Authors:Sofia Miguens, Paulo Tunhas Pages: 13 - 17 Abstract: In this text we present the articles contained in issue 6 of Con-Textos Kantianos, which is dedicated to the relation between Kant’s philosophy and current discussions in philosophy of mind and epistemology. The articles are organized in three sections, dedicated respectively to sensory consciousness and judgement, spontaneity and Kantianism and science. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1092758 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Johannes Haag Pages: 18 - 41 Abstract: Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars’s account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars’s position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1092766 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Kenneth R. Westphal Pages: 42 - 78 Abstract: Kant’s account of cognitive judgment is sophisticated, sound and philosophically far more illuminating than is often appreciated. Key features of Kant’s account of cognitive judgment are widely dispersed amongst various sections of the Critique of Pure Reason, whilst common philosophical proclivities have confounded these interpretive difficulties. This paper characterises Kant’s account of causal-perceptual judgment concisely to highlight one central philosophical achievement: Kant’s finding that, to understand and investigate empirical knowledge we must distinguish between predication as a grammatical form of sentences, statements or (candidate) judgments, and predication as a (proto-)cognitive act of ascribing some characteristic(s) to some localised particular(s). With Kant’s finding in view, I then elucidate how we have occluded his achievement. My results are not merely interpretive, but philosophical, because they show that Kant’s account of perceptual judgment accords with – and indeed justifies – a central and sound point regarding language, thought and reference advocated by apparently unlikely philosophical comrades. These finding highlight some methodological cautions which require re-emphasis today. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1092771 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Sofia Miguens Pages: 79 - 92 Abstract: Within current philosophy of perception John McDowell has for quite some time been defending a view inspired by Kant (McDowell 1994, McDowell 2009, McDowell 2013). Charles Travis opposes such view and counters it with his own, Frege-inspired, approach (Travis 2013, Travis 2014, Travis forthcoming). By analysing the clash between Travis’ idea of the silence of the senses and McDowell’s idea of intuitional content, the present article aims to characterize the core of their divergence regarding the nature of perceptual judgement. It also aims at presenting their engagement as a reformulated version of the debate around conceptual and nonconceptual content of perception, bringing forth some of its stakes. Such reformulated version of the debate makes it possible to bring out what a Kantian position on representation, consciousness and appearances ultimately amounts to, as well as to identify a particular angle of criticism to it. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095143 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Matias Oroño Pages: 93 - 105 Abstract: Hay una tendencia dentro del debate sobre el conceptualismo y el no-conceptualismo kantiano a pasar por alto la estética de Kant. El objetivo central de este artículo es ofrecer un análisis sobre la interpretación no-conceptualista de Heidemann en torno a la teoría kantiana de los juicios de gusto. En primer lugar, se discuten los argumentos que Heidemann ofrece acerca del carácter cognitivo de los juicios de gusto. En segundo lugar, se analiza el supuesto no-conceptualismo implicado en la experiencia estética de lo bello. En tercer lugar, se ofrece una interpretación alternativa sobre el vínculo entre la teoría de Kant sobre los juicios de gusto y el debate en torno al (no)-conceptualismo. Se defiende la tesis según la cual los juicios de gusto no poseen valor cognitivo, pero permiten comprender aspectos centrales de la teoría kantiana del conocimiento. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095149 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Juan José Rosales Sánchez Pages: 106 - 120 Abstract: John McDowell sostiene que el contenido de la experiencia es completamente conceptual y que, por tanto, no hay nada que pueda denominarse contenido no conceptual. Alega este filósofo que las bases de su defensa de este único contenido de la experiencia se encuentran en la obra de Kant, específicamente en la Crítica de la razón pura. Pues bien, a partir de las lecturas directas de esa misma obra de Kant y de las Lecciones de lógica, mejor conocidas como Lógica Jäsche, y de la lectura indirecta de Sobre el fundamento último de la diferenciación de las direcciones en el espacio, argumentamos a favor de una interpretación de las habilidades y de las prácticas como posibles expresiones del contenido no conceptual en la epistemología de Kant. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095155 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Sílvia Bento Pages: 121 - 137 Abstract: A análise de Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik [Kant e o Problema da Metafísica] de Heidegger constitui o propósito do nosso artigo. Publicado em 1929, o ano do “debate Heidegger-Cassirer” em Davos, Kant e o Problema da Metafísica fornece uma interpretação controversa e peculiar da Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant. Debruçando-se sobre a primeira edição (1781) da Crítica de Kant, Heidegger apresenta uma interpretação ontológica da subjetividade transcendental kantiana. Contra a atenção neo-kantiana dedicada à lógica e à espontaneidade subjetiva, Heidegger procura lançar luz sobre as determinações finitas e recetivas da subjetividade kantiana, salientando a preponderância da imaginação enquanto faculdade fundamental e possibilidade da subjetividade humana. A elucidação cuidadosa de tais posições heideggerianas relativas à Crítica da Razão Pura constitui o objeto do nosso trabalho. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095177 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Addison Ellis Pages: 138 - 164 Abstract: Kant describes the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity. What this means is that our capacity to judge what is true is responsible for its own exercises, which is to say that we issue our judgments for ourselves. To issue our judgments for ourselves is to be self-conscious – i.e., conscious of the grounds upon which we judge. To grasp the spontaneity of the understanding, then, we must grasp the self-consciousness of the understanding. I argue that what Kant requires for explaining spontaneity is a conception of judgment as an intrinsic self-consciousness of the total unity of possible knowledge. This excludes what have been called ‘relative’ accounts of the spontaneity of the understanding, according to which our judgments are issued through a capacity fixed by external conditions. If so, then Kant conceives of understanding as entirely active. Or, to put it another way, he conceives of this capacity as absolutely spontaneous. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095667 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Martín Arias-Albisu Pages: 165 - 185 Abstract: En el “Prólogo” a sus Primeros principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza, Kant sostiene que la psicología empírica, a diferencia de la física matemática y la química flogística, no es una ciencia de la naturaleza. Este artículo se propone ofrecer una interpretación de las razones por las cuales Kant atribuye este estatus a la psicología empírica. Mostraré, por un lado, que la psicología empírica no posee un carácter científico en sentido propio como la física matemática porque los fenómenos internos no pueden presentarse a priori como movimientos en el espacio; y, por el otro, que esta psicología no posee un carácter científico en sentido impropio como la química flogística porque no es posible realizar experimentos ni observaciones rigurosas en el dominio del sentido interno. La psicología empírica es una mera descripción natural, sistemática y clasificatoria, de los fenómenos del sentido interno. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095671 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Eric Beauron Pages: 186 - 206 Abstract: Cet article analyse la fonction épistémologique du jugement réfléchissant dont le principe est dégagé dans les introductions de la Critique de la faculté de juger (CFJ). L'analyse du § 62 de la CFJ, en lien avec le § 38 des Prolégomènes et l'Appendice à la Dialectique transcendantale, permet de mettre au jour le rôle heuristique du principe de finalité formelle et de l'affinité dans les procédures scientifiques, notamment dans l'invention newtonienne de la loi de gravitation universelle à partir des lois de Kepler. Le but est d'exposer le fonctionnement du jugement réfléchissant dans un contexte épistémologique où les fonctions de l'entendement ne peuvent plus opérer, dès lors que le donné empirique échappe aux principes transcendantaux de l'Analytique des principes. Le fonctionnement d'un « comme si » épistémologique est mis en lumière et permet d'assurer le lien architectonique entre la nature au sens technique et la nature mécanique, du point de vue de l'invention scientifique. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095679 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Manuela Teles Pages: 207 - 236 Abstract: Em 1882, Frege escreveu a Anton Marty que o seu projeto era provar que as leis fundamentais da aritmética são analíticas no sentido de Kant. A resposta a esta carta foi assinada por Carl Stumpf, que aconselhou Frege a escrever sobre as suas motivações para a criação da linguagem formal que apresentou na sua Begriffsschrift, escrita três anos antes. Os Grundlagen der Arithmetik, que Frege publicou dois anos depois, podem ser vistos como o seu resultado por seguir o conselho de Stumpf. Aí, Frege menciona Kant novamente, tanto enquanto motivação para o seu programa logicista como enquanto um seu opositor. Neste artigo, pretendo compreender esta influência de dois lados de Kant nos propósitos de Frege. Para isso, apresento e discuto excertos dos Grundlagen onde Frege fala sobre Kant. Mostro que, depois de rejeitar a proposta de Kant de que juízos numéricos (como 7+5) são sintéticos a priori, Frege tem uma visão da definição de Kant de analítico de acordo com a qual é possível conhecer objetos que não são percetíveis pelos sentidos ou pela intuição apenas pela razão. É esta visão que está na base da motivação de Frege para o seu programa logicista. De acordo com o programa logicista de Frege, os números são objetos conhecidos exclusivamente pelas suas propriedades, sem ligação com qualquer representação (sensorial ou intuitiva). A visão de Frege permite-nos pensar que Kant poderia ter chegado a este resultado com a sua noção de analítico não fosse o seu compromisso com a noção de conceitos enquanto representações que são os blocos de construção dos pensamentos. Em vez disso, Frege propõe que novos conceitos podem ser descobertos na decomposição de pensamentos e que esta descoberta é uma tarefa para a lógica em exclusivo. Sendo uma tarefa da lógica em exclusivo é precisamente o sentido de analítico de Kant. O que a visão de Frege acrescenta ao analítico de Kant é, então, que pode ser uma fonte de conhecimento. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095683 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Paulo Tunhas Pages: 237 - 255 Abstract: A filosofia de Fernando Gil busca, desde o início, um acordo do projecto kantiano com certos modos pré-kantianos de pensar, nomeadamente o de Leibniz. E igualmente, a partir de certa altura, com um certo pós-kantismo, o de Fichte. Estes dois acordos são fundamentais na constituição de uma filosofia do conhecimento profundamente original, que analiso neste artigo. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095685 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Pablo Muchnik, Lawrence Pasternack Pages: 256 - 271 Abstract: This Guide is designed to restore the theological background that informs Kant’s treatment of grace in Religion to its rightful place. This background is essential not only to understand the nature of Kant’s overall project in this book, namely, to determine the “association” or “union” between Christianity (as a historical faith) and rational religion, but also to dispel the impression of “internal contradictions” and “conundrums” that contemporary interpreters associate with Kant’s treatment of grace and moral regeneration. That impression, we argue, is the result of entrenched interpretative habits that can be traced back to Karl Barth’s reading of the text. Once we realize that such a reading rests on a mistake, much of the anxiety and confusion that plague current discussions on these issues can be put to rest. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095821 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Robert Gressis Pages: 272 - 284 Abstract: In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant claims that we may need to invoke divine aid in order to explain how a person can change from evil to good. Kant’s language is a bit curious; why does he not more clearly assert, either that we must posit divine grace, or that we may not' The explanation is this: if we affirm that God grants aid, then this could convince people to passively await it or to think, upon becoming good, that they are part of a special elect. On the other hand, if we affirm that God does not help, then some may despair of ever becoming good while those who successfully change could become arrogant. Thus, Kant is noncommittal about grace because it allows the morally timorous to have hope that they can change, and the morally successful to avoid hubris. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095823 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Dennis Vanden Auweele Pages: 285 - 301 Abstract: Kant’s concept of grace in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason is a difficult topic, exegetically speaking. Obviously enough, Kant subscribes positively to a notion of divine assistance. This appears awkward given his rationalist ethics rooted in personal autonomy. This has given cause to interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion – both early commentators and today – to read Kant’s account of grace is uniquely rationalist. This would make grace a rational expectation given personal commitment to good works. The argument of this paper is that grace is a hyperrationalist element in Kant’s practical philosophy because of the potentially problematic consequences of Kant’s views of human nature. Human nature is namely not particularly prone to be responsive to the rational moral law and therefore requires a number of pedagogical tools that facilitate moral agency. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095827 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Jacqueline Mariña Pages: 302 - 320 Abstract: In this paper I argue against two prevailing views of Kant’s Religion. Against commentators such as Michalson and Quinn, who have argued that Kant’s project in Religion is riddled with inconsistencies and circularities, I show that a proper understanding of Kant’s views on grace reveals these do not exist. And contra commentators that attribute to Kant at best a minimalist conception of grace (e.g., Wood 1991 and Pasternack 2014), I show that Kant’s view of it is remarkably robust. I argue that Kant works with three different conceptions of grace. These are: a) grace and the God within, b) grace and the transformation of the fundamental orientation, and c) grace that can be laid hold of; the first and the last play a significant role in his philosophy of religion. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095833 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Anne Margaret Baxley Pages: 321 - 328 Abstract: Against a widely-held interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy, according to which Kant holds that all finite rational beings have an innate right to freedom as well as a duty to enter into a civil condition governed by a social contract in order to preserve that freedom, Robert Hanna contends that Kant is in fact an anarchist. Hanna’s argument for his novel thesis that Kant ultimately views the State as an unjustifiably coercive institution that should be eliminated depends heavily on the claim there is an outright conflict between Kant’s political theory in The Doctrine of Right and Kant’s ethics. I argue that we should resist Hanna’s provocative claim that Kant’s ethics directly falsifies his official political theory. Further, I suggest that even morally autonomous Kantian angels need the State to guarantee the protection of their external freedom and to promote justice. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095704 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Robert Hanna Pages: 329 - 334 Abstract: In this brief reply to Anne Margaret Baxley’s comments on my paper, “Exiting the State and Debunking the State of Nature,” I respond to her two critical worries about my thesis that there is an unbridgeable gap between Kant’s political theory, which is classically liberal, and his ethics/theory of enlightenment/moral theology, which is anarchist: (i) that Kant’s strong moral epistemic skepticism in the Groundwork about knowing the true motives of our choices and actions, requires coercive State intervention in order to ensure that we heed mutual relations of external freedom and do our juridical duties, and (ii) that the overall crookedness of the human timber, i.e., our almost inevitable empirical tendency to fall short of autocracy, requires the very same State interventions for the very same moral-political straightening purposes. I argue that (i*) Kant isn’t the moral epistemic skeptic he’s standardly taken to be—on the contrary, we have veridical, direct, occurrent, essentially non-conceptual, non-empirical awareness of autonomous choices and actions, via The Fact of Reason, and (ii*) that coercing people to be morally good necessarily undermines the moral worth of their choices and actions and turns them into nothing but well-oiled, law-abiding robots of the State—so we must exit the State in order to belong to an ethical community instead, i.e., Kantian anarchism; hence my unbridgeable-gap thesis still stands. I end by self-advertising for existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095718 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Óscar Cubo Ugarte Pages: 335 - 354 Abstract: El presente texto ofrece las líneas fundamentales de la interpretación que Julius Ebbinghaus realiza de la filosofía del derecho de Kant. En primer lugar, expone la famosa “tesis de la independencia” (Unabhängigkeitsthese) presentada en numeroso trabajos por J. Ebbinghaus. En segundo lugar, centra su atención en el diagnóstico que hace J. Ebbinghaus de los casos de “injusticia extrema” y se pone en relación la fórmula de Radbruch con la filosofía del derecho de Kant. Por último, y frente al positivismo jurídico, J. Ebbinghaus sitúa los límites de la dominación política en el derecho de la humanidad. Las consecuencias normativas de dicho derecho se ponen de manifiesto en caso de injusticia extrema, cuyo ejemplo paradigmático lo ofrece la Alemania Nacionalsocialista. A partir la ley de la humanidad, Julius Ebbinghaus ofrece una justificación kantiana del concepto de delitos de lesa humanidad. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095837 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
Authors:Julius Ebbinghaus Pages: 355 - 365 Abstract: El presente texto traduce por primera vez al castellano «La ley de la humanidad y los límites del poder estatal», a partir de la edición de la editorial Bouvier: Julius Ebbinghaus, Sittlichkeit und Recht. Praktische Philosophie 1929-1954 (pp. 367 – 376). La traducción está antecedida por un estudio sobre Julius Ebbinghaus y su interpretación de la filosofía del derecho de Kant. En este ensayo clásico de 1953, Julius Ebbinghaus ofrece una clara articulación de las líneas fundamentales de la doctrina del derecho de Kant. Por un lado, hace patente que el sistema de la libertad política en Kant sólo puede garantizarse con un sistema legal positivo; por otro lado, y frente al positivismo jurídico, sitúa los límites de la dominación política en la ley de la humanidad. Las consecuencias normativas de dicho derecho se ponen de manifiesto en caso de injustica extrema, cuyo ejemplo paradigmático lo ofrece la Alemania Nacionalsocialista. A partir la ley de la humanidad, Julius Ebbinghaus ofrece una justificación kantiana del concepto de delitos de lesa humanidad. PubDate: 2017-12-08 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1095840 Issue No:Vol. 1, No. 6 (2017)
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