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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 834 journals)
Showing 401 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
Journal of Social Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Journal of the American Philosophical Association     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Journal of the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 49)
Journal of the Philosophy of Games     Open Access  
Journal of the Philosophy of History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of the Sociology and Theory of Religion     Open Access  
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Journal of World Philosophies     Open Access  
Journal on Computational Thinking (JCThink)     Open Access  
Juris (Jurnal Ilmiah Syariah)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Jurisprudence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Jurnal Dinamika Penelitian : Media Komunikasi Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan     Open Access  
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam (Journal of Islamic Economics and Business)     Open Access  
Jurnal Filsafat     Open Access  
Jurnal Living Hadis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Jurnal Theologia     Open Access  
Jurnal Ushuluddin     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Jus Cogens : A Critical Journal of Philosophy of Law and Politics     Hybrid Journal  
Kader     Open Access  
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Kalagatos : Philosophical Journal     Open Access  
KALAM     Open Access  
Kant Yearbook     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Kant-Studien     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Kantian Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Kervan. International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies     Open Access  
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Kirke og Kultur     Full-text available via subscription  
Kodifikasia     Open Access  
Kontemplasi : Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin     Open Access  
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
KÜLLİYAT Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi     Open Access  
Kultura i Wartości     Open Access  
Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal     Open Access  
Labyrinth : An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics     Open Access  
Labyrinthe     Open Access  
Las Torres de Lucca : Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política     Open Access  
Lato Sensu : Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences     Open Access  
Laval théologique et philosophique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Law, Ethics and Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Le foucaldien     Open Access  
Le Portique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Leadership and the Humanities     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Lebenswelt : Aesthetics and philosophy of experience     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Les ateliers de l’éthique : The Ethics Forum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg     Open Access  
Letras : Órgano de la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Huamans     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Levinas Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Lexicon Philosophicum : International Journal for the History of Texts and Ideas     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Library Philosophy and Practice     Open Access   (Followers: 68)
Límite : Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología     Open Access  
Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Linguistics and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Locke Studies     Open Access  
Logic and Logical Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Logique et Analyse     Full-text available via subscription  
Logos & Episteme     Full-text available via subscription  
Logos i Ethos     Open Access  
Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica     Open Access  
Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Macalester Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Manuscrito     Open Access  
Marwah : Jurnal Perempuan, Agama dan Jender     Open Access  
Mayéutica     Hybrid Journal  
Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Mediterranea : International Journal on the Transfer of Knowledge     Open Access  
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences     Open Access  
MELINTAS     Open Access  
Metafísica y persona     Open Access  
Metaphilosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Metaphor and Symbol     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Metaphysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Metaphysics     Open Access  
Méthexis International Journal for Ancient Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Methodos     Open Access  
Midéo : Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales     Open Access  
Midwest Studies In Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Millennium     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Mind     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 56)
Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica     Open Access  
Mises : Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics     Open Access  
Mizar : Costellazione di pensieri     Open Access  
Modernos & Contemporâneos : International Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Moral Philosophy and Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Mouseion: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
Muslim Heritage     Open Access  
Mutatis Mutandis : Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Myth & Symbol     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Naturaleza y Libertad : Revista de estudios interdisciplinares     Open Access  
New Nietzsche Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Newman Studies Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
Nietzsche-Studien     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nietzscheforschung     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Noctua. La tradizione filosofica dall'antico al moderno     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Nóema     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Noesis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Nordic Journal of Aesthetics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Nordic Wittgenstein Review     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Nordisk Judaistik / Scandinavian Jewish Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift     Open Access  
Nous     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
NTU Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Nuansa : Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu Sosial dan Keagamaan Islam     Open Access  
O Que Nos Faz Pensar : Cadernos do Departamento de Filosofia da PUC-Rio     Open Access  
Oksident     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Online Journal of Health Ethics     Open Access  
Open Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Open Philosophy     Open Access  
Outlines. Critical Practice Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Overheard in Seville : Bulletin of the Santayana Society     Full-text available via subscription  
Oxímora : Revista Internacional de Ética y Política     Open Access  
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Páginas de Filosofía     Open Access  
PAN: Philosophy Activism Nature     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Paradigmi     Full-text available via subscription  
Paragrana - Internationale Zeitschrift für Historische Anthropologie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Paralaxe     Open Access  
Patristica et Mediævalia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Pelícano     Open Access  
Pensamiento Actual     Open Access  
Pensamiento y Cultura     Open Access  
Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica     Open Access  
Pensar : Revista Eletrônica da FAJE     Open Access  
Performance Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Person-Centered & Experiential Psychotherapies     Hybrid Journal  
Persona Studies     Open Access  
Persona y Bioetica     Open Access  
Perspectivas : Revista de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Tocantins     Open Access  
Perspectives. International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Phenomenology and Mind     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philia&Filia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philo : A Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Philonsorbonne     Open Access  
Philosophers' Imprint     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
philoSOPHIA     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Philosophia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Philosophia Africana     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Philosophia Reformata     Hybrid Journal  
Philosophia Scientiæ     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philosophic Exchange     Open Access  
Philosophical Books     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Inquiry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Philosophical Inquiry in Education     Open Access  
Philosophical Investigations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Philosophical Issues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Philosophical Magazine Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Papers     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Philosophical Papers and Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Philosophical Perspectives     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)     Open Access  
Philosophical Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38)
Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 56)
Philosophical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Philosophical Topics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Philosophie antique : Problèmes, Renaissances, Usages     Full-text available via subscription  
Philosophies     Open Access  
Philosophique     Open Access  
Philosophiques     Open Access  
Philosophische Rundschau     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Philósophos : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Philosophy & Public Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Philosophy & Social Criticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Philosophy & Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Philosophy & Theory in Biology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Philosophy and Literature     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 26)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
Philosophy and Progress     Open Access  
Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia e Questioni Pubbliche     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Philosophy and Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Philosophy and Theology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Philosophy Compass     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Philosophy East and West     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Philosophy in Review     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Philosophy in the Contemporary World     Full-text available via subscription  
Philosophy Now     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 27)
Philosophy Today     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Phronesis : A journal for Ancient Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Phronimon     Open Access  
Poiesis & Praxis : International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Pólemos     Open Access  
Polis : The Journal of the Society for Greek Political Thought     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Polish Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Poroi     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne     Open Access  
Pragmatics & Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Pragmatics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)

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Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Philosophia
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.455
Number of Followers: 8  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1574-9274 - ISSN (Online) 0048-3893
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2626 journals]
  • Backtracking Analysis and Causal Ascription of Singular Historicals
    • Abstract: One task of historians is to construct causal ascription of singular historicals between eminent historical events. For instance, the controversy resulting from the confusing butterfly ballot of Florida’s year 2000 presidential election cost Gore his presidency. However, to research into these matters is inevitably to appeal to counterfactual deliberation in an epistemic fashion because the past is fixed. One standard idea is Max Weber’s, Weber causation: “f was a cause of φ” is assertable iff “¬f □→ ¬φ” is assertable. Reiss (2009) gives an exceptionally good analysis of this topic and outlines historians’ reasoning, claiming that backtracking analyses of counterfactual conditionals employed in historical thought experiments is the signature of historical study of causal ascription of singular historicals. Nevertheless, he concludes that it is very difficult to reach an uncontroversial ascription for this sort in most cases. For this reason, he proposes to find difference-making relations that will suffice. The objective of this paper is to provide a more fine-grained, intervention-based, backtracking analysis of counterfactual conditionals upon which a more satisfactory account of causal ascription of singular historicals can be given. Reiss’ account of difference-making relation will be shown to be unsatisfactory. Moreover, a formal ground of the epistemology of historical thought experiments can be given, along with the constraints of this account resultant from the semantic features of non-transitivity and strong centering of counterfactual conditionals. Finally, some epistemological points of causal ascription of singular historicals and historical thought experiments will be given.
      PubDate: 2020-04-02
       
  • A Presentist-Friendly Definition of “Endure”
    • Abstract: It is a commonplace that things persist, though thinkers disagree over what persistence consist in. Views about time are closely related to views about persistence, though some have questioned the compatibility of certain combinations, such as Jonathan Tallant’s recent argument that presentism is incompatible with all views of persistence, including endurantism. We believe that such arguments can be avoided with neutral definitions of the terms. However, a nearly exhaustive investigation of contemporary literature revealed that, except for two that we could find, all definitions of “persist,” “endure,” and derivatives are incompatible with presentism! And, the exceptions fail to capture endurantist intuitions about endurance. But we believe that present-friendly and intuitive definitions of these concepts can be given. In this paper we offer such definitions. We go on to apply our definitions to two sample cases, showing that if our neutral definitions are used, the arguments in the cases fail.
      PubDate: 2020-03-26
       
  • On Complete Information Dispositionalism
    • Abstract: In a trio of recent articles, Johnson and Nado (2014, 2016, Philosophia, 45, 717–734, 2017) defend a form of metasemantic dispositionalism, arguing for a novel approach to the “error”-problem, based on speakers’ dispositional states under what they call a state of “full information”. In this article, I argue that their brand of dispositionalism fails to solve the “error”-problem, because of what I think of as counterexamples to it. In the final sections, I propose a way to amend the theory to shield it from some of the counterexamples, based on the idea that what determines meaning is not only dispositions to apply words under full information, but also dispositions to evaluate one’s prior usage, under full information.
      PubDate: 2020-03-26
       
  • Review of Blockheads!: Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and
           Consciousness , A. Pautz and D. Stoljar (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press,
           2019. 634 pp
    • PubDate: 2020-03-23
       
  • Kant Can’t Get No . . . Contradiction
    • Abstract: According to Kant, the universalization of the maxim of false promising leads to a contradiction, namely, to everyone adopting the maxim of false promising which would in effect make promising impossible. I first propose a reconstruction of Kant’s reasoning in four steps and then show that each of these steps is highly problematic. In the second part I argue that attempts by several prominent contemporary philosophers to defend Kant fail because they encounter similar difficulties.
      PubDate: 2020-03-23
       
  • Close to the Truth
    • Abstract: We often think or say that someone was wrong about something but almost right about it or close to the truth. This can mean more than one thing. Here, I propose an analysis of the idea of being epistemically close to the truth. This idea plays an important role in our practice of epistemic evaluation and therefore deserves some detailed attention. I start (section1) with an exposition of the idea of getting things right by looking at the main forms of reliabilism about true belief and belief acquisition. The focus on reliabilism is justified because (almost) everyone is a reliabilist in a basic sense. Section 2 develops a notion of closeness to the truth in two steps. Section 3 mentions some ways in which this notion is useful, one having to do with the Gettier problem.
      PubDate: 2020-03-18
       
  • Slot Theory and Slotite Theory
    • Abstract: ‘Instantiation-directed slot theorists’ believe that properties/relations have slots which are filled by their instances/relata e.g., where Abigail is taller than Bronia, there are two slots in the relation Taller Than such that Abigail fills the first slot and Bronia fills the second. This crude statement of the theory runs into ‘The Problem of Filling’, whereby a natural understanding of the relation between slots, filling, and instantiation leads to absurd results. This paper examines a variety of solutions to that problem, one of which is an extension of slot theory that adds an additional category of entities, ‘slotites’.
      PubDate: 2020-03-16
       
  • Ineffability: the Very Concept
    • Abstract: In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said' I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of ‘saying something’ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘language’, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, ‘ineffability’ is ambiguous, too, and we should make a distinction between weak and strong ineffability. Weak ineffability is rooted in the deficiencies of a particular language while strong ineffability stems from the structure of a particular cognitive system and its capacities for conceptual mental representation. Mental contents are only sayable if we are able to conceptualize them and then create signs to represent them in communication.
      PubDate: 2020-03-14
       
  • Connecting Twenty-First Century Connectionism and Wittgenstein
    • Abstract: By pointing to deep philosophical confusions endemic to cognitive science, Wittgenstein might seem an enemy of computational approaches. We agree (with Mills 1993) that while Wittgenstein would reject the classicist’s symbols and rules approach, his observations align well with connectionist or neural network approaches. While many connectionisms that dominated the later twentieth century could fall prey to criticisms of biological, pedagogical, and linguistic implausibility, current connectionist approaches can resolve those problems in a Wittgenstein-friendly manner. We (a) present the basics of a Vector Symbolic Architecture formalism, inspired by Smolensky (1990), and indicate how high-dimensional vectors can operate in a context-sensitive and object-independent manner in biologically plausible time scales, reflecting Wittgenstein’s notions of language-games and family resemblance; we (b) show how “soft” symbols for such a formalism can be formed with plausible learning cycles using Sparse Distributed Memory, resolving disputes surrounding Wittgenstein’s private language argument; and (c) show how connectionist networks can extrapolate meaningful patterns to solve problems, providing “ways to go on” without explicit rules, which indicates linguistic plausibility. Connectionism thus provides a systematicity and productivity that is more than a mere implementation of a classical approach, and provides Wittgenstein-friendly and Wittgenstein-illuminating models of mind and language for cognitive science.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11
       
  • Kantian Forgiveness: Fallibility, Guilt and the need to become a Better
           Person: Reply to Blöser
    • Abstract: In ‘Human Fallibility and the Need for Forgiveness’, Claudia Blöser (Philosophia 47:1-19, 2019) has proposed a Kantian account of our reasons to forgive that situates our moral fallibility as their ultimate ground. Blöser argues that Kant’s duty to be forgiving is grounded on the need to be relieved from the burden of our moral failure (guilt), a need that we all have in virtue of our moral fallible nature, regardless of whether or not we have repented. Blöser claims that Kant’s proposal yields a plausible account of the normative status of forgiveness. Kant classifies the duty to be forgiving as a wide (imperfect) duty of virtue, and according to Blöser, this means that Kantian forgiveness is elective in the sense that forgiveness is good in general (i.e. an attitude that we have moral reason to adopt) but without being obligatory in each particular case. In the course of presenting her own reconstruction of Kant’s account, Blöser also objects to some aspects of an interpretation of Kant’s theory of forgiveness which I had previously defended in my paper ‘Forgiveness and Moral Development’ (Philosophia 44:1029–1055, 2016). Although there are a lot of points of agreement between our interpretations, the aim of this article is to highlight four key points of disagreement. These issues are worth discussing because they have implications not only for a plausible interpretation of a recognisable Kantian account of forgiveness but also for wider debates in the contemporary literature on forgiveness. First, I show that Kant is not committed to a form of weak situationism as suggested by Blöser and that Kant’s grounding of the duty to be forgiving does not appeal to moral luck. Second, I argue that although Kant’s duty to be forgiving is elective in one sense of the term, it is not elective in another important sense of the term, and that it is in fact better not to interpret Kantian imperfect duties as being elective. Third, I show that awareness of moral fallibility per se does not provide a morally appropriate ground for forgiveness and offer an alternative reconstruction of Kant’s account- in which fallibility plays a role, but it is not the main reason to forgive. Finally, I argue that Blöser’s account of the need to be forgiven is not recognisable Kantian because, from a Kantian perspective, repentance is a necessary condition for the desirability and, in fact, the very possibility of ameliorating our own guilt.
      PubDate: 2020-03-10
       
  • Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics
    • Abstract: Investigation into the reality of time can be pursued within the ontological domain or it can also span human thought and natural language. I propose to approach time by correlating three domains of inquiry: metaphysical time (M), the human concept of time (E), and temporal reference in natural language (L), entertaining the possibility of what I call a ‘horizontal reduction’ (L > E > M) and ‘vertical reduction’. I present a view of temporalityL/E as epistemic modality, drawing on evidence from the L domain and its correlates in the E and M domains. On this view, the human concept of time is a complex, ‘molecular’ concept and can be broken down into primitive concepts that are modal in nature, featuring as degrees of epistemic commitment to representations of states of affairs. I present evidence from tensed and tenseless languages (endorsing the L > E path) and point out its compatibility with the view of real time as metaphysical modality (endorsing the E > M path).
      PubDate: 2020-03-10
       
  • Protecting Persons from Animal Bites: the Case for the Ontological
           Significance of Persons
    • Abstract: Eric Olson criticizes Lynne Baker’s constitution account of persons on the grounds that personhood couldn’t be ontologically significant as nothing new comes into existence with the acquisition of thought. He claims that for something coming to function as a thinker is no more ontologically significant than something coming to function as a locomotor when a motor is added to it. He levels two related charges that there’s no principled answer about when and where constitution takes place rather than an already existing object just acquiring new properties. I’ll argue that none of these objections are problems for understanding person to be a substantial kind.
      PubDate: 2020-03-04
       
  • The Frege-Geach Problem and Blackburn’s Expressivism
    • Abstract: Blackburn has outlined a formal account for moral expressivism, and we argued that the moral Frege-Geach problem can be solved formally by appending two rules for the boo-operator which are missing from his account. We then extended Blackburn’s formal account to generate a similar solution to the problem in modal context and showed that the validity of the modal argument can be preserved too in modal expressivism. However, the higher-order element endorsed by Blackburn does not seem necessary for solving the Frege-Geach problem. Nor is his extension from moral expressivism to modal expressivism tenable, since the latter violates its own ontological constraint. A general moral is drawn on the basis on three observations made in evaluating Blackburn’s expressivism.
      PubDate: 2020-03-03
       
  • Correction to: Non-transitive Better than Relations and Rational Choice
    • Abstract: There is a mistake in the definition of the covering criterion on page 6.
      PubDate: 2020-03-01
       
  • Moti Mizrahi (ed): The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive
           Transformation'
    • PubDate: 2020-03-01
       
  • Rearranging the Furniture
    • Abstract: According to Peter van Inwagen, there are, from the point of view of serious metaphysics, no (non-living) composites, only simples. Saying that we have built a ship is a misleading (even if ordinarily acceptable) way of saying that we have rearranged some simples ship- wise. However, the notion of rearranging simples is problematic, and van Inwagen’s resort to “honorary simples” does not make it less so. Simples can be rearranged only by way of rearranging these, making talk of them not merely a convenient facon de parler, as van Inwagen claims, but ineliminable even when we are in the “ontology room.”
      PubDate: 2020-03-01
       
  • What Does God Know but can’t Say' Leibniz on Infinity, Fictitious
           Infinitesimals and a Possible Solution of the Labyrinth of Freedom
    • Abstract: Despite his commitment to freedom, Leibniz’ philosophy is also founded on pre-established harmony. Understanding the life of the individual as a spiritual automaton led Leibniz to refer to the puzzle of the way out of determinism as the Labyrinth of Freedom. Leibniz claimed that infinite complexity is the reason why it is impossible to prove a contingent truth (in a finite number of steps). But by means of Leibniz’ calculus, it actually can be shown in a finite number of steps how to calculate a summation of infinite parts. It appears that the analogy Leibniz drew between the mathematics of infinite series and the logic of contingent truths did more harm than good. A solution consistent with Leibniz’ perception of infinity is proposed. Alongside the existence of the aforementioned analogy, it is based on a disanalogy between the mathematics of infinite series and the logic of infinitely complex truths. This is a disanalogy that Leibniz had already used to solve the Labyrinth of Continuum which he declared more than once could, like the Labyrinth of Freedom, be solved by means of the nature of infinity. The solution of both labyrinths is based on the fictitiousness of the infinitesimal.
      PubDate: 2020-03-01
       
  • Philosophy in Poland: Varieties of Anti-Irrationalism. A Commitment to
           Reason without the Worship of Reason
    • Abstract: I shall elaborate more on the idea of anti-irrationalism proposed by the Polish analytic philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, a prominent member of the Lvov-Warsaw School of philosophy and logic. In my reading, anti-irrationalism stands in opposition not only to overt irrationalism, which is made clear by the term itself, but also to all forms of rationalism that tip toward something like worship of reason. Having characterized anti-irrationalism as it originally appeared in Ajdukiewicz’s works, I shall propose a certain reformulation (and generalization) of it, so as to capture a broader philosophical legacy in Poland, primarily, yet not exclusively the Lvov-Warsaw School.
      PubDate: 2020-03-01
       
  • CHOICE: an Objective, Voluntaristic Theory of Prudential Value
    • Abstract: It is customary to think that Objective List (“OL), Desire-Satisfaction (“D-S”) and Hedonistic (“HED”) theories of prudential value pretty much cover the waterfront, and that those of the three that are “subjective” are naturalistic (in the sense attacked by Moore, Ross and Ewing), while those that are “objective” must be Platonic, Aristotelian or commit the naturalist fallacy. I here argue for a theory that is both naturalistic (because voluntaristic) and objective but neither Platonic, Aristotelian, nor (I hope) fallacious. In addition, this proposal, called “CHOICE,” is an example of neither an OL, D-S, nor HED theory. It is a theory according to which uncoerced choosings create objective values that we (even everyone) may be wrong about, because valuations are conative rather than epistemic activities. On this view, intrinsic prudential goods necessarily involve likely (pursuant to lawlike regularities) net increases in successful free choosings.
      PubDate: 2020-03-01
       
  • Maddy vs. Quine on Innate Concepts. Revisiting a Perennial Debate in Light
           of Recent Empirical Results
    • Abstract: This article critically assesses the empirical research that leads Quine, in his posthumously published work, to abandon his empiricist principle that humans do not have any innate concepts, or knowledge. It is the same empirical research that Penelope Maddy capitalizes on to develop her own contributions to naturalized epistemology, and it has been pioneered by developmental psychologist Elisabeth Spelke. Spelke employs the method of habituation and preferential looking to argue that human infants have innate concepts, and that they have some knowledge about what can and cannot happen to physical objects. Taking into account empirical studies as well as methodological considerations, this article examines whether this research can support these strong philosophical conclusions drawn from it, finding that it likely cannot provide such support.
      PubDate: 2020-03-01
       
 
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