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  Subjects -> POLITICAL SCIENCE (Total: 886 journals)
    - CIVIL RIGHTS (10 journals)
    - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (105 journals)
    - POLITICAL SCIENCE (747 journals)
    - POLITICAL SCIENCES: GENERAL (24 journals)

POLITICAL SCIENCE (747 journals)                  1 2 3 4 | Last

Showing 1 - 200 of 281 Journals sorted alphabetically
A Contracorriente     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ab Imperio     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Acta Borealia: A Nordic Journal of Circumpolar Societies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Acta Politica Estica     Open Access  
Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Administrative Science Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 149)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
AFFRIKA Journal of Politics, Economics and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Africa Conflict Monitor     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Africa Insight     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Africa Institute Occasional Paper     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Africa Renewal     Free   (Followers: 5)
Africa Review : Journal of the African Studies Association of India     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Africa Today     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
African Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 60)
African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
African Diaspora     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
African East-Asian Affairs     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
African Identities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
African Journal of Democracy and Governance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
African Journal of Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
African Renaissance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
African Yearbook of Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Africanus     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Afrique contemporaine : La revue de l'Afrique et du développement     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Agenda Política     Open Access  
Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Agrarian South : Journal of Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Alternatives : Global, Local, Political     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Altre Modernità     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
América Latina Hoy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
American Communist History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
American Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 264)
American Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 219)
American Political Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
American Politics Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
American Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
Anacronismo e Irrupción     Open Access  
Analecta política     Open Access  
Análise Social     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annales UMCS, Politologia     Open Access  
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
Annual Review of Economics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 30)
Annual Review of Political Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 141)
AQ - Australian Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Arabian Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Arctic Review on Law and Politics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Arena Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 15)
Asia Minor Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Asia Policy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Asia-Pacific Journal : Japan Focus     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Asia-Pacific Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Asian Affairs: An American Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Asian Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Asian Politics and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
AUDEM : The International Journal of Higher Education and Democracy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Aurora. Revista de Arte, Mídia e Política     Open Access  
Australasian Review of African Studies, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Australian Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Australian Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Austrian Journal of Political Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Balcanica Posnaniensia Acta et studia     Open Access  
Baltic Journal of European Studies     Open Access  
Bandung : Journal of the Global South     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Basic Income Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Beleid en Maatschappij     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
BMC International Health and Human Rights     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Brazilian Political Science Review     Open Access  
Brésil(s)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
British Journal of Canadian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
British Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 187)
British Journal of Politics and International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
British Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
British Review of New Zealand Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity     Open Access   (Followers: 48)
Bulletin d'histoire politique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bustan     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Cadernos de Estudos Sociais e Políticos     Open Access  
CADUS - Revista de Estudos de Política, História e Cultura     Open Access  
Cahiers de l'Urmis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cahiers de Sciences politiques de l'ULg     Open Access  
California Journal of Politics and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Cambio 16     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Cambridge Review of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Caucasus Survey     Hybrid Journal  
Central and Eastern European Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Central Asian Affairs     Hybrid Journal  
Central Banking     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Central European Journal of Public Policy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
China : An International Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
China perspectives     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
China Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
China Report     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
China Review International     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
China-EU Law Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Chinese Journal of Global Governance     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Chinese Journal of International Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Chinese Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Cittadinanza Europea (LA)     Full-text available via subscription  
Civil Wars     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union     Open Access  
Class, Race and Corporate Power     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cold War History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Communication, Politics & Culture     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Communist and Post-Communist Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Comparative Political Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 149)
Comparative Politics (Russia)     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Comparative Strategy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Competition & Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Conferences on New Political Economy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Confines     Open Access  
Conflict and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Conflict Management and Peace Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Conflict Trends     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Conflict, Security & Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 356)
Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Conjunctions. Transdisciplinary Journal of Cultural Participation     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Contemporary Italian Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Contemporary Japan     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Contemporary Journal of African Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
Contemporary Review of the Middle East     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Contemporary Security Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 20)
Contemporary Wales     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Contenciosa     Open Access  
Contexto Internacional     Open Access  
Cooperation and Conflict     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
CQ Researcher     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
CQ Weekly     Full-text available via subscription  
Criterio Jurídico     Open Access  
Critical Asian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Critical Review : A Journal of Politics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Critical Reviews on Latin American Research     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Critical Social Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 33)
Critical Studies on Terrorism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Cuadernos de historia de España     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Cultura de Paz     Open Access  
Cultural Critique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Culture Mandala : The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies     Open Access  
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Decolonization : Indigeneity, Education & Society     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Defence Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Defense & Security Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Democracy & Education     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
Democratic Communiqué     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Democratic Theory     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Democratization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31)
Democrazia e diritto     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Demokratie und Geschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Der Donauraum     Hybrid Journal  
Der Staat     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Desafíos     Open Access  
Development and Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 46)
Digest of Middle East Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Diplomacy & Statecraft     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Diplomatic History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Dissent     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Diversité urbaine     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
East European Jewish Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
East European Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Economia Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 36)
Ecopolítica     Open Access  
eJournal of eDemocracy and Open Government     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
El Cotidiano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Electoral Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Em Pauta : Teoria Social e Realidade Contemporânea     Open Access  
Encuentro     Open Access  
Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Equal Opportunities International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Espacios Públicos     Open Access  
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudos Avançados     Open Access  
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Ethics & Global Politics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal  
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Études internationales     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Eureka Street     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Europe's World     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Integration Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
European Journal of American Culture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
European Journal of Government and Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
European Journal of International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
European Journal of Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
European Journal of Political Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 68)

        1 2 3 4 | Last

Journal Cover European Journal of Political Economy
  [SJR: 0.956]   [H-I: 54]   [43 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 0176-2680
   Published by Elsevier Homepage  [3044 journals]
  • Development Minister Characteristics and Aid Giving
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 3 September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Andreas Fuchs, Katharina Richert
      Over 300 government members have had the main responsibility for international development cooperation in 23 member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee since the organization started reporting detailed Official Development Assistance (ODA) data in 1967. Understanding their role in foreign aid giving is crucial since their decisions can influence aid effectiveness and thus economic development on the ground. Our study examines whether development ministers’ personal characteristics are associated with aid budgets and aid quality. To this end, we create a novel database on development ministers’ gender, political ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, education, and time in office over the 1967–2012 period. Results from fixed-effects panel regressions show that some of the personal characteristics of development ministers matter. Most notably, we find that more experienced ministers with respect to their time in the development office obtain larger aid budgets. Moreover, our results suggest that female ministers as well as officeholders with prior professional experience in development cooperation and a longer time in office provide higher-quality ODA.

      PubDate: 2017-09-08T06:18:09Z
       
  • Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Sonja Brangewitz, Sarah Brockhoff
      This paper analyzes the sustainability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions to agree on a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient, fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extent the sustainability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions that have formed. In our setup, countries are symmetric, but coalitions can be of arbitrary size. We analyze sustainability by means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we rank the sustainability of different coalition structures. We show that sub-coalitions consisting of singleton regions have the largest incentives to deviate and that the sustainability of cooperation depends on the degree of cooperative behavior ex-ante. Bilateral agreements between pairs of regions turn out to be the form of cooperation that is the easiest to sustain.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • On the historical roots of women's empowerment across Italian provinces:
           religion or family culture'
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Monica Bozzano
      Why do women's economic decision-making and political empowerment vary so widely' What are the main potential determinants of such variations' Over a cross-section of Italian provincial data, we analyze the association between two specific facets of women's empowerment, the percentage of women holding office in local political bodies and the percentage of women in high-ranking jobs, and the religious and cultural conditions which facilitate or hinder women's inclusion. Our hypothesis is that culture, in particular those values embodied by religious culture, plays a central role in shaping norms and beliefs about the role and involvement of women in society. Moreover we suggest that these cultural norms are inherited from the past and therefore have a high degree of inertia. Both OLS and IV results indicate that our measures of women's empowerment are strongly associated with religious culture, as proxied by religious marriages. These results are robust and consistent across specifications.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Corruption and political stability: Does the youth bulge matter'
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, Stefan Witthuhn
      This study shows that the relative size of the youth bulge matters in how corruption affects the internal stability of a political system. Using panel data covering the 1984–2012 period for more than 100 countries, we find that the effect of corruption on political stability depends on the youth bulge. Corruption is a destabilizing factor for political systems when the share of the youth population in the adult population exceeds a critical level of approximately 20%. The moderating effect of the youth bulge in the stability–corruption nexus is robust, controlling for country and year fixed effects, a set of control variables that may affect internal political stability, an alternative operationalization of the youth bulge, corruption, and a dynamic panel estimation method.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica
      How can a small special interest group successfully get an inefficient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying' We consider a simple model of agenda setting where two groups of different size lobby a politician over a transfer from one group to the other, and the group which sets the agenda can choose the size of the proposed transfer. The groups have resources which are used to pay the politician and to overcome the public goods problem within the group. Our key result is that which group prevails in the agenda setting game depends crucially on whether the transfers can also be used to pay the politician – in which case we say they are fungible. If the transfer is fungible, as in the case of a monetary payment, the smaller group prevails. If the transfer is non-fungible the result depends on whether it is rival or not – civil rights for example are non-rival. In the case of a rival non-fungible transfer depending on circumstances either group may prevail. In the non-rival case the large group prevails. Our results explain the apparent paradox that when it comes to special financial favors small groups seem very effective, but when it comes to large non-financial issues – such as minority rights – large groups are more effective.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Expropriation risk and FDI in developing countries: Does return of capital
           dominate return on capital'
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): M. Akhtaruzzaman, Nathan Berg, Christopher Hajzler
      Previously reported effects of institutional quality and political risks on foreign direct investment (FDI) are mixed and, therefore, difficult to interpret. We present empirical evidence suggesting a relatively clear, statistically robust, and intuitive characterization. Institutional factors that affect the likelihood of an abrupt and total loss of foreigners’ capital (i.e., return of capital) dominate factors that affect rates of return conditional on a strictly positive terminal investment value (i.e., return on capital). The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that expropriation risk is most important among the available measures of different dimensions of institutional quality. A one-standard-deviation reduction in expropriation risk is associated with a 72% increase in FDI, which is substantially larger than the effects of any other dimensions of institutional quality as simultaneously estimated in our empirical models of expected FDI inflows. We show that this evidence is consistent with the predictions of a standard theory of FDI under imperfect contract enforcement and multiple dimensions of political risk.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Suffrage, labour markets and coalitions in colonial Virginia
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Elena Nikolova, Milena Nikolova
      We study Virginia's suffrage from the early-17th century until the American Revolution using an analytical narrative and econometric analysis of unique data on franchise restrictions. First, we hold that suffrage changes reflected labour market dynamics. Indeed, Virginia's liberal institutions initially served to attract indentured servants from England who were needed in the labour-intensive tobacco farming but deteriorated once worker demand subsided and planters replaced white workers with slaves. Second, we argue that Virginia's suffrage was also the result of political bargaining influenced by shifting societal coalitions. We show that new politically influential coalitions of freemen and then of small and large slave-holding farmers emerged in the second half of the 17th and early-18th centuries, respectively. These coalitions were instrumental in reversing the earlier democratic institution\s. Our main contribution stems from integrating the labour markets and bargaining/coalitions arguments, thus proving a novel theoretical and empirical explanation for institutional change.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Single round vs. runoff elections under plurality rule: A theoretical
           analysis
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Massimo Bordignon, Tommaso Nannicini, Guido Tabellini
      We compare single round vs. runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. With large and sufficiently polarized groups of moderate voters, under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility is smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. These results are robust to several extentions.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Symmetric tax competition and lobbying within federations
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Simon Winter
      The present paper deals with the question of whether tax harmonization and federal taxation increase welfare in a symmetric tax competition framework with heterogeneous individuals and lobbying. A model closely related to the approach of Lai (2010) is linked to externalities that are familiar from conventional public finance. The observed deviations from efficient taxation are derived from the interplay of four externalities, which can be divided into two groups: externalities occurring due to tax competition and externalities which are caused by lobbying. Whether or not the centralization of tax competences is useful depends mainly on the relative sizes of the competition-induced and lobbying-induced externalities.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Who do you blame in local finance' An analysis of municipal financing
           in Italy
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Massimo Bordignon, Veronica Grembi, Santino Piazza
      We study the effect of introducing a less transparent tax tool for the financing of local governments. A political agency model suggests that politicians with stronger re-electoral incentives would raise more tax revenues and use more the less transparent tax tool to enhance their probability of re-election. This prediction is tested by studying a reform that in 1999 allowed Italian municipalities to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax of residents). Exploiting the existence of a term limit for mayors, we use a Difference in Difference approach, to estimate how mayors facing re-electoral concerns reacted to the introduction of the less transparent tax tool compared to mayors facing term limit. We find results in line with theory. We also show that the reduction in the property tax is larger in smaller municipalities and in municipalities with lower level of social capital. The normative implications are then discussed.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Rewarding the introduction of multiparty elections
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Nam Kyu Kim, Alex Kroeger
      Do aid donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections' Are multiparty elections rewarded in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes' How do the rewards for institutional reforms compare to the rewards for substantive improvements in governance and political rights' These questions are of particular interest given both the spread of democracy and the emergence of autocracies with multiparty elections for the executive and legislature as the modal form of authoritarianism. To answer these questions, we examine temporal dynamics in aid flows before and after transitions to multiparty elections and the strategic allocation of aid rewards to specific sectors depending upon electoral competition and substantive improvements in governance and political rights. We find that, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral and multilateral donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes while also rewarding substantive improvements in governance and political rights. Sector specific analyses reveal that multiparty elections are rewarded with greater democracy aid and economic aid in both democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the quality of elections matters: the adoption of democratic elections receives greater aid gains than the adoption of authoritarian elections.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • THRESHOLDS: A MODEL OF RELIGIOUS GOVERNANCE AND EVOLUTION
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 19 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Mario Ferrero
      Religious organizations set thresholds of belief and behavior required of their members. In a simple model of individual religious behavior, this paper shows that if a religion denies the benefits of membership to those who fall short of the threshold, it stands to gain an increase in compliance with its rules by forcing members to the edge of defection, hence the incentive to set the thresholds strategically. When members’ compliance costs are private information, the model yields several regimes: a pooling contract if costs are close enough to each other, a separating contract if costs are different enough, and an expulsion solution if the proportion of high-cost types in the total membership is too low. Changes in costs and in membership composition trigger changes in thresholds and switches between regimes, thus providing a model of religious governance and evolution. We then review the history of sectarianism in the three monotheistic religions and show that the model can help account for the basic differences between them as well as explain the historical evolution of dogmas and behavioral rules within each of them. A specialized case study focuses on the evolution of Catholic religious orders.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Public opinion and the political economy of educational reforms: A survey
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 4 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Marius R. Busemeyer, Philipp Lergetporer, Ludger Woessmann
      In the political economy of education policy, interactions between policymakers and public opinion can create discrepancies between political awareness and action. While a large literature studies public opinion on different aspects of the welfare state, research has only recently started to investigate the public’s attitudes towards education policy. We survey this emerging literature with a particular focus on public preferences for education spending in different sociodemographic subgroups, policy trade-offs, support for specific education reforms, and the importance of information for public preferences. While the available evidence is multifaceted, there is some general indication that citizens place high priority on education policy, show substantial willingness to reform, and are responsive to information and adequate reform designs.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
       
  • Altruistic Punishment in Elections
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 3 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Jason A. Aimone, Luigi Butera, Thomas Stratmann
      Altruistic punishment is a fundamental driver for cooperation in human interactions. In this paper, we expand our understanding of this form of pro-social behavior to help explain a puzzle of voting: why do individuals who are indifferent between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate when voting is costly' Using a simple voting experiment, we provide robust evidence that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting is costly and the voter has no monetary stake in the election outcome. In our sample, and in a robustness check through Monte Carlo simulation, we show that at least fourteen percent of individuals are willing to incur a cost to vote against candidates who broke their electoral promises, even when they have no pecuniary interest in the election outcome.

      PubDate: 2017-08-03T21:00:12Z
       
  • Who are the ‘ghost’ MPs' Evidence from the French
           Parliament
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 3 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Nicolas Gavoille
      This paper studies the characteristics of the ghost deputies of the French National Assembly, i.e. deputies who do not have any official recorded activity over a whole year. Using a rich dataset providing various information about all deputies from 1959 to 2012, the results indicate that the typical ghost deputy is an old man with a low level of schooling, member of a large party which does not support the government and who is elected in jurisdiction with a low level of political competition. However, personal characteristics are less and less correlated with performance over the years. Finally, ghost deputies face more difficulties to achieve reelection, but are penalized only at the first round, voters exclusively considering national factors at the second round.

      PubDate: 2017-08-03T21:00:12Z
       
  • “Mind the Gap'” Rising Income Inequality and Individual
           Trade Policy Preferences
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Quynh Nguyen
      How does rising income inequality affect individual attitudes toward international trade' While there exists a plethora of studies on the interlinkages between international trade and income inequality, the existing literature on individual trade policy preferences has not considered the role of inequality in shaping public opinion about international trade. By bringing these two separate strands of literature together, this study examines whether citizens associate income disparities with trade liberalization and, if so, how this linkage affects their attitudes toward international trade. Using data from a population-based survey-embedded experiment, this study identifies two key findings. First, individuals draw a link between skewed income distribution trends and international trade. Second, the perceived linkage between rising income inequality and trade liberalization is disconnected from the formation of trade policy preferences. These findings suggest that the association between rising income inequality and trade liberalization does not automatically lead citizens to endorse protectionist trade measures not because they are ignorant about the distributional effects of international trade. Rather, citizens fail to connect income inequality to foreign trade policy, because they may not perceive trade-induced inequality as unfair.

      PubDate: 2017-08-03T21:00:12Z
       
  • Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 27 July 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Henry W. Chappell, Rob Roy McGregor
      Many central banks now publish transcripts or summaries of meeting discussions and record policy preferences of individual members of policymaking committees. We present an econometric model of committee decisions for Sweden's Riksbank that uses individual preference data pooled over committee members and meetings. Estimates indicate that members attach a small weight to their own preferences when voting; instead, members tend to defer to the perceived committee consensus. These results contrast with some previous findings that members deferred to the committee chairman when voting.

      PubDate: 2017-08-03T21:00:12Z
       
  • Market and Political Power Interactions in Greece: A Theory
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 14 July 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Tryphon Kollintzas, Dimitris Papageorgiou, Vanghelis Vassilatos
      In this paper, we develop a neoclassical growth model of market and political power interactions that captures the main features of the economic and political system of Greece and explains the weak economic growth of Greece in the last forty years. The model incorporates the insiders-outsiders labor market structure and the concept of an elite government. Outsiders form a group of workers that supply labor to a competitive private sector. And, insiders form a group of workers that enjoy market power in supplying labor to the public sector and influence the policy decisions of government, including those that affect the development and maintenance of public sector infrastructures. This leads to labor misallocation and inefficient fiscal policies. Thus, even though expanding public sector output has a positive effect on growth, eventually this is counterbalanced by the labor misallocation and inefficient tax policy outcomes leading to a growth reversal phenomenon. The model proposed in this paper may be applicable to other countries that have a similar politicoeconomic structure with Greece, namely other Southern European countries.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Retirement, consumption of political information, and political knowledge
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 14 July 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Marcel Garz
      Democratic societies depend on citizens being informed about candidates and representatives, to allow for optimal voting and political accountability. As the Fourth Estate, news media have a crucial role in this context. However, due to selective exposure, media bias, and endogeneity it is not a priori clear if news consumption increases voter information. Focusing on the increase in leisure time that is associated with retirement, this study investigates whether changes in the consumption of political information affect campaign-related knowledge. For that purpose, I use survey data pertaining to the 2000, 2004, and 2008 US presidential elections. Instrumenting with eligibility for old age benefits, the results show that retirement improves respondents’ performance in answering knowledge questions. The effect is mostly driven by additional exposure to newscasts and newspapers. There is also evidence of increasing polarization due to retirement.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Do equalization payments affect subnational borrowing' Evidence from
           regression discontinuity
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 July 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Monika Köppl–Turyna, Hans Pitlik
      According to the fiscal federalism literature, subcentral budget constraints become softer when local governments are more dependent on revenues over which they have no discretion. As a consequence of ‘transfer dependency’, subcentral governments can expect to be bailed out by the central government and therefore tend to accumulate higher levels of debt. We test this conjecture with data from Austrian municipalities. In fiscal terms, Austria is a highly centralized federation in which tax autonomy at the municipal level is rather weak. Our identification strategy is based on a discontinuity caused by the unique regulation of population weights in the tax-sharing agreement between central government and the municipalities. Our results indicate that, in line with theoretical expectations, municipalities with higher revenue dependency are responsible for higher net borrowing per capita. The size of the additional borrowing effect equals to about 5% of average municipal debt. We also find that almost one half of the observed discontinuity works through an investment channel.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • The political economy of policy reform
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): George Economides, Arye L. Hillman, Apostolis Philippopoulos


      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Are OECD policy recommendations for public sector reform biased against
           welfare states' Evidence from a new database
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): Andreas Bergh, Margareta Dackehag, Martin Rode
      Policy advice by the OECD has long been at the heart of academic debates on welfare state reform, with frequent claims questioning the ideological orientation of recommendations. This paper constructs an indicator of perceived reform need for 24 countries, quantifying the policy advice contained in the OECD Economic Surveys around 1985, 1995, and 2005. These recommendations describe a policy consensus that is based on competition, work incentives, monetary reform, fiscal discipline, and labor market reform. Empirically, perceived need for reform is well explained by preceding levels of economic freedom. In particular, countries with more government intervention, lower property rights protection, and more regulation are perceived to have a bigger reform need. In turn, perceived reform need has no explanatory power for subsequent changes in social expenditure and welfare state entitlements. Only in countries with right wing governments, perceived reform need might be followed by marginal reductions in welfare state entitlements, but definitely not in social expenditure.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Ready to reform: How popular initiatives can be successful
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): Katharina E. Hofer, Christian Marti, Monika Bütler
      We study whether the number of signatures collected to qualify a popular initiative affects the probability of reforming the status quo. The initiative process is modeled as a sequential game under uncertainty: petitioners make an entry decision and collect signatures to qualify the initiative. Politicians decide about a political compromise – a counter proposal – after which petitioners have the option to withdraw the initiative before the vote. In equilibrium, politicians infer the initiative's popularity from the number of signatures and collection time. The more the initiative is perceived as a threat to the status quo, the more likely politicians come up with a counter proposal. Under certain conditions, petitioners have the incentive to collect more signatures than required for qualification to demonstrate high success probability. We test model predictions using the data set of all Swiss constitutional initiatives at the federal level between 1891 and 2010. Overall, we find supporting evidence for the model mechanisms. Fast signature collection is associated with a higher probability of reform. The effect is mediated through a higher probability of provoking a counter proposal. Ultimately, counter proposals are key to amending the status quo. Restricting the signature collection time reduces the informative mechanism of the signature collection process considerably.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Macroeconomic effects of structural reforms and fiscal consolidations:
           Trade-offs and complementarities
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): Dimitris Papageorgiou, Evangelia Vourvachaki
      This paper studies the impact of product and labour market structural reforms and the effects of their joint implementation with alternative debt consolidation strategies. The set-up is a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated for the Greek economy. The results show that structural reforms produce important long-run GDP gains that materialize earlier, the faster the reforms are implemented. When implemented jointly with fiscal consolidations, structural reforms may amplify the short-run costs of fiscal tightening. The GDP dynamics depend on the fiscal instrument used for public debt consolidation. In the long run, however, there are complementarity gains irrespective of the fiscal instrument used.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Tuition fees: User prices and private incentives
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): George Economides, Apostolis Philippopoulos, Stelios Sakkas
      This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of introducing tuition fees for public education services into a tax system with income and consumption taxes. The setup is a neoclassical growth model where agents differ in capital holdings. We show that the introduction of tuition fees (a) improves individual incentives to work and/or save and (b) can be both efficient and equitable. The focus is on the role of tuition fees as an extra price and how this affects private incentives.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • A large scale OLG model for the analysis of the redistributive effects of
           policy reforms
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): Alessandro Bucciol, Laura Cavalli, Igor Fedotenkov, Paolo Pertile, Veronica Polin, Nicola Sartor, Alessandro Sommacal
      The paper presents a large scale overlapping generation model with heterogeneous agents, where the household is the decision unit. We calibrate the model for three European countries – France, Italy and Sweden – which show marked differences in the design of some public programmes. We examine the properties in terms of annual and life cycle redistribution of a number of tax-benefit programmes, by studying the impact of removing from our model economies some or all of them. We find that whether one considers a life cycle or an annual horizon, and whether behavioural responses are accounted for or not, has a large impact on the results. The model may provide useful insights for policy makers on which kind of reforms are more likely to achieve specific equity objectives.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Reforming the public administration: The role of crisis and the power of
           bureaucracy
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): Zareh Asatryan, Friedrich Heinemann, Hans Pitlik
      The need to balance austerity with growth policies has put government efficiency high on the economic policy agenda in Europe. Administrative reforms that boost the internal efficiency of bureaucracy can alleviate the trade-off between consolidation and public service provision. Against such a backdrop, this paper constructs (and makes available) a novel reform indicator to explore the determinants of public administration reforms for a panel of EU countries. The findings support political-economic reasoning: An economic and fiscal crisis is a potent catalyst for reforms, but a powerful bureaucracy constrains the opportunities of a crisis to promote reform. Furthermore, there is some suggestive evidence for horizontal learning from other EU countries, and for vertical learning associated with a particular type of EU cohesion spending.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Explaining changes in tax burdens in Latin America: Do politics trump
           economics'
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): Mark Hallerberg, Carlos Scartascini
      This paper examines whether elections, which are generally held on fixed dates, and banking crises explain the timing of tax reforms and the allocation of the additional tax burden. Using an original fine-grained data set of tax reforms, the paper finds support for the role of these two sources of variation. In particular, the probability of reform is higher during banking crises. During electoral periods, increasing taxes becomes highly unlikely, even if the government is facing financing problems. Interestingly, politics seem to trump economics: banking crises do not affect the probability of having a reform during electoral times. Moreover, the presence of an IMF program affects the tax instruments chosen: countries with a program increase the value-added tax, while those without raise the personal income tax. Finally, the ideology of the president does not explain who bears the additional tax burden.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • Support for free-market policies and reforms: Does the field of study
           influence students' political attitudes'
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): Mira Fischer, Björn Kauder, Niklas Potrafke, Heinrich W. Ursprung
      Since opinion leaders are usually university graduates, the field of study has an influence on public support for economic policies and policy reforms intended to enhance efficiency because advocating such policies often requires appreciation of the beneficial roles of markets and economic freedom. We investigate whether the field of study influences German university students' political attitudes. We disentangle self-selection from learning effects and reveal systematic differences between incoming students' political attitudes across eight fields of study. In a second step we explore how the students' political attitudes change as they progress in their academic training. Only studying economics has an unambiguous pro-market influence on political attitudes: by the time of graduation, economics students are some 6.2 percentage points more likely than they were in their initial year of study to agree with free-market policy positions. Studying humanities and natural sciences has a pro-leftist influence.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
       
  • The Dynamics of Political Party Support and Egocentric Economic
           Evaluations: the Scottish Case
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 23 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Georgios Marios Chrysanthou, María Dolores Guilló
      We explore the dynamics of the Scottish National Party (SNP) support using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) during 1999-06. We study the relative importance of political sentiments and egocentric economic evaluations by disentangling the effects of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by gender. Egocentric economic evaluations constitute an important determinant of SNP support over the entire period, being this effect stronger among the male electorate. The results are consistent with the electors holding the incumbent Labour Party accountable for their personal financial situation, though financial security augments the nationalist propensity among partisan voters. Furthermore, retrospective economic evaluations form a significant determinant of incumbent Labour Party support in both the 1999-02 and 2003-06 intervening electoral cycles.

      PubDate: 2017-07-03T07:43:40Z
       
  • Populism and Institutional Capture
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Nicholas Chesterley, Paolo Roberti
      This paper analyzes the relationship between populism and institutional capture. Populist politicians provide voters with a utility boom followed by a subsequent bust. Non-populists provide a constant level of utility. Once elected, however, politicians of both types are able to seize control of institutions to ensure their re-election. We show that in equilibrium, populist politicians may capture institutions to avoid being voted out of power during the bust: non-populists do not. Voters rationally elect a populist if voters discount the future sufficiently or if it is too costly for the populist to seize control of institutions. Unfortunately, both types of politician may prefer not to strengthen institutions, either to allow their capture or to discourage the election of the populist.

      PubDate: 2017-06-22T11:33:33Z
       
  • (Un-)Intended Effects of Fiscal Rules
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 16 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Heiko T. Burret, Lars P. Feld
      The paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules’ coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the following: First, fiscal rules reduce public deficits. The effect is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt brakes exhibit some unintended effects, i.e., an evasion into unconstrained accounts, emphasizing the importance of constraining all accounts. Third, the existence of political budget cycles depends on the institutional context, i.e., the timing of elections and the presence of debt brakes. Fifth, cantonal debt brakes dampen the fiscal deterioration during unexpected deficit shocks by more rapid fiscal adjustments.

      PubDate: 2017-06-22T11:33:33Z
       
  • Immigration, Assimilation, and the Future of Public Education
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Ryuichi Tanaka, Lidia Farre, Francesc Ortega
      This paper analyzes the effects of immigration on the size and quality of public education using a quantitative political economy model that allows for a heterogeneous immigrant population. Our analysis distinguishes between short and long-run effects and accounts for the consequences of naturalization and assimilation. We use the model to analyze Spain's large 2000-2008 immigration wave. We find that immigration led to a 15% increase in public enrollment in the short run, together with a 3% reduction in public education spending and almost a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of native households using private schools. Depending on the eventual degree of assimilation, these trends will be greatly intensified or mitigated once immigrants naturalize and gain the right to vote. Our analysis suggests that assimilation in terms of family size and the value assigned to children's education are the most relevant dimensions quantitatively. We also show that immigration policies that favor one group over another can significantly alter the overall effects of immigration on the schooling system.

      PubDate: 2017-06-12T11:06:30Z
       
  • Breaking the norms: When is evading inheritance taxes socially
           acceptable?
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 May 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Martin Abraham, Kerstin Lorek, Friedemann Richter, Matthias Wrede
      Using the example of inheritance tax, we examine the relationship between the structure of the tax and the strength of the social tax compliance norm. Based on the assumption that deviation from a legal norm is the more accepted the less its underlying principles are jeopardized, we argue that violating the tax compliance norm is socially justifiable if revenue requirements as well as equity and efficiency tax principles are not infringed upon by the evasion. Building on the literature on tax evasion, optimal inheritance taxation, and family economics, we hypothesize that a large non-declared amount of transfer and a high liquidity of the transferred asset decrease the acceptability of inheritance tax evasion and that both a high degree of kinship and young age of the heir increase the acceptance of evasion. Utilizing an experimental design embedded in a survey on the acceptance of inheritance tax evasion conducted in Germany in 2012, we confirm these hypotheses empirically.

      PubDate: 2017-05-23T10:11:52Z
       
  • Active and Passive Corruption: Theory and Evidence
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 19 May 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Salvatore Capasso, Lodovico Santoro
      Focusing on the idea that a different allocation of bargaining power between the public official and the private agent can explain the emergence of two types of corruption, this paper develops a theoretical model which provides an account of different level of bribes and incentives when the bargaining power is in the hands of the official (active corruption) or in the hands of the private agent (passive corruption). By employing Italian data which explicitly differentiate between active and passive corruption, the paper empirically re-examines the determinants of the aggregate level corruption. The results show that the various categories of government expenditure, which proxy different allocations of bargaining power, differently affect active and passive corruption.

      PubDate: 2017-05-23T10:11:52Z
       
  • Polity age and political budget cycles: Evidence from a Danish municipal
           reform
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 15 May 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Lasse Aaskoven
      Incumbent incentive for competence-signaling and lack of voter information are generally thought to be factors that increase the prevalence of political budget cycles. These mechanisms should be more prevalent in new political units. Since the creation of new political units is rarely exogenous, however, serious endogeneity issues would be an issue for empirical studies of this subject. To overcome these problems, I use a Danish local government reform—which amalgamated some (but not all) Danish municipalities, thereby creating new political units—in a way that is arguably quasi-experimental to study whether political budget cycles are larger in new political units. Contrary to theoretical predictions, political budget cycles seem to be of a smaller scale in the new municipalities, but only regarding budget cycles in budgetary overruns. The findings are of wider interest for discussions the mechanisms behind context-conditional political budget cycles.

      PubDate: 2017-05-17T22:03:08Z
       
  • Political Cycles and Corruption in Russian Regions
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 8 May 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Oleg Sidorkin, Dmitriy Vorobyev
      It has been established that opportunistic incumbent politicians, both elected and appointed, adjust public policies in systematic ways over political cycles. We show that the corrupt behavior of appointed politicians also follows certain patterns which are driven by political cycles. Based on BEEPS data, exploiting variation in the dates of surveys and in the starting dates of Russian regional governors' terms of office, we find that corruption levels, as perceived by firms operating in different regions of Russia, are higher closer to the end of a regional governor's term. We argue that such a pattern cannot be explained by standard political budget cycle reasoning, but rather that the observed pattern may be generated by governors' accumulation of private information about their likelihood of remaining in office for another term. When a governor gradually learns that he will not be re-appointed once his current term has expired, he has increasing incentives to engage in corrupt activities in order to accumulate wealth before his departure. Alternatively, when a governor becomes more certain that he will remain in office, he may have higher incentives to smooth rent extraction over time and thus not to increase it. We test this explanation in several ways and consistently find supporting evidence.

      PubDate: 2017-05-12T21:54:05Z
       
  • Finance and income inequality: A review and new evidence
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 23 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm
      Using a panel fixed effects model for a sample of 121 countries covering 1975–2005, we examine how financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises are related to income inequality. In contrast with most previous work, our results suggest that all finance variables increase income inequality. The level of financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on inequality. Also the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality, in contrast to the quality of economic institutions. Our main findings are robust for using random effects, cross-country regressions and legal origin as instrument for financial development.

      PubDate: 2017-04-25T21:15:16Z
       
  • Untying the Motives of Giving Grants vs. Loans
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 18 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Khusrav Gaibulloev, Javed Younas
      The aid allocation literature has assumed that two forms of aid flows – grants and concessional loans – are determined identically. Its findings reflect average behavioral patterns based on an aggregate of these two distinct transfer types. This analysis shows that the past findings generally apply to grants but not to concessional loans. In particular, the amount of grants decreases with income, whereas the amount of concessional loans increases with income. However, donors increase both grants and loans to politically aligned administrations during election years irrespective of recipients’ income level. Other econometric issues such as endogeneity of income and cross-sectional dependence are taken into account.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Mind the Gap: Disparity in Redistributive Preference between Political
           Elites and the Public in China
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 18 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Weihua An, Maoliang Ye
      In this research, we emphasize the importance of studying the gap in redistributive preference between political elites and the public because of the strategic roles played by the former in policy processes. We use China as a case study, wherein the fulfillment of surging demands for redistribution is largely dependent on whether or not the political elites will advocate for redistribution. Using data from the Chinese General Social Survey, we find that the political elites prefer significantly less progressive taxation and less redistributive expenditure than the public. The gap in redistributive preference is larger on the expenditure side than on the taxation side. Moreover, the causes of the gap appear to vary by the measures for redistribution. Accounting for covariate differences fully explains the gap in preference for progressive taxation, but not the gap in preference for redistributive expenditure.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Social mobility at the top and the higher education system
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 15 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Elise S. Brezis, Joël Hellier
      This paper relates social mobility and social stratification to the structure of higher education. We develop an intergenerational model which shows that a two-tier higher education characterised by a division between elite and standard universities can be a key factor in generating permanent social stratification, social immobility and self-reproduction of the ‘elite’. In our approach, low mobility at the top is essentially explained by the differences in quality and in selection between elite and standard universities. A key result is that the wider the quality gap and the difference in per-student expenditures between elite and standard universities, the less social mobility. This is because a larger quality gap reinforces the weight of family backgrounds at the expense of personal ability. Our simulations show that this impact can be large. These findings provide theoretical bases for the differences in social mobility at the top observed between advanced countries.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Paola Conconi, Nicolas Sahuguet, Maurizio Zanardi
      One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, almost never fight each other. Recent empirical findings show that binding term limits invalidate this result: democratic dyads in which at least one country imposes term limits on the executive are as conflict prone as autocratic and mixed dyads. Moreover, in democracies with two-term limits conflicts are more likely during the executive's second term. To rationalize these findings, we model international relations as a repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We show that the fear of losing office makes democratic leaders less willing to start costly conflicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can run for re-election. Term limits thus make it harder to sustain peaceful relations.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral
           selection
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 12 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Yukihiro Yazaki
      This paper examines how bureaucracy affects political accountability and electoral selection, using a three-tier political agency model consisting of voters, politicians and bureaucrats. In the model’s hierarchy, politicians are constrained by elections while bureaucrats are controlled by budgets. If voters and bureaucrats prefer different types of politicians (i.e. they have a conflict of interests), incumbents pass oversized budgets to prevent bureaucrats from engaging in strategic behaviours that damage incumbents’ reputations. If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type of politicians (i.e. they have an alignment of interests), bureaucrats cannot obtain a concession from politicians. In the latter case, however, bureaucrats send voters a credible signal regarding an incumbent’s type, which improves electoral selection. This paper also shows that political appointment systems improve political accountability in the conflict-of-interests case while they weaken electoral selection in the alignment-of-interests case.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Do Fiscal Rules Constrain Fiscal Policy? A Meta-Regression-Analysis
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 12 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Friedrich Heinemann, Marc-Daniel Moessinger, Mustafa Yeter
      We implement a meta-regression-analysis for the budgetary impact of numerical fiscal rules based on 30 studies published in the last decade. The existing empirical evidence points to a constraining effect of rules on fiscal aggregates. However, this seemingly optimistic message is strongly weakened as our analysis points to a bias if the potential endogeneity of fiscal rules is not explicitly taken into account. Furthermore, our analysis provides evidence for the presence of a publication bias. Both sources of bias reduce the statistical precision of obtained effects below usual levels of statistical significance. In addition, we offer suggestive evidence for the effect size based on a small coherent sub-sample and provide recommendations for future research on the budgetary impact of fiscal rules.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Globalization and the Decline in Labor Shares: Exploring the Relationship
           beyond Trade and Financial Flows
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Andrew T. Young, Maria Y. Tackett
      We employ data from up to 125 countries during the 1970–2009 period to explore the relationship between globalization and labor share. Existing studies report a negative relationship between trade and investment flows and labor shares. While we also find that economic flows are often negatively related to labor shares, measures of social globalization tend to be positively related to labor shares. While greater mobility of goods and capital may be associated with increases in capital's bargaining power, all else equal, greater flows of information, ideas, and people may increase the bargaining power of workers.

      PubDate: 2017-04-11T20:42:10Z
       
 
 
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