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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 834 journals)
Showing 401 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
Journal of Social Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Journal of the American Philosophical Association     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Journal of the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 49)
Journal of the Philosophy of Games     Open Access  
Journal of the Philosophy of History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of the Sociology and Theory of Religion     Open Access  
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Journal of World Philosophies     Open Access  
Journal on Computational Thinking (JCThink)     Open Access  
Juris (Jurnal Ilmiah Syariah)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Jurisprudence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Jurnal Dinamika Penelitian : Media Komunikasi Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan     Open Access  
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam (Journal of Islamic Economics and Business)     Open Access  
Jurnal Filsafat     Open Access  
Jurnal Living Hadis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Jurnal Theologia     Open Access  
Jurnal Ushuluddin     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Jus Cogens : A Critical Journal of Philosophy of Law and Politics     Hybrid Journal  
Kader     Open Access  
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Kalagatos : Philosophical Journal     Open Access  
KALAM     Open Access  
Kant Yearbook     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Kant-Studien     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Kantian Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Kervan. International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies     Open Access  
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Kirke og Kultur     Full-text available via subscription  
Kodifikasia     Open Access  
Kontemplasi : Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin     Open Access  
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
KÜLLİYAT Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi     Open Access  
Kultura i Wartości     Open Access  
Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal     Open Access  
Labyrinth : An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics     Open Access  
Labyrinthe     Open Access  
Las Torres de Lucca : Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política     Open Access  
Lato Sensu : Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences     Open Access  
Laval théologique et philosophique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Law, Ethics and Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Le foucaldien     Open Access  
Le Portique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Leadership and the Humanities     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Lebenswelt : Aesthetics and philosophy of experience     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Les ateliers de l’éthique : The Ethics Forum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg     Open Access  
Letras : Órgano de la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Huamans     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Levinas Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Lexicon Philosophicum : International Journal for the History of Texts and Ideas     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Library Philosophy and Practice     Open Access   (Followers: 68)
Límite : Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología     Open Access  
Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Linguistics and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Locke Studies     Open Access  
Logic and Logical Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Logique et Analyse     Full-text available via subscription  
Logos & Episteme     Full-text available via subscription  
Logos i Ethos     Open Access  
Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica     Open Access  
Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Macalester Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Manuscrito     Open Access  
Marwah : Jurnal Perempuan, Agama dan Jender     Open Access  
Mayéutica     Hybrid Journal  
Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Mediterranea : International Journal on the Transfer of Knowledge     Open Access  
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences     Open Access  
MELINTAS     Open Access  
Metafísica y persona     Open Access  
Metaphilosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Metaphor and Symbol     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Metaphysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metaphysics     Open Access  
Méthexis International Journal for Ancient Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Methodos     Open Access  
Midéo : Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales     Open Access  
Midwest Studies In Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Millennium     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Mind     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 56)
Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica     Open Access  
Mises : Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics     Open Access  
Mizar : Costellazione di pensieri     Open Access  
Modernos & Contemporâneos : International Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Moral Philosophy and Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Mouseion: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
Muslim Heritage     Open Access  
Mutatis Mutandis : Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Myth & Symbol     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Naturaleza y Libertad : Revista de estudios interdisciplinares     Open Access  
New Nietzsche Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Newman Studies Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Nietzsche-Studien     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nietzscheforschung     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Noctua. La tradizione filosofica dall'antico al moderno     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Nóema     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Noesis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Nordic Journal of Aesthetics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Nordic Wittgenstein Review     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Nordisk Judaistik / Scandinavian Jewish Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift     Open Access  
Nous     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
NTU Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Nuansa : Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu Sosial dan Keagamaan Islam     Open Access  
O Que Nos Faz Pensar : Cadernos do Departamento de Filosofia da PUC-Rio     Open Access  
Oksident     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Online Journal of Health Ethics     Open Access  
Open Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Open Philosophy     Open Access  
Outlines. Critical Practice Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Overheard in Seville : Bulletin of the Santayana Society     Full-text available via subscription  
Oxímora : Revista Internacional de Ética y Política     Open Access  
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Páginas de Filosofía     Open Access  
PAN: Philosophy Activism Nature     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Paradigmi     Full-text available via subscription  
Paragrana - Internationale Zeitschrift für Historische Anthropologie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Paralaxe     Open Access  
Patristica et Mediævalia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Pelícano     Open Access  
Pensamiento Actual     Open Access  
Pensamiento y Cultura     Open Access  
Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica     Open Access  
Pensar : Revista Eletrônica da FAJE     Open Access  
Performance Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Person-Centered & Experiential Psychotherapies     Hybrid Journal  
Persona Studies     Open Access  
Persona y Bioetica     Open Access  
Perspectivas : Revista de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Tocantins     Open Access  
Perspectives. International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Phenomenology and Mind     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philia&Filia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philo : A Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Philonsorbonne     Open Access  
Philosophers' Imprint     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
philoSOPHIA     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Philosophia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Philosophia Africana     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Philosophia Reformata     Hybrid Journal  
Philosophia Scientiæ     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philosophic Exchange     Open Access  
Philosophical Books     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Inquiry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Philosophical Inquiry in Education     Open Access  
Philosophical Investigations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Philosophical Issues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Philosophical Magazine Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Papers     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Philosophical Papers and Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Philosophical Perspectives     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)     Open Access  
Philosophical Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38)
Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 56)
Philosophical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Philosophical Topics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Philosophie antique : Problèmes, Renaissances, Usages     Full-text available via subscription  
Philosophies     Open Access  
Philosophique     Open Access  
Philosophiques     Open Access  
Philosophische Rundschau     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Philósophos : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Philosophy & Public Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Philosophy & Social Criticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Philosophy & Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Philosophy & Theory in Biology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Philosophy and Literature     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 26)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
Philosophy and Progress     Open Access  
Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia e Questioni Pubbliche     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Philosophy and Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Philosophy and Theology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Philosophy Compass     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Philosophy East and West     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Philosophy in Review     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Philosophy in the Contemporary World     Full-text available via subscription  
Philosophy Now     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 27)
Philosophy Today     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Phronesis : A journal for Ancient Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Phronimon     Open Access  
Poiesis & Praxis : International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Pólemos     Open Access  
Polis : The Journal of the Society for Greek Political Thought     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Polish Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Poroi     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne     Open Access  
Pragmatics & Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Pragmatics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)

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Philosophies
Number of Followers: 0  

  This is an Open Access Journal Open Access journal
ISSN (Online) 2409-9287
Published by MDPI Homepage  [222 journals]
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 6: Empathy and Vicarious Experience.
           Congruence or Identical Emotion'

    • Authors: Patricia Brunsteins
      First page: 6
      Abstract: Feeling empathy is something that happens, an experience we can remember once we have had it, or an experience we would like to have. I consider empathy, from an integral point of view (i.e., cognitive and emotive aspects are part of empathy), as the capacity of putting oneself in the place of others. Although, by this time, my general characterization of empathy will not be discussed, I will focus on one question about empathy for which there is still no agreement: whether the emotion of the person experiencing empathy must be identical or not to the emotion felt by the person being empathized with. The aim of this work is, firstly, to reduce the four possibilities about the relationship between the empathizer’s emotion and the emotion felt by the person who is the target of empathy to two exhaustive and exclusive views: (1) the idea of identity of emotions between the empathizer and the target and (2) the point of view of the congruence of emotions between the empathizer and the target, both being cases of personal emotional experiences. Secondly, I suggest that these possibilities may make up an exclusive disjunctive argument, showing that problems with the first part of the argument or the premise would lead us to accept the second part: to feel empathy we do not need to feel exactly the same emotion that the object of empathy feels.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-03-22
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020006
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 7: The Modal—Amodal Distinction in the
           Debate on Conceptual Format

    • Authors: Sabrina Haimovici
      First page: 7
      Abstract: In this paper, I review the main criteria offered for distinguishing the modal and amodal approaches to conceptual format: the type of input to which the representations respond, the relation they bear to perceptual states, and the specific neural systems to which they belong. I evaluate different interpretations of them and argue that they all face difficulties. I further show that they lead to cross-classifications of certain types of representations, using approximate number representations as an example.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-03-28
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020007
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 8: Empirical Support for Perceptual
           Conceptualism

    • Authors: Nicolás Serrano
      First page: 8
      Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by offering an empirical reading of the conceptualist position, and making three predictions from it. Then, I will consider recent experimental results from cognitive sciences that seem to point towards those predictions. I will conclude that, while the evidence offered by those experiments is far from decisive, it is enough not only to show that conceptualism is an empirically meaningful position but also that there is empirical support for it.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-03-28
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020008
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 9: Space and Time as Relations: The
           Theoretical Approach of Leibniz

    • Authors: Basil Evangelidis
      First page: 9
      Abstract: The epistemological rupture of Copernicus, the laws of planetary motions of Kepler, the comprehensive physical observations of Galileo and Huygens, the conception of relativity, and the physical theory of Newton were components of an extremely fertile and influential cognitive environment that prompted the restless Leibniz to shape an innovative theory of space and time. This theory expressed some of the concerns and intuitions of the scientific community of the seventeenth century, in particular the scientific group of the Academy of Sciences of Paris, but remained relatively unknown until the twentieth century. After Einstein, however, the relational theory of Leibniz gained wider respect and fame. The aim of this article is to explain how Leibniz foresaw relativity, through his critique of contemporary mechanistic philosophy.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-04-02
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020009
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 10: How to Make Correct Predictions in False
           Belief Tasks without Attributing False Beliefs: An Analysis of Alternative
           Inferences and How to Avoid Them

    • Authors: Ricardo Perera, Sofia Albornoz Stein
      First page: 10
      Abstract: The use of new paradigms of false belief tasks (FBT) allowed to reduce the age of children who pass the test from the previous 4 years in the standard version to only 15 months or even a striking 6 months in the nonverbal modification. These results are often taken as evidence that infants already possess an—at least implicit—theory of mind (ToM). We criticize this inferential leap on the grounds that inferring a ToM from the predictive success on a false belief task requires to assume as premise that a belief reasoning is a necessary condition for correct action prediction. It is argued that the FBT does not satisfactorily constrain the predictive means, leaving room for the use of belief-independent inferences (that can rely on the attribution of non-representational mental states or the consideration of behavioral patterns that dispense any reference to other minds). These heuristics, when applied to the FBT, can achieve the same predictive success of a belief-based inference because information provided by the test stimulus allows the recognition of particular situations that can be subsumed by their ‘laws’. Instead of solving this issue by designing a single experimentum crucis that would render unfeasible the use of non-representational inferences, we suggest the application of a set of tests in which, although individually they can support inferences dissociated from a ToM, only an inference that makes use of false beliefs is able to correctly predict all the outcomes.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-04-10
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020010
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 11: Cajal’s Law of Dynamic Polarization:
           Mechanism and Design

    • Authors: Sergio Daniel Barberis
      First page: 11
      Abstract: Santiago Ramón y Cajal, the primary architect of the neuron doctrine and the law of dynamic polarization, is considered to be the founder of modern neuroscience. At the same time, many philosophers, historians, and neuroscientists agree that modern neuroscience embodies a mechanistic perspective on the explanation of the nervous system. In this paper, I review the extant mechanistic interpretation of Cajal’s contribution to modern neuroscience. Then, I argue that the extant mechanistic interpretation fails to capture the explanatory import of Cajal’s law of dynamic polarization. My claim is that the definitive formulation of Cajal’s law of dynamic polarization, despite its mechanistic inaccuracies, embodies a non-mechanistic pattern of reasoning (i.e., design explanation) that is an integral component of modern neuroscience.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-04-16
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020011
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 12: (Mind)-Reading Maps

    • Authors: Fernanda Velázquez Coccia
      First page: 12
      Abstract: In a two-system theory for mind-reading, a flexible system (FS) enables full-blown mind-reading, and an efficient system (ES) enables early mind-reading. Efficient processing differs from flexible processing in terms of restrictions on the kind of input it can take and the kinds of mental states it can ascribe (output). Thus, systems are not continuous and each relies on different representations: the FS on beliefs and other propositional attitudes, and the ES on belief-like states or registrations. There is a conceptual problem in distinguishing the representations each system operates with. They contend that they can solve this problem by appealing to a characterization of registrations based on signature limits, but this does not work. I suggest a solution to this problem. The difference between registration and belief becomes clearer if each vehicle turns out to be different. I offer some reasons in support of this proposal related to the performance of spontaneous-response false belief tasks.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-04-17
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020012
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 13: A Defense of an Amodal Number System

    • Authors: Abel Wajnerman Paz
      First page: 13
      Abstract: It has been argued that the approximate number system (ANS) constitutes a problem for the grounded approach to cognition because it implies that some conceptual tasks are performed by non-perceptual systems. The ANS is considered non-perceptual mainly because it processes stimuli from different modalities. Jones (2015) has recently argued that this system has many features (such as being modular) which are characteristic of sensory systems. Additionally, he affirms that traditional sensory systems also process inputs from different modalities. This suggests that the ANS is a perceptual system and therefore it is not problematic for the grounded view. In this paper, I defend the amodal approach to the ANS against these two arguments. In the first place, perceptual systems do not possess the properties attributed to the ANS and therefore these properties do not imply that the ANS is perceptual. In the second place, I will propose that a sensory system only needs to be dedicated to process modality-specific information, which is consistent with responding to inputs from different modalities. I argue that the cross-modal responses exhibited by traditional sensory systems are consistent with modality-specific information whereas some responses exhibited by the ANS are not.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-04-24
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020013
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 14: Undetachable Concepts in Non-Human Animals

    • Authors: Laura Danón
      First page: 14
      Abstract: In this paper, I would like to explore the idea that some non-human animals may be incapable of detaching or separating some of their concepts both from other concepts and from the larger thought contents that they are part of. This, in turn, will make it impossible for them to recombine these undetachable concepts with others in every admissible way. I will begin by distinguishing three different ways in which one concept may be undetachable from others, and I will show how each of them leads to specific restrictions in the kinds of conceptual re-combinations that they admit. Finally, I will try to provide some theoretical reasons, as well as some empirical evidence, to give at least initial support to the hypothesis that some non-human animals actually suffer from the limitations previously identified.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-05-03
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020014
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 15: The Algebraic View of Computation:
           Implementation, Interpretation and Time

    • Authors: Attila Egri-Nagy
      First page: 15
      Abstract: Computational implementations are special relations between what is computed and what computes it. Though the word “isomorphism” appears in philosophical discussions about the nature of implementations, it is used only metaphorically. Here we discuss computation in the precise language of abstract algebra. The capability of emulating computers is the defining property of computers. Such a chain of emulation is ultimately grounded in an algebraic object, a full transformation semigroup. Mathematically, emulation is defined by structure preserving maps (morphisms) between semigroups. These are systematic, very special relationships, crucial for defining implementation. In contrast, interpretations are general functions with no morphic properties. They can be used to derive semantic content from computations. Hierarchical structure imposed on a computational structure plays a similar semantic role. Beyond bringing precision into the investigation, the algebraic approach also sheds light on the interplay between time and computation.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-05-11
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020015
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 16: The Philosophy of Ecology and
           Sustainability: New Logical and Informational Dimensions

    • Authors: Joseph E. Brenner
      First page: 16
      Abstract: Ecology and sustainability are current narratives about the behavior of humans toward themselves and the environment. Ecology is defined as a science, and a philosophy of ecology has become a recognized domain of the philosophy of science. For some, sustainability is an accepted, important moral goal. In 2013, a Special Issue of the journal Sustainability dealt with many of the relevant issues. Unfortunately, the economic, ideological, and psychological barriers to ethical behavior and corresponding social action remain great as well as obvious. In this paper, I propose that a new, non-standard and non-propositional logic of real processes, Logic in Reality (LIR) grounded in physics applies to the science and philosophy of these narratives and helps to explicate them. Given the ecological role of organizations and institutions, reference is often made to organizational or institutional logics as guides to ecological practice. This paper suggests that these logics are either too abstract or too informal to have an impact in a conflictual world. Recognition of the suggested new, transdisciplinary logical dimension of ecological processes may provide credibility and support to new initiatives in ecology and its philosophy.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-05-31
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3020016
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 1: Acknowledgement to Reviewers of
           Philosophies in 2017

    • Authors: Philosophies Editorial Office
      First page: 1
      Abstract: Peer review is an essential part in the publication process, ensuring that Philosophies maintains high quality standards for its published papers [...]
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-01-11
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3010001
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 2: Probabilistic Justification Logic

    • Authors: Joseph Lurie
      First page: 2
      Abstract: Justification logics are constructive analogues of modal logics. They are often used as epistemic logics, particularly as models of evidentialist justification. However, in this role, justification (and modal) logics are defective insofar as they represent justification with a necessity-like operator, whereas actual evidentialist justification is usually probabilistic. This paper first examines and rejects extant candidates for solving this problem: Milnikel’s Logic of Uncertain Justifications, Ghari’s Hájek–Pavelka-Style Justification Logics and a version of probabilistic justification logic developed by Kokkinis et al. It then proposes a new solution to the problem in the form of a justification logic that incorporates the essential features of both a fuzzy logic and a probabilistic logic.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-02-16
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3010002
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 3: Intuition and Awareness of Abstract Models:
           A Challenge for Realists

    • Authors: Dimitris Kilakos
      First page: 3
      Abstract: It is plausible to think that, in order to actively employ models in their inquiries, scientists should be aware of their existence. The question is especially puzzling for realists in the case of abstract models, since it is not obvious how this is possible. Interestingly, though, this question has drawn little attention in the relevant literature. Perhaps the most obvious choice for a realist is appealing to intuition. In this paper, I argue that if scientific models were abstract entities, one could not be aware of them intuitively. I deploy my argumentation by building on Chudnoff’s elaboration on intuitive awareness. Furthermore, I shortly discuss some other options to which realists could turn in order to address the question of awareness.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-02-25
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3010003
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 4: The Oxford Handbook of Hegel. By Dean Moyar
           (Ed.). Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2017; 880 pp.; ISBN:
           9780199355228

    • Authors: Michele Cardani
      First page: 4
      Abstract: Despite Georg W.F. Hegel’s claim that “philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late” because, like the owl of Minerva, it “begins its flight only with the onset of dusk” [1] (p. 23), and beyond the contextual and contingent issues that might contribute to its return in auge,1 there exist important theoretical reasons to consider the question “why Hegel now and again'” still legitimate and current.[...]
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-02-28
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3010004
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Philosophies, Vol. 3, Pages 5: Towards Cognitive Moral Quasi-Realism

    • Authors: Eduardo García-Ramírez
      First page: 5
      Abstract: There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism.
      Citation: Philosophies
      PubDate: 2018-03-06
      DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3010005
      Issue No: Vol. 3, No. 1 (2018)
       
 
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