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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 363 journals)
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access  
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access  
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 150)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription  
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access  
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de Clásicos y Modernos     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Contemporary Political Theory     Partially Free   (Followers: 19)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Full-text available via subscription  
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 13)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription  
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Diánoia     Open Access  
Dilemata     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 22)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Études de lettres     Open Access  
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 4)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 163)
Facta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)

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Journal Cover Axiomathes
   Journal TOC RSS feeds Export to Zotero [6 followers]  Follow    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
     ISSN (Print) 1572-8390 - ISSN (Online) 1122-1151
     Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2209 journals]   [SJR: 0.19]   [H-I: 10]
  • Free Will and Rationality
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper I analyse different justifications for the claim that the minor premise of the libertarian argument is true, namely, intuition, van Inwagen’s argument from moral responsibility and an argument from rationality. I claim none of these is satisfactory. I conclude by suggesting a possible way of interpreting the meaning of the free will intuition libertarians claim we have.
      PubDate: 2014-09-12
  • Correspondence Truth and Quantum Mechanics
    • Abstract: Abstract The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the case at a certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of ‘no go’ theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen–Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub–Clifton ‘uniqueness theorem’ is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences.
      PubDate: 2014-09-01
  • The Irrationality of Physicalism
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper argues, not that physicalism is wrong, but that it is irrational. The paper defines standards of rationality, both metaphysical and epistemological, that physicalism necessarily inherits from science. Then it assesses physicalist efforts to naturalize consciousness in light of these. It concludes that physicalism allows its metaphysics to outrun its epistemology, in defiance of applicable standards, revealing a fundamental incoherence in the doctrine. The paper also briefly reviews other naturalization programs, to claim that physicalism, unlike the sciences, hasn’t proved fruitful.
      PubDate: 2014-09-01
  • A Process Ontology
    • Abstract: Abstract The paper assumes that to be of practical interest process must be understood as physical action that takes place in the world rather than being an idea in the mind. It argues that if an ontology of process is to accommodate actuality, it must be represented in terms of relative probabilities. Folk physics cannot accommodate this, and so the paper appeals to scientific culture because it is an emergent knowledge of the world derived from action in it. Process is represented as a contradictory probability distribution that does not depend on a spatio-temporal frame. An actuality is a probability density that grounds the values of probabilities to constitute their distributions. Because probability is a conserved value, probability distributions are subject to the constraint of symmetry and must be zero-sum. An actuality is locked-in by other actualities to become a zero-sum symmetry of probability values. It is shown that the locking-in of actualities constructs spatio-temporal locality, lends actualities specificity, and makes them a contradiction. Localization is the basis for understanding empirical observation. Because becoming depends on its construction of being, processes exist as trajectories. The historical trajectories of evolution and revolution as well as the non-historical trajectory of strong emergence are how processes are observed to exist.
      PubDate: 2014-09-01
  • The Quantum-Like Approach of Psychosomatic Phenomena in Application
    • Abstract: Abstract The quantum-like approach of psychosomatic phenomena suggests an explanation of the correlations between mind and body in terms of quantum-like entanglement, that is, without appealing to any concept of psychophysical, efficient causality. This approach is developed within the Hilbert space formalism and its general consequences are drawn. It is first illustrated by a simple, qualitative model of the placebo effect which shows that representing psychosomatic states by entangled states can explain that purely psychological factors can produce a-causal changes of physiological parameters. Then, a dynamical, quantitative and predictive model of bipolar disorder which makes use of the unitarity of the temporal evolution of psychosomatic states due to biological and psychological rhythms is worked out. This model can explain some current observations, like for example the severe fluctuations in mood between depression and mania, and it can forecast the moment of shifting. In addition, it justifies the efficiency of chronotherapy on theoretical basis.
      PubDate: 2014-09-01
  • Husserl’s Break from Brentano Reconsidered: Abstraction and the
           Structure of Consciousness
    • Abstract: The paper contends that abstraction lies at the core of the philosophical and methodological rupture that occurred between Husserl and his mentor Franz Brentano. To accomplish this, it explores the notion of abstraction at work in these two thinkers’ methodological discussions through their respective claims regarding the structure of consciousness, and shows that how Husserl and Brentano analyze the structure of consciousness conditions and strictly delineates the nature and reach of their methods of inquiry. The paper pays close attention to intentionality, founding (Fundierung), and qualitative modification (qualitative Modifikation) understood as principles of consciousness. While intentionality has been the topic of numerous discussions surrounding these two thinkers’ work, founding and qualitative modification have slipped under the radar despite the fact that they hold—as I intend to show—the key to shedding new light on their respective methods of inquiry. More specifically, the paper explicates the ways in which Brentano’s notion of founding (understood as a relationship between whole acts) and his failure to identify radical-qualitative modification as a principle of consciousness preclude him from offering a successful model for philosophical universalizing thought. It is my hope to show that Husserl’s rethinking of founding as a relationship between certain structural moments of acts along with his novel notion of qualitative modification ground his attempt to carve a new method of philosophical inquiry—albeit jejune and ambiguous at the time of the Investigations, yet nevertheless able to successfully negotiate the problems faced by his predecessor.
      PubDate: 2014-09-01
  • The Import of the Original Bradley’s Regress(es)
    • Abstract: Abstract Much of the recent metaphysical literature on the problem of the relational unity of complexes leaves the impression that Bradley (or some Bradleyan argument) has uncovered a serious problem to be addressed. The problem is thought to be particularly challenging for trope theorists and realists about universals. In truth, there has been little clarity about the nature and import of the original Bradley’s regress arguments. In this paper, I offer a careful analysis and reconstruction of the arguments in Bradley’s Appearance and Reality (1893). The analysis reveals that no less than three regress arguments against relations can be found. I show that none of them are compelling. I argue that, as a result, it is a serious misstep for philosophers today to offer metaphysical theses based on the unchallenged assumption that Bradley has established his regress result. I further analyze the underpinnings of the Bradley problem as it is frequently cast in contemporary literature and show that they rely on certain confusions and biases, which once brought to light, make current Bradley-inspired arguments against relations unconvincing.
      PubDate: 2014-09-01
  • Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation,
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world (ontic aim) in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings (epistemic aim). Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. This analysis extends Illari’s account in important ways, putting more pressure on ontic readings of mechanistic explanation and providing an answer to the question how ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation are related. I argue these point in terms of cases on memory research drawn from neuroscience and research on extinct neurogenetic mechanisms from early nervous systems biology.
      PubDate: 2014-08-28
  • Biodiversity Surgery: Some Epistemological Challenges in Facing Extinction
    • Abstract: Abstract Biological conservation has a long story, but what distinguishes Conservation Biology from previous conservation fields is its multidisciplinary scope and its character as a mission-oriented crisis discipline. These characteristics suggested the introduction of the metaphor of biological conservation as a sort of surgery. This paper is about the initial stages of such surgery. Firstly, some data about the so-called “Big Sixth”—the disease—will be presented together with some information about Conservation Biology—the surgeon. Then epistemic and epistemological difficulties in extinction assessment and conservation prioritization, and triage in particular, will be pointed out. It will be argued that, while data deficiency arising from empirical and practical constraints can in principle be overcome, a different order of difficulties stems from the competition among several species concepts. In this case, it will be suggested that the extent of complications is of such significance to require a thorough re-assessment of the very nature of the patients, i.e., outside the metaphor, of the concept of species.
      PubDate: 2014-08-21
  • Composable Relations Induced in Networks of Aligned Ontologies: A Category
           Theoretic Approach
    • Abstract: Abstract A network of aligned ontologies is a distributed system, whose components (constituent ontologies) are interacting and interoperating, the result of this interaction being, either the extension of local assertions, which are valid within each individual ontology, to global assertions holding between remote ontology syntactic entities (concepts, individuals) through a network path, or to local assertions holding between local entities of an ontology, but induced by remote ontologies, through a cycle in the network. The mechanism for achieving this interaction is the composition of relations. In this perspective, (a) we introduce the notions of local composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to the same ontology, remotely induced composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to remote ontologies through a path of ontologies and alignments in the network, and network induced local composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to the same ontology, but through a path of ontologies and alignments forming a cycle starting and ending at the same ontology, to characterize the logical consequences extracted from a network of aligned ontologies, and (b) we propose a category-based methodology for detecting semantic inconsistencies in networks of aligned ontologies, which is based on contravariant representable functors and on the definition of two composition operators suitable for propagating local knowledge through the network.
      PubDate: 2014-08-19
  • A Reply to Heathcote’s: On the Exhaustion of Mathematical Entities
           by Structures
    • Abstract: Abstract In this article I respond to Heathcote’s “On the Exhaustion of Mathematical Entities by Structures”. I show that his ontic exhaustion issue is not a problem for ante rem structuralists. First, I show that it is unlikely that mathematical objects can occur across structures. Second, I show that the properties that Heathcote suggests are underdetermined by structuralism are not so underdetermined. Finally, I suggest that even if Heathcote’s ontic exhaustion issue if thought of as a problem of reference, the structuralist has a readily available solution.
      PubDate: 2014-06-27
  • Arrows, Balls and the Metaphysics of Motion
    • Abstract: Abstract The arrow paradox is an argument purported to show that objects do not really move. The two main metaphysics of motion, the At–At theory of motion and velocity primitivism, solve the paradox differently. It is argued that neither solution is completely satisfactory. In particular it is contended that there are no decisive arguments in favor of the claim that velocity as it is constructed in the At–At theory is a truly instantaneous property, which is a crucial assumption to solve the paradox. If so the At–At theory faces the threat that most of our physical theories turn out to be non-Markovian. Finally it is considered whether all those threats and paradoxes are dispelled if only a new metaphysics of persistence is taken into account, namely four-dimensionalism.
      PubDate: 2014-06-03
  • Frege’s Logicism and the Neo-Fregean Project
    • Abstract: Neo-logicism is, not least in the light of Frege’s logicist programme, an important topic in the current philosophy of mathematics. In this essay, I critically discuss a number of issues that I consider to be relevant for both Frege’s logicism and neo-logicism. I begin with a brief introduction into Wright’s neo-Fregean project and mention the main objections that he faces. In Sect. 2, I discuss the Julius Caesar problem and its possible Fregean and neo-Fregean solution. In Sect. 3, I raise what I take to be a central objection to the position of neo-logicism. In Sect. 4, I attempt to clarify how we should understand Frege’s stipulation that the two sides of an abstraction principle qua contextual definition of a term-forming operator shall be “gleichbedeutend”. In Sect. 5, I consider the options that Frege might have had to establish the analyticity of Hume’s Principle: The number that belongs to the concept F is equal to the number that belongs to the concept G if and only if F and G are equinumerous. Section 6 is devoted to Frege’s two criteria of thought identity. In Sects. 7 and 8, I defend the position of the neo-logicist against an alleged “knock-down argument”. In Sect. 9, I comment on Frege’s description of abstraction in Grundlagen, §64 and the use of the terms “recarving” and “reconceptualization” in the relevant literature on Fregean abstraction and neo-logicism. I argue that Fregean abstraction has nothing to do with the recarving of a sentence content or its decomposition in different ways. I conclude with remarks on global logicism versus local logicisms.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
  • Against Psychological Sequentialism
    • Abstract: Abstract Psychological Sequentialism holds that no causal constraint is necessary for the preservation of what matters in survival; rather, it is sufficient for preservation if two groups of mental states are similar enough and temporally close enough. Suppose that one’s body is instantaneously dematerialized and subsequently, by an amazing coincidence, a collection of molecules is configured to form a qualitatively identical human body. According to Psychological Sequentialism, these events preserve what matters in survival. In this article, I examine some of the main arguments for the view and argue that they fail to establish that no causal constraint is necessary. I also argue that Psychological Sequentialism yields implausible consequences that render it hard to accept the view.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
  • On the Exhaustion of Mathematical Entities by Structures
    • Abstract: Abstract There has been considerable discussion in the literature of one kind of identity problem that mathematical structuralism faces: the automorphism problem, in which the structure is unable to individuate the mathematical entities in its domain. Shapiro (Philos Math 16(3):285–309, 2008) has partly responded to these concerns. But I argue here that the theory faces an even more serious kind of identity problem, which the theory can’t overcome staying within its remit. I give two examples to make the point.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
  • “Memory of Water” Without Water: The Logic of Disputed
    • Abstract: Abstract The “memory of water” was a major international controversy that remains unresolved. Taken seriously or not, this hypothesis leads to logical contradictions in both cases. Indeed, if this hypothesis is held as wrong, then we have to explain how a physiological signal emerged from the background and we have to elucidate a bulk of coherent results. If this hypothesis is held as true, we must explain why these experiments were difficult to reproduce by other teams and why some blind experiments were so disturbing for the expected outcomes. In this article, a third way is proposed by modeling these experiments in a quantum-like probabilistic model. It is interesting to note that this model does not need the hypothesis of the “memory of water” and, nevertheless, all the features of Benveniste’s experiments are taken into account (emergence of a signal from the background, difficulties faced by other teams in terms of reproducibility, disturbances during blind experiments, and apparent “jumps of activity” between samples). In conclusion, it is proposed that the cognitive states of the experimenter exhibited quantum-like properties during Benveniste’s experiments.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
  • Erratum to: Frege’s Logicism and the Neo-Fregean Project
    • PubDate: 2014-06-01
  • On the Evolutionary Defense of Scientific Antirealism
    • Abstract: Abstract Van Fraassen (The scientific image, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980) claims that successful theories exist today because successful theories survive and unsuccessful ones die. Wray (Erkenntnis 67:81–89, 2007; Erkenntnis 72:365–377, 2010) appeals to Stanford’s new pessimistic induction (Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), arguing that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation is better than the realist explanation that successful theories exist because they are approximately true. I argue that if the pessimistic induction is correct, then the evolutionary explanation is neither true nor empirically adequate, and that realism is better than selectionism because realism explains more phenomena in science than selectionism.
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
  • What is a Line'
    • Abstract: Abstract Since the discovery of incommensurability in ancient Greece, arithmeticism and geometricism constantly switched roles. After ninetieth century arithmeticism Frege eventually returned to the view that mathematics is really entirely geometry. Yet Poincaré, Brouwer, Weyl and Bernays are mathematicians opposed to the explication of the continuum purely in terms of the discrete. At the beginning of the twenty-first century ‘continuum theorists’ in France (Longo, Thom and others) believe that the continuum precedes the discrete. In addition the last 50 years witnessed the revival of infinitesimals (Laugwitz and Robinson—non-standard analysis) and—based upon category theory—the rise of smooth infinitesimal analysis and differential geometry. The spatial whole-parts relation is irreducible (Russell) and correlated with the spatial order of simultaneity. The human imaginative capacities are connected to the characterization of points and lines (Euclid) and to the views of Aristotle (the irreducibility of the continuity of a line to its points), which remained in force until the ninetieth century. Although Bolzano once more launched an attempt to arithmetize continuity, it appears as if Weierstrass, Cantor and Dedekind finally succeeded in bringing this ideal to its completion. Their views are assessed by analyzing the contradiction present in Grünbaum’s attempt to explain the continuum as an aggregate of unextended elements (degenerate intervals). Alternatively a line-stretch is characterized as a one-dimensional spatial subject, given at once in its totality (as a whole) and delimited by two points—but it is neither a breadthless length nor the (shortest) distance between two points. The overall aim of this analysis is to account for the uniqueness of discreteness and continuity by highlighting their mutual interconnections exemplified in the nature of a line as a one-dimensional spatial subject, while acknowledging that points are merely spatial objects which are always dependent upon an extended spatial subject. Instead of attempting to reduce continuity to discreteness or discreteness to continuity, a third alternative is explored: accept the irreducibility of number and space and then proceed by analyzing their unbreakable coherence. The argument may be seen as exploring some implications of the view of John Bell, namely that the “continuous is an autonomous notion, not explicable in terms of the discrete.” Bell points out that initially Brouwer, in his dissertation of 1907, “regards continuity and discreteness as complementary notions, neither of which is reducible to each other.”
      PubDate: 2014-06-01
  • Aspectual Shape: Presentational Approach
    • Abstract: Abstract Aspectual shape is widely recognized property of intentionality. This means that subject’s access to reality is necessarily conditioned by applied concepts, perspective, modes of sensation, etc. I argue against representational and indirect-realist account of this phenomenon. My own proposition—presentational and direct realist—is based on the recognition of historical contexts, in which the phenomenon of aspectuality should be reconsidered; on the other hand—it is based on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of aspectual perception. Moreover I apply some results from the area of logicophilosophical investigations called qua theory.
      PubDate: 2014-05-21
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