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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 392 journals)
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access  
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access  
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 27)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Análisis filosófico     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 214)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Full-text available via subscription  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (Followers: 22)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 16)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Diánoia     Open Access  
Dilemata     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)

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Journal Cover   Axiomathes
  [SJR: 0.265]   [H-I: 13]   [6 followers]  Follow
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8390 - ISSN (Online) 1122-1151
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2302 journals]
  • Representational Structures of Arithmetical Thinking: Part I
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, representational structures of arithmetical thinking, encoded in human minds, are described. On the basis of empirical research, it is possible to distinguish four types of mental number lines: the shortest mental number line, summation mental number lines, point-place mental number lines and mental lines of exact numbers. These structures may be treated as generative mechanisms of forming arithmetical representations underlying our numerical acts of reference towards cardinalities, ordinals and magnitudes. In the paper, the theoretical framework for a formal model of mental arithmetical representations is constructed. Many competitive conceptions of the mental system responsible for our arithmetical thinking may be unified within the presented framework. The paradigm underlying our research may be interpreted philosophically as a neo-Kantian approach to modeling the mind’s representational structures.
      PubDate: 2015-04-14
  • Introduction
    • PubDate: 2015-04-04
  • Science Generates Limit Paradoxes
    • Abstract: Abstract The sciences occasionally generate discoveries that undermine their own assumptions. Two such discoveries are characterized here: the discovery of apophenia by cognitive psychology and the discovery that physical systems cannot be locally bounded within quantum theory. It is shown that such discoveries have a common structure and that this common structure is an instance of Priest’s well-known Inclosure Schema. This demonstrates that science itself is dialetheic: it generates limit paradoxes. How science proceeds despite this fact is briefly discussed, as is the connection between our results and the realism-antirealism debate. We conclude by suggesting a position of epistemic modesty.
      PubDate: 2015-03-21
  • Erratum to: Intuition and Its Object
    • PubDate: 2015-03-11
  • Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation,
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world (ontic aim) in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings (epistemic aim). Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. This analysis extends Illari’s account in important ways, putting more pressure on ontic readings of mechanistic explanation and providing an answer to the question how ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation are related. I argue these point in terms of cases on memory research drawn from neuroscience and research on extinct neurogenetic mechanisms from early nervous systems biology.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
  • Upward and Downward Causation from a Relational-Horizontal Ontological
    • Abstract: Abstract Downward causation (DC) exercised by emergent properties of wholes upon their lower-level constituents’ properties has been accused of conceptual and metaphysical incoherence. Only upward causation is usually peacefully accepted. The aim of this paper is to criticize and refuse (1) the traditional hierarchical-vertical way of conceiving both types of causation, although preserving their deepest ontological significance, as well as (2) the widespread acceptance of the traditional atomistic-combinatorial view of the entities and the relations that constitute the so-called ‘emergence base’. Assuming those two perspectives with no reserves, we are condemned to confine our debate to the question of whether reified wholes can have the power to downwardly change or influence their lower-level parts, a question which seems profoundly misleading to me. I therefore propose an alternative relational ontological view, assuming a straightforward horizontal and intra-level way of representing those putative cases of cross-level causation. I finally confront two recent replies to Kim’s well-known objections to DC—Craver and Bechtel (Biol Philos 22:547–563, 2007) and Kistler (Philos Psychol 22(5):595–609, 2009)—, emphasizing their global positive approaches, as well as the reasons why their accounts still seem insufficient to me. I conclude arguing that both Kim’s principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and its allegation of an overdetermination in cases of DC can be surpassed by the new relational ontological perspective presented here.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
  • Reductionism, Agency and Free Will
    • Abstract: Abstract In the context of the free will debate, both compatibilists and event-causal libertarians consider that the agent’s mental states and events are what directly causes her decision to act. However, according to the ‘disappearing agent’ objection, if the agent is nothing over and above her physical and mental components, which ultimately bring about her decision, and that decision remains undetermined up to the moment when it is made, then it is a chancy and uncontrolled event. According to agent-causalism, this sort of problem can be overcome if one realizes that the agent herself, as an irreducible substance, is the true originator of her actions. I’ll present arguments that favor this view. Event-causalists have countered that if the agent identifies with some of the inner states that play the self-determining causal role in bringing about the action, then it is as though the action was directly caused by herself. I’ll object that this is not a distinctive aspect of free agency. Agent-causalism has been criticized from most naturalistically inclined fronts, and it must address risks of implausibility, contradiction and unintelligibility. Even though I’ll acknowledge these challenges, I’ll still argue that libertarian free will cannot be defended by any reductionist alternative, and that agent-causalism does not conflict with contemporary science but only with some of its unproven assumptions.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
  • Free Will and Rationality
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper I analyse different justifications for the claim that the minor premise of the libertarian argument is true, namely, intuition, van Inwagen’s argument from moral responsibility and an argument from rationality. I claim none of these is satisfactory. I conclude by suggesting a possible way of interpreting the meaning of the free will intuition libertarians claim we have.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
  • Supervenient Emergentism and Mereological Emergentism
    • Abstract: Abstract In recent years, emergentism has resurfaced as a possible method by which to secure autonomous mental causation from within a physicalistic framework. Critics argue, however, that emergentism fails, since emergentism entails that effects have sufficient physical causes, so they cannot also have distinct mental causes. In this paper I argue that this objection may be effective against supervenient emergentism, but it is not established that it is effective against mereological emergentism. In fact, after demonstrating that two founding emergentists, Samuel Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan, are mereological emergentists, I show how mereological emergentism provides fresh responses to the causal exclusion problem.
      PubDate: 2015-02-21
  • Introduction
    • PubDate: 2015-01-15
  • Duality and Inferential Semantics
    • Abstract: It is well known that classical inferentialist semantics runs into problems regarding abnormal valuations (Carnap in Formalization of logic. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1943; Hjortland in Notre Dame J Formal Logic 55(4):445–467, 2014; Peregrin in J Philos Logic 39(3):255–274, 2010). It is equally well known that the issues can be resolved if we construct the inference relation in a multiple-conclusion sequent calculus. The latter has been prominently developed in recent work by Restall (Logic, methodology and philosophy of science: proceedings of the twelfth international congress. Kings College Publications, pp 189–205, 2005), with the guiding interpretation that the valid sequent says that the simultaneous assertion of all of Γ with the denial of all of Δ is incoherent. However, such structures face significant interpretive challenges (Rumfitt in Grazer Philos Stud 77(1):61–84, 2008; Steinberger in J Philos Logic 40(3):333–355, 2011; Tennant in The taming of the true. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997), and they do not provide an adequate grasp on the machinery of the duality of assertions and denials that could (a) provide an abstract account of inferential semantics; (b) show why the dual treatment is semantically superior. This paper explores a slightly different tack by considering a dual-calculus framework consisting of two, single-conclusion, inference relations dealing with the preservation of assertion and the preservation of denial, respectively. In this context, I develop an abstract inferentialist semantics, before going on to show that the framework is equivalent to Restall’s, whilst providing a better grasp on the underlying proof-structure.
      PubDate: 2015-01-09
  • Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism
    • Abstract: Abstract The aim of this paper is to point out the limitations of Hybrid Modal Realism as a general theory of modalities, i.e. one that gives an analysis of possibilities as well as impossibilities. To do so we will firstly sketch the goals that theories of impossible worlds should achieve. Secondly we will briefly present the two most popular accounts of impossibilities—Extended Modal Realism and Extended Ersatzism. We will focus on the aspects of both theories which became the motivation for a hybrid view. In the last part of this paper we will analyze Francesco Berto’s Hybrid Modal Realism and present reasons why this account is an insufficient tool for analyzing impossibilities.
      PubDate: 2014-12-30
  • Russellian Facts About the Slingshot
    • Abstract: Abstract The so-called “Slingshot” argument purports to show that an ontology of facts is untenable. In this paper, we address a minimal slingshot restricted to an ontology of physical facts as truth-makers for empirical physical statements. Accepting that logical matters have no bearing on the physical facts that are truth-makers for empirical physical statements and that objects are themselves constituents of such facts, our minimal slingshot argument purportedly shows that any two physical statements with empirical content are made true by one and the same fact. It is well-known that Russell’s theory of descriptions may be employed to reveal a scope fallacy in the slingshot argument. This paper reveals that there is a quite independent Russellian criticism of the slingshot argument based on the thesis that facts are structured entities.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
  • Benedykt Bornstein’s Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
    • Abstract: Abstract The aim of this paper is to present and discuss main philosophical ideas concerning logic and mathematics of a significant but forgotten Polish philosopher Benedykt Bornstein. He received his doctoral degree with Kazimierz Twardowski but is not included into the Lvov–Warsaw School of Philosophy founded by the latter. His philosophical views were unique and quite different from the views of main representatives of Lvov–Warsaw School. We shall discuss Bornstein’s considerations on the philosophy of geometry, on the infinity, on the foundations of set theory and his polemics with Stanisław Leśniewski as well as his conception of a geometrization of logic, of the categorial logic and of the mathematics of quality.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
  • Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues
    • Abstract: Abstract Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality (representation per se), transparency (immediacy of cognitive content consequent upon the unawareness of underlying representational processes), subjectivity (first-person perspective) or reflexivity (autonoetic awareness). However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible for operationalizing such a reflexive state. Current reliance by higher-order and intrinsic self-representational theories on self-representing data structures to achieve reflexive self-awareness is highly problematic, suggesting a solution in terms of a self-referential processing regime.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
  • Contemporary Quantum Physics Metaphysical Challenge: Looking for a
           Relational Metaphysics
    • Abstract: Abstract Traditionally, Physics has been dominated by the image of objects, that is, by the atomistic metaphysics of absolutely intrinsic (monadic) properties of qualitatively unchangeable individual entities. The first major challenge to this metaphysics inside physics comes with quantum mechanics, specifically with the well-known phenomenon known as ‘quantum entanglement’. From quantum entanglement it seems that we can conclude that: (1) quantum objects are not independent entities; (2) wholes (systems) have an ontological priority over their parts (subsystems). However, it is arguable that is too risky to infer such conclusions directly from quantum mechanics. If epistemological consequences of quantum mechanics are inescapable, is seems unwise to take any direct ontological consequences from it. After all, quantum mechanics does not refer to the states of physical entities before measurements, but it is just a theory that allows us to calculate the possible outcomes from any given measurement. Still, this does not mean that, indirectly, quantum mechanics does not give some account of quantum reality that deeply challenges traditional objects metaphysics, namely, (1) through the simple existence of the measurement problem; and (2) through the experimental violations of Bell inequality. Even challenged, the object picture in physics can thus prevail. But we must also not forget that on the last decades, Quantum Physics has being evolved beyond the direct scope of quantum mechanics. I will try to argue that in at least some contemporary approaches in Quantum Physics we can see that there is a movement pointing towards a relational ontological view, according to which the ontological primacy is not to be given to individual entities, as self-sufficient elements with their own intrinsic and immutable identities—as in traditional object’s metaphysics—but to some sort of relational structures. I argue that although this relational metaphysics is still to be developed, it will have to be able to account for both the relational and object natures of quantum entities.
      PubDate: 2014-11-18
  • Measurement and Metaphysics in van Fraassen’s Scientific
    • Abstract: Abstract Van Fraassen has presented in Scientific Representation an attractive notion of measurement as an important part of the empiricist structuralism that he endorses. However, he has been criticized on the grounds that both his notion of measurement and his empiricist structuralism force him to do the very thing he objects to in other philosophical projects—to endorse a controversial metaphysics. This paper proposes a defense of van Fraassen by arguing that his project is indeed a ‘metaphysical’ project, but one which is very similar to Strawson’s ‘descriptive metaphysics’; if this is the case, van Fraassen’s project may be taken, following recent suggestions made by Ney and Paul, as a form of metaphysics that can potentially make a crucial contribution to scientific inquiry.
      PubDate: 2014-11-18
  • An Overview of Type Theories
    • Abstract: Abstract Pure type systems arise as a generalisation of simply typed lambda calculus. The contemporary development of mathematics has renewed the interest in type theories, as they are not just the object of mere historical research, but have an active role in the development of computational science and core mathematics. It is worth exploring some of them in depth, particularly predicative Martin-Löf’s intuitionistic type theory and impredicative Coquand’s calculus of constructions. The logical and philosophical differences and similarities between them will be studied, showing the relationship between these type theories and other fields of logic.
      PubDate: 2014-11-15
  • What is a Proof?
    • Abstract: Abstract In this programmatic paper we renew the well-known question “What is a proof?”. Starting from the challenge of the mathematical community by computer assisted theorem provers we discuss in the first part how the experiences from examinations of proofs can help to sharpen the question. In the second part we have a look to the new challenge given by “big proofs”.
      PubDate: 2014-11-09
  • Reasoning Processes as Epistemic Dynamics
    • Abstract: Abstract This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus highlighting their relationship and allowing a better understanding of how they interact together.
      PubDate: 2014-10-30
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