for Journals by Title or ISSN
for Articles by Keywords
help

 A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

        1 2 3        [Sort by number of followers]   [Restore default list]

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 555 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription  
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access  
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Agone     Open Access  
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Al-Ulum     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 29)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Annales UMCS. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia)     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Appareil     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access  
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aufklärung: revista de filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription  
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access  
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication / Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija     Open Access  
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conceptus : zeitschrift für philosophie     Hybrid Journal  
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 20)
Controvérsia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Conversations : The Journal of Cavellian Studies     Open Access  
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dao     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doctor virtualis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éndoxa     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Environmental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Estética     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 40)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Études Platoniciennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 8)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 46)
Facta Universitatis, Series : Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History     Open Access  
FairPlay, Revista de Filosofia, Ética y Derecho del Deporte     Open Access  
Faith and Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Fichte-Studien     Full-text available via subscription  
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Filosofia e Educação     Open Access  
Filosofia Theoretica : Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Filosofia Unisinos     Open Access  
FLEKS : Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice     Open Access  
Forum Philosophicum     Full-text available via subscription  
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Franciscanum. Revista de las ciencias del espíritu     Open Access  
Frontiers of Philosophy in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Global Bioethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Review of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Hegel Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription  
Hegel-Jahrbuch     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Heidegger Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences     Hybrid Journal  
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
HOPOS : The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Horizons philosophiques     Full-text available via subscription  
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Humanist Studies & the Digital Age     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Husserl Studies     Hybrid Journal  
HYBRIS, Revista de Filosofí­a     Open Access  
Hypnos. Revista do Centro de Estudos da Antiguidade     Open Access  
Idealistic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Impact : The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain     Free   (Followers: 4)
Informal Logic     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Ingenium. Revista Electrónica de Pensamiento Moderno y Metodología en Historia de la Ideas     Open Access  
Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Intellèctus     Open Access  
Interações : Cultura e Comunidade     Open Access  
Interespe. Interdisciplinaridade e Espiritualidade na Educação     Open Access  
International Corporate Responsibility Series     Full-text available via subscription  
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Journal for Transformative Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Applied Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Engineering, Social Justice, and Peace     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
International Journal of Philosophical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Philosophy Study     Open Access   (Followers: 5)

        1 2 3        [Sort by number of followers]   [Restore default list]

Journal Cover Axiomathes
  [SJR: 0.265]   [H-I: 13]   [4 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8390 - ISSN (Online) 1122-1151
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2335 journals]
  • Neuroscience and Whitehead I: Neuro-ecological Model of Brain
    • Authors: Georg Northoff
      Pages: 219 - 252
      Abstract: Abstract Neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain and its various neuro-sensory and neuro-cognitive functions. However, despite all progress, the model of the brain as well as its ontological characterization remain unclear. The aim in this first paper is the discussion of an empirically plausible model of the brain with the subsequent claim of a neuro-ecological model. Whitehead claimed that he inversed or reversed the Kantian notion of the subject by putting it back into the ecological context of the world, the so-called reformist subjectivist principle. Based on empirical evidence about the experience-dependence of the brain’s spontaneous activity, I argue for an analogous inversion or reversion with regard to the model of brain: empirical evidence is well compatible with a neuro-ecological model which extends beyond and integrates both Humean neuro-sensory and Kantian neuro-cognitive models. I conclude that a neuro-ecological and process-based model of brain and its relationship to the world may offer a novel model of brain that carries major ontological implications as they shall be discussed in the second paper.
      PubDate: 2016-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9286-2
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2016)
       
  • “Memory of Water” Without Water: Modeling of Benveniste’s
           Experiments with a Personalist Interpretation of Probability
    • Authors: Francis Beauvais
      Pages: 329 - 345
      Abstract: Abstract Benveniste’s experiments were at the origin of a scientific controversy that has never been satisfactorily resolved. Hypotheses based on modifications of water structure that were proposed to explain these experiments (“memory of water”) were generally considered as quite improbable. In the present paper, we show that Benveniste’s experiments violated the law of total probability, one of the pillars of classical probability theory. Although this could suggest that quantum logic was at work, the decoherence process is however at first sight an obstacle to describe this macroscopic experimental situation. Based on the principles of a personalist view of probability (quantum Bayesianism or QBism), a modeling could nevertheless be built that fitted the outcomes reported in Benveniste’s experiments. Indeed, in QBism, there is no split between microscopic and macroscopic, but between the world where an agent lives and his internal experience of that world. The outcome of an experiment is thus displaced from the object to its perception by an agent. By taking into account both the personalist view of probability and measurement fluctuations, all characteristics of Benveniste’s experiments could be described in a simple modeling: change of the biological system from resting state to “activated” state, concordance of “expected” and observed outcomes and apparent “jumping” of “biological activities” from sample to sample. No hypothesis on change of water structure was necessary. In conclusion, a modeling of Benveniste’s experiments based on a personalist view of probability offers for the first time a logical framework for these experiments that have remained controversial and paradoxical till date.
      PubDate: 2016-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-015-9279-6
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2016)
       
  • Against Mathematical Convenientism
    • Authors: Seungbae Park
      Pages: 115 - 122
      Abstract: Abstract Indispensablists argue that when our belief system conflicts with our experiences, we can negate a mathematical belief but we do not because if we do, we would have to make an excessive revision of our belief system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘mathematical convenientism.’ I argue that mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy and that it demolishes the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument and Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument.
      PubDate: 2016-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-015-9281-z
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 2 (2016)
       
  • Two Fundamentally Different Perspectives on Time
    • Authors: Jesse M. Mulder
      Abstract: Abstract Frege taught us how to understand one form of predication: an atemporal one. There is also a different, temporal form of predication, which I briefly introduce. Accordingly, there are two fundamentally different approaches to time: a reductive one, aiming to account for time in terms of Frege’s atemporal predication, and a non-reductive one, insisting that the temporal form of predication is sui generis, and that time is to be understood in its terms. I do not directly argue for or against reductionism in this paper. Rather, by evaluating the debates on endurantism–perdurantism, A-theory–B-theory, and presentism–eternalism, I argue that these debates, although aiming to be fundamental, largely boil down to mere quarrels between alternative reductive approaches. We should take notice of this fact and reorient ourselves within the debate on time accordingly: the real issue is whether we should reduce or not. I briefly sketch in what sense endurantism, A-theory, and presentism may be developed on a properly anti-reductionist basis.
      PubDate: 2016-08-24
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9307-1
       
  • Norton and the Logic of Thought Experiments
    • Abstract: Abstract John D. Norton defends an empiricist epistemology of thought experiments, the central thesis of which is that thought experiments are nothing more than arguments. Philosophers have attempted to provide counterexamples to this claim, but they haven’t convinced Norton. I will point out a more fundamental reason for reformulation that criticizes Norton’s claim that a thought experiment is a good one when its underlying logical form possesses certain desirable properties. I argue that by Norton’s empiricist standards, no thought experiment is ever justified in any deep sense due to the properties of its logical form. Instead, empiricists should consider again the merits of evaluating thought experiments more like laboratory experiments, and less like arguments.
      PubDate: 2016-08-23
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9306-2
       
  • Presentism and the Flow of Time
    • Authors: Jerzy Gołosz
      Abstract: Abstract The paper examines the relations between presentism and the thesis concerning the existence of the flow of time. It tries to show that the presentist has to admit the existence of the passage of time and that the standard formulation of presentism as a singular thesis saying that only the present exists is insufficient because it does not allow the inference of the existence of the passage of time. Instead of this, the paper proposes a formulation of presentism with the aid of the notion of becoming; not only does a formulation state the existence of the flow of time in such a way as to avoid the question of the rate of the passage of time, it also allows the inference of the existence of only present things and events. The paper demonstrates that the proposed conception of presentism also has other virtues, such as homogeneity, non-triviality, and ability to express dynamicity of presentists’ image of the world which testify for it.
      PubDate: 2016-08-19
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9305-3
       
  • Criticisms of Cicovacki’s The Analysis of Wonder
    • Authors: Eric Chelstrom
      Abstract: Abstract The Analysis of Wonder is a stimulating and worthy introduction to the difficult and unique thought of Nicolai Hartmann. In this venue, the focus is upon criticisms of Cicovacki’s book. The opportunity to elicit further clarification and argumentation from Cicovacki should be fruitful. Hartmann’s philosophy is truly unique in nature and vast. As such, it is worth noting at the outset that, given the nature of Cicovacki’s book and a lack of deeper familiarity with Hartmann’s philosophy, the concerns raised herein may very well be issues in Hartmann that Cicovacki is replicating. The criticisms addressed herein present five sets of worries related to The Analysis of Wonder. The first three may be relatively minor concerns having to do with (1) what is meant by the rediscovery of the world; (2) Cicovacki’s criticisms of post-modernism and existentialism; and (3) Cicovacki’s use of Arendt as a way of framing Hartmann’s value to contemporary philosophy and beyond. The latter two sets of worries are more substantive. They involve (4) Hartmann’s account of the importance of a loving attitude and (5) Hartmann’s theory of personality. Again, these are presented in the spirit of an invitation to dialogue more about Hartmann, a figure who Cicovacki represents well in The Analysis of Wonder.
      PubDate: 2016-08-19
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9303-5
       
  • Attitudes and Normativity
    • Authors: Tadeusz Ciecierski
      Abstract: Abstract The paper attempts to pose a problem for theories claiming that intentional attributions are essentially normative. Firstly, I argue that the claim is ambiguous. Secondly, that three possible interpretations of the claim can be distinguished: one that appeals to normative impositions put on agents of intentional states, another that exploits the fact that one can normatively assess the states in question and a further one that locates normativity in the domain of special intentional explanations. Thirdly, it is argued that each interpretation faces serious difficulties: they either fail to provide a justification for the claim they intend to make or they contradict certain justified observations about intentional attributions.
      PubDate: 2016-08-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9302-6
       
  • Mechanisms, Experiments, and Theory-Ladenness: A
           Realist–Perspectivalist View
    • Authors: Marco Buzzoni
      Abstract: Abstract The terms “perspectivism” and “perspectivalism” have been the focus of an intense philosophical discussion with important repercussions for the debate about the role of mechanisms in scientific explanations. However, leading exponents of the new mechanistic philosophy have conceded more than was necessary to the radically subjectivistic perspectivalism, and fell into the opposite error, by retaining not negligible residues of objectivistic views about mechanisms. In order to remove this vacillation between the subjective-cultural and the objective-natural sides of mechanisms, we shall raise the question about theory-ladenness over again and interpret it in its connection with the technical–experimental nature of scientific knowledge, as affirming the perspectival character of scientific knowledge: It is because of the character at once theory-laden and practice-laden, i.e. technique-laden, of our putting questions to nature that empirical reality must be investigated from particular perspectives: nature can be known scientifically only from a potentially infinite (not determinable a priori) number of perspectives or theoretical points of view, concretely exemplified by mechanisms or experimental ‘machines’ that allow specific access to specific aspects of sensible reality.
      PubDate: 2016-08-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9301-7
       
  • The Intentionality of Sensation and the Problem of Classification of
           Philosophical Sciences in Brentano’s empirical Psychology
    • Authors: Ion Tănăsescu
      Abstract: Abstract In the well-known intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: (1) the intentional inexistence of an object, (2) the relation to a content, and (3) the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian classification of mental phenomena: in Brentano’s psychology one can distinguish two concepts of mental phenomena—the mental phenomenon in a broad sense and the mental phenomenon in a narrow sense; the former concept allows the separation of the mental from the physical, while the narrow concept allows the distinguishing of the main classes of mental phenomena. The third part of the paper shows that, with respect to sensation, the absence of a direction toward an object is compatible with both Brentano’s early taxonomies of philosophical sciences, and his early program for the establishment of a new, empirical and non-speculative philosophy. For this reason, I hold that intentionality is important for the foundation of both psychology, and empirical philosophy.
      PubDate: 2016-07-27
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9300-8
       
  • Methodological Perspectivism and Scheme-Interpretationism in Science and
           Elsewhere
    • Authors: Hans Lenk
      Abstract: Abstract The paper discusses Giere’s perspectivism in philosophy of science. Giere is certainly right in judging that, even within perspectives, the strongest possible conclusion is that some model provides a good but never perfect fit to aspects of the world, but its agency-laden “modelism” and realistic instrumentalism should be extended to a comprehensive general perspectivist and “indirect” realistic epistemology and embed it in an anthropology proper of the man as “flexible multiple human being”. Scheme-interpretations and specific perspectives are necessary for any cognition in any science—natural and social, but also for everyday conceptions, modeling and practical acting as well as in philosophy and philosophy of science.
      PubDate: 2016-07-20
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9295-1
       
  • An Internal Limit of the Structural Analysis of Causation
    • Authors: Alessandro Giordani
      Abstract: Abstract Structural models of systems of causal connections have become a common tool in the analysis of the concept of causation. In the present paper I offer a general argument to show that one of the most powerful definitions of the concept of actual cause, provided within the structural models framework, is not sufficient to grant a full account of our intuitive judgements about actual causation, so that we are still waiting for a comprehensive definition. This is done not simply by focusing on a set of case studies, but by arguing that our intuitions about two different kinds of causal patterns, i.e., overdetermination and counterdetermination, cannot be addressed using that definition.
      PubDate: 2016-06-29
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9297-z
       
  • The Metaphysical Requirement for Models of Prediction and Explanationist
           Approaches to the Problem of Induction
    • Authors: Jaeho Lee
      Abstract: Abstract David Armstrong once argued that to solve the problem of induction with inference to the best explanation we need an anti-Humean conception of law. Some Humeans have argued that this argument begs the question against Humeanism. In this paper, I propose a new argument for the same conclusion which is not vulnerable to this criticism. In particular, I argue that explanationist approaches to the problem of induction that are combined with Humeanism is internally incoherent.
      PubDate: 2016-06-27
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9299-x
       
  • The Costs of Ockhamism
    • Authors: Ciro De Florio; Aldo Frigerio
      Abstract: Abstract This paper has a twofold aim. The first is to offer a precise definition of soft fact. Without such definition it is impossible to assess the Ockhamist solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom in an accurate way. The second purpose is to identify the costs of such a solution, distinguishing them from some of the other costs usually ascribed to Ockhamism, which Ockhamism does not actually need to pay. In particular, it is argued that Ockhamism is committed to the view that a true future exists and to a form of backward causation.
      PubDate: 2016-06-25
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9298-y
       
  • Lewis, Change and Temporary Intrinsics
    • Authors: Mario Alai
      Abstract: Abstract This is an attempt to sort out what is it that makes many of us uncomfortable with the perdurantist solution to the problem of change. Lewis argues that only perdurantism can reconcile change with persistence over time, while neither presentism nor endurantism can. So, first, I defend the endurantist solution to the problem of change, by arguing that what is relative to time are not properties, but their possession. Second, I explore the anti-perdurantist strategy of arguing that Lewis cannot solve the problem of change, for he cannot account for how some properties are possessed by objects in time. However, I argue that this strategy fails, for if by saying that objects in time can have properties ‘timelessly’ we mean “at no particular time” and “tenselessly”, only objects outside time can have properties in that way; but if we mean “for all the time they exist”, or “essentially”, perdurantists can account for this. Finally, I argue that actually perdurantism cannot solve the problem, but for different reasons: for either it sweeps the problem under the carpet, denying change, and in general subverting our conceptual scheme in a dangerous way, or it becomes equivalent to the endurantist picture that properties are had at times. Nor perdurantism is justified by the Relativity Theory or the B-theory of time, because while endurantism is certainly comfortable with presentism, it need not be committed to it; and even if it were, presentism need not be refuted by the Relativity Theory.
      PubDate: 2016-06-23
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9296-0
       
  • What is the Nature of Mathematical–Logical Objects?
    • Authors: Stathis Livadas
      Abstract: Abstract This article deals with a question of a most general, comprehensive and profound content as it is the nature of mathematical–logical objects insofar as these are considered objects of knowledge and more specifically objects of formal mathematical theories. As objects of formal theories they are dealt with in the sense they have acquired primarily from the beginnings of the systematic study of mathematical foundations in connection with logic dating from the works of G. Cantor and G. Frege in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Largely motivated by a phenomenologically founded view of mathematical objects/states-of-affairs, I try to consistently argue for their character as objects shaped to a certain extent by intentional forms exhibited by consciousness and the modes of constitution of inner temporality and at the same time as constrained in the form of immanent ‘appearances’ by what stands as their non-eliminable reference, that is, the world as primitive soil of experience and the mathematical intuitions developed in relations of reciprocity within-the-world. In this perspective and relative to my intentions I enter, in the last section, into a brief review of certain positions of G. Sher’s foundational holism and R. Tieszen’s constituted platonism, among others, respectively presented in Sher (Bull Symb Log 19:145–198, 2013) and Tieszen (After Gödel: platonism and rationalism in mathematics and logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011).
      PubDate: 2016-06-14
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9294-2
       
  • Decompositional Equivalence: A Fundamental Symmetry Underlying Quantum
           Theory
    • Authors: Chris Fields
      Abstract: Abstract Decompositional equivalence is the principle that there is no preferred decomposition of the universe into subsystems. It is shown here, by using a simple thought experiment, that quantum theory follows from decompositional equivalence together with Landauer’s principle. This demonstration raises within physics a question previously left to psychology: how do human—or any—observers identify or agree about what constitutes a “system of interest”?
      PubDate: 2016-04-29
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9289-z
       
  • Mental, behavioural and physiological nonlocal correlations within the
           Generalized Quantum Theory framework
    • Authors: Harald Walach; Patrizio Tressoldi; Luciano Pederzoli
      Abstract: Abstract Generalized Quantum Theory (GQT) seeks to explain and predict quantum-like phenomena in areas usually outside the scope of quantum physics, such as biology and psychology. It draws on fundamental theories and uses the algebraic formalism of quantum theory that is used in the study of observable physical matter such as photons, electrons, etc. In contrast to quantum theory proper, GQT is a very generalized form that does not allow for the full application of formalism. For instance neither a commutator, such as Planck’s constant, nor any additive operations are defined, which precludes the usage of a full Hilbert-space formalism. But it is a formalized phenomenological theory that is applicable whenever the core element of a quantum theory needs to be captured, namely in the presence of incompatible or non-commuting operations. As a consequence, it also predicts nonlocal, generalized entanglement correlations in systems other than proper quantum systems. In this paper we summarize the specific scientific evidence relating to the quantum-like mental, behavioral and physiological nonlocal correlations. Such non-local, generalized entanglement correlations are expected, both in space and time, between subsystems of a larger system, whenever observables pertaining to the global system are incompatible or complementary to observables pertaining to subsystems, as predicted by GQT. The result is a coherent explanation of a significant amount of controversial and seemingly weird occurrences that cannot be explained by classical physical laws. This review also offers a new perspective of the human mind’s potential.
      PubDate: 2016-04-28
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9290-6
       
  • Neuroscience and Whitehead II: Process-Based Ontology of Brain
    • Authors: Georg Northoff
      Abstract: While neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain, the implications of these empirical findings for ontological questions in philosophy including the mind–body problem remain yet unclear. In the first paper, I discussed the model of brain that as implied and supported by the empirical data. This leads me now to the question of an empirically plausible ontology of brain. Therefore, the aim in this second paper is the ontological characterization of the brain in terms of a process-based ontology that avoids what Whitehead described as “simple location” and “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. The discussion of the model of the brain is complemented by developing a process-based ontological characterization of the brain. Specifically, as based on Whitehead, I argue that “simple location” of the brain as thing or object in time and space amounts to nothing but an abstraction rendering what Whitehead described as “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. Instead of describing the brain as static, non-temporal and isolated thing or object, I characterize the brain ontologically by dynamic, temporal, and relational processes. This leads me to a process-based ontology of brain which may be specified in spatiotemporal terms. Since the world’s larger spatiotemporal range or scale contains, e.g., nests, the smaller one of the brain, I characterize their ontological relationship by “spatiotemporal nestedness” and “spatiotemporal directedness”. Such spatiotemporal relationship between world and brain precludes the confusion between the world as whole and the brain as part, e.g., “mereological confusion”. I conclude that process-based or better, more specifically, spatiotemporal ontology of the brain and its relationship to the world may offer novel views on the question for the ontological relationship between mind and brain, e.g., the mind–brain problem, by converting or reformulating it as “world-brain problem”.
      PubDate: 2016-04-12
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9287-1
       
  • Why be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher?
    • Authors: Moti Mizrahi
      Pages: 205 - 218
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in turn, show why philosophers should argue with humility.
      PubDate: 2015-12-14
      DOI: 10.1007/s10516-015-9284-9
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 2 (2015)
       
 
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
Fax: +00 44 (0)131 4513327
 
Home (Search)
Subjects A-Z
Publishers A-Z
Customise
APIs
Your IP address: 54.198.14.214
 
About JournalTOCs
API
Help
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-2016