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  Subjects -> POLITICAL SCIENCE (Total: 880 journals)
    - CIVIL RIGHTS (10 journals)
    - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (101 journals)
    - POLITICAL SCIENCE (746 journals)
    - POLITICAL SCIENCES: GENERAL (23 journals)

POLITICAL SCIENCE (746 journals)                  1 2 3 4 | Last

Showing 1 - 200 of 281 Journals sorted alphabetically
A Contracorriente     Open Access  
Ab Imperio     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Acta Borealia: A Nordic Journal of Circumpolar Societies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Acta Politica Estica     Open Access  
Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies     Open Access  
Administrative Science Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 143)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
AFFRIKA Journal of Politics, Economics and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Africa Conflict Monitor     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Africa Insight     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Africa Institute Occasional Paper     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Africa Renewal     Free   (Followers: 5)
Africa Review : Journal of the African Studies Association of India     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Africa Today     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
African Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 59)
African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
African Diaspora     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
African East-Asian Affairs     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
African Identities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
African Journal of Democracy and Governance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
African Journal of Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
African Renaissance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
African Yearbook of Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Africanus     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Afrique contemporaine : La revue de l'Afrique et du développement     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Agenda Política     Open Access  
Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Agrarian South : Journal of Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Alternatives : Global, Local, Political     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Altre Modernità     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
América Latina Hoy     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
American Communist History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
American Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 251)
American Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 209)
American Political Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
American Politics Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
American Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
Anacronismo e Irrupción     Open Access  
Analecta política     Open Access  
Análise Social     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annales UMCS, Politologia     Open Access  
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Annual Review of Economics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 30)
Annual Review of Political Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 132)
AQ - Australian Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Arabian Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Arctic Review on Law and Politics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Arena Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 14)
Asia Minor Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Asia Policy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Asia-Pacific Journal : Japan Focus     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Asia-Pacific Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Asian Affairs: An American Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Asian Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Asian Politics and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
AUDEM : The International Journal of Higher Education and Democracy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Aurora. Revista de Arte, Mídia e Política     Open Access  
Australasian Review of African Studies, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Australian Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Australian Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Austrian Journal of Political Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Balcanica Posnaniensia Acta et studia     Open Access  
Baltic Journal of European Studies     Open Access  
Bandung : Journal of the Global South     Open Access  
Basic Income Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Beleid en Maatschappij     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
BMC International Health and Human Rights     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Brazilian Political Science Review     Open Access  
Brésil(s)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
British Journal of Canadian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
British Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 142)
British Journal of Politics and International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
British Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
British Review of New Zealand Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity     Open Access   (Followers: 48)
Bulletin d'histoire politique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bustan     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Cadernos de Estudos Sociais e Políticos     Open Access  
CADUS - Revista de Estudos de Política, História e Cultura     Open Access  
Cahiers de l'Urmis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cahiers de Sciences politiques de l'ULg     Open Access  
California Journal of Politics and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Cambio 16     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Cambridge Review of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Caucasus Survey     Hybrid Journal  
Central and Eastern European Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Central Asian Affairs     Hybrid Journal  
Central Banking     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Central European Journal of Public Policy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
China : An International Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
China perspectives     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
China Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
China Report     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
China Review International     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
China-EU Law Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Chinese Journal of Global Governance     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Chinese Journal of International Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Chinese Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Cittadinanza Europea (LA)     Full-text available via subscription  
Civil Wars     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union     Open Access  
Class, Race and Corporate Power     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cold War History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Communication, Politics & Culture     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Communist and Post-Communist Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Comparative Political Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 139)
Comparative Politics (Russia)     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Comparative Strategy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Competition & Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Conferences on New Political Economy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Confines     Open Access  
Conflict and Society     Full-text available via subscription  
Conflict Management and Peace Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Conflict Trends     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Conflict, Security & Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 354)
Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Conjunctions. Transdisciplinary Journal of Cultural Participation     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Contemporary Italian Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Contemporary Japan     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Contemporary Journal of African Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 33)
Contemporary Review of the Middle East     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Contemporary Security Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Contemporary Wales     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Contenciosa     Open Access  
Contexto Internacional     Open Access  
Cooperation and Conflict     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
CQ Researcher     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
CQ Weekly     Full-text available via subscription  
Criterio Jurídico     Open Access  
Critical Asian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Critical Review : A Journal of Politics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Critical Reviews on Latin American Research     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Critical Social Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32)
Critical Studies on Terrorism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Cuadernos de historia de España     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultura de Paz     Open Access  
Cultural Critique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Culture Mandala : The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies     Open Access  
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Decolonization : Indigeneity, Education & Society     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Defence Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Defense & Security Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Democracy & Education     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
Democratic Communiqué     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Democratic Theory     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Democratization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31)
Democrazia e diritto     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Demokratie und Geschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Der Donauraum     Hybrid Journal  
Der Staat     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Desafíos     Open Access  
Development and Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 45)
Digest of Middle East Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Diplomacy & Statecraft     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Diplomatic History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Dissent     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Diversité urbaine     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
East European Jewish Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
East European Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Economia Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
Ecopolítica     Open Access  
eJournal of eDemocracy and Open Government     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
El Cotidiano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Electoral Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Em Pauta : Teoria Social e Realidade Contemporânea     Open Access  
Encuentro     Open Access  
Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Equal Opportunities International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Espacios Públicos     Open Access  
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudos Avançados     Open Access  
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Ethics & Global Politics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal  
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Études internationales     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Eureka Street     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Europe's World     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Integration Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
European Journal of American Culture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
European Journal of Government and Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
European Journal of International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 50)
European Journal of Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
European Journal of Political Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 65)

        1 2 3 4 | Last

Journal Cover European Journal of Political Economy
  [SJR: 0.956]   [H-I: 54]   [43 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 0176-2680
   Published by Elsevier Homepage  [3042 journals]
  • The Dynamics of Political Party Support and Egocentric Economic
           Evaluations: the Scottish Case
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 23 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Georgios Marios Chrysanthou, María Dolores Guilló
      We explore the dynamics of the Scottish National Party (SNP) support using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) during 1999-06. We study the relative importance of political sentiments and egocentric economic evaluations by disentangling the effects of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by gender. Egocentric economic evaluations constitute an important determinant of SNP support over the entire period, being this effect stronger among the male electorate. The results are consistent with the electors holding the incumbent Labour Party accountable for their personal financial situation, though financial security augments the nationalist propensity among partisan voters. Furthermore, retrospective economic evaluations form a significant determinant of incumbent Labour Party support in both the 1999-02 and 2003-06 intervening electoral cycles.

      PubDate: 2017-07-03T07:43:40Z
       
  • Populism and Institutional Capture
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Nicholas Chesterley, Paolo Roberti
      This paper analyzes the relationship between populism and institutional capture. Populist politicians provide voters with a utility boom followed by a subsequent bust. Non-populists provide a constant level of utility. Once elected, however, politicians of both types are able to seize control of institutions to ensure their re-election. We show that in equilibrium, populist politicians may capture institutions to avoid being voted out of power during the bust: non-populists do not. Voters rationally elect a populist if voters discount the future sufficiently or if it is too costly for the populist to seize control of institutions. Unfortunately, both types of politician may prefer not to strengthen institutions, either to allow their capture or to discourage the election of the populist.

      PubDate: 2017-06-22T11:33:33Z
       
  • (Un-)Intended Effects of Fiscal Rules
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 16 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Heiko T. Burret, Lars P. Feld
      The paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules’ coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the following: First, fiscal rules reduce public deficits. The effect is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt brakes exhibit some unintended effects, i.e., an evasion into unconstrained accounts, emphasizing the importance of constraining all accounts. Third, the existence of political budget cycles depends on the institutional context, i.e., the timing of elections and the presence of debt brakes. Fifth, cantonal debt brakes dampen the fiscal deterioration during unexpected deficit shocks by more rapid fiscal adjustments.

      PubDate: 2017-06-22T11:33:33Z
       
  • Immigration, Assimilation, and the Future of Public Education
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Ryuichi Tanaka, Lidia Farre, Francesc Ortega
      This paper analyzes the effects of immigration on the size and quality of public education using a quantitative political economy model that allows for a heterogeneous immigrant population. Our analysis distinguishes between short and long-run effects and accounts for the consequences of naturalization and assimilation. We use the model to analyze Spain's large 2000-2008 immigration wave. We find that immigration led to a 15% increase in public enrollment in the short run, together with a 3% reduction in public education spending and almost a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of native households using private schools. Depending on the eventual degree of assimilation, these trends will be greatly intensified or mitigated once immigrants naturalize and gain the right to vote. Our analysis suggests that assimilation in terms of family size and the value assigned to children's education are the most relevant dimensions quantitatively. We also show that immigration policies that favor one group over another can significantly alter the overall effects of immigration on the schooling system.

      PubDate: 2017-06-12T11:06:30Z
       
  • Breaking the norms: When is evading inheritance taxes socially
           acceptable?
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 May 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Martin Abraham, Kerstin Lorek, Friedemann Richter, Matthias Wrede
      Using the example of inheritance tax, we examine the relationship between the structure of the tax and the strength of the social tax compliance norm. Based on the assumption that deviation from a legal norm is the more accepted the less its underlying principles are jeopardized, we argue that violating the tax compliance norm is socially justifiable if revenue requirements as well as equity and efficiency tax principles are not infringed upon by the evasion. Building on the literature on tax evasion, optimal inheritance taxation, and family economics, we hypothesize that a large non-declared amount of transfer and a high liquidity of the transferred asset decrease the acceptability of inheritance tax evasion and that both a high degree of kinship and young age of the heir increase the acceptance of evasion. Utilizing an experimental design embedded in a survey on the acceptance of inheritance tax evasion conducted in Germany in 2012, we confirm these hypotheses empirically.

      PubDate: 2017-05-23T10:11:52Z
       
  • Active and Passive Corruption: Theory and Evidence
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 19 May 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Salvatore Capasso, Lodovico Santoro
      Focusing on the idea that a different allocation of bargaining power between the public official and the private agent can explain the emergence of two types of corruption, this paper develops a theoretical model which provides an account of different level of bribes and incentives when the bargaining power is in the hands of the official (active corruption) or in the hands of the private agent (passive corruption). By employing Italian data which explicitly differentiate between active and passive corruption, the paper empirically re-examines the determinants of the aggregate level corruption. The results show that the various categories of government expenditure, which proxy different allocations of bargaining power, differently affect active and passive corruption.

      PubDate: 2017-05-23T10:11:52Z
       
  • Polity age and political budget cycles: Evidence from a Danish municipal
           reform
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 15 May 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Lasse Aaskoven
      Incumbent incentive for competence-signaling and lack of voter information are generally thought to be factors that increase the prevalence of political budget cycles. These mechanisms should be more prevalent in new political units. Since the creation of new political units is rarely exogenous, however, serious endogeneity issues would be an issue for empirical studies of this subject. To overcome these problems, I use a Danish local government reform—which amalgamated some (but not all) Danish municipalities, thereby creating new political units—in a way that is arguably quasi-experimental to study whether political budget cycles are larger in new political units. Contrary to theoretical predictions, political budget cycles seem to be of a smaller scale in the new municipalities, but only regarding budget cycles in budgetary overruns. The findings are of wider interest for discussions the mechanisms behind context-conditional political budget cycles.

      PubDate: 2017-05-17T22:03:08Z
       
  • Political Cycles and Corruption in Russian Regions
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 8 May 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Oleg Sidorkin, Dmitriy Vorobyev
      It has been established that opportunistic incumbent politicians, both elected and appointed, adjust public policies in systematic ways over political cycles. We show that the corrupt behavior of appointed politicians also follows certain patterns which are driven by political cycles. Based on BEEPS data, exploiting variation in the dates of surveys and in the starting dates of Russian regional governors' terms of office, we find that corruption levels, as perceived by firms operating in different regions of Russia, are higher closer to the end of a regional governor's term. We argue that such a pattern cannot be explained by standard political budget cycle reasoning, but rather that the observed pattern may be generated by governors' accumulation of private information about their likelihood of remaining in office for another term. When a governor gradually learns that he will not be re-appointed once his current term has expired, he has increasing incentives to engage in corrupt activities in order to accumulate wealth before his departure. Alternatively, when a governor becomes more certain that he will remain in office, he may have higher incentives to smooth rent extraction over time and thus not to increase it. We test this explanation in several ways and consistently find supporting evidence.

      PubDate: 2017-05-12T21:54:05Z
       
  • Finance and income inequality: A review and new evidence
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 23 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm
      Using a panel fixed effects model for a sample of 121 countries covering 1975–2005, we examine how financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises are related to income inequality. In contrast with most previous work, our results suggest that all finance variables increase income inequality. The level of financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on inequality. Also the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality, in contrast to the quality of economic institutions. Our main findings are robust for using random effects, cross-country regressions and legal origin as instrument for financial development.

      PubDate: 2017-04-25T21:15:16Z
       
  • Untying the Motives of Giving Grants vs. Loans
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 18 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Khusrav Gaibulloev, Javed Younas
      The aid allocation literature has assumed that two forms of aid flows – grants and concessional loans – are determined identically. Its findings reflect average behavioral patterns based on an aggregate of these two distinct transfer types. This analysis shows that the past findings generally apply to grants but not to concessional loans. In particular, the amount of grants decreases with income, whereas the amount of concessional loans increases with income. However, donors increase both grants and loans to politically aligned administrations during election years irrespective of recipients’ income level. Other econometric issues such as endogeneity of income and cross-sectional dependence are taken into account.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Mind the Gap: Disparity in Redistributive Preference between Political
           Elites and the Public in China
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 18 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Weihua An, Maoliang Ye
      In this research, we emphasize the importance of studying the gap in redistributive preference between political elites and the public because of the strategic roles played by the former in policy processes. We use China as a case study, wherein the fulfillment of surging demands for redistribution is largely dependent on whether or not the political elites will advocate for redistribution. Using data from the Chinese General Social Survey, we find that the political elites prefer significantly less progressive taxation and less redistributive expenditure than the public. The gap in redistributive preference is larger on the expenditure side than on the taxation side. Moreover, the causes of the gap appear to vary by the measures for redistribution. Accounting for covariate differences fully explains the gap in preference for progressive taxation, but not the gap in preference for redistributive expenditure.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Social mobility at the top and the higher education system
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 15 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Elise S. Brezis, Joël Hellier
      This paper relates social mobility and social stratification to the structure of higher education. We develop an intergenerational model which shows that a two-tier higher education characterised by a division between elite and standard universities can be a key factor in generating permanent social stratification, social immobility and self-reproduction of the ‘elite’. In our approach, low mobility at the top is essentially explained by the differences in quality and in selection between elite and standard universities. A key result is that the wider the quality gap and the difference in per-student expenditures between elite and standard universities, the less social mobility. This is because a larger quality gap reinforces the weight of family backgrounds at the expense of personal ability. Our simulations show that this impact can be large. These findings provide theoretical bases for the differences in social mobility at the top observed between advanced countries.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Paola Conconi, Nicolas Sahuguet, Maurizio Zanardi
      One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, almost never fight each other. Recent empirical findings show that binding term limits invalidate this result: democratic dyads in which at least one country imposes term limits on the executive are as conflict prone as autocratic and mixed dyads. Moreover, in democracies with two-term limits conflicts are more likely during the executive's second term. To rationalize these findings, we model international relations as a repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We show that the fear of losing office makes democratic leaders less willing to start costly conflicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can run for re-election. Term limits thus make it harder to sustain peaceful relations.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral
           selection
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 12 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Yukihiro Yazaki
      This paper examines how bureaucracy affects political accountability and electoral selection, using a three-tier political agency model consisting of voters, politicians and bureaucrats. In the model’s hierarchy, politicians are constrained by elections while bureaucrats are controlled by budgets. If voters and bureaucrats prefer different types of politicians (i.e. they have a conflict of interests), incumbents pass oversized budgets to prevent bureaucrats from engaging in strategic behaviours that damage incumbents’ reputations. If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type of politicians (i.e. they have an alignment of interests), bureaucrats cannot obtain a concession from politicians. In the latter case, however, bureaucrats send voters a credible signal regarding an incumbent’s type, which improves electoral selection. This paper also shows that political appointment systems improve political accountability in the conflict-of-interests case while they weaken electoral selection in the alignment-of-interests case.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Do Fiscal Rules Constrain Fiscal Policy? A Meta-Regression-Analysis
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 12 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Friedrich Heinemann, Marc-Daniel Moessinger, Mustafa Yeter
      We implement a meta-regression-analysis for the budgetary impact of numerical fiscal rules based on 30 studies published in the last decade. The existing empirical evidence points to a constraining effect of rules on fiscal aggregates. However, this seemingly optimistic message is strongly weakened as our analysis points to a bias if the potential endogeneity of fiscal rules is not explicitly taken into account. Furthermore, our analysis provides evidence for the presence of a publication bias. Both sources of bias reduce the statistical precision of obtained effects below usual levels of statistical significance. In addition, we offer suggestive evidence for the effect size based on a small coherent sub-sample and provide recommendations for future research on the budgetary impact of fiscal rules.

      PubDate: 2017-04-19T21:06:22Z
       
  • Globalization and the Decline in Labor Shares: Exploring the Relationship
           beyond Trade and Financial Flows
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Andrew T. Young, Maria Y. Tackett
      We employ data from up to 125 countries during the 1970–2009 period to explore the relationship between globalization and labor share. Existing studies report a negative relationship between trade and investment flows and labor shares. While we also find that economic flows are often negatively related to labor shares, measures of social globalization tend to be positively related to labor shares. While greater mobility of goods and capital may be associated with increases in capital's bargaining power, all else equal, greater flows of information, ideas, and people may increase the bargaining power of workers.

      PubDate: 2017-04-11T20:42:10Z
       
  • The Protestant Ethic and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Religious
           Minorities in the Former Holy Roman Empire
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 9 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Luca Nunziata, Lorenzo Rocco
      We investigate the effect of Protestantism versus Catholicism on the decision to become an entrepreneur in former Holy Roman Empire regions. Our research design exploits religious minorities' strong attachment to religious ethic and the predetermined historical determination of religious minorities' geographical distribution in the 1500s as a result of the “cuius regio eius religio” (whose realm, his religion) rule. We find that today Protestantism increases the probability to be an entrepreneur by around 5 percentage points with respect to Catholicism, a result that survives to a battery of robustness checks. We explicit the assumptions underlying the identification strategy and provide an extensive testing of their validity by making use of several European datasets.

      PubDate: 2017-04-11T20:42:10Z
       
  • Do Ideology Movements and Legal Intervention Matter: A Synthetic Control
           Analysis of the Chongqing Model
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 April 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Yang Zhou
      Institutions have a fundamental influence on the economic performance of a regime. Among the various aspects of institutions, ideology and the legal system are two important ones. Chongqing Municipality, a province-level region in China, experienced such a combination with a unique leader from late 2007 to early 2012. This paper investigates, via the Synthetic Control Method, the economic performance of Chongqing in the last 13 years. In particular, it discusses the impact of the red ideology movements and legal intervention undertaken by Bo Xilai. The results reveal that although his economic policies promoted the Chongqing economy, the Maoist political policies advocated by Bo partially undermined its economic growth in the short run.

      PubDate: 2017-04-04T20:33:22Z
       
  • Introduction to the EJPE special issue on “The Political Economy of
           Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies”
    • Abstract: Publication date: March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 47
      Author(s): Ansgar Belke, Daniel Gros


      PubDate: 2017-03-29T05:03:27Z
       
  • Regime switches under policy uncertainty in monetary unions
    • Abstract: Publication date: March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 47
      Author(s): Paolo Canofari, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
      This paper analyzes the effects of policy uncertainty on the stability of a monetary union. Focusing on peripheral countries, we study how uncertainty over the consequences of a possible exit affects regime switches. Applying game theory and a cost-benefit analysis, we model a regime switch as the endogenous result of a two-stage policy game. We find that the effects of uncertainty are not trivial. Unilateral exits are less probable, but contagion is more likely to be observed. Our results are driven by two opposite forces: a traditional conservative effect induced by policy uncertainty in a single policymaker framework, which calls for more stability, and a strategic effect, arising from the strategic interaction, which may undermine the monetary union's foundation and strengthen incentives for contagion.

      PubDate: 2017-03-29T05:03:27Z
       
  • Strategic fiscal policies and leadership in a monetary union
    • Abstract: Publication date: March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 47
      Author(s): Georgios Chortareas, Christos Mavrodimitrakis
      We consider the strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary policies in a monetary union when a fiscal authority enjoys a strategic advantage. In particular we depart from the standard literature on strategic interactions in monetary unions in that we solve a three-stage game, where the two national fiscal authorities do not play simultaneously. We find that there is always an incentive for the leader fiscal authority to play a three-stage game, which leaves the other fiscal authority worse off under demand shocks. This choice leads to more (less) volatile union-wide fiscal stance for demand (supply) shocks compared to the standard narrow-coordination case. This volatility is positively related to demand shocks' asymmetries.

      PubDate: 2017-03-29T05:03:27Z
       
  • Exchange rate expectations and economic policy uncertainty
    • Abstract: Publication date: March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 47
      Author(s): Joscha Beckmann, Robert Czudaj
      This study provides a new angle on the relationship between political decisions and exchange rates. We link a conventional exchange rate modeling approach to the literature on the political economy of exchange rates and studies dealing with the role of policy announcements for financial market expectations by addressing the impact of policy uncertainty on exchange rate expectations and forecast errors of professionals. Our results show that expectations are not only affected by announcements but also by the degree of uncertainty regarding the future stance of economic policy. We find that forecast errors are strongly affected by policy uncertainty compared to expectations, suggesting that the effect of uncertainty is not efficiently accounted for in market expectations. Our main findings hold for economic policy uncertainty, fiscal policy uncertainty and monetary policy uncertainty. In addition, the estimates for the Japanese yen suggest a safe haven role of the yen since higher policy uncertainty in the US results in an expected appreciation of the yen.

      PubDate: 2017-03-29T05:03:27Z
       
  • Reserve accumulation and exchange rate policy in China: The authoritarian
           elite's aim of political survival
    • Abstract: Publication date: March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 47
      Author(s): Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli, Giovanni B. Pittaluga
      Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, China has significantly increased its foreign exchange reserves. We argue that the resulting abnormal levels of currency reserves accumulated by Chinese authorities are not intended to maximize the citizenry's economic welfare, as in a mercantilist or a precautionary account, but rather to forestall the elite's own political demise. This goal has been pursued mainly by generating large current account surpluses through manipulation of the renminbi exchange rate. The Chinese elite has sought to promote the acceptance of this policy by influencing the costs of collective action taken by winners and losers.

      PubDate: 2017-03-29T05:03:27Z
       
  • Shocking news and cognitive performance
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 21 March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Panu Poutvaara, Olli Ropponen
      We study how shocking news affects cognitive performance. Identifying these effects makes societies more resilient by helping to adjust policy responses to reduce indirect costs of future atrocities. Our analysis is based on a school shooting that coincided with national matriculation exams, allowing a difference-in-differences analysis. We find a substantial negative effect on males: their average performance dropped by seven percent. The average performance of females was unaffected. Our findings suggest that a shocking event may call for psychological support for young people even in communities that are not directly affected.
      Graphical abstract image Highlights

      PubDate: 2017-03-21T15:27:17Z
       
  • Inequality, redistribution and cultural integration in the Welfare State
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Alberto Bisin, Thierry Verdier
      This paper constructs a simple theoretical political economy model to analyze the dynamic interactions between redistribution, public good provision and cultural integration of minority groups. Cultural differentiation erodes the support for general public good provision and vertical redistribution, reducing in turn the attractiveness of adoption of the mainstream culture by the minority groups. Our model shows the possibility for multiple politico-cultural steady state trajectories depending strongly on the initial degree of cultural differentiation in the society. An exogenous increase in income inequality is shown to increase the likelihood of multiple steady state trajectories. In a context with multiple minority groups, culltural fragmentation favors integration into the mainstream culture.

      PubDate: 2017-03-21T15:27:17Z
       
  • Inferring hawks and doves from voting records
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 18 March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Sylvester Eijffinger, Ronald Mahieu, Louis Raes
      We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.

      PubDate: 2017-03-21T15:27:17Z
       
  • Rent extraction by capitalists
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 4 March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Markus Brueckner
      Rent extraction by capitalists is present if the capital income share exceeds the capital output elasticity. Based on a sample of 111 countries during the period 1970–2010, panel model estimates show that: (i) the average capital income share significantly exceeds the average capital output elasticity; (ii) the difference between the average capital income share and the average capital output elasticity has increased over time; (iii) in democracies the average capital income share is not significantly different from the average capital output elasticity. The findings suggest that there exists more rent extraction by capitalists in autocracies and anocracies than in democracies.

      PubDate: 2017-03-09T14:57:15Z
       
  • Does Inequality Constrain the Power to Tax? Evidence from the OECD
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 3 March 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Md. Rabiul Islam, Jakob B. Madsen, Hristos Doucouliagos
      We investigate the consequences of income inequality on the income tax-to-GDP ratio for 21 OECD countries over a long time period spanning 1870 to 2011. We use several identification strategies, including using unionization as a new IV for inequality. In contrast to predictions from median voter models, we find that rising inequality significantly depresses the income tax ratio. This finding is robust to alternative measures of inequality, treatment for endogeneity, and model specification. The tax ratio increases with the degree of democracy and openness and decreases with urbanization. Inequality also reduces the indirect tax ratio, alters the tax structure, and moderates government spending as a share of GDP.

      PubDate: 2017-03-04T14:46:00Z
       
  • Assessing bureaucratic start-up costs through Mystery Calls. Evidence from
           the One-stop shops for doing business
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 27 February 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Silvia Giacomelli, Marco Tonello
      We analyze the mystery calls conducted over a sample of Italian municipalities surveying the front office services provided by the One-stop shops (OSSs) for doing business. Mystery calls are phone interviews conducted by callers who pretend to be prospective entrepreneurs wanting to start a new business, and whose identity and purposes were not known to the OSSs respondents. The information on the days and on the number of phone calls needed by the interviewers to conduct the mystery calls make it possible to construct new measures of bureaucratic start-up costs and study their determinants. We find that lower bureaucratic costs are mainly associated with factors related to organization features of the OSS, such as a more intensive use of ICT and expertise of the employees. The socio-economic context where the OSS operates also plays a role, while the characteristics of the political bodies generally do not.

      PubDate: 2017-03-04T14:46:00Z
       
  • Single round vs. runoff elections under plurality rule: A theoretical
           analysis
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 24 February 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Massimo Bordignon, Tommaso Nannicini, Guido Tabellini
      We compare single round vs. runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. With large and sufficiently polarized groups of moderate voters, under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility is smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. These results are robust to several extentions.

      PubDate: 2017-02-24T18:24:29Z
       
  • Rewarding the introduction of multiparty elections
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 22 February 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Nam Kyu Kim, Alex Kroeger
      Do aid donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections? Are multiparty elections rewarded in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes? How do the rewards for institutional reforms compare to the rewards for substantive improvements in governance and political rights? These questions are of particular interest given both the spread of democracy and the emergence of autocracies with multiparty elections for the executive and legislature as the modal form of authoritarianism. To answer these questions, we examine temporal dynamics in aid flows before and after transitions to multiparty elections and the strategic allocation of aid rewards to specific sectors depending upon electoral competition and substantive improvements in governance and political rights. We find that, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral and multilateral donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes while also rewarding substantive improvements in governance and political rights. Sector specific analyses reveal that multiparty elections are rewarded with greater democracy aid and economic aid in both democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the quality of elections matters: the adoption of democratic elections receives greater aid gains than the adoption of authoritarian elections.

      PubDate: 2017-02-24T18:24:29Z
       
  • Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing
           in Italy
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 February 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Massimo Bordignon, Veronica Grembi, Santino Piazza
      We study the effect of introducing a less transparent tax tool for the financing of local governments. A political agency model suggests that politicians with stronger re-electoral incentives would raise more tax revenues and use more the less transparent tax tool to enhance their probability of re-election. This prediction is tested by studying a reform that in 1999 allowed Italian municipalities to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax of residents). Exploiting the existence of a term limit for mayors, we use a Difference in Difference approach, to estimate how mayors facing re-electoral concerns reacted to the introduction of the less transparent tax tool compared to mayors facing term limit. We find results in line with theory. We also show that the reduction in the property tax is larger in smaller municipalities and in municipalities with lower level of social capital. The normative implications are then discussed.

      PubDate: 2017-02-17T18:09:44Z
       
  • Symmetric Tax Competition and Lobbying within Federations
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 11 February 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Simon Winter
      The present paper deals with the question of whether tax harmonization and federal taxation increase welfare in a symmetric tax competition framework with heterogeneous individuals and lobbying. A model closely related to the approach of Lai (2010) is linked to externalities that are familiar from conventional public finance. The observed deviations from efficient taxation are derived from the interplay of four externalities, which can be divided into two groups: externalities occurring due to tax competition and externalities which are caused by lobbying. Whether or not the centralization of tax competences is useful depends mainly on the relative sizes of the competition-induced and lobbying-induced externalities.

      PubDate: 2017-02-12T12:36:19Z
       
  • Suffrage, labour markets and coalitions in colonial Virginia
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 25 January 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Elena Nikolova, Milena Nikolova
      We study Virginia's suffrage from the early-17th century until the American Revolution using an analytical narrative and econometric analysis of unique data on franchise restrictions. First, we hold that suffrage changes reflected labour market dynamics. Indeed, Virginia's liberal institutions initially served to attract indentured servants from England who were needed in the labour-intensive tobacco farming but deteriorated once worker demand subsided and planters replaced white workers with slaves. Second, we argue that Virginia's suffrage was also the result of political bargaining influenced by shifting societal coalitions. We show that new politically influential coalitions of freemen and then of small and large slave-holding farmers emerged in the second half of the 17th and early-18th centuries, respectively. These coalitions were instrumental in reversing the earlier democratic institutions. Our main contribution stems from integrating the labour markets and bargaining/coalitions arguments, thus proving a novel theoretical and empirical explanation for institutional change.

      PubDate: 2017-01-29T18:54:13Z
       
  • Expropriation Risk and FDI in Developing Countries: Does Return Of Capital
           Dominate Return On Capital?
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 22 January 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): M. Akhtaruzzaman, Nathan Berg, Christopher Hajzler
      Previously reported effects of institutional quality and political risks on foreign direct investment (FDI) are mixed and, therefore, difficult to interpret. We present empirical evidence suggesting a relatively clear, statistically robust, and intuitive characterization. Institutional factors that affect the likelihood of an abrupt and total loss of foreigners’ capital (i.e., return of capital) dominate factors that affect rates of return conditional on a strictly positive terminal investment value (i.e., return on capital). The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that expropriation risk is most important among the available measures of different dimensions of institutional quality. A one-standard-deviation reduction in expropriation risk is associated with a 72% increase in FDI, which is substantially larger than the effects of any other dimensions of institutional quality as simultaneously estimated in our empirical models of expected FDI inflows. We show that this evidence is consistent with the predictions of a standard theory of FDI under imperfect contract enforcement and multiple dimensions of political risk.

      PubDate: 2017-01-22T18:40:31Z
       
  • Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 12 January 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica
      How can a small special interest group successfully get an inefficient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying? We consider a simple model of agenda setting where two groups of different size lobby a politician over a transfer from one group to the other, and the group which sets the agenda can choose the size of the proposed transfer. The groups have resources which are used to pay the politician and to overcome the public goods problem within the group. Our key result is that which group prevails in the agenda setting game depends crucially on whether the transfers can also be used to pay the politician - in which case we say they are fungible. If the transfer is fungible, as in the case of a monetary payment, the smaller group prevails. If the transfer is non-fungible the result depends on whether it is rival or not - civil rights for example are non-rival. In the case of a rival non-fungible transfer depending on circumstances either group may prevail. In the non-rival case the large group prevails. Our results explain the apparent paradox that when it comes to special financial favors small groups seem very effective, but when it comes to large non-financial issues - such as minority rights - large groups are more effective.

      PubDate: 2017-01-15T18:27:18Z
       
 
 
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