thinkers objection or, instead, leaves them vulnerable to another objection, one that they would otherwise have no problem resisting.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9903-5
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the
           “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy
    • Authors: Zoe Ashton; Moti Mizrahi
      Pages: 595 - 612
      Abstract: The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust’s Digital Library, which provide some empirical support for the second rather than the first hypothesis. Our data also suggest that appealing to intuition is a much older philosophical methodology than the “received wisdom” alleges. We then discuss the implications of our findings for the contemporary debate over philosophical methodology.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9904-4
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Singular Thought, Cognitivism, and Conscious Attention
    • Authors: Heimir Geirsson
      Pages: 613 - 626
      Abstract: The focus of this paper will be on singular thoughts. In the first section I will present Jeshion’s cognitivism; a view that holds that one should characterize singular thoughts by their cognitive roles. In the second section I will argue that, contrary to Jeshion’s claims, results from studies of object tracking in cognitive psychology do not support cognitivism. In the third section I will discuss Jeshion’s easy transmission of singular thought and argue that it ignores a relevant distinction between general and specific understanding of names. Finally, the last section will argue that conscious attention should replace Jeshion’s significance condition as a necessary condition for one to have a singular thought. The paper will show that we need to take seriously the acquaintance requirement for singular thoughts, as even the easy transmission of singular thoughts with the use of names will be called into question.
      PubDate: 2018-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9905-3
      Issue No: Vol. 83, No. 3 (2018)
  • Simplicity and the Meaning of Mental Association
    • Authors: Mike Dacey
      Abstract: Some thoughts just come to mind together. This is usually thought to happen because they are connected by associations, which the mind follows. Such an explanation assumes that there is a particular kind of simple psychological process responsible. This view has encountered criticism recently. In response, this paper aims to characterize a general understanding of associative simplicity, which might support the distinction between associative processing and alternatives. I argue that there are two kinds of simplicity that are treated as characteristic of association, and as a result three possible versions of associative processing. This provides a framework that informs our understanding of association as a current and historical concept, including how various specific versions in different parts of psychology relate to one another. This framework can also guide debates over normative evaluations of actions produced by processes thought to be associative.
      PubDate: 2018-05-02
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0005-9
  • On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief
    • Authors: Jakob Koscholke
      Abstract: Thomas Kroedel has recently proposed an interesting Pareto-style condition on permissible belief. Despite the condition’s initial plausibility, this paper aims at providing a counterexample to it. The example is based on the view that a proper condition on permissible belief should not give permission to believe a proposition that undermines one’s belief system or whose epistemic standing decreases in the light of one’s de facto beliefs.
      PubDate: 2018-04-19
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0003-y
  • Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements
    • Authors: Fabienne Peter
      Abstract: The recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational response question: how are you rationally required to respond to a doxastic disagreement with someone, especially with someone you take to be your epistemic peer' A doxastic disagreement with someone also confronts you with a slightly different question. This question, call it the epistemic trust question, is: how much should you trust our own epistemic faculties relative to the epistemic faculties of others' Answering the epistemic trust question is important for the epistemology of disagreement because it sheds light on the rational response question. My main aim in this paper is to argue—against recent attempts to show otherwise—that epistemic self-trust does not provide a reason for remaining steadfast in doxastic disagreements with others.
      PubDate: 2018-04-18
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0004-x
  • An Ontology of Words
    • Authors: Nurbay Irmak
      Abstract: Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosophical work done about what words really are. In this paper, I develop a new ontology for words. I argue that (a) words are abstract artifacts that are created to fulfill various kinds of purposes, and (b) words are abstract in the sense that they are not located in space but they have a beginning and may have an end in time given that certain conditions are met. What follows from this two-fold argument is that words, from an ontological point of view, are more like musical works, fictional characters or computer programs, than numbers or sets.
      PubDate: 2018-04-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0001-0
  • What Jancis Robinson Didn’t Know May Have Helped Her
    • Authors: David C. Sackris
      Abstract: A position has been advanced by a number of philosophers, notably by Burnham and Skilleås, that certain knowledge is required to aesthetically appreciate a fine wine. They further argue that pleasure is not an integral part of aesthetically appreciating wine. Their position implies that a novice cannot aesthetically appreciate a fine wine. This paper draws on research into tasting and psychology to rebut these claims. I argue that there is strong evidence from both the average consumer and from wine experts that they are unable to separate enjoyment from aesthetic evaluation; secondly, I argue that wine knowledge may actually preclude tasting of the wine as it exists in the glass due to perceptual bias. I conclude by arguing that it is unclear how exactly knowledge of things like terroir is supposed to affect the taste, as well as question what role conforming to a certain style plays in aesthetic success, as arguments that require knowledge for appreciation typically emphasize knowledge of styles of wine.
      PubDate: 2018-04-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-9981-z
  • Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from
    • Authors: Pär Sundström
      Abstract: In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like “blue” and “red”. This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of “learning” are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot “learn” a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a distinction, we can and do sometimes “learn” a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional “abstractionist” views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about “abstracting” concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about “the learning-nonlearning distinction”.
      PubDate: 2018-04-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0002-z
  • Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with
           Russellian Panpsychism'
    • Authors: Hedda Hassel Mørch
      Abstract: The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism, known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that the theories are not compatible as they currently stand, in view of what I call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I will offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all, and jointly enable significant progress on the mind–body problem.
      PubDate: 2018-04-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-9995-6
  • Counterfactual Reasoning, Realism and Quantum Mechanics: Much Ado About
    • Authors: Federico Laudisa
      Abstract: I show why old and new claims on the role of counterfactual reasoning for the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem are unjustified: once the logical relation between locality and counterfactual reasoning is clarified, the use of the latter does no harm and the nonlocality result can well follow from the EPR premises. To show why, after emphasizing the role of incompleteness arguments that Einstein developed before the EPR paper, I critically review more recent claims that equate the use of counterfactual reasoning with the assumption of a strong form of realism and argue that such claims are untenable.
      PubDate: 2018-04-03
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-9997-4
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