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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 350 journals)
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (2 followers)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (3 followers)
Agone     Open Access   (1 follower)
Aisthesis     Open Access  
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (1 follower)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (2 followers)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (19 followers)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (1 follower)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (12 followers)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access  
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (1 follower)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (1 follower)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (1 follower)
Ars Disputandi     Open Access   (1 follower)
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (2 followers)
Astérion     Open Access   (2 followers)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (74 followers)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription  
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (5 followers)
Between the Species     Open Access   (2 followers)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (5 followers)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (1 follower)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (7 followers)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (18 followers)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (16 followers)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (13 followers)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, The     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (12 followers)
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access  
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (9 followers)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de Clásicos y Modernos     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (3 followers)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (4 followers)
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (8 followers)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (5 followers)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (5 followers)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (17 followers)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Full-text available via subscription  
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (14 followers)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (3 followers)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (2 followers)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (2 followers)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (2 followers)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (4 followers)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Diánoia     Open Access  
Dilemata     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (8 followers)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (2 followers)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription  
Eidos     Open Access   (1 follower)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (3 followers)
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (1 follower)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (5 followers)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (7 followers)
Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook     Full-text available via subscription   (2 followers)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (11 followers)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (4 followers)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (7 followers)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (21 followers)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (1 follower)
Études de lettres     Open Access  
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access  
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (4 followers)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (93 followers)

        1 2 3 4 | Last

Axiomathes    [7 followers]  Follow    
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
     ISSN (Print) 1572-8390 - ISSN (Online) 1122-1151
     Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2187 journals]   [SJR: 0.19]   [H-I: 10]
  • Husserl’s Break from Brentano Reconsidered: Abstraction and the
           Structure of Consciousness
    • Abstract: The paper contends that abstraction lies at the core of the philosophical and methodological rupture that occurred between Husserl and his mentor Franz Brentano. To accomplish this, it explores the notion of abstraction at work in these two thinkers’ methodological discussions through their respective claims regarding the structure of consciousness, and shows that how Husserl and Brentano analyze the structure of consciousness conditions and strictly delineates the nature and reach of their methods of inquiry. The paper pays close attention to intentionality, founding (Fundierung), and qualitative modification (qualitative Modifikation) understood as principles of consciousness. While intentionality has been the topic of numerous discussions surrounding these two thinkers’ work, founding and qualitative modification have slipped under the radar despite the fact that they hold—as I intend to show—the key to shedding new light on their respective methods of inquiry. More specifically, the paper explicates the ways in which Brentano’s notion of founding (understood as a relationship between whole acts) and his failure to identify radical-qualitative modification as a principle of consciousness preclude him from offering a successful model for philosophical universalizing thought. It is my hope to show that Husserl’s rethinking of founding as a relationship between certain structural moments of acts along with his novel notion of qualitative modification ground his attempt to carve a new method of philosophical inquiry—albeit jejune and ambiguous at the time of the Investigations, yet nevertheless able to successfully negotiate the problems faced by his predecessor.
      PubDate: 2014-01-22
       
  • Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues
    • Abstract: Abstract Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality (representation per se), transparency (immediacy of cognitive content consequent upon the unawareness of underlying representational processes), subjectivity (first-person perspective) or reflexivity (autonoetic awareness). However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible for operationalizing such a reflexive state. Current reliance by higher-order and intrinsic self-representational theories on self-representing data structures to achieve reflexive self-awareness is highly problematic, suggesting a solution in terms of a self-referential processing regime.
      PubDate: 2014-01-19
       
  • The Quantum-Like Approach of Psychosomatic Phenomena in Application
    • Abstract: Abstract The quantum-like approach of psychosomatic phenomena suggests an explanation of the correlations between mind and body in terms of quantum-like entanglement, that is, without appealing to any concept of psychophysical, efficient causality. This approach is developed within the Hilbert space formalism and its general consequences are drawn. It is first illustrated by a simple, qualitative model of the placebo effect which shows that representing psychosomatic states by entangled states can explain that purely psychological factors can produce a-causal changes of physiological parameters. Then, a dynamical, quantitative and predictive model of bipolar disorder which makes use of the unitarity of the temporal evolution of psychosomatic states due to biological and psychological rhythms is worked out. This model can explain some current observations, like for example the severe fluctuations in mood between depression and mania, and it can forecast the moment of shifting. In addition, it justifies the efficiency of chronotherapy on theoretical basis.
      PubDate: 2014-01-18
       
  • The Import of the Original Bradley’s Regress(es)
    • Abstract: Abstract Much of the recent metaphysical literature on the problem of the relational unity of complexes leaves the impression that Bradley (or some Bradleyan argument) has uncovered a serious problem to be addressed. The problem is thought to be particularly challenging for trope theorists and realists about universals. In truth, there has been little clarity about the nature and import of the original Bradley’s regress arguments. In this paper, I offer a careful analysis and reconstruction of the arguments in Bradley’s Appearance and Reality (1893). The analysis reveals that no less than three regress arguments against relations can be found. I show that none of them are compelling. I argue that, as a result, it is a serious misstep for philosophers today to offer metaphysical theses based on the unchallenged assumption that Bradley has established his regress result. I further analyze the underpinnings of the Bradley problem as it is frequently cast in contemporary literature and show that they rely on certain confusions and biases, which once brought to light, make current Bradley-inspired arguments against relations unconvincing.
      PubDate: 2014-01-11
       
  • The Irrationality of Physicalism
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper argues, not that physicalism is wrong, but that it is irrational. The paper defines standards of rationality, both metaphysical and epistemological, that physicalism necessarily inherits from science. Then it assesses physicalist efforts to naturalize consciousness in light of these. It concludes that physicalism allows its metaphysics to outrun its epistemology, in defiance of applicable standards, revealing a fundamental incoherence in the doctrine. The paper also briefly reviews other naturalization programs, to claim that physicalism, unlike the sciences, hasn’t proved fruitful.
      PubDate: 2013-12-15
       
  • Equivalence of Problems (An Attempt at an Explication of Problem)
    • Abstract: On the one hand, Pavel Tichý has shown in his Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) that the best way of explicating meaning of the expressions of a natural language consists in identification of meanings with abstract procedures. TIL explicates objective abstract procedures as so-called constructions. Constructions that do not contain free variables and are in a well-defined sense ´normalized´ are called concepts in TIL. On the second hand, Kolmogorov in (Mathematische Zeitschrift 35: 58–65, 1932) formulated a theory of problems, using NL expressions. He explicitly avoids presenting a definition of problems. In the present paper an attempt at such a definition (explication)—independent of but in harmony with Medvedev´s explication—is given together with the claim that every concept defines a problem. The paper treats just mathematical concepts, and so mathematical problems, and tries to show that this view makes it possible to take into account some links between conceptual systems and the ways how to replace a noneffective formulation of a problem by an effective one. To show this in concreto a wellknown Kleene’s idea from his (Introduction to metamathematics. D. van Nostrand, New York, 1952) is exemplified and explained in terms of conceptual systems so that a threatening inconsistence is avoided.
      PubDate: 2013-12-01
       
  • Quantum No-Go Theorems and Consciousness
    • Abstract: Abstract Our conscious minds exist in the Universe, therefore they should be identified with physical states that are subject to physical laws. In classical theories of mind, the mental states are identified with brain states that satisfy the deterministic laws of classical mechanics. This approach, however, leads to insurmountable paradoxes such as epiphenomenal minds and illusionary free will. Alternatively, one may identify mental states with quantum states realized within the brain and try to resolve the above paradoxes using the standard Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics. In this essay, we first show that identification of mind states with quantum states within the brain is biologically feasible, and then elaborating on the mathematical proofs of two quantum mechanical no-go theorems, we explain why quantum theory might have profound implications for the scientific understanding of one’s mental states, self identity, beliefs and free will.
      PubDate: 2013-12-01
       
  • Unconscious Representations 1: Belying the Traditional Model of Human
           Cognition
    • Abstract: Abstract The traditional model of human cognition (TMHC) postulates an ontological and/or structural gap between conscious and unconscious mental representations. By and large, it sees higher-level mental processes as commonly conceptual or symbolic in nature and therefore conscious, whereas unconscious, lower-level representations are conceived as non-conceptual or sub-symbolic. However, experimental evidence belies this model, suggesting that higher-level mental processes can be, and often are, carried out in a wholly unconscious way and/or without conceptual representations, and that these can be processed unconsciously. This entails that the TMHC, as well as the theories on mental representation it motivates and that in turn support it, is wrong.
      PubDate: 2013-12-01
       
  • A Defense of Emergence
    • Abstract: Abstract I defend a physicalistic version of ontological emergence; qualia emerge from the brain, but are physical properties nevertheless. First, I address the following questions: what are the central tenets of physicalistic ontological emergentism; what are the relationships between these tenets; what is the relationship between physicalistic ontological emergentism and non-reductive physicalism; and can there even be a physicalistic version of ontological emergentism? This discussion is merely an attempt to clarify exactly what a physicalistic version of ontological emergentism must claim, and to show that the view is at least coherent. I then defend the view from objections, for example, Kim’s (Philos Stud 95:3–36, 1999) attempt to apply a version of his exclusion argument to ontological emergentism. I conclude by offering a positive argument for the view: given certain empirical evidence concerning the organization of the brain, physicalism might have to endorse ontological emergentism to avoid epiphenomenalism.
      PubDate: 2013-12-01
       
  • Do Expectations Have Time Span?
    • Abstract: Abstract If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at which the expectation is satisfied. However, it seems that we cannot always identify the beginning of an expectation, and in a few cases, its end. If so, the reduction of expectations to neural events or accompanying feelings which spread over time in the usual way seems a hard enterprise, because these processes, much as other physical processes, have a definite and largely measurable time span. Only at a higher level, that is, as part of human life, expectation can be said to be temporal.
      PubDate: 2013-12-01
       
  • Launching, Entraining, and Representational Momentum: Evidence Consistent
           with an Impetus Heuristic in Perception of Causality
    • Abstract: Abstract Displacements in the remembered location of stimuli in displays based on Michotte’s (1946/1963) launching effect and entraining effect were examined. A moving object contacted an initially stationary target, and the target began moving. After contacting the target, the mover became stationary (launching trials) or continued moving in the same direction and remained adjacent to the target (entraining trials). In launching trials, forward displacement was smaller for targets than for movers; in entraining trials, forward displacement was smaller for movers than for targets. Also, forward displacement was smaller for targets in launching trials than for targets in entraining trials. Data are consistent with a hypothesis that the launching effect involves an attribution that the mover imparted to the target a dissipating impetus that was responsible for target motion. Introspective experience of a perception of physical causality in the launching effect might result because behavior of movers and targets is consistent with that predicted by an impetus heuristic.
      PubDate: 2013-12-01
       
  • Correspondence Truth and Quantum Mechanics
    • Abstract: Abstract The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the case at a certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of ‘no go’ theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen–Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub–Clifton ‘uniqueness theorem’ is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences.
      PubDate: 2013-10-26
       
  • What is a Line?
    • Abstract: Abstract Since the discovery of incommensurability in ancient Greece, arithmeticism and geometricism constantly switched roles. After ninetieth century arithmeticism Frege eventually returned to the view that mathematics is really entirely geometry. Yet Poincaré, Brouwer, Weyl and Bernays are mathematicians opposed to the explication of the continuum purely in terms of the discrete. At the beginning of the twenty-first century ‘continuum theorists’ in France (Longo, Thom and others) believe that the continuum precedes the discrete. In addition the last 50 years witnessed the revival of infinitesimals (Laugwitz and Robinson—non-standard analysis) and—based upon category theory—the rise of smooth infinitesimal analysis and differential geometry. The spatial whole-parts relation is irreducible (Russell) and correlated with the spatial order of simultaneity. The human imaginative capacities are connected to the characterization of points and lines (Euclid) and to the views of Aristotle (the irreducibility of the continuity of a line to its points), which remained in force until the ninetieth century. Although Bolzano once more launched an attempt to arithmetize continuity, it appears as if Weierstrass, Cantor and Dedekind finally succeeded in bringing this ideal to its completion. Their views are assessed by analyzing the contradiction present in Grünbaum’s attempt to explain the continuum as an aggregate of unextended elements (degenerate intervals). Alternatively a line-stretch is characterized as a one-dimensional spatial subject, given at once in its totality (as a whole) and delimited by two points—but it is neither a breadthless length nor the (shortest) distance between two points. The overall aim of this analysis is to account for the uniqueness of discreteness and continuity by highlighting their mutual interconnections exemplified in the nature of a line as a one-dimensional spatial subject, while acknowledging that points are merely spatial objects which are always dependent upon an extended spatial subject. Instead of attempting to reduce continuity to discreteness or discreteness to continuity, a third alternative is explored: accept the irreducibility of number and space and then proceed by analyzing their unbreakable coherence. The argument may be seen as exploring some implications of the view of John Bell, namely that the “continuous is an autonomous notion, not explicable in terms of the discrete.” Bell points out that initially Brouwer, in his dissertation of 1907, “regards continuity and discreteness as complementary notions, neither of which is reducible to each other.”
      PubDate: 2013-10-12
       
  • On the Evolutionary Defense of Scientific Antirealism
    • Abstract: Abstract Van Fraassen (The scientific image, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980) claims that successful theories exist today because successful theories survive and unsuccessful ones die. Wray (Erkenntnis 67:81–89, 2007; Erkenntnis 72:365–377, 2010) appeals to Stanford’s new pessimistic induction (Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), arguing that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation is better than the realist explanation that successful theories exist because they are approximately true. I argue that if the pessimistic induction is correct, then the evolutionary explanation is neither true nor empirically adequate, and that realism is better than selectionism because realism explains more phenomena in science than selectionism.
      PubDate: 2013-10-10
       
  • Frege’s Logicism and the Neo-Fregean Project
    • Abstract: Neo-logicism is, not least in the light of Frege’s logicist programme, an important topic in the current philosophy of mathematics. In this essay, I critically discuss a number of issues that I consider to be relevant for both Frege’s logicism and neo-logicism. I begin with a brief introduction into Wright’s neo-Fregean project and mention the main objections that he faces. In Sect. 2, I discuss the Julius Caesar problem and its possible Fregean and neo-Fregean solution. In Sect. 3, I raise what I take to be a central objection to the position of neo-logicism. In Sect. 4, I attempt to clarify how we should understand Frege’s stipulation that the two sides of an abstraction principle qua contextual definition of a term-forming operator shall be “gleichbedeutend”. In Sect. 5, I consider the options that Frege might have had to establish the analyticity of Hume’s Principle: The number that belongs to the concept F is equal to the number that belongs to the concept G if and only if F and G are equinumerous. Section 6 is devoted to Frege’s two criteria of thought identity. In Sects. 7 and 8, I defend the position of the neo-logicist against an alleged “knock-down argument”. In Sect. 9, I comment on Frege’s description of abstraction in Grundlagen, §64 and the use of the terms “recarving” and “reconceptualization” in the relevant literature on Fregean abstraction and neo-logicism. I argue that Fregean abstraction has nothing to do with the recarving of a sentence content or its decomposition in different ways. I conclude with remarks on global logicism versus local logicisms.
      PubDate: 2013-10-06
       
  • On the Exhaustion of Mathematical Entities by Structures
    • Abstract: Abstract There has been considerable discussion in the literature of one kind of identity problem that mathematical structuralism faces: the automorphism problem, in which the structure is unable to individuate the mathematical entities in its domain. Shapiro (Philos Math 16(3):285–309, 2008) has partly responded to these concerns. But I argue here that the theory faces an even more serious kind of identity problem, which the theory can’t overcome staying within its remit. I give two examples to make the point.
      PubDate: 2013-10-04
       
  • How to Individuate Universals—Or Not
    • Abstract: Abstract In a recent article in this journal, J. P. Moreland (2013) extends his theory of individuation to include universals. In this note, I show how Moreland’s novel proposal leads to the unwanted conclusion that every concrete particular exists of necessity and has but a single essential property.
      PubDate: 2013-09-01
       
  • The Many Faces of Psychoontology
    • Abstract: Abstract Psychoontology is a philosophical theory of the cognizing subject and various related matters. In this article. I present two approaches to the discipline—the first proposed by Jerzy Perzanowski, the second by Jesse Prinz and Yoram Hazony. I then undertake to bring these into unity using certain ideas from Husserl and Frege. Applying the functor qua, psychoontology can be described as a discipline concerned with: (a) the cognizing subject qua being—this leads to the question: what kind of being is the subject (is it an object?, simple or complex?, a process?) and what makes him/her/it possible; (b) being qua cognized, this leads to the question: under what conditions can we access the world? Since the notion of being qua cognized might seem peculiar, I present its context and discuss it in detail in the last section.
      PubDate: 2013-09-01
       
  • Ontology, Reference, and the        class="a-plus-plus">Qua Problem: Amie Thomasson on
           Existence
    • Abstract: Abstract I argue that Amie Thomasson’s recent theory of the methodology to be applied to find the truth-conditions for claims of existence faces serious objections. Her account is based on Devitt and Sterelny’s solution to the qua problem for theories of reference fixing; however, such a solution cannot be also applied to analyze existential claims.
      PubDate: 2013-09-01
       
  • Some Eighteenth Century Contributions to the Mind–Body Problem
           (Wolff, Taurellus, Knutzen, Bülfiger and the Pre-Critical Kant)
    • Abstract: Abstract This work speaks about very special solution of the mind–body problem. This solution based on the so-called Principle of Co-existence stands out as one of the most interesting attempts at solving the mind–body problem. It states that substances can only exert a mutual influence on one another if they have something in common. This does not have to be a common property but rather, a binding relationship. Thus, substances co-exist when they remain bound by a common relationship, for instance, to an external subject. The Principle of Co-existence played an extremely important role in Kant’s philosophy, not only since it provided a framework for solving the mind–body problem, but since it captured the very basis of its existence. The Principle found also reflection in the works of Kant’s successors, such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel or Feuerbach. It had significant—though often hidden—repercussions on later philosophy of mind. The notion of force and the principle of its operation became key concepts in resolving the mind–body problem. As a result, philosophy of mind concentrated on the search for a principle explaining the occurrence of two complementary types of phenomena. This established a tradition which, to a greater or lesser extent, has survived to our day.
      PubDate: 2013-09-01
       
 
 
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