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  Subjects -> POLITICAL SCIENCE (Total: 1086 journals)
    - CIVIL RIGHTS (13 journals)
    - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (136 journals)
    - POLITICAL SCIENCE (903 journals)
    - POLITICAL SCIENCES: GENERAL (34 journals)

POLITICAL SCIENCE (903 journals)            First | 1 2 3 4 5     

Showing 201 - 281 of 281 Journals sorted alphabetically
Diversité urbaine     Full-text available via subscription  
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
East European Jewish Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
East European Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Eastern Review     Open Access  
Economia Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38)
Ecopolítica     Open Access  
eJournal of eDemocracy and Open Government     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Ekonomi, İşletme, Siyaset ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi     Open Access  
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
El Cotidiano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Electoral Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
Em Pauta : Teoria Social e Realidade Contemporânea     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Encuentro     Open Access  
Entramados y Perspectivas     Open Access  
Environment and Planning C : Politics and Space     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 39)
Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Espacios Públicos     Open Access  
Estudios digital     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudos Avançados     Open Access  
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Ethics & International Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Ethics & Global Politics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Études internationales     Full-text available via subscription  
Eunomia. Rivista semestrale del Corso di Laurea in Scienze Politiche e delle Relazioni Internazionali     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Eureka Street     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
European Integration Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
European Journal for Security Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
European Journal of American Culture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
European Journal of Government and Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
European Journal of International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 60)
European Journal of Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 59)
European Journal of Political Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 82)
European Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
European Politics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
European Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
European Security     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
European Union Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 54)
European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Eurostudia     Open Access  
Evaluation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Evaluation and Program Planning     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Evidence Base : A journal of evidence reviews in key policy areas     Open Access  
Exchange : The Journal of Public Diplomacy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Fascism     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Federal Governance     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Fédéralisme Régionalisme     Open Access  
FEU Academic Review     Open Access  
Fijian Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Financial Times     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 38)
Foreign Policy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 48)
Foreign Policy Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Foreign Policy Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Foro Interno. Anuario de Teoría Política     Open Access  
French Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Gaceta Laboral     Open Access  
Genocide Studies International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Geographische Zeitschrift     Full-text available via subscription  
Geopolítica(s). Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Geopolitics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Geopolitics under Globalization     Open Access  
German Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
German Politics and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Germinal : Marxismo e Educação em Debate     Open Access  
Gestão & Regionalidade     Open Access  
Ghana Journal of Development Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Ghana Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 408)
Global Discourse : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Global Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 46)
Global Journal of Peace Research and Praxis     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Global Media Journal : African Edition     Open Access  
Global Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Global Societies Journal     Open Access  
Global Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Global South, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Global War Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Göç Dergisi     Full-text available via subscription  
Good Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Government and Opposition     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24)
Granì     Open Access  
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Hague Journal of Diplomacy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Hegel Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Helsinki Monitor     Hybrid Journal  
Hic Rhodus : Crisis capitalista, polémica y controversias     Open Access  
Historia i Polityka     Open Access  
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Hommes & Migrations     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
HONAI : International Journal for Educational, Social, Political & Cultural Studies     Open Access  
Horyzonty Polityki     Open Access  
Human Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 57)
Human Rights Case Digest     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Human Rights Law Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 64)
Human Rights Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 70)
Human Rights Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration     Open Access  
Idäntutkimus     Open Access  
identidade!     Open Access  
Identities : Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Identity Papers : A Journal of British and Irish Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
IDP. Revista de Internet, Derecho y Politica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Ids Practice Papers     Hybrid Journal  
Indes : Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft     Hybrid Journal  
Index on Censorship     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
India Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Indialogs : Spanish Journal of India Studies     Open Access  
Indonesia Prime     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Indonesian Journal of Community Engagement     Open Access  
Innovation Policy and the Economy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Innovations : Technology, Governance, Globalization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Insight on Africa     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Intelligence & National Security     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Interdisciplinary Political Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Interdisziplinäre Zeitschrift für Südasienforschung     Open Access  
Interest Groups & Advocacy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Interfaces Brasil/Canadá     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 68)
International Area Studies Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Communication of Chinese Culture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Critical Thought     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Journal : Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of Area Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
International Journal of Children's Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Journal of E-Politics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of East Asian Studies     Open Access  
International Journal of Electronic Government Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
International Journal of Environmental Policy and Decision Making     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Group Tensions     Hybrid Journal  
International Journal of Human Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 58)
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 587)
International Journal of Intercultural Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
International Journal of Press/Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
International Journal of Refugee Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
International Journal of Sexuality and Gender Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
International Journal of Social Quality     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Migration     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
International Migration Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 275)
International Negotiation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
International NGO Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
International Organization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 106)
International Peacekeeping     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 476)
International Political Science Abstracts     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
International Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 91)
International Political Sociology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
International Quarterly for Asian Studies     Open Access  
International Regional Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
International Security     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 75)
International Socialism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Spectator : Italian Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
International Studies Perspectives     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Studies Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 53)
International Studies Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
International Theory: A Journal of International Politics, Law and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Irish Political Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Israel Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Istanbul Journal of Economics and Politics     Open Access  
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica     Hybrid Journal  
Italian Politics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
IZA Journal of Development and Migration     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Izquierdas     Open Access  
Japan Forum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Japanese Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
JCMS : Journal of Common Market Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 49)
Jewish Culture and History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
JICSA : Journal of Islamic Civilization in Southeast Asia     Open Access  
JKAP (Jurnal Kebijakan dan Administrasi Publik)     Open Access  
Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines     Hybrid Journal  
Journal Exit-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur     Open Access  
Journal for Deradicalization     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Journal for Peace and Justice Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Journal for Perspectives of Economic Political and Social Integration. Journal for Mental Changes     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Journal for the Study of Radicalism     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Journal für Rechtspolitik     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Journal of African Foreign Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Journal of African Studies and Development     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Journal of African Union Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal of Borneo-Kalimantan     Open Access  
Journal of Catholic Social Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Chinese Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 3)

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Similar Journals
Journal Cover
European Journal of Political Economy
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.176
Citation Impact (citeScore): 2
Number of Followers: 59  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0176-2680
Published by Elsevier Homepage  [3182 journals]
  • Autocratic Governors in Public Procurement
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 6 November 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Andrey Tkachenko, Daniil Esaulov The personal role of sub-national rulers is crucial for regional development in countries with weak institutions. This paper studies the impact of regional governors’ tenure in office and their local ties on procurement performance in Russia. To identify the causal effect, we construct instruments for governor’s tenure by exploiting the regional vote share of ruling party in past parliament elections. We find the evidence that governors who do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared to governors with local ties (insiders). Namely, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at awarding stage significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, for governors-outsiders this restriction becomes stronger with tenure in office, while governors-insiders do not demonstrate such negative tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition by governors-outsiders cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution: the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination either increase or keep stable with tenure for governors-outsiders and these outcomes decrease with tenure for governors-insiders.
       
  • Empowering knowledge: Political leaders, education, and economic
           liberalization
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 31 October 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jingheng Li, Tianyang Xi, Yang Yao Recent literature reports significant effects of political leaders in driving economic policies but does not provide an exhaustive answer as to why. This paper argues that educational background plays an important role in shaping leaders' ideas and beliefs, which in turn matter for policy making in the long run. Using a cross-country data covering 137 countries and regions over 1960–2005, the paper documents a robustly positive relationship between leaders’ educational attainment and faster liberal reforms, regardless of regime type. The effects are more salient for leaders who majored in economics, social science, and natural science. Moreover, the effects of education seem to be orthogonal to alternative channels such as partisan politics, geopolitical factors, and public opinions.
       
  • Fiscal discipline in EMU' Testing the effectiveness of the Excessive
           Deficit Procedure
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 October 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jasper De Jong, Niels Gilbert The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), central to the Stability and Growth Pact, has been criticized from opposite ends. Some blame the EDP for imposing too much fiscal austerity. Others question whether the EDP has any disciplining power at all. To test its actual effects, we construct a real-time database of EDP recommendations and estimate augmented real-time and ex-post fiscal reaction functions for a panel of EMU member states. Overall, we find that a 1% of GDP larger EDP recommendation leads to 0.8–0.9% of GDP of additional fiscal consolidation plans, and 0.6–0.7% of actual consolidation. This result does not extend to countries subject to financial support programs: we find that, while they did implement substantial consolidation measures, in these countries required and delivered consolidation efforts are less connected. Overall, our results suggest that EDP recommendations have substantially shaped fiscal policies in the euro area, especially in the years 2010–2014, when EDP recommendations were most frequent.
       
  • Rainy day politics. An instrumental variables approach to the effect of
           parties on political outcomes
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 17 October 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jo Thori Lind Scholars have grappled with the question of how parties affect policy. Here I propose and test an instrumental variable approach using rainfall. In Norwegian municipal elections, potential left wing voters are likely to abstain from voting with election day rain, whereas the opposite holds for right-wingers. Then rainfall provides an exogenous source of variation, and hence an instrument, for the party composition of the municipal council. A strengthening of the right wing parties due to rainfall shifts expenditures toward education, but reduces total spending. This also shows that political competition does not drive party platforms to converge.
       
  • Quality of judicial institutions, crimes, misdemeanors, and dishonesty
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 12 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Naci Mocan, Samantha Bielen, Wim Marneffe We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.
       
  • Towards a cashless economy: Economic and socio-political implications
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 October 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Nissim Cohen, Anna Rubinchik, Labib Shami We construct a simple general equilibrium model to demonstrate how eliminating cash can lead to a misallocation of resources in a naturally segmented economy with observed (official) and non-observed (informal) sectors. The source of inefficiency mirrors the standard arguments explaining why money is essential: a promise backed by a good produced in one sector can not be used in another and so absence of a reliable fiat money reduces the gains from trade. We also point to several additional unintended consequences of cash elimination.
       
  • Legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 26 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Pedro Naso, Erwin Bulte, Tim Swanson We examine the interaction between two legal systems in post-conflict Sierra Leone. To do that, we measure the impact of competition between state and non-state legal authorities on the number of disputes and on the amount of fines charged per dispute. Our results suggest a potential negative externality between regimes for civil disputes—that is, an increase in the cost of apprehending a person—and a reduction in the amount of fines per dispute collected when two regimes operate in the same village. This indicates that a potential benefit to the local people from multiple competing regimes is a reduction on expected authoritative expropriation.
       
  • Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 21 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jan Zapal The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo; the status-quo is endogenous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point, the dynamic utility ideal, is a moderate policy relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment; players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute; when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We provide conditions under which the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, and we prove its existence in generic games with impatient players and in symmetric games. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness.
       
  • Is money where the fun ends' Material interests and individuals’
           preference for direct democracy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 19 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Philipp Harms, Claudia Landwehr Are people's attitudes towards referendums as a decision-making procedure predominantly driven by their material self-interest, or do individuals also value direct democracy as such, regardless of the material payoffs associated with anticipated policy outcomes' To answer this question, we use a survey data set that offers information on respondents' support for referendums as a procedure to decide on tax policy, their income levels, socio-economic characteristics, and, most importantly, their expectation about the majority's support for higher taxes. We find that the support of low-income individuals for referendums increases substantially if they expect a clear population majority in favor of more redistribution. Conversely, individuals with a high income who expect a majority in favor of higher taxes do not reject referendums more strongly than individuals with an average income who share these expectations.
       
  • Parties, divided government, and infrastructure expenditures: Evidence
           from U.S. states
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 11 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Lukas Buchheim, Stephan Fretz This paper examines the impact of parties and divided government on infrastructure expenditures for transportation, education, and social services in U.S. states. As infrastructure expenditures are considered a bi-partisan priority, we hypothesize that divided governments expand infrastructure spending compared to governments under true Democratic or Republican control. We test this hypothesis using U.S. state-level data over the period 1970 to 2008 and find that divided governments indeed increase expenditures for these budget categories. Specifically, divided governments spend more on transportation than unified Democratic governments, and more on education and social services than unified Republican governments. The effect is most pronounced for the core infrastructure of transportation and even stronger when only looking at capital outlays instead of total expenditures.
       
  • Partisan lobbyists in conflicts
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 August 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Gerald Eisenkopf The paper studies the impact of partisan advisors in economic conflicts. In the experiment these lobbyists can give recommendations to their contestants. The results show that recommendations do not increase contest intensity even though most contestants follow them rather closely. However, the lobbyists effectively undermine nonbinding agreements that aim at reducing contest expenditure between the conflict parties.
       
  • Demand of direct democracy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 August 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Guadalupe Correa-Lopera The growing demand for referendum challenges the traditional model of representative democracy. In this paper we study under which conditions voters prefer a system of representative democracy to direct democracy. In direct democracies voters choose a policy among two alternatives, under uncertainty about which policy better fits the realized state of the world; in representative democracies voters select a candidate who, once elected, chooses a policy having observed which is the realized state of the world. Voters and politicians' payoffs depend on a common component which is positive only if the policy fits the state of the world, and on a private ideological bias towards one of the policies. In direct democracies voters are uncertain about the future state of the world, while in representative democracies they are uncertain about the degree of ideological bias of the candidates, even if they know towards which policy each candidate is biased. We show that representative democracy is preferred if (i) the majority of voters are pragmatic (the common component prevails), and (ii) society is ideologically polarized, meaning that the majority of voters are ideological (the private component prevails), but the median voter is pragmatic. Direct democracy is the preferred instrument for collective choices in societies in which the majority of voters and the median voter are ideological, implying that the majority of voters have the same ideological bias, as, for instance, it occurs when the populist rhetoric of people against the elite succeeds.
       
  • Stability of revolutionary governments in the face of mass protest
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 23 August 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Dmitry Dagaev, Natalia Lamberova, Anton Sobolev Why do some newly introduced revolutionary governments face anti-government demonstrations and swiftly exit office, while others are able to establish political regimes that last for decades' Historical evidence finds revolutionary governments in the first decade of twenty-first century to be three times more vulnerable to mass protest than a hundred years ago. What can explain this trend' This paper relates the stability of newly emerged revolutionary governments to the political composition of the protest that brings a new incumbent to power and in factors that can shape it. Our theoretical model, incorporating protest into a dynamic Downsian framework, features the significant role of protest coordination, communication technology, ideology, and the coercive capacity of the regime. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it discusses a new historical trend of instability of revolutionary governments. Second, it proposes a model that helps to understand the growing instability of revolutionary regimes, as well as conditions that undermine stability. In equilibrium, it is possible to have a revolutionary government overthrown by popular uprising, despite the fact that it gained power on the wave of popular support. Third, under a set of conditions, the new incumbent would always come from a different part of political spectrum.
       
  • Did rainfall shocks cause civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa' The
           implications of data revisions
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 25 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Weidong Liang, Nicholas Sim In their seminal paper, Miguel et al. (2004) found that negative rainfall shocks (measured as negative year-on-year rainfall growth) had caused civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa over the 1981–1999 period. Since then, the rainfall and conflict data they used had undergone multiple revisions. We show that rainfall shocks are no longer statistically significant for civil conflict when the revised data are used. This is true whether we employ a different functional form for rainfall, extend the sample to include more recent observations, use longer lags for rainfall shocks, employ dynamic panel regression, or panel regressions that take into account of cross-sectional dependence. Using rainfall shocks as instruments for growth, we also find that growth is insignificant for civil conflict if the revised data are used. Upon further investigation, we find that updates in the rainfall and conflict data for one or a few countries may alone cause rainfall shocks to lose statistical significance.
       
  • Corruption, workforce selection and mismatch in the public sector
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Sauro Mocetti, Tommaso Orlando We examine the impact of corruption on workforce selection and personnel allocation in the public sector. Using Italian data, we find that the selection of public employees in terms of human capital worsens in comparison to that of their private sector counterparts in areas with higher levels of corruption. Moreover, corruption is associated with educational mismatch in the allocation of human resources and, in particular, with an increase in the rate of under-qualification. These results are robust to several alternative indicators and specifications, including IV estimation using past dependence on public spending and the historical relevance of foreign domination as exogenous sources of variation for current corruption.
       
  • WTO membership and corruption
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 22 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Sanchari Choudhury Despite widespread belief that accession process and formal membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) improve the quality of governance within a country, there is no convincing empirical evidence to substantiate this thought. Here, I investigate whether the WTO status of a country has a causal effect on firm-level reports of political corruption using a nonparametric partial identification approach to bound the average treatment effects (ATEs). I also analyze conditional ATEs to explore various sources of potential heterogeneity. Contrary to popular belief, I find that WTO membership is likely to have no causal effect on domestic corruption overall. And if anything, it is likely to increase corrupt practices, particularly among firms that are established post WTO membership and those that are government owned.
       
  • Electoral systems and immigration
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Giuseppe Russo, Francesco Salsano Unexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where immigration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appropriates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed, the policymaker must distribute the compensation. With respect to proportional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a few decisive districts and leave after-compensation rents higher, therefore producing higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration than do voters. Finally, our model predicts that opposition to immigration is more geographically dispersed in plurality systems. Basic evidence supports this prediction.
       
  • Does accrual accounting alter fiscal policy decisions' - Evidence from
           Germany
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 17 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Désirée I. Christofzik Many governments have replaced traditional cash-based accounting with some form of accrual-based accounting system. However, empirical evidence on the effects of the public accounting system on fiscal policy is scarce. Following rules by the federal states, municipalities in Germany have adopted accrual-based accounting systems gradually. By exploiting variations over time and across states I find no evidence for an impact on the overall financial balance. However, my findings suggest that accrual accounting has altered the structure of the budget. Revenues from the sales of non-financial assets have decreased significantly. This supports the hypothesis that municipalities had used these one-off measures before to meet fiscal constraints. Using data on entities controlled by the municipalities, the analysis provides no evidence for repercussions on these public funds, institutions or enterprises.
       
  • Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 4 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Diego Aycinena, Lucas Rentschler This paper studies entry decisions in contests with private values. Potential contestants observe their value and the common opportunity cost of entry, and make entry decisions simultaneously. Theory predicts that whether or not contestants are informed of the number of entrants prior to choosing their expenditures has no effect on entry or aggregate expenditures. We test these assertions in our experiments. We find substantial over-entry in both information structures. However, entry is higher when contestants are informed. Since expenditures do not, on average, differ across information structures, aggregate expenditure is also higher when contestants are informed. Contestants earn on average less than the opportunity cost of entry.
       
  • Costs of change and political polarization
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 2 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Hans Gersbach, Philippe Muller, Oriol Tejada We study a two-period model of policy-making where (i) changes of current policies impose costs on all individuals that increase linearly with the magnitude of the policy shift and (ii) political power changes over time. We show that policy polarization is minimal for intermediate marginal costs. In turn, welfare is a single-peaked function of the marginal cost. One interpretation is that societies with political institutions that impose positive but moderate costs on political reforms simultaneously achieve the highest welfare and the lowest policy polarization.
       
  • Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 June 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Barbara Annicchiarico, Enrico Marvasi We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.
       
  • Overstrained citizens' The number of ballot propositions and the
           quality of the decision process in direct democracy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 June 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Alois Stutzer, Michael Baltensperger, Armando N. Meier We study how the number of ballot propositions affects the quality of decision making in direct democracy, as reflected in citizens’ knowledge, voting behavior, and attitudes toward democracy. Using three comprehensive data sets from Switzerland with over 3,500 propositions, we exploit variation in the number of federal and cantonal propositions. Voters know the most about the content of federal propositions when they are exclusively presented and less with a high number of concurrent cantonal propositions on the ballot. Across other outcomes we find no consistent indications that – for the observed variation in the exposure to popular votes – a high number of propositions impedes the quality of decision making in Swiss federal direct democracy. In the medium to longer term, more federal propositions on the ballot rather relate to higher perceived political influence and satisfaction with democracy.
       
  • Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian
           municipalities
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 11 June 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Andrea Bonfatti, Lorenzo Forni The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It uses data on Italian municipalities during the 2000s and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian sub-national fiscal rule (Domestic Stability Pact, DSP) introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 10–20 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that municipalities subject to the DSP show a pre-electoral increase in capital spending which is only a quarter of the one of municipalities not subject to the rule.
       
  • The electoral migration cycle
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 8 June 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Federico Revelli This paper proposes a new test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the exogenous time structure of recurrent local elections. The test is based on the idea that competitive elections represent periodic perturbations to the Tiebout equilibrium of local public good provision and allocation of households to communities, so that their schedule should affect the timing of households' sorting decisions. On the other hand, internal migration flows that have nothing to do with the demand for public goods over which localities vote recurrently ought to be orthogonal to the timing of elections in a reduced-form migration equation. I exploit the staggered schedule of mayoral elections in Italy to analyze migration, elections, and public budget data across several thousands of municipalities, and find evidence of a systematic influence of the electoral calendar on the timing of sorting decisions.
       
  • Revisiting the redistribution hypothesis with perceived inequality and
           redistributive preferences
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2019Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 58Author(s): Gwangeun Choi It is a long-standing puzzle whether or not changes in economic inequality lead to changes in redistribution. However, there has been a lack of conclusive evidence about this relationship. Moreover, redistributive preferences as an intervening factor between inequality and redistribution, which are taken for granted implicitly or explicitly in redistribution theories, have been largely overlooked in the existing analyses. Besides, recent comparative studies of inequality and redistribution have started paying attention to inequality perceptions that deviate from actual inequality. Thus, this inquiry aims to reconstruct the classical redistribution theory by employing perceived inequality and preferences for redistribution and to test the reformulated redistribution hypotheses. One of the most challenging efforts for the analysis is to develop a country-level measure of perceived inequality. To this end, the Gini coefficient of perceived social position (perceived Gini) was first created by using data from 16 rounds of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1987 to 2014), covering 34 OECD countries. The empirical results show robust evidence that perceived inequality, not actual inequality, is significantly associated with redistributive preferences, while preferences for redistribution do not translate into any type of redistribution.
       
  • Term limit extension and electoral participation. Evidence from a
           diff-in-discontinuities design at the local level in Italy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 6 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Marco Alberto De Benedetto, Maria De Paola We study the effect of term limits on voter turnout in Italian local elections. Since 2014 the Italian law allows mayors in municipalities with a population size lower than 3,000 inhabitants to re-run for a third term, whereas mayors in cities with a number of residents above the cut-off still face a two-term limit. The introduction of the reform permits us to implement a difference-in-discontinuities design exploiting the before/after with the discontinuous policy change. We find that voters negatively react to the introduction of the reform: electoral participation decreases by about 5 percentage points in municipalities eligible to the treatment compared to municipalities in the control group. This negative effect is essentially driven by a decrease in the political competition. We also find that relaxing term limits does not improve the quality of politicians running for election.
       
  • Corruption in space: A closer look at the world's subnations
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 27 May 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Stefan Borsky, Katja Kalkschmied Corruption levels differ not only between but also within countries. In this paper we analyze spatial interdependencies in corruption levels for a large sample of 1232 subnational regions from 81 countries. Based on a spatial autoregressive model, which controls for country-fixed effects and corrects for spatial autocorrelation in the error term, we find that a subnational region's corruption level is positively correlated with neighboring subnational regions' corruption levels. Extending the core model and allowing for heterogeneous spatial effects, we find that most spillovers among subnational regions occur within national borders. Moreover, in particular high income subnational regions and subnational regions with relative low corruption levels tend to spill in space. This is due to their high degree of connectivity in terms of economic, sociocultural and political exchange with other subnational regions. Our estimation results underline the importance to consider not only a subnational region's own characteristics, but also spatial interdependencies when implementing efficient anti-corruption policies at the local level.
       
  • Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: Evidence from an Italian
           reform
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 25 May 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Giuseppe Albanese, Marika Cioffi, Pietro Tommasino We explore how electoral rules and the degree of civicness of the voters interact in shaping elected officials' behaviour. We use a dataset with the expenditure proposals sponsored by Italian Senators from 1994 to 2013 and exploit the 2005 electoral reform that transformed a mainly majoritarian system into a mainly proportional one. First, we confirm previous results: legislators elected in first-past-the-post districts are more likely to sponsor pork-barrel bills and to put effort into legislative activity than those elected with a closed-list proportional system. Second, more importantly, we find that the effects of the electoral rules are muted in areas with high civicness.
       
  • “The winner takes it all” or a story of the optimal allocation of the
           European Cohesion Fund
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 23 May 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Benoit Dicharry, Phu Nguyen-Van, Thi Kim Cuong Pham This paper aims to determine an optimal allocation of the European Cohesion Fund (ECF) and compares it with the observed allocation. This optimal allocation is the solution of a donor optimization problem which maximizes recipient countries' GDP per capita to achieve economic convergence in the EU. Compared to the observed allocation, our solution can identify the recipient countries that can benefit from higher ECF transfers than the observed levels, as those having low relative GDP per capita, large population size and where the ECF has a strong capacity to support economic growth. Result is robust to changes in the specification of the donor's utility function.
       
  • The growth-maximizing level of regulation: Evidence from a panel of
           international data
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 16 May 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jac C. Heckelman, Bonnie Wilson Existing evidence suggests that regulation diminishes economic growth. In theory, however, regulation may be either growth-enhancing or diminishing. We therefore empirically revisit the relation between regulation and growth, allowing for both positive and negative effects. In an unbalanced panel of 132 countries over eight time periods, we find evidence of a hump-shape relation between regulation and growth. The estimates imply that for more than 95% of the sample the total effect of regulation on growth is positive. The estimates also imply that about 60% of the sample observations are associated with over-regulation, relative to the growth-maximizing level. Similar findings apply to the (majority) subsample of non-OECD nations in the dataset. However, for the (minority) subsample of OECD nations, both the total and marginal effects of regulation on growth are negative.
       
  • The subversive nature of inequality: Subjective inequality perceptions and
           attitudes to social inequality
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 May 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Andreas Kuhn This paper shows that higher levels of perceived wage inequality are associated with a weaker (stronger) belief into meritocratic (non-meritocratic) principles as being important in determining individual wages. This finding is further corroborated using various complementary measures of individuals’ perception of the chances and risks associated with an unequal distribution of economic resources, such as their perception of the chances of upward mobility. I finally show that those individuals perceiving a high level of wage inequality also tend to be more supportive of redistributive policies and progressive taxation. Taken together, these findings suggest that high levels of perceived wage inequality do have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of market outcomes.
       
  • Purely procedural preferences - Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 7 May 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Nadine Chlaß, Werner Güth, Topi Miettinen We conduct experiments in which parties face a pair of two-player pie-splitting procedures. Parties submit their strategy in each, their beliefs about their opponent's choices, and are also asked whether they prefer one procedure over the other. The procedures – a yes-no game, an ultimatum game, and a dictator game – are designed such that by all existing economic preference models, whether distributive or procedural, parties should be indifferent between them. In particular, the procedures should yield the same outcomes, the same expected outcomes and carry the same information on parties' intentions. At the same time, the procedures differ in the way they distribute decision and information rights across players, and also in their complexity and efficiency. Experimentally, parties do indeed still reveal preferences over the procedures at hand. To explore why this happens, we elicit individuals' simplicity and efficiency ratings of the procedures, and also the degree by which individuals invoke the equality of basic rights and liberties in their moral judgement – an ethical criterion not yet captured by any preference model. The preferences we find link to this data. We explore formalizations for such preferences.
       
  • Globalization and taxation: Theory and evidence
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 15 April 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Priyaranjan Jha, Giray Gozgor We construct a theoretical model to capture the compensation and efficiency effects of globalization in a set up where the redistributive tax rate is chosen by the median voter. The model predicts that the two alternative modes of globalization- trade liberalization and financial openness- could potentially have different effects on taxation. We then provide some empirical evidence on the relationship between taxation and the alternative modes of globalization using a large cross-country panel data set. On average, globalization is associated with lower taxation but there is some evidence that in countries with high capital-labor ratio, globalization is associated with increased taxation. We make a distinction between de jure and de facto measures of globalization and find a strong negative relationship between taxation and de jure measures of globalization. The results for de facto measures of globalization are mixed.
       
  • Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 11 April 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Mo Qiao, Siying Ding, Yongzheng Liu This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.
       
  • Employment shocks and anti-EU sentiment
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 5 April 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Marie Lechler Euroscepticism and the rise of populist parties have often been linked to economic insecurity. This paper identifies regional employment changes as causal factors for forming attitudes towards the European Union and voting for eurosceptic parties in European Parliament elections. To do so, I combine industry-specific employment data for roughly 260 European NUTS II regions with individual-level Eurobarometer survey data for the past 20 years and regional voting results. I apply panel data and instrumental variable methods; for the latter I construct a Bartik-style instrument, which predicts employment changes on the basis of regional industry specialization and Europe-wide sector specific employment growth rates. The effect of employment changes on attitudes towards the EU is particularly strong for unemployed and low-skilled workers in regions with a high share of migrants from other European member states, which supports the narrative that ‘losers of globalization’ tend to be more skeptical towards economic and political integration.
       
  • Voter turnout and government's legitimate mandate
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Alberto Grillo The paper studies a group-mobilization model of costly voting in which citizens care about the legitimate mandate of the government formed by the winning group. This, as a function of the electorate's voting behavior, depends on both the margin of victory and the total turnout rate. Citizens prefer a high mandate when their own group forms the government but a low one if the government is formed by an opposing group. As such, the eventual losing group faces a trade-off: a higher participation from its members decreases the margin of victory but increases the total turnout. In equilibrium, a second fundamental trade-off arises, which overturns the supposed positive relationship between turnout and mandate: as the total turnout becomes more important for the government's mandate, the first decreases but the second strengthens. The key mechanism at play is a shift in the relative participation of the two groups, which favors the majority and raises its margin of victory, thus yielding a bandwagon effect. The implications for the evolution of turnout and the occurrence of election boycotts are discussed.
       
  • IMF conditionality and central bank independence
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 14 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Andreas Kern, Matthias Rau-Göhring, Bernhard Reinsberg This paper studies the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in promoting central bank independence (CBI). While anecdotal evidence suggests that the IMF has been playing a vital role for CBI, the underlying mechanisms of this influence are not well understood. We argue that the IMF has ulterior motives when pressing countries for increased CBI. First, IMF loans are primarily transferred to local monetary authorities. Thus, enhancing CBI aims to insulate central banks from political interference to shield loan disbursements from government abuse. Second, several loan conditionality clauses imply a substantial transfer of political leverage over economic policy making to monetary authorities. As a result, the IMF through pushing for CBI seeks to establish a politically insulated veto player to promote its economic policy reform agenda. We argue that the IMF achieves these aims through targeted lending conditions. We hypothesize that the inclusion of these loan conditions leads to greater CBI. To test our hypothesis, we use a recently available dataset on IMF programs that includes detailed information on CBI reforms and IMF conditionality for up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012. Our findings indicate that targeted loan conditionality plays a critical role in promoting CBI. These results are robust towards varying modeling assumptions and withstand a battery of robustness checks.
       
  • The impact of two different economic systems on dishonesty
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Dan Ariely, Ximena Garcia-Rada, Katrin Gödker, Lars Hornuf, Heather Mann Using an artefactual field experiment, this paper tests the long-term implications of living in a specific economic system on individual dishonesty. By comparing cheating behaviour across individuals from the former socialist East with those of the capitalist West of Germany, we examine behavioural differences within a single country. We find long-term implications of living in a specific economic system for individual dishonesty when social interactions are possible: participants with an East German background cheat significantly more on an abstract die-rolling task than those with a West German background, but only when exposed to the enduring system of former West Germany. Moreover, our results indicate that the longer individuals had experienced socialist East Germany, the more likely they were to cheat on the behavioural task.
       
  • Are voters rational'
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 7 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Teemu Lyytikäinen, Janne Tukiainen We test whether a voter's decision to cast a vote depends on its probability of affecting the election outcome. Using exogenous variation arising at population cutoffs determining council sizes in Finnish municipal elections, we show that larger council size increases both pivotal probabilities and turnout. These effects are statistically significant, fairly large and robust. Finally, we use a novel instrumental variables design to show that the jumps in the pivotal probabilities are the likely candidate for explaining the increase in turnout, rather than the other observed simultaneous jumps at the council size cutoffs. Moreover, our results indicate that turnout responds only to within-party pivotal probabilities, perhaps because they are more salient to the voters than the between-party ones.
       
  • Cultural interaction and economic development: An overview
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 6 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Mark Gradstein, Moshe Justman The rising scope and intensity of interaction between culturally polarized populations in a variety of political contexts has led to the emergence of a growing body of research on the reciprocal relationship between cultural interaction and economic development. This paper offers a brief overview of this literature. It first describes the multiple channels through which cultural divisions and economic development interact. Then, motivated by these observations, it presents a theoretical framework that highlights the scope for welfare-improving policy interventions in education, immigration policy and ethnic autonomy; surveys empirical evidence on such policies; and suggests directions for further research.
       
  • Partial decentralization as a way to prevent secessionist conflict
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Sabine Flamand We study secessionist conflict driven by cultural and economic motives in a political union of two regions, and analyze under what conditions partial decentralization may serve as a conflict-mitigating strategy. While the probability of a successful secession is increasing in heterogeneity, it is increasing in interregional income inequality if and only if the union is socially efficient to start with. If the cost of diversity decreases proportionally with decentralization, there always exists a range of decentralization levels compatible with peace. Greater inequality always widens this range but greater heterogeneity widens the range if and only if the union is efficient. The decentralization level implemented to prevent conflict relates to the underlying secession probability. If decentralization is not reversible, peace is not self-enforcing, yet multiple rounds of decentralization can be used to postpone the eventual date of secession.
       
  • The tug-of-war in the laboratory
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win the tug-of-war causes a greater reduction in bidding than either a decrease in the prize or greater impatience despite all three having the same predicted effect. These findings have implications both for theorists and practitioners.
       
  • Bonus pay for teachers, spatial sorting, and student achievement
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 16 February 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Muharrem Yeşilırmak Bonus pay policy for teachers in the U.S. is analyzed in this paper. We quantitatively argue that, because of the decentralized education finance system in the U.S., this policy may lead to higher teacher and household sorting across school districts. This then may lead to higher variance of achievement and lower mean achievement. Formally, we use an equilibrium political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous in exogenously set income, and teachers, heterogeneous in exogenously set quality, are endogenously allocated across two school districts. Public education expenditures, which includes teachers’ wage payment and non-teacher related education spending, are financed through local income taxation. Income tax rate in each district is determined via majority voting. Achievement depends on the efforts chosen by teachers and non-teacher related education spending. Teacher efficiency wage per unit of quality is determined at the national teacher labor market. We first calibrate our benchmark model by matching certain statistics from the U.S. data. Then in a computational experiment, we introduce bonus pay for teachers which rises with average achievement. We find that for the recently observed level of average bonus pay (6.59% of average base salary), variance of achievement is 2.46% higher and mean achievement is 1.79% lower than the benchmark. Variance of achievement reaches its peak when average bonus pay is 14.06% and then it starts falling. Also, mean achievement always falls as average bonus pay rises.
       
  • Crime, incentives and political effort: Evidence from India
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 February 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Kai Gehring, T. Florian Kauffeldt, Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati Political representatives with criminal backgrounds are considered a great problem in many countries. In India, public disclosure of the large share of politicians currently facing criminal charges has sparked a heated public debate and emerging literature assessing the causes and effects. We develop two hypotheses based on our theoretical considerations. Based on the coding of published affidavits and a comprehensive set of three proxies to measure effort in the 14th Lok Sabha over the 2004–2009 legislative period, we put these hypotheses to an empirical test. Members of the parliament (MPs) facing criminal accusations exhibit on average about 5% lower attendance rates and lower utilization rates in a local area development fund, but only insignificantly lower parliamentary activity. In line with our hypotheses, these differences decline in the development level of the constituency - a proxy for higher rent-seeking possibilities and monitoring intensity. We argue and demonstrate why these negative relations should constitute an upper bound estimate of the causal effect, and show that even under conservative assumptions the effect is unlikely to be caused by unaccounted selection-bias.
       
  • Exit strategies, capital flight and speculative attacks: Europe's version
           of the trilemma
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 12 February 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Andreas Steiner, Sven Steinkamp, Frank Westermann In the winter 2011/12, a wave of internal capital flight prompted the ECB to abandon its exit strategy and announce an unprecedented monetary expansion. We analyze this episode in several dimensions: (i) we provide an event-study analysis, covering key variables from national central banks' balance sheets, (ii) we rationalize the empirical patterns in a formal discussion of the constraints in a monetary union and (iii) we analyze different indicators of redenomination risk in the euro area. Finally, we argue that the euro area entails an inherent policy trilemma that makes it prone to speculative attacks.
       
  • Policy induced increases in private healthcare financing provide
           short-term relief of total healthcare expenditure growth: Evidence from
           OECD countries
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 11 February 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Steffen Eriksen, Rasmus Wiese Healthcare reforms have long been advocated as a cure to the increasing healthcare expenditures in advanced economies. Nevertheless, it has not been established whether a market solution via private financing, rather than public financing, curb aggregate healthcare expenditures. To our knowledge, this paper is the first that quantifies the impact of reforms that significantly increases (decreases) the private (public) share of healthcare financing on total healthcare expenditures relative to income in 20 OECD countries. Our reform measure is based on structural break testing of the private share of total expenditures, and verification using evidence of policy reforms. To quantify the effect of these reforms we apply Propensity Score Matching and Inverse Probability Weighted regression analysis. Over a 5-year evaluation period the reforms lead to an accumulated cost saving 0.45 percentage points of GDP. The yearly effects of the reforms are largest in the first years in the post-reform period and decreases in size as a function of time since the reform. Our findings suggest that the investigated healthcare reforms have a relatively short-lived effect on aggregate health spending relative to GDP. The findings are robust to various sensitivity tests.
       
  • The geography of natural resources, ethnic inequality and civil conflicts
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 February 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Christian Lessmann, Arne Steinkraus We study whether the spatial distribution of natural resources across different ethnic groups within countries causes spatial inequality and the incidence of armed conflict. By providing a theoretical rent-seeking model and analysing a set of geo-coded data for mines, night-time light emissions, local populations and ethnic homelands, we show that the spatial distribution of resources is a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality. Moreover, a spatially unequal distribution of natural resources induces rent-seeking behaviour and thus increases the risk of civil conflicts. Consequently, we extend the perspective of the resource curse to explain cross-country differences in income inequality and the onset of civil conflicts.
       
  • Effects of runoff voting rules on number of parties and candidates'
           political experience: Evidence from a law change in Peru
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 February 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Javier Torres, Guillermo Díaz We study the effect of a change in electoral rules on political competition, measured by the number of candidates and their political experience. We explore the effects of a change in legislation, introduced a year before the gubernatorial elections in Peru on the number of parties that participated in these elections. We also investigate how the legislative change affected the political experience of the candidates. Given that the legislative change did not apply to elections for provincial mayors, we use those elections as a control group, in a difference-in-differences design. Our estimates show the number of parties registered increased by a margin of around 2.2 after the legislative change. The change also increased the candidates' years of accumulated political experience, particularly in the subsequent gubernatorial elections.
       
  • Wedges: Distribution, distortions, and market integration
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 8 February 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Giuseppe Bertola This paper's model lets an international wedge continuously index a country's capital market integration with the rest of the world, and studies politico-economic determination of a domestic labor wedge that corrects market imperfections and/or redistributes welfare across differently wealthy voters. International integration influences the equilibrium policy, at given country-specific political and structural features, through the strength of factor price effects and through ownership of domestic and foreign capital by the country's citizens. If policy reduces market employment, then it unambiguously does so more strongly when a capital-poor country integrates more tightly with the rest of the world.
       
  • Quantity-cum-quality contests
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 11 January 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): J. Atsu Amegashie Quality and quantity are very common features of production processes. People care about these two features and they tend to be connected. I consider a contest in which the quantity and quality of output are rewarded. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the quantity contest. This latter feature implies that the two contests are interlinked. I find that when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently high, then treating quality and quantity as the same has a disincentive effect on the production of quality. In contrast, when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently low, treating quality and quantity as the same has no disincentive effect on the production of quality. I also find an equilibrium in which no one exerts effort in the quantity contest. When there is a binding budget constraint on effort, I find that effort in the quantity contest is smaller relative to the unconstrained case but effort in the quality contest may remain unchanged.
       
  • The political economy of contributive pensions in developing countries
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 7 January 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Marie-Louise Leroux, Dario Maldonado, Pierre Pestieau This paper sheds light on the role of public institutions as a way to reduce tax evasion through a close link between payroll taxation and pension benefits. We use a political economy model in which agents have the possibility to hide part of their earnings in order to avoid taxation and, where the public system is more efficient in providing annuitized pension benefits than the private sector. We show that in the absence of evasion costs, agents are indifferent to the tax rate level as they can always perfectly adapt compliance so as to face their preferred effective tax rate. There is unanimity in favour of the maximum tax rate and, the public pension system is found to be partially contributive in order to increase tax compliance and thus the resources collected. This, in turn, enables higher redistribution toward the worst-off agents. When evasion costs are introduced, perfect substitutability between compliance and taxation breaks down. At the majority-voting equilibrium, individuals at the bottom of the income distribution who are in favour of more redistribution, and those at the top who want to transfer more resources to the old age, form a coalition against middle-income agents, in favour of high tax rates. In addition to the previous tax base argument, the optimal level of the Bismarkian pillar is now chosen so as to account for political support.
       
  • International flows of people and institutional change
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 4 January 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Imran Arif, Joshua C. Hall International travel clearly increases human interaction over space and exposes societies to foreign influences, foreign ideas, and foreign institutions. Does international travel promote institutional change in a traveler's home country' This paper uses panel data from 149 countries to test the hypothesis of institutional change stemming from international travel. We generally find that foreign travel does not affect political institutions. In one sub-sample, we find limited evidence that international travel can be a determinant of institutional quality in the home country depending upon whether the home country is an autocracy or democracy.
       
  • Can media drive the electorate' The impact of media coverage on voting
           intentions
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 December 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Ralf Dewenter, Melissa Linder, Tobias Thomas A growing literature uses media data to explain perception and behaviour in the economic and political context. In this paper, we investigate how media coverage affects political preferences, namely voting intention. For our empirical analysis, we merge 14 years of human-coded data obtained from leading media in Germany with results of the comprehensive German Politbarometer survey from February 1998 through December 2012. In contrast to the existing literature, we do not utilize access to certain media outlets, but use the tonality of articles and newscasts on political parties and politicians based on human coded media data. To account for endogeneity, we employ instrumental variable probit estimations. In addition, we control for a multitude of (internal) personal characteristics, such as age, and gender, as well as for (external) macroeconomic variables, such as business climate, unemployment, and inflation. The results show that media coverage of a political party has a positive and significant effect on the voting intention for this party. When media outlets cover a political party more positively, the electorate has a greater tendency to vote for it. Hence, we conclude that the electoral success or failure of political parties is at least partially caused by the media coverage on them. This hints on the special responsibility of media in democracies.
       
  • Electoral fraud and voter turnout: An experimental study
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 18 December 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Vardan Baghdasaryan, Giovanna Iannantuoni, Valeria Maggian In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The electoral process is illicitly influenced by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables us to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with a moderate level of fraud while, with higher levels of electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of “agents” voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.
       
  • Happy partisans and extreme political views: The impact of national versus
           local representation on well-being
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 December 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jeremy Jackson The political party of elected officials can affect the happiness of the voting public through several different channels. Partisan voters will be happier whenever a member of their party controls political office regardless of the policies implemented. It is hypothesized that congruence between individual party identity and state politician affiliations should have a greater impact on citizen happiness than congruence with politicians at the national level due to results from the literature on Tiebout sorting. It is further hypothesized that individuals with extreme ideological views may report greater happiness as their ideology fulfills basic psychological needs for certainty and structure. Using data from the Generalized Social Survey the effect of party congruence of individuals with national and state politicians on happiness is estimated. The effect of extreme ideological political views on happiness is also estimated. Results find that congruence with presidential party affiliation has a much greater impact on happiness than congruence with national legislative affiliation, gubernatorial, or state legislative affiliation contradicting the hypothesis. Those who possess extreme political views are also found to report higher levels of happiness.
       
  • The impact of majority coalitions on local government spending, service
           delivery, and corruption in Indonesia
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 27 November 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Blane D. Lewis, Adrianus HendrawanThis study examines the impact of majority coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia. The investigation finds that majority coalitions, i.e. those coalitions for which participating political parties control greater than half of council seats, cause a shift in local government spending towards health sector activities and induce improvements in citizen health service access—but only for a year or two, after which the positive effects disappear. The study shows that budget fraud starts to become problematic in the last two years of the coalition's life. Majority coalition support for the local health spending and service agenda dissipates quickly as attention turns to corrupting the budget, via increased infrastructure outlays and associated rent-seeking. We hypothesize that budget fraud serves, in part, to finance subsequent rounds of local parliamentary and executive elections.
       
  • Political competition, tax salience and accountability theory and evidence
           from Italy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 19 November 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Emanuele Bracco, Francesco Porcelli, Michela Redoano This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely.
       
  • Complex ballot propositions, individual voting behavior, and status quo
           bias
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 5 November 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Zohal Hessami, Sven Resnjanskij One concern about direct democracy is that citizens may not be sufficiently competent to decide about complex policies. This may lead to exaggerated conservatism in the voting decision (status quo bias). To investigate how complexity affects individual voting behavior, we develop a novel measure of proposition complexity (using official pre-referendum booklets) and combine it with post-referendum survey data from Switzerland. Using Heckman selection estimations to account for endogenous variation in participation rates, we find that an increase in proposition complexity from the 10th to the 90th percentile would decrease voters' approval by 5.6 ppts, which is often decisive: an additional 12% of the propositions in our sample would be rejected.
       
  • Relative age effects in political selection
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 October 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Janne Tukiainen, Tuomas Takalo, Topi Hulkkonen We exploit a regression discontinuity design to provide causal evidence of the relative age effect (RAE) on a long-run adult age outcome: Political selection. We find strong evidence of the RAE in politics in Finland. However, the effect is heterogeneous: We find that male candidates born early in the calendar year have a significantly higher probability of getting elected to the parliament but no similar RAE applies to female candidates nor to municipal elections. Moreover, this effect only takes place in the most competitive parliamentary districts and is present only for some parties. We also find that in all the groups where the RAE does not exist, early-born candidates are under-represented suggesting attrition of talent in the candidate placement. Overall, our results show that seemingly artificial cutoffs imposed by the government have persistent consequences even on the selection to the highest positions of power within a society.
       
  • Is it the economic policy, stupid' Economic policy, political parties
           & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 15 October 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Daniel L. Bennett, Jason T. Long Incumbent politicians have a well-known advantage in seeking re-election. Using the Economic Freedom of North America dataset, we examine how changes in economic policy during an incumbent governor's tenure influence the probability of losing their re-election bid. Put simply, does economic policy matter for the incumbent advantage' The results suggest that a decrease in economic freedom increases the probability of an incumbent loss, regardless of the governor's party. A decomposition analysis indicates that these results are primarily driven by the government spending sub-index. Furthermore, a more granular analysis suggests that: (1) increases in government consumption spending and government employment are associated with a lower probability of re-election among Democratic incumbent governors, but a higher probability among Republicans; (2) increases in transfer payments relative to personal income reduce the likelihood of re-election, regardless of party; and (3) among Republican incumbents, increases of income taxation and of top marginal tax rates are associated with a higher and lower, respectively, probability of losing re-election. Finally, controlling for a variety of demographic, political and socioeconomic factors, we find that high unemployment increases the probability that an incumbent loses re-election, while increasing net population migration reduces it.
       
  • Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under
           political competition
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 15 October 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Monica A. Giovanniello, Carlo Perroni, Kimberley Scharf, Al Slivinski Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can protect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority. In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.
       
  • Democratic reversals and the size of government
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 October 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jeffrey Jensen, Sidak Gebre Yntiso While the fiscal and redistributive consequences of democracy is one of the central debates in political economy, most empirical studies analyze this question solely in the context of transitions to democracy. In this paper, we explore the consequences to taxation of democratic reversal using the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans in the US South between 1880 and 1910. Following the federally-imposed extension of the franchise to the former slaves during Reconstruction (1865–1877), Southern states erected a series of legal restrictions, such as literacy tests and poll taxes, aimed primarily at preventing Southern African Americans from registering to vote. Using an original dataset of local and state taxes and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we demonstrate that the adoption of literacy tests for voting eligibility in each state was followed by a significant decline in tax revenues that is highly correlated to the share of each county's population who was African American. We also find that black disenfranchisement led to a shift of the tax burden onto urban counties and a greater reliance on indirect taxation. Our results survive a battery of robustness checks, alternative specifications and additional tests of the redistributionist thesis. The findings are not only consistent with standard models of redistribution following democratization, but also indicate that the elasticity of taxes with respect to enfranchisement is substantial and larger than the one suggested by the cross-national literature.
       
  • Coattails and the forces that drive them: Evidence from Mexico
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 October 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Andrei Gomberg, Emilio Gutiérrez, Paulina López, Alejandra Vázquez Coattails and the forces behind them have important implications for the understanding of electoral processes and their outcomes. By focusing our attention on neighboring electoral sections that face the same local congressional election, but different municipal elections, and assuming that political preferences for local legislative candidates remain constant across neighboring electoral sections, we exploit variation in the strength of the municipal candidates in each of these electoral sections to estimate coattails from municipal to local congressional elections in Mexico. A one percentage increase in vote share for a municipal candidate translates, depending on his or her party, into an average of between 0.45 and 0.78 percentage point increase in vote share for the legislative candidates from the same party (though this effect may not have been sufficient to affect an outcome in any electoral district in our sample). In addition, we find that a large fraction of the effect is driven by individuals switching their vote decision in the legislative election, rather than by an increase in turnout.
       
  • Delay determinants of European Banking Union implementation
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 29 September 2018Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer Most countries in the European Union (EU) delay the transposition of European Commission (EC) directives, which aim at reforming banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance. We compile a systematic overview of these delays to investigate if they result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems. Transposition delays pertaining to the three Banking Union directives differ considerably across the 28 EU members. Bivariate regression analyses suggest that existing national bank regulation and supervision drive delays the most. Political factors are less relevant. These results are qualitatively insensitive to alternative estimation methods and lag structures. Multivariate analyses highlight that well-stocked deposit insurance schemes speed-up the implementation of capital requirements, banking systems with many banks are slower in implementing new bank rescue and resolution rules, and countries with a more intensive sovereign-bank nexus delay the harmonization of EU deposit insurance more.
       
 
 
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