Subjects -> POLITICAL SCIENCE (Total: 1152 journals)
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    - POLITICAL SCIENCE (960 journals)
    - POLITICAL SCIENCES: GENERAL (34 journals)

POLITICAL SCIENCE (960 journals)            First | 1 2 3 4 5     

Showing 201 - 281 of 281 Journals sorted alphabetically
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Der Donauraum     Hybrid Journal  
Desafíos     Open Access  
Development and Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 58)
Digest of Middle East Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Diplomacy & Statecraft     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Diplomatic History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Dissent     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Diversité urbaine     Full-text available via subscription  
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Earth System Governance     Open Access  
East European Jewish Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
East European Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Eastern African Literary and Cultural Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Eastern Review     Open Access  
Economia Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
Ecopolítica     Open Access  
eJournal of eDemocracy and Open Government     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Ekonomi, İşletme, Siyaset ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi     Open Access  
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
El Cotidiano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Electoral Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 44)
Em Pauta : Teoria Social e Realidade Contemporânea     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Encuentro     Open Access  
Entramados y Perspectivas     Open Access  
Environment and Planning C : Politics and Space     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 40)
Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Espacios Públicos     Open Access  
Estudios digital     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudos Avançados     Open Access  
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Ethics & International Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Ethics & Global Politics     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Éthique publique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Études internationales     Full-text available via subscription  
Eunomia. Rivista semestrale del Corso di Laurea in Scienze Politiche e delle Relazioni Internazionali     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Eureka Street     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
European Integration Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
European Journal for Security Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
European Journal of American Culture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology     Hybrid Journal  
European Journal of Government and Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
European Journal of International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 61)
European Journal of Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 60)
European Journal of Political Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 85)
European Journal of Political Research : Political Data Yearbook     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
European Policy Analysis     Hybrid Journal  
European Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
European Politics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
European Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
European Security     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
European Union Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 55)
European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Eurostudia     Open Access  
Evaluation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Evaluation and Program Planning     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Evidence Base : A journal of evidence reviews in key policy areas     Open Access  
Exchange : The Journal of Public Diplomacy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Fascism     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Federal Governance     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Fédéralisme Régionalisme     Open Access  
FEU Academic Review     Open Access  
Fijian Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Financial Times     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 39)
Foreign Policy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 51)
Foreign Policy Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Foreign Policy Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Foro Interno. Anuario de Teoría Política     Open Access  
French Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Frontiers in Political Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Gaceta Laboral     Open Access  
Genocide Studies International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Geographische Zeitschrift     Full-text available via subscription  
Geopolítica(s). Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Geopolitics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Geopolitics under Globalization     Open Access  
German Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
German Politics and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Germinal : Marxismo e Educação em Debate     Open Access  
Gestão & Regionalidade     Open Access  
Ghana Journal of Development Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Ghana Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
Global Affairs     Hybrid Journal  
Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 415)
Global Discourse : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Global Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 48)
Global Journal of Peace Research and Praxis     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Global Media Journal : African Edition     Open Access  
Global Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Global Societies Journal     Open Access  
Global Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Global South, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Global War Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Göç Dergisi     Full-text available via subscription  
Good Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Governare la paura. Journal of interdisciplinary studies     Open Access  
Government and Opposition     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24)
Granì     Open Access  
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Hague Journal of Diplomacy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Hegel Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Helsinki Monitor     Hybrid Journal  
Hic Rhodus : Crisis capitalista, polémica y controversias     Open Access  
Historia i Polityka     Open Access  
History of Communism in Europe     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Hommes & Migrations     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
HONAI : International Journal for Educational, Social, Political & Cultural Studies     Open Access  
Horyzonty Polityki     Open Access  
Human Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 59)
Human Rights Case Digest     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Human Rights Law Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 64)
Human Rights Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 70)
Human Rights Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration     Open Access  
Idäntutkimus     Open Access  
identidade!     Open Access  
Identities : Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Identity Papers : A Journal of British and Irish Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
IDP. Revista de Internet, Derecho y Politica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Ids Practice Papers     Hybrid Journal  
IKAT : The Indonesian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Indes : Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft     Hybrid Journal  
Index on Censorship     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
India Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Indialogs : Spanish Journal of India Studies     Open Access  
Indonesia Prime     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Indonesian Journal of Community Engagement     Open Access  
Innovation Policy and the Economy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Innovations : Technology, Governance, Globalization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Insight on Africa     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
InSURgência : revista de direitos e movimentos sociais     Open Access  
Intelligence & National Security     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
Interdisciplinary Political Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Interdisziplinäre Zeitschrift für Südasienforschung     Open Access  
Interest Groups & Advocacy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Interfaces Brasil/Canadá     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 69)
International Area Studies Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Communication of Chinese Culture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
International Critical Thought     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Journal : Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Area Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
International Journal of Children's Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Journal of E-Politics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of East Asian Studies     Open Access  
International Journal of Electronic Government Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of Environmental Policy and Decision Making     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Group Tensions     Hybrid Journal  
International Journal of Human Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 59)
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 583)
International Journal of Intercultural Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
International Journal of Peace Studies     Open Access  
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
International Journal of Press/Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
International Journal of Refugee Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
International Journal of Sexuality and Gender Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
International Journal of Social Quality     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Migration     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
International Migration Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 281)
International Negotiation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
International NGO Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
International Organization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 108)
International Peacekeeping     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 475)
International Political Science Abstracts     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
International Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 97)
International Political Sociology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 41)
International Quarterly for Asian Studies     Open Access  
International Regional Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
International Review of Public Policy     Open Access  
International Security     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 76)
International Socialism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Spectator : Italian Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
International Studies Perspectives     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Studies Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 55)
International Studies Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
International Theory: A Journal of International Politics, Law and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Irish Political Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Israel Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Istanbul Journal of Economics and Politics     Open Access  
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Italian Politics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
IZA Journal of Development and Migration     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Izquierdas     Open Access  

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Similar Journals
Journal Cover
European Journal of Political Economy
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.176
Citation Impact (citeScore): 2
Number of Followers: 60  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0176-2680 - ISSN (Online) 0176-2680
Published by Elsevier Homepage  [3206 journals]
  • Collective vs. Individual Lobbying
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 18 February 2020Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Norimichi MatsuedaAbstractThis paper presents a menu-auction model in which firms lobby the government to make an environmental regulation less burdensome. In this lobbying game, industrial interests are opposed by an environmental interest group. We compare political outcomes under two institutional arrangements. In the first, firms must join an organization that represents the interests of the industry. In the second, firms would lobby the government individually. The two arrangements result in strikingly different equilibrium outcomes. Only a small fraction of firms join the lobby group under collective lobbying, but all firms participate in lobbying activities when there is no such group. Thus, an attempt by firms to solve the apparent collective action problem through coordination would effectively backfire. The reason is that coordination among firms would increase the leverage available to the government, to demand high political contributions. We also evaluate the desirability of the two lobbying regimes from the private perspective of individual firms, and from the perspective of society as a whole. This permits us to evaluate possible restrictions on lobbying activities.
       
  • The impact of local financial development on firm growth in Vietnam: Does
           the level of corruption matter'
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 7 February 2020Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Viet T. Tran, Yabibal M. Walle, Helmut HerwartzAbstractWe examine the effects of province-level financial development and corruption on the performance of Vietnamese firms in terms of the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker. Employing a large firm-level dataset of more than 40,000 firms for the period 2009–2013 and applying a heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy, we find that province-level financial development promotes firm growth, while corruption hinders it. Most importantly, the marginal effect of financial development on firm growth depends negatively on the level of corruption. Moreover, financial development exacerbates the growth-retarding effect of corruption.
       
  • Passports for Sale: the Political Economy of Conflict and Cooperation in a
           Meta-Club
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 February 2020Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Kai A. Konrad, Ray ReesAbstractSome of the member states of the European Union sell citizenship or residence to wealthy foreign investors. We analyse these ”golden-passport” programs as a study in the political economy of conflict and cooperation in an international meta-club. Seen through the lens of club goods theory, the EU is a club of nations, each of which can be interpreted as itself a club. Each single nation reserves the right to govern the admission of new individual members into its own club, and new members automatically benefit from the EU wide meta-club good. We characterize the unique equilibrium when individual clubs that may differ in membership size are free to choose the terms on which they admit members, and evaluate it from the point of view of the wellbeing of the set of clubs as a whole. We identify club size and benefits as well as differences in cost externalities as the key determinants. We also consider how the set of clubs as a whole can respond to the economic inefficiency problems such a situation creates.
       
  • Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris
           Salon
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 February 2020Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Federico Etro, Silvia Marchesi, Elena StepanovaAbstractWe analyze the art market in Paris between the government-controlled Salon and the post-1880 system, when the Republican government liberalized art exhibitions. The jury of the old Salon decided on submissions with a bias in favor of conservative art of the academic insiders, erecting entry barriers against outsiders as the Impressionists. With a difference-in difference estimation, we provide evidence that the end of the government-controlled Salon contributed to start the price increase of the Impressionists relative to the insiders.
       
  • Economic Downturns, Inequality, and Democratic Improvements
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 31 January 2020Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Michael T. Dorsch, Paul MaarekAbstractThis paper explores the extent to which discrete improvements in the democratic quality of political institutions can be explained by income inequality. Empirical tests of this relationship have generally yielded null results, though typically test an unconditional relationship. Guided by a theoretical nuance of the “new economic view” of democratization and using an instrumental variable strategy, we re-examine the relationship conditional on the state of the macroeconomy. We demonstrate that the more unequal are societies, the higher the probability of experiencing democratic improvements following economic downturns. Following growth periods, higher income inequality has a slight negative or null effect on the likelihood of democratic improvement. The conditional result provides a simple explanation for why previous literature has found largely null results concerning inequality and democratization and offers additional evidence in support of the new economic view.
       
  • Political ideology and the intragenerational prospect of upward mobility
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 22 January 2020Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Maite D. Laméris, Harry Garretsen, Richard Jong-A-PinAbstractWe re-examine the effect of prospects of upward mobility (POUM) on the support for redistribution. Unlike previous studies, we analyse this relation in an intragenerational context and consider the moderating effect of political ideology through which mobility expectations affect redistributive preferences. We find that the POUM effect is conditional on political preferences. That is, we find that only for right-wing individuals expected upward income mobility negatively affects support for redistribution. Left-wing individuals prefer redistribution, regardless of expected upward income movements.
       
  • Positioning and negotiations: The case of pharmaceutical pricing
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 9 January 2020Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Sverre Grepperud, Pedersen Pål AndreasAbstractWe study a positioning game prior to negotiations where each party invests into influential activities in order to raise voter support for their preferred bargaining outcome. The case chosen for our analysis is a bilateral monopoly where a purchaser meets a pharmaceutical firm and where the two negotiate on the price of a new and innovative medicine. We identify factors that influence on the negotiated price such as treatment effects of the new and the existing drug, production costs of the new drug, the price of the existing drug, the marginal cost of public funds and patient group size. Furthermore, it is shown that the negotiated price, depending on the characteristics of a political cost function with regard to the influential activities, is influenced by the order of moves taken by the parties. Regardless of the strategic interrelationships between the two parties, likely positioning games to be played are those where one of the two negotiating parties acts as a leader while the rival acts as a follower.
       
  • Immigration, ethnic diversity and voting: The role of individual income
    • Abstract: Publication date: January 2020Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 61Author(s): Giorgio Bellettini, Carlotta Berti Ceroni, Chiara MonfardiniAbstractWe exploit a unique panel dataset merging data on individual socio-economic characteristics and individual turnout in an Italian municipality to investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity in residential neighborhoods and propensity to vote. Using these data, we document for the first time a differential effect of diversity on electoral turnout depending on household equivalent income. Specifically, we show that ethnic diversity in the neighborhood reduces the political participation of the poor, while it fosters that of the more affluent. These results highlight a potential democratic deficit stemming from reduced and unequal electoral turnout in increasingly heterogeneous neighborhoods.
       
  • Gender quotas and the selection of local politicians: evidence from French
           municipal elections
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 28 December 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Julie LassébieAbstractUsing data on the universe of elected politicians in French municipalities, this paper studies the impact of a gender quota law on the political representation of women and on the composition of municipal councils. The empirical strategy, a Difference-in-Discontinuities design, takes advantage of the fact that the policy applies to cities above a population threshold, and that this threshold has been modified over time. I find that the quota policy has a substantial impact on the share of female candidates and elected politicians, but fails to promote female mayors and list leaders, even in cities that have been exposed to the policy for 13 years. Women do not reach leadership positions because they are more likely to resign than male politicians. This higher propensity of women to leave politics is correlated with local gender norms concerning the place of women in society, and also varies with individual characteristics such as age and professional background. In a second part, I show that quotas have little effect on the composition of municipal councils in terms of socio-economic background, age, and political experience.
       
  • Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal
           probability - Evidence from Hungary
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 December 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): András GregorAbstractI estimate the effects of political competition on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to Hungarian municipalities between 1998 and 2006. The intergovernmental transfers were intended to finance schooling, elder care, and administrative needs in municipalities. Rather than use closeness of the dominant blocks' vote share, which is the standard measure of political competition, I instead employ (Myerson, 2000)'s pivotal probabilities, calculated at the municipality level. As a result, the number of voters, in addition to the vote difference, is taken into account when describing political competition at the municipal level. I argue that under mixed-member proportional systems, as well as under proportional systems in general, pivotal probability reflects the political reality better than closeness can. I find evidence that swing municipalities in villages are targeted and, ceteris paribus, that poorer regions receive larger transfer amounts than other areas.
       
  • How does petty corruption affect tax morale in Sub-Saharan Africa'
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2019Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 60Author(s): Björn Jahnke, Reinhard A. WeisserAbstractRevenues from taxation gain in importance to finance economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. One obstacle to enhancing the willingness to remit taxes can be the extortion of bribes by public officials. Using micro-level data from the Afrobarometer, we show that petty corruption erodes tax morale. The effect on tax morale is more severe in countries and regions where fewer people are affected by petty corruption and becomes insignificant if extortion of bribes is particularly prevalent. Differing levels of civic participation and potential access to tax funded services are also found to induce heterogeneous reactions to corruption experience. Applying a mediation analysis, we demonstrate that petty corruption not only has a direct effect on tax morale but also diminishes confidence in tax authorities and therefore affects tax morale indirectly. The harmful effects of corruption experience, however, operate mainly through a generally lowered inclination to uphold high levels of tax morale.
       
  • Clash of civilizations demystified
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2019Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 60Author(s): Gunes GokmenAbstractThis paper provides empirical evidence in support of the clash-of-civilizations view on the nature of interstate conflicts in the post-Cold War era. First, we show that countries belonging to different civilizations have a higher probability of interstate conflict before and after the Cold War period, but not during the Cold War. Second, we explain the differential impact of civilizations on conflict over time by providing evidence that civilizational differences were suppressed during the Cold War by ideology and super-power camps. Third, we provide evidence that the component of civilizations that matters the most for conflict in the post-Cold War period is language, and not religion. Fourth, we analyze the long-term cultural, geographical and historical determinants of civilizational differences, and show that language has the largest explanatory power.
       
  • Dynamics of conflict
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2019Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 60Author(s):
       
  • Trade, poverty, and social protection in developing countries
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2019Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 60Author(s): Raj M. Desai, Nita RudraAbstractHow do shifts in trade affect social protections for the poor' Although the fraction of the world's population considered the “extreme” poor has fallen by over one-half over the past quarter century, many of those lifted above the global poverty line remain vulnerable to shocks that could place them back into poverty. These are the groups that require social protection to stabilize their incomes. Among the shocks to which the absolute poor have been exposed are those created by trade liberalization, particularly of the agricultural sector. The resulting risks, uncertainties, and threats to social stability from this type of trade require that the poor be provided with some forms of adjustment assistance. We examine the effects of trade components on several dimensions of social protection in developing countries, including spending, coverage, and adequacy over the past two decades. We find that, contrary to previous studies, disaggregating trade may be a key to determining which international market variables drive expansion of social protection. Disaggregating trade balances in agricultural vs. manufactured goods reveals that net food and agricultural exporters provide better social protection than countries that report agricultural trade deficits. Meanwhile, countries with manufacturing trade surpluses tend to experience reduced social protection coverage. We reason that governments of net agricultural exporters face incentives to invest in social programs that extend eligibility to the rural poor. Manufacturing export-driven economies, on the other hand, are likely participants in global production chains that limit the capacity of the public sector to extend social protection.
       
  • Publisher's note
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2019Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 60Author(s):
       
  • Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2019Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 60Author(s): Gil S. Epstein, Ira N. GangAbstractGovernments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the taxes they pay the government. We examine the political economy of a decentralised revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralised with decentralised governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by constituencies trying to affect government taxation decisions.
       
  • Population Size and the Size of Government
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 26 November 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Tim Krieger, Daniel MeierrieksAbstractWe examine the effect of population size on government size for a panel of 130 countries for the period between 1970 and 2014. We show that previous analyses of the nexus between population size and government size are incorrectly specified and fail to consider the influence of cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration. Using a panel time-series approach that adequately accounts for these issues, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size. This finding suggests that effects of population size that increase government size (primarily due to the costs of heterogeneity, congestion, crime and conflict) dominate effects that reduce government size (primarily due to scale economies).
       
  • Does democracy cause growth' A meta-analysis (of 2000 regressions)
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 14 November 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Marco Colagrossi, Domenico Rossignoli, Mario A. MaggioniAbstractThe relationship between democracy and economic growth has been widely debated in the social sciences with contrasting results. We apply a meta-analytical framework surveying 188 studies (2047 models) covering 36 years of research in the field. We also compare the effect of democracy on growth with the effect of human capital on growth in a sub-sample of 111 studies (875 models). Our findings suggest that democracy has a positive and direct effect on economic growth beyond the reach of publication bias, albeit weaker (about one third) of that of human capital. Further, the growth effect of democracy appears to be stronger in more recent papers not surveyed in Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008). Finally, we show that the heterogeneity in the reported results is mainly driven by spatial and temporal differences in the samples, indicating that the democracy and growth nexus is not homogeneous across world regions and decades.
       
  • Autocratic Governors in Public Procurement
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 6 November 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Andrey Tkachenko, Daniil EsaulovAbstractThe personal role of sub-national rulers is crucial for regional development in countries with weak institutions. This paper studies the impact of regional governors’ tenure in office and their local ties on procurement performance in Russia. To identify the causal effect, we construct instruments for governor’s tenure by exploiting the regional vote share of ruling party in past parliament elections. We find the evidence that governors who do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared to governors with local ties (insiders). Namely, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at awarding stage significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, for governors-outsiders this restriction becomes stronger with tenure in office, while governors-insiders do not demonstrate such negative tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition by governors-outsiders cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution: the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination either increase or keep stable with tenure for governors-outsiders and these outcomes decrease with tenure for governors-insiders.
       
  • Empowering knowledge: Political leaders, education, and economic
           liberalization
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 31 October 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jingheng Li, Tianyang Xi, Yang YaoAbstractRecent literature reports significant effects of political leaders in driving economic policies but does not provide an exhaustive answer as to why. This paper argues that educational background plays an important role in shaping leaders' ideas and beliefs, which in turn matter for policy making in the long run. Using a cross-country data covering 137 countries and regions over 1960–2005, the paper documents a robustly positive relationship between leaders’ educational attainment and faster liberal reforms, regardless of regime type. The effects are more salient for leaders who majored in economics, social science, and natural science. Moreover, the effects of education seem to be orthogonal to alternative channels such as partisan politics, geopolitical factors, and public opinions.
       
  • Fiscal discipline in EMU' Testing the effectiveness of the Excessive
           Deficit Procedure
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 October 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jasper De Jong, Niels GilbertAbstractThe Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), central to the Stability and Growth Pact, has been criticized from opposite ends. Some blame the EDP for imposing too much fiscal austerity. Others question whether the EDP has any disciplining power at all. To test its actual effects, we construct a real-time database of EDP recommendations and estimate augmented real-time and ex-post fiscal reaction functions for a panel of EMU member states. Overall, we find that a 1% of GDP larger EDP recommendation leads to 0.8–0.9% of GDP of additional fiscal consolidation plans, and 0.6–0.7% of actual consolidation. This result does not extend to countries subject to financial support programs: we find that, while they did implement substantial consolidation measures, in these countries required and delivered consolidation efforts are less connected. Overall, our results suggest that EDP recommendations have substantially shaped fiscal policies in the euro area, especially in the years 2010–2014, when EDP recommendations were most frequent.
       
  • Rainy day politics. An instrumental variables approach to the effect of
           parties on political outcomes
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 17 October 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jo Thori LindAbstractScholars have grappled with the question of how parties affect policy. Here I propose and test an instrumental variable approach using rainfall. In Norwegian municipal elections, potential left wing voters are likely to abstain from voting with election day rain, whereas the opposite holds for right-wingers. Then rainfall provides an exogenous source of variation, and hence an instrument, for the party composition of the municipal council. A strengthening of the right wing parties due to rainfall shifts expenditures toward education, but reduces total spending. This also shows that political competition does not drive party platforms to converge.
       
  • Quality of judicial institutions, crimes, misdemeanors, and dishonesty
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 12 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Naci Mocan, Samantha Bielen, Wim MarneffeAbstractWe investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.
       
  • Towards a cashless economy: Economic and socio-political implications
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 October 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Nissim Cohen, Anna Rubinchik, Labib ShamiAbstractWe construct a simple general equilibrium model to demonstrate how eliminating cash can lead to a misallocation of resources in a naturally segmented economy with observed (official) and non-observed (informal) sectors. The source of inefficiency mirrors the standard arguments explaining why money is essential: a promise backed by a good produced in one sector can not be used in another and so absence of a reliable fiat money reduces the gains from trade. We also point to several additional unintended consequences of cash elimination.
       
  • Legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 26 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Pedro Naso, Erwin Bulte, Tim SwansonAbstractWe examine the interaction between two legal systems in post-conflict Sierra Leone. To do that, we measure the impact of competition between state and non-state legal authorities on the number of disputes and on the amount of fines charged per dispute. Our results suggest a potential negative externality between regimes for civil disputes—that is, an increase in the cost of apprehending a person—and a reduction in the amount of fines per dispute collected when two regimes operate in the same village. This indicates that a potential benefit to the local people from multiple competing regimes is a reduction on expected authoritative expropriation.
       
  • Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 21 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Jan ZapalAbstractThe paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo; the status-quo is endogenous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point, the dynamic utility ideal, is a moderate policy relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment; players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute; when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We provide conditions under which the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, and we prove its existence in generic games with impatient players and in symmetric games. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness.
       
  • Is money where the fun ends' Material interests and individuals’
           preference for direct democracy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 19 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Philipp Harms, Claudia LandwehrAbstractAre people's attitudes towards referendums as a decision-making procedure predominantly driven by their material self-interest, or do individuals also value direct democracy as such, regardless of the material payoffs associated with anticipated policy outcomes' To answer this question, we use a survey data set that offers information on respondents' support for referendums as a procedure to decide on tax policy, their income levels, socio-economic characteristics, and, most importantly, their expectation about the majority's support for higher taxes. We find that the support of low-income individuals for referendums increases substantially if they expect a clear population majority in favor of more redistribution. Conversely, individuals with a high income who expect a majority in favor of higher taxes do not reject referendums more strongly than individuals with an average income who share these expectations.
       
  • Parties, divided government, and infrastructure expenditures: Evidence
           from U.S. states
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 11 September 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Lukas Buchheim, Stephan FretzAbstractThis paper examines the impact of parties and divided government on infrastructure expenditures for transportation, education, and social services in U.S. states. As infrastructure expenditures are considered a bi-partisan priority, we hypothesize that divided governments expand infrastructure spending compared to governments under true Democratic or Republican control. We test this hypothesis using U.S. state-level data over the period 1970 to 2008 and find that divided governments indeed increase expenditures for these budget categories. Specifically, divided governments spend more on transportation than unified Democratic governments, and more on education and social services than unified Republican governments. The effect is most pronounced for the core infrastructure of transportation and even stronger when only looking at capital outlays instead of total expenditures.
       
  • Partisan lobbyists in conflicts
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 August 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Gerald EisenkopfAbstractThe paper studies the impact of partisan advisors in economic conflicts. In the experiment these lobbyists can give recommendations to their contestants. The results show that recommendations do not increase contest intensity even though most contestants follow them rather closely. However, the lobbyists effectively undermine nonbinding agreements that aim at reducing contest expenditure between the conflict parties.
       
  • Demand of direct democracy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 August 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Guadalupe Correa-LoperaAbstractThe growing demand for referendum challenges the traditional model of representative democracy. In this paper we study under which conditions voters prefer a system of representative democracy to direct democracy. In direct democracies voters choose a policy among two alternatives, under uncertainty about which policy better fits the realized state of the world; in representative democracies voters select a candidate who, once elected, chooses a policy having observed which is the realized state of the world. Voters and politicians' payoffs depend on a common component which is positive only if the policy fits the state of the world, and on a private ideological bias towards one of the policies. In direct democracies voters are uncertain about the future state of the world, while in representative democracies they are uncertain about the degree of ideological bias of the candidates, even if they know towards which policy each candidate is biased. We show that representative democracy is preferred if (i) the majority of voters are pragmatic (the common component prevails), and (ii) society is ideologically polarized, meaning that the majority of voters are ideological (the private component prevails), but the median voter is pragmatic. Direct democracy is the preferred instrument for collective choices in societies in which the majority of voters and the median voter are ideological, implying that the majority of voters have the same ideological bias, as, for instance, it occurs when the populist rhetoric of people against the elite succeeds.
       
  • Stability of revolutionary governments in the face of mass protest
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 23 August 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Dmitry Dagaev, Natalia Lamberova, Anton SobolevAbstractWhy do some newly introduced revolutionary governments face anti-government demonstrations and swiftly exit office, while others are able to establish political regimes that last for decades' Historical evidence finds revolutionary governments in the first decade of twenty-first century to be three times more vulnerable to mass protest than a hundred years ago. What can explain this trend' This paper relates the stability of newly emerged revolutionary governments to the political composition of the protest that brings a new incumbent to power and in factors that can shape it. Our theoretical model, incorporating protest into a dynamic Downsian framework, features the significant role of protest coordination, communication technology, ideology, and the coercive capacity of the regime. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it discusses a new historical trend of instability of revolutionary governments. Second, it proposes a model that helps to understand the growing instability of revolutionary regimes, as well as conditions that undermine stability. In equilibrium, it is possible to have a revolutionary government overthrown by popular uprising, despite the fact that it gained power on the wave of popular support. Third, under a set of conditions, the new incumbent would always come from a different part of political spectrum.
       
  • Did rainfall shocks cause civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa' The
           implications of data revisions
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 25 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Weidong Liang, Nicholas SimAbstractIn their seminal paper, Miguel et al. (2004) found that negative rainfall shocks (measured as negative year-on-year rainfall growth) had caused civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa over the 1981–1999 period. Since then, the rainfall and conflict data they used had undergone multiple revisions. We show that rainfall shocks are no longer statistically significant for civil conflict when the revised data are used. This is true whether we employ a different functional form for rainfall, extend the sample to include more recent observations, use longer lags for rainfall shocks, employ dynamic panel regression, or panel regressions that take into account of cross-sectional dependence. Using rainfall shocks as instruments for growth, we also find that growth is insignificant for civil conflict if the revised data are used. Upon further investigation, we find that updates in the rainfall and conflict data for one or a few countries may alone cause rainfall shocks to lose statistical significance.
       
  • Corruption, workforce selection and mismatch in the public sector
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Sauro Mocetti, Tommaso OrlandoAbstractWe examine the impact of corruption on workforce selection and personnel allocation in the public sector. Using Italian data, we find that the selection of public employees in terms of human capital worsens in comparison to that of their private sector counterparts in areas with higher levels of corruption. Moreover, corruption is associated with educational mismatch in the allocation of human resources and, in particular, with an increase in the rate of under-qualification. These results are robust to several alternative indicators and specifications, including IV estimation using past dependence on public spending and the historical relevance of foreign domination as exogenous sources of variation for current corruption.
       
  • WTO membership and corruption
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 22 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Sanchari ChoudhuryAbstractDespite widespread belief that accession process and formal membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) improve the quality of governance within a country, there is no convincing empirical evidence to substantiate this thought. Here, I investigate whether the WTO status of a country has a causal effect on firm-level reports of political corruption using a nonparametric partial identification approach to bound the average treatment effects (ATEs). I also analyze conditional ATEs to explore various sources of potential heterogeneity. Contrary to popular belief, I find that WTO membership is likely to have no causal effect on domestic corruption overall. And if anything, it is likely to increase corrupt practices, particularly among firms that are established post WTO membership and those that are government owned.
       
  • Electoral systems and immigration
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Giuseppe Russo, Francesco SalsanoAbstractUnexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where immigration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appropriates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed, the policymaker must distribute the compensation. With respect to proportional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a few decisive districts and leave after-compensation rents higher, therefore producing higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration than do voters. Finally, our model predicts that opposition to immigration is more geographically dispersed in plurality systems. Basic evidence supports this prediction.
       
  • Does accrual accounting alter fiscal policy decisions' - Evidence from
           Germany
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 17 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Désirée I. ChristofzikAbstractMany governments have replaced traditional cash-based accounting with some form of accrual-based accounting system. However, empirical evidence on the effects of the public accounting system on fiscal policy is scarce. Following rules by the federal states, municipalities in Germany have adopted accrual-based accounting systems gradually. By exploiting variations over time and across states I find no evidence for an impact on the overall financial balance. However, my findings suggest that accrual accounting has altered the structure of the budget. Revenues from the sales of non-financial assets have decreased significantly. This supports the hypothesis that municipalities had used these one-off measures before to meet fiscal constraints. Using data on entities controlled by the municipalities, the analysis provides no evidence for repercussions on these public funds, institutions or enterprises.
       
  • Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 4 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Diego Aycinena, Lucas RentschlerAbstractThis paper studies entry decisions in contests with private values. Potential contestants observe their value and the common opportunity cost of entry, and make entry decisions simultaneously. Theory predicts that whether or not contestants are informed of the number of entrants prior to choosing their expenditures has no effect on entry or aggregate expenditures. We test these assertions in our experiments. We find substantial over-entry in both information structures. However, entry is higher when contestants are informed. Since expenditures do not, on average, differ across information structures, aggregate expenditure is also higher when contestants are informed. Contestants earn on average less than the opportunity cost of entry.
       
  • Costs of change and political polarization
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 2 July 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Hans Gersbach, Philippe Muller, Oriol TejadaAbstractWe study a two-period model of policy-making where (i) changes of current policies impose costs on all individuals that increase linearly with the magnitude of the policy shift and (ii) political power changes over time. We show that policy polarization is minimal for intermediate marginal costs. In turn, welfare is a single-peaked function of the marginal cost. One interpretation is that societies with political institutions that impose positive but moderate costs on political reforms simultaneously achieve the highest welfare and the lowest policy polarization.
       
  • Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 June 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Barbara Annicchiarico, Enrico MarvasiAbstractWe extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.
       
  • Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian
           municipalities
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 11 June 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Andrea Bonfatti, Lorenzo ForniAbstractThe paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It uses data on Italian municipalities during the 2000s and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian sub-national fiscal rule (Domestic Stability Pact, DSP) introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 10–20 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that municipalities subject to the DSP show a pre-electoral increase in capital spending which is only a quarter of the one of municipalities not subject to the rule.
       
  • The tug-of-war in the laboratory
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 March 2019Source: European Journal of Political EconomyAuthor(s): Cary Deck, Roman M. SheremetaAbstractThe tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win the tug-of-war causes a greater reduction in bidding than either a decrease in the prize or greater impatience despite all three having the same predicted effect. These findings have implications both for theorists and practitioners.
       
 
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