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POLITICAL SCIENCE (759 journals)                  1 2 3 4 | Last

Showing 1 - 200 of 281 Journals sorted alphabetically
A Contracorriente     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ab Imperio     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Acta Borealia: A Nordic Journal of Circumpolar Societies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Acta Politica Estica     Open Access  
Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Administrative Science Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 161)
Affirmations : of the modern     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
AFFRIKA Journal of Politics, Economics and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Africa Conflict Monitor     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Africa Insight     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Africa Institute Occasional Paper     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Africa Renewal     Free   (Followers: 5)
Africa Report     Full-text available via subscription  
Africa Review : Journal of the African Studies Association of India     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Africa Today     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
African Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 60)
African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
African Diaspora     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
African East-Asian Affairs     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
African Identities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
African Journal of Democracy and Governance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
African Journal of Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
African Renaissance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
African Yearbook of Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Africanus     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review     Open Access  
Afrique contemporaine : La revue de l'Afrique et du développement     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Agenda Política     Open Access  
Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Agrarian South : Journal of Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Alternatives : Global, Local, Political     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Altre Modernità     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
América Latina Hoy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
American Communist History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
American Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 288)
American Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 235)
American Political Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
American Politics Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
American Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Anacronismo e Irrupción     Open Access  
Analecta política     Open Access  
Análise Social     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annales UMCS, Politologia     Open Access  
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
Annual Review of Economics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 31)
Annual Review of Political Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 154)
AQ - Australian Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription  
Arabian Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Arctic Review on Law and Politics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Arena Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Armed Conflict Survey     Full-text available via subscription  
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Asia Minor Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Asia Policy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Asia-Pacific Journal : Japan Focus     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Asia-Pacific Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Asian Affairs: An American Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Asian Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Asian Politics and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
AUDEM : The International Journal of Higher Education and Democracy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Aurora. Revista de Arte, Mídia e Política     Open Access  
Australasian Review of African Studies, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Australian Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Australian Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Austrian Journal of Political Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Balcanica Posnaniensia Acta et studia     Open Access  
Baltic Journal of European Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bandung : Journal of the Global South     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Basic Income Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Beleid en Maatschappij     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
BMC International Health and Human Rights     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Brazilian Political Science Review     Open Access  
Brésil(s)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
British Journal of Canadian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
British Journal of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 174)
British Journal of Politics and International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
British Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
British Review of New Zealand Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity     Open Access   (Followers: 49)
Bulletin d'histoire politique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bustan     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Cadernos de Estudos Sociais e Políticos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
CADUS - Revista de Estudos de Política, História e Cultura     Open Access  
Cahiers de l'Urmis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cahiers de Sciences politiques de l'ULg     Open Access  
Cambio 16     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Cambridge Review of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Caucasus Survey     Hybrid Journal  
Central and Eastern European Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Central Asian Affairs     Hybrid Journal  
Central Banking     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Central European Journal of Public Policy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
China : An International Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
China perspectives     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
China Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 49)
China Report     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
China Review International     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
China-EU Law Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Chinese Journal of Global Governance     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Chinese Journal of International Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Chinese Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Cittadinanza Europea (LA)     Full-text available via subscription  
Civil Wars     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union     Open Access  
Class, Race and Corporate Power     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cold War History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Communication, Politics & Culture     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
Communist and Post-Communist Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Comparative Political Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 157)
Comparative Politics (Russia)     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Comparative Strategy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Competition & Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Conferences on New Political Economy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Confines     Open Access  
Conflict and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Conflict Management and Peace Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31)
Conflict Trends     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Conflict, Security & Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 374)
Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Conjunctions. Transdisciplinary Journal of Cultural Participation     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Contemporary Italian Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Contemporary Japan     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Contemporary Journal of African Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Contemporary Review of the Middle East     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Contemporary Security Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 21)
Contemporary Wales     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Contenciosa     Open Access  
Contexto Internacional     Open Access  
Cooperation and Conflict     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
CQ Researcher     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
CQ Weekly     Full-text available via subscription  
Criterio Jurídico     Open Access  
Critical Asian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Critical Review : A Journal of Politics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Critical Reviews on Latin American Research     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Critical Social Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35)
Critical Studies on Terrorism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Cuadernos de historia de España     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Cultura de Paz     Open Access  
Cultural Critique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Culture Mandala : The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies     Open Access  
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Decolonization : Indigeneity, Education & Society     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Defence Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Defense & Security Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Democracy & Education     Open Access   (Followers: 15)
Democratic Communiqué     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Democratic Theory     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Democratization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 33)
Democrazia e diritto     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Demokratie und Geschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Der Donauraum     Hybrid Journal  
Der Staat     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Desafíos     Open Access  
Development and Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Digest of Middle East Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Diplomacy & Statecraft     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Diplomatic History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Dissent     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Diversité urbaine     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
East European Jewish Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
East European Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Economia Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 36)
Ecopolítica     Open Access  
eJournal of eDemocracy and Open Government     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
El Cotidiano     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Electoral Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
Em Pauta : Teoria Social e Realidade Contemporânea     Open Access  
Encuentro     Open Access  
Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Equal Opportunities International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Espacios Públicos     Open Access  
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudios Políticos     Open Access  
Estudos Avançados     Open Access  
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Ethics & Global Politics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Éthique publique     Open Access  
Études internationales     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Eureka Street     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Europe's World     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Integration Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
European Journal of American Culture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
European Journal of Government and Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
European Journal of International Relations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)

        1 2 3 4 | Last

Journal Cover European Journal of Political Economy
  [SJR: 0.956]   [H-I: 54]   [45 followers]  Follow
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 0176-2680
   Published by Elsevier Homepage  [3118 journals]
  • Transparency diminishes framing-effects in voting on redistribution: Some
           experimental evidence
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 16 December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Fabian Paetzel, Jan Lorenz, Markus Tepe
      This study analyzes whether enabling people to get informed about redistributive consequences is an effective measure to prevent equivalence framing in the domain of voting on redistribution. Utilizing the redistribution mechanism of the Meltzer-Richard model, an equivalent frame is induced by letting subjects vote either on a proportional tax rate or an outcome equivalent minimum net income. In a series of laboratory experiments, we find that framing effects both on the individually preferred and collectively agreed level of redistribution are tremendously strong if the information tool is not available (low transparency condition). Once subjects have access to the information tool (high transparency condition), the framing effect on individually preferred tax rates is significantly reduced, and after group communication, the framing effect is washed out from the collective decision. High transparency increases redistribution if subjects have to set a redistributive tax rate and lowers redistribution if subjects have to set a minimal income. Thus, the availability of the information tool has an asymmetric effect on the level of redistribution.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Why Go to Court' Bargaining Failure under the Shadow of Trial with
           Complete Information
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Michael McBride, Stergios Skaperdas, Pi-Han Tsai
      Why do legal disputes ever go to trial' Prior research emphasizes the role of mistakes, irrationalities, or asymmetric information because rational litigants with complete or symmetric information should choose pre-trial settlements over the costs and risks of trial. Using a dynamic incomplete-contracting framework, we provide an overlooked rationale for going to court. Even though risky and costly, going to court can be both rational and socially efficient when a court decision enhances property rights and deters future costly litigation. Experimental evidence supports these predictions. Our findings provide new insights into the incidence of litigation and trial.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Rational ignorance, populism, and reform
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 2 December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Carlo Prato, Stephane Wolton
      This paper studies how voters' demand for economic reforms affects the probability that successful or populist reforms are adopted. We study a model of electoral competition with rationally ignorant voters in which the success of a reform is tied to a politician's unobservable competence. We show that when voters' demand for reform is high, candidates engage in a form of populism and propose reformist agendas regardless of their ability to successfully carry them out. As voters are then faced with either risky reformers or policy inaction, the relationship between demand for reform and the probability that any (i.e., genuine or populist) policy change is implemented depends on how harmful botched reforms are. Our results help organize the mixed empirical evidence regarding the impact of crises on the likelihood of reform. They also suggest that the rise of populism may cause political disenchantment rather than the other way round.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Political Economy Aspects of Income (Re-) Distribution
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 50
      Author(s): Jan-Egbert Sturm

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Expressive voting and political ideology in a laboratory democracy
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 50
      Author(s): Rasmus Wiese, Richard Jong-A-Pin
      We test the theory of expressive voting in relation to political ideology in a laboratory experiment. After deriving our hypotheses from a decision theoretic model, we examine voting decisions in an experiment in which we use the size of the electorate as the treatment variable. Using a Heckman selection model that includes both the electoral participation decision and voting choice decision, we find mixed results for the expressive voting hypothesis. In line with expressive voting, our findings suggest that non-ideological voters are more likely to abstain from voting than ideological voters – especially when the electorate grows large. Concerning the voting choice decision between an equal but inefficient, and an unequal but efficient income distribution the evidence for expressive voting is mixed. We do find that voters with socialist (left wing) preferences behave expressively, but we do not find this effect for voters with capitalist (right wing) preferences.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Mind the gap: Disparity in redistributive preference between political
           elites and the public in China
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 50
      Author(s): Weihua An, Maoliang Ye
      In this research, we emphasize the importance of studying the gap in redistributive preference between political elites and the public because of the strategic roles played by the former in policy processes. We use China as a case study, wherein the fulfillment of surging demands for redistribution is largely dependent on whether or not the political elites will advocate for redistribution. Using data from the Chinese General Social Survey, we find that the political elites prefer significantly less progressive taxation and less redistributive expenditure than the public. The gap in redistributive preference is larger on the expenditure side than on the taxation side. Moreover, the causes of the gap appear to vary by the measures for redistribution. Accounting for covariate differences fully explains the gap in preference for progressive taxation, but not the gap in preference for redistributive expenditure.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Inequality, redistribution and cultural integration in the Welfare State
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 50
      Author(s): Alberto Bisin, Thierry Verdier
      This paper constructs a simple theoretical political economy model to analyze the dynamic interactions between redistribution, public good provision and cultural integration of minority groups. Cultural differentiation erodes the support for general public good provision and vertical redistribution, reducing in turn the attractiveness of adoption of the mainstream culture by the minority groups. Our model shows the possibility for multiple politico-cultural steady state trajectories depending strongly on the initial degree of cultural differentiation in the society. An exogenous increase in income inequality is shown to increase the likelihood of multiple steady state trajectories. In a context with multiple minority groups, cultural fragmentation favors integration into the mainstream culture.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Rent extraction by capitalists
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 50
      Author(s): Markus Brueckner
      Rent extraction by capitalists is present if the capital income share exceeds the capital output elasticity. Based on a sample of 111 countries during the period 1970–2010, panel model estimates show that: (i) the average capital income share significantly exceeds the average capital output elasticity; (ii) the difference between the average capital income share and the average capital output elasticity has increased over time; (iii) in democracies the average capital income share is not significantly different from the average capital output elasticity. The findings suggest that there exists more rent extraction by capitalists in autocracies and anocracies than in democracies.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Finance and income inequality: A review and new evidence
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 50
      Author(s): Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm
      Using a panel fixed effects model for a sample of 121 countries covering 1975–2005, we examine how financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises are related to income inequality. In contrast with most previous work, our results suggest that all finance variables increase income inequality. The level of financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on inequality. Also the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality, in contrast to the quality of economic institutions. Our main findings are robust for using random effects, cross-country regressions and legal origin as instrument for financial development.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Partisanship, priming and participation in public-good schemes
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 27 November 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Marie Briguglio, Liam Delaney, Alex Wood
      This study tests whether psychological attachment to a political party influences voluntary participation in a government-promoted public-good scheme, positing that cooperation is higher among households that identify with the party in government and lower among households that identify with the party in opposition. The focus is participation in a voluntary recycling scheme, in the context of a European country (Malta) where two parties dominate the political landscape. A nationally-representative survey (n = 1037), yielded information on recycling participation rates and on environmental and political preferences. The survey was conducted shortly after a change in government and also gauged intent to participate in a new scheme with a split-sample manipulation in which the treatment group received a political prime. The results indicate that the initial uptake of the scheme launched by a Nationalist government was significantly lower among respondents close to the Labour Party. Five years later this effect had decayed. But intent to participate in the hypothetical scheme was lower among respondents close to the party in opposition (this time, the Nationalist Party), if primed with a cue that associates the new scheme with the Labour party. Formal modeling of scheme participation and intent (controlling for political and environmental ideology inter alia), yielded consistent results. These findings shed light on a new dimension which may be responsible for diverse rates of uptake of a public good schemes with practical implications for scheme promotion.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Delayed mimicking: the timing of fiscal interactions in Europe
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 22 November 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Marie-Pierre Hory
      Fiscal interactions in Europe are a major challenge. Countries can cooperate or be engaged in a tax or a yardstick competition process. This paper uses a Spatial Dynamic Panel Data model (SDPD) to test the timing of fiscal stances interactions in Europe. Results show that fiscal interactions are not contemporaneous: governments mimic the behavior of neighboring governments on the last year, leading to a kind of “delayed mimicking” behaviors. This result is then used and deepened to discriminate between the three main rationales for fiscal interactions. Using original weighting schemes based on political proximity and similarities between investment contexts, we show that fiscal interactions in Europe are likely due to yardstick competition. Implications are twofold: on one hand controlling for delayed interactions when fiscal interactions are estimated is necessary, and, on the other hand, more organizations are needed in Europe in order to foster cooperation and thus to improve fiscal policy efficiency.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Give a fish or teach fishing' Partisan affiliation of U.S. governors
           and the poverty status of immigrants
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 November 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Sekou Keita, Pierre Mandon
      This paper investigates how governors' partisan affiliation affects the poverty status of immigrants to the U.S. To this end, we compare the poverty outcomes of immigrants in states ruled by Democratic governors relative to the outcomes for those in states ruled by Republican governors. We employ a regression discontinuity design using the re-centered Democratic margin of victory as a running variable, to overcome the identification challenge posed by confounding factors. Consistent with the literature on partisan affiliation, we find that immigrants are more likely to get out of poverty in states with Democratic governors than states with Republican governors. Our results are submitted to a variety of robustness checks and sensitivity tests, to assess the validity of the identification strategy, and highlight conditional lame-duck effects. A formal mediation analysis reveals that the empirical results are mediated through better access to the labor market and possibly through higher wages and labor earnings for immigrants. Last but not least, we check for alternative hypotheses and potential detrimental effects for native populations.

      PubDate: 2017-12-27T07:24:37Z
  • Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: In depth analysis of the
           functional components of government expenditures
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 9 November 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Vítor Castro, Rodrigo Martins
      This article analyses the incidence of politically driven cycles on the functional components and sub-components of government expenditures over a group of 18 European countries during the period 1990–2012. An LSDVC estimator is employed in the empirical analysis. The results provide evidence of political opportunism at aggregated and disaggregated levels of public expenditures. The expenditure components that have proved to be more related to that behaviour are public services, education, social protection and some sub-components of health expenditure, items that tend to generate outcomes that are more visible to voters. Some disaggregated evidence of partisan manipulation is also found.

      PubDate: 2017-11-17T14:48:38Z
  • Cashless Payments and Tax Evasion
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 3 November 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Giovanni Immordino, Francesco Flaviano Russo
      Cashless payments hinder tax evasion because they build a trail for the underlying transactions. Using European data, we find empirical evidence supporting this claim: credit and debit card payments are negatively related to VAT evasion. We also find that using electronic cards to withdraw cash at ATMs, by making cash more abundant, fosters VAT evasion.

      PubDate: 2017-11-09T14:21:11Z
  • Do mergers of large local governments reduce expenditures' –
           Evidence from Germany using the synthetic control method
    • Abstract: Publication date: December 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 50
      Author(s): Felix Roesel
      States merge local governments to achieve economies of scale. Little is known to which extent mergers of county-sized local governments reduce expenditures, and influence political outcomes. I use the synthetic control method to identify the effect of mergers of large local governments in Germany (districts) on public expenditures. In 2008, the German state of Saxony reduced the number of districts from 22 to 10. Average district population increased substantially from 113,000 to 290,000 inhabitants. I construct a synthetic counterfactual from states that did not merge districts for years. The results do neither show reductions in total expenditures, nor in expenditures for administration, education, and social care. There seems to be no scale effects in jurisdictions of more than 100,000 inhabitants. By contrast, I find evidence that mergers decreased the number of candidates and voter turnout in district elections while vote shares for populist right-wing parties increased.

      PubDate: 2017-10-26T14:55:06Z
  • Social Transfers and Conditionalities under Different Regime Types
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 October 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Marina Dodlova, Anna Giolbas, Jann Lay
      This paper examines the implications of political factors for social policy choices. Specifically, we explore the link between regime type and adoption of unconditional transfers versus transfers conditioned on beneficiaries’ investments in human capital. Due to the direct nature of benefits, unconditional transfers are more likely to be used to buy off opposition and prevent social unrest. As transfers that are conditioned on education and health pay off only in a relatively distant future, they are rarely initiated for political motives and rather defined by interests of long-term development and human capital accumulation. Using the new dataset on Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in developing countries, we find that transfers are indeed chosen so as to be unconditional under less democratic regimes. There is some evidence that conditional transfers are more likely to be adopted in democracies. In particular, democracies tend to increase the number of conditional schemes once any social transfer program is introduced.

      PubDate: 2017-10-11T05:24:18Z
  • How voters use grade scales in evaluative votings
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 30 September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, Jean-François Laslier, Isabelle Lebon
      During the first round of the 2012 French presidential election, participants in an in situ experiment were invited to vote according to “evaluative voting”, which involves rating the candidates using a numerical scale. Various scales were used: (0,1), (-1,0,1), (0,1,2), and (0,1,…,20). The paper studies scale calibration effects, i.e., how individual voters adapt to the scale, leading to possibly different election outcomes. The data show that scales are not linearly equivalent, even if individual ordinal preferences are not inconsistent. Scale matters, notably because of the symbolic power of negative grades, which does not affect all candidates uniformly.

      PubDate: 2017-10-04T05:00:52Z
  • Income Inequality and Oligarchs in Russian Regions: A Note
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 28 September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Jarko Fidrmuc, Lidwina Gundacker
      We trace the rise of the so called oligarchs in post-Soviet Russia and examine their relationship to income distribution in Russia. When Russia moved to a market economy in the 1990s a new business elite evolved. Russia's distinctive path towards market economy, among other factors, gave rise to the oligarchs who now control large parts of the economy and have a strong standing within politics and society. Using a unique regional data set on the locations of oligarchs’ businesses across the Russian regions, we test Acemoglu's (2008) proposition that oligarchic societies experience extreme income inequality. Our results show significantly higher levels of income inequality in regions with a higher presence of oligarchs.

      PubDate: 2017-10-04T05:00:52Z
  • “Alcohol Bans”: Can They Reveal the Effect of Xi Jinping's
           Anti-Corruption Campaign'
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 28 September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Yang Shu, Jiayao Cai
      China is perceived to be one of the most politically corrupt countries in the world. Chinese government officials establish firm ties with trusted people through lavish banquets with flowing alcohol, providing privileged access to scarce resources like licenses, land, bank loans, subsidies, and government contracts. In China, Baijiu, the most popular grain liquor at these parties, works as the currency of bribery and is the lubricant for political connections for corruption. Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy, known as the “Alcohol Bans,” has targeted Baijiu in an attempt to stop the boozy banquets, and, consequently, to bring an end to this channel of political networking. This paper employs the event study approach and connects cumulative abnormal stock returns of high-end Baijiu companies with the impact of the Alcohol Bans. It applies the difference-in-difference method to rule out unobserved reasons for stock market changes. The result is unchanged in both the efficient market hypothesis test and the abnormal return test. We consider if Baijiu may be substituted for other luxuries, and find little evidence for such “substitution effects.” Our work concludes that the Alcohol Bans has partially contributed to Xi's anti-corruption campaign.

      PubDate: 2017-10-04T05:00:52Z
  • More Effective Defense Capabilities and Pareto-Improving Resource
           Transfers: Conflict on the Korean Peninsula
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 21 September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Suk Jae Noh
      Analyzing the resource allocation between productive and appropriative activities in a conflict between prey and predator, this paper demonstrates the possibility of Pareto-improving economic assistance from South Korea to North Korea, even when augmented resources are used by North Korea to build up more offensive weapons, if resource transfer is coupled with the enhanced security position of South Korea. Some combinations of resource transfer (carrot) and increased effectiveness of defense (stick) increase production efficiency by decreasing the total amount of appropriative activities in a conflict. These combinations of stick and carrot can in some cases change the behavior of North Korea from that of a pure predator to that of a part-time predator. These results shed some light on policy debates in South Korea's dealings with North Korea.

      PubDate: 2017-09-26T16:42:21Z
  • Beyond Divide and Rule: Weak Dictators, Natural Resources and Civil
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Giacomo De Luca, Petros G. Sekeris, Juan F. Vargas
      We propose a model where weak rulers have incentives to let ethnically divided countries plunge in civil war. Allowing inter-group fighting reduces production - and hence the tax base - but enables the ruler to devote more resources to increasing the tax rate. This mechanism is increasingly salient with larger amounts of natural resources, especially if these are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the theoretical predictions using cross-country data, and show that our empirical results are robust to controlling for the usual determinants of civil war incidence, and to using various proxies for the ruler's relative weakness and for the presence of natural resources.

      PubDate: 2017-09-26T16:42:21Z
  • Development Minister Characteristics and Aid Giving
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 3 September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Andreas Fuchs, Katharina Richert
      Over 300 government members have had the main responsibility for international development cooperation in 23 member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee since the organization started reporting detailed Official Development Assistance (ODA) data in 1967. Understanding their role in foreign aid giving is crucial since their decisions can influence aid effectiveness and thus economic development on the ground. Our study examines whether development ministers’ personal characteristics are associated with aid budgets and aid quality. To this end, we create a novel database on development ministers’ gender, political ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, education, and time in office over the 1967–2012 period. Results from fixed-effects panel regressions show that some of the personal characteristics of development ministers matter. Most notably, we find that more experienced ministers with respect to their time in the development office obtain larger aid budgets. Moreover, our results suggest that female ministers as well as officeholders with prior professional experience in development cooperation and a longer time in office provide higher-quality ODA.

      PubDate: 2017-09-08T06:18:09Z
  • Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Sonja Brangewitz, Sarah Brockhoff
      This paper analyzes the sustainability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions to agree on a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient, fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extent the sustainability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions that have formed. In our setup, countries are symmetric, but coalitions can be of arbitrary size. We analyze sustainability by means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we rank the sustainability of different coalition structures. We show that sub-coalitions consisting of singleton regions have the largest incentives to deviate and that the sustainability of cooperation depends on the degree of cooperative behavior ex-ante. Bilateral agreements between pairs of regions turn out to be the form of cooperation that is the easiest to sustain.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • On the historical roots of women's empowerment across Italian provinces:
           religion or family culture'
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Monica Bozzano
      Why do women's economic decision-making and political empowerment vary so widely' What are the main potential determinants of such variations' Over a cross-section of Italian provincial data, we analyze the association between two specific facets of women's empowerment, the percentage of women holding office in local political bodies and the percentage of women in high-ranking jobs, and the religious and cultural conditions which facilitate or hinder women's inclusion. Our hypothesis is that culture, in particular those values embodied by religious culture, plays a central role in shaping norms and beliefs about the role and involvement of women in society. Moreover we suggest that these cultural norms are inherited from the past and therefore have a high degree of inertia. Both OLS and IV results indicate that our measures of women's empowerment are strongly associated with religious culture, as proxied by religious marriages. These results are robust and consistent across specifications.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Corruption and political stability: Does the youth bulge matter'
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, Stefan Witthuhn
      This study shows that the relative size of the youth bulge matters in how corruption affects the internal stability of a political system. Using panel data covering the 1984–2012 period for more than 100 countries, we find that the effect of corruption on political stability depends on the youth bulge. Corruption is a destabilizing factor for political systems when the share of the youth population in the adult population exceeds a critical level of approximately 20%. The moderating effect of the youth bulge in the stability–corruption nexus is robust, controlling for country and year fixed effects, a set of control variables that may affect internal political stability, an alternative operationalization of the youth bulge, corruption, and a dynamic panel estimation method.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica
      How can a small special interest group successfully get an inefficient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying' We consider a simple model of agenda setting where two groups of different size lobby a politician over a transfer from one group to the other, and the group which sets the agenda can choose the size of the proposed transfer. The groups have resources which are used to pay the politician and to overcome the public goods problem within the group. Our key result is that which group prevails in the agenda setting game depends crucially on whether the transfers can also be used to pay the politician – in which case we say they are fungible. If the transfer is fungible, as in the case of a monetary payment, the smaller group prevails. If the transfer is non-fungible the result depends on whether it is rival or not – civil rights for example are non-rival. In the case of a rival non-fungible transfer depending on circumstances either group may prevail. In the non-rival case the large group prevails. Our results explain the apparent paradox that when it comes to special financial favors small groups seem very effective, but when it comes to large non-financial issues – such as minority rights – large groups are more effective.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Expropriation risk and FDI in developing countries: Does return of capital
           dominate return on capital'
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): M. Akhtaruzzaman, Nathan Berg, Christopher Hajzler
      Previously reported effects of institutional quality and political risks on foreign direct investment (FDI) are mixed and, therefore, difficult to interpret. We present empirical evidence suggesting a relatively clear, statistically robust, and intuitive characterization. Institutional factors that affect the likelihood of an abrupt and total loss of foreigners’ capital (i.e., return of capital) dominate factors that affect rates of return conditional on a strictly positive terminal investment value (i.e., return on capital). The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that expropriation risk is most important among the available measures of different dimensions of institutional quality. A one-standard-deviation reduction in expropriation risk is associated with a 72% increase in FDI, which is substantially larger than the effects of any other dimensions of institutional quality as simultaneously estimated in our empirical models of expected FDI inflows. We show that this evidence is consistent with the predictions of a standard theory of FDI under imperfect contract enforcement and multiple dimensions of political risk.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Suffrage, labour markets and coalitions in colonial Virginia
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Elena Nikolova, Milena Nikolova
      We study Virginia's suffrage from the early-17th century until the American Revolution using an analytical narrative and econometric analysis of unique data on franchise restrictions. First, we hold that suffrage changes reflected labour market dynamics. Indeed, Virginia's liberal institutions initially served to attract indentured servants from England who were needed in the labour-intensive tobacco farming but deteriorated once worker demand subsided and planters replaced white workers with slaves. Second, we argue that Virginia's suffrage was also the result of political bargaining influenced by shifting societal coalitions. We show that new politically influential coalitions of freemen and then of small and large slave-holding farmers emerged in the second half of the 17th and early-18th centuries, respectively. These coalitions were instrumental in reversing the earlier democratic institution\s. Our main contribution stems from integrating the labour markets and bargaining/coalitions arguments, thus proving a novel theoretical and empirical explanation for institutional change.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Single round vs. runoff elections under plurality rule: A theoretical
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Massimo Bordignon, Tommaso Nannicini, Guido Tabellini
      We compare single round vs. runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. With large and sufficiently polarized groups of moderate voters, under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility is smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. These results are robust to several extentions.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Symmetric tax competition and lobbying within federations
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Simon Winter
      The present paper deals with the question of whether tax harmonization and federal taxation increase welfare in a symmetric tax competition framework with heterogeneous individuals and lobbying. A model closely related to the approach of Lai (2010) is linked to externalities that are familiar from conventional public finance. The observed deviations from efficient taxation are derived from the interplay of four externalities, which can be divided into two groups: externalities occurring due to tax competition and externalities which are caused by lobbying. Whether or not the centralization of tax competences is useful depends mainly on the relative sizes of the competition-induced and lobbying-induced externalities.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Who do you blame in local finance' An analysis of municipal financing
           in Italy
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Massimo Bordignon, Veronica Grembi, Santino Piazza
      We study the effect of introducing a less transparent tax tool for the financing of local governments. A political agency model suggests that politicians with stronger re-electoral incentives would raise more tax revenues and use more the less transparent tax tool to enhance their probability of re-election. This prediction is tested by studying a reform that in 1999 allowed Italian municipalities to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax of residents). Exploiting the existence of a term limit for mayors, we use a Difference in Difference approach, to estimate how mayors facing re-electoral concerns reacted to the introduction of the less transparent tax tool compared to mayors facing term limit. We find results in line with theory. We also show that the reduction in the property tax is larger in smaller municipalities and in municipalities with lower level of social capital. The normative implications are then discussed.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Rewarding the introduction of multiparty elections
    • Abstract: Publication date: September 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 49
      Author(s): Nam Kyu Kim, Alex Kroeger
      Do aid donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections' Are multiparty elections rewarded in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes' How do the rewards for institutional reforms compare to the rewards for substantive improvements in governance and political rights' These questions are of particular interest given both the spread of democracy and the emergence of autocracies with multiparty elections for the executive and legislature as the modal form of authoritarianism. To answer these questions, we examine temporal dynamics in aid flows before and after transitions to multiparty elections and the strategic allocation of aid rewards to specific sectors depending upon electoral competition and substantive improvements in governance and political rights. We find that, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral and multilateral donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes while also rewarding substantive improvements in governance and political rights. Sector specific analyses reveal that multiparty elections are rewarded with greater democracy aid and economic aid in both democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the quality of elections matters: the adoption of democratic elections receives greater aid gains than the adoption of authoritarian elections.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 19 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Mario Ferrero
      Religious organizations set thresholds of belief and behavior required of their members. In a simple model of individual religious behavior, this paper shows that if a religion denies the benefits of membership to those who fall short of the threshold, it stands to gain an increase in compliance with its rules by forcing members to the edge of defection, hence the incentive to set the thresholds strategically. When members’ compliance costs are private information, the model yields several regimes: a pooling contract if costs are close enough to each other, a separating contract if costs are different enough, and an expulsion solution if the proportion of high-cost types in the total membership is too low. Changes in costs and in membership composition trigger changes in thresholds and switches between regimes, thus providing a model of religious governance and evolution. We then review the history of sectarianism in the three monotheistic religions and show that the model can help account for the basic differences between them as well as explain the historical evolution of dogmas and behavioral rules within each of them. A specialized case study focuses on the evolution of Catholic religious orders.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Public opinion and the political economy of educational reforms: A survey
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 4 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Marius R. Busemeyer, Philipp Lergetporer, Ludger Woessmann
      In the political economy of education policy, interactions between policymakers and public opinion can create discrepancies between political awareness and action. While a large literature studies public opinion on different aspects of the welfare state, research has only recently started to investigate the public’s attitudes towards education policy. We survey this emerging literature with a particular focus on public preferences for education spending in different sociodemographic subgroups, policy trade-offs, support for specific education reforms, and the importance of information for public preferences. While the available evidence is multifaceted, there is some general indication that citizens place high priority on education policy, show substantial willingness to reform, and are responsive to information and adequate reform designs.

      PubDate: 2017-09-02T06:06:19Z
  • Altruistic Punishment in Elections
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 3 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Jason A. Aimone, Luigi Butera, Thomas Stratmann
      Altruistic punishment is a fundamental driver for cooperation in human interactions. In this paper, we expand our understanding of this form of pro-social behavior to help explain a puzzle of voting: why do individuals who are indifferent between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate when voting is costly' Using a simple voting experiment, we provide robust evidence that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting is costly and the voter has no monetary stake in the election outcome. In our sample, and in a robustness check through Monte Carlo simulation, we show that at least fourteen percent of individuals are willing to incur a cost to vote against candidates who broke their electoral promises, even when they have no pecuniary interest in the election outcome.

      PubDate: 2017-08-03T21:00:12Z
  • Who are the ‘ghost’ MPs' Evidence from the French
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 3 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Nicolas Gavoille
      This paper studies the characteristics of the ghost deputies of the French National Assembly, i.e. deputies who do not have any official recorded activity over a whole year. Using a rich dataset providing various information about all deputies from 1959 to 2012, the results indicate that the typical ghost deputy is an old man with a low level of schooling, member of a large party which does not support the government and who is elected in jurisdiction with a low level of political competition. However, personal characteristics are less and less correlated with performance over the years. Finally, ghost deputies face more difficulties to achieve reelection, but are penalized only at the first round, voters exclusively considering national factors at the second round.

      PubDate: 2017-08-03T21:00:12Z
  • “Mind the Gap'” Rising Income Inequality and Individual
           Trade Policy Preferences
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 1 August 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Quynh Nguyen
      How does rising income inequality affect individual attitudes toward international trade' While there exists a plethora of studies on the interlinkages between international trade and income inequality, the existing literature on individual trade policy preferences has not considered the role of inequality in shaping public opinion about international trade. By bringing these two separate strands of literature together, this study examines whether citizens associate income disparities with trade liberalization and, if so, how this linkage affects their attitudes toward international trade. Using data from a population-based survey-embedded experiment, this study identifies two key findings. First, individuals draw a link between skewed income distribution trends and international trade. Second, the perceived linkage between rising income inequality and trade liberalization is disconnected from the formation of trade policy preferences. These findings suggest that the association between rising income inequality and trade liberalization does not automatically lead citizens to endorse protectionist trade measures not because they are ignorant about the distributional effects of international trade. Rather, citizens fail to connect income inequality to foreign trade policy, because they may not perceive trade-induced inequality as unfair.

      PubDate: 2017-08-03T21:00:12Z
  • Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 27 July 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Henry W. Chappell, Rob Roy McGregor
      Many central banks now publish transcripts or summaries of meeting discussions and record policy preferences of individual members of policymaking committees. We present an econometric model of committee decisions for Sweden's Riksbank that uses individual preference data pooled over committee members and meetings. Estimates indicate that members attach a small weight to their own preferences when voting; instead, members tend to defer to the perceived committee consensus. These results contrast with some previous findings that members deferred to the committee chairman when voting.

      PubDate: 2017-08-03T21:00:12Z
  • Market and Political Power Interactions in Greece: A Theory
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 14 July 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Tryphon Kollintzas, Dimitris Papageorgiou, Vanghelis Vassilatos
      In this paper, we develop a neoclassical growth model of market and political power interactions that captures the main features of the economic and political system of Greece and explains the weak economic growth of Greece in the last forty years. The model incorporates the insiders-outsiders labor market structure and the concept of an elite government. Outsiders form a group of workers that supply labor to a competitive private sector. And, insiders form a group of workers that enjoy market power in supplying labor to the public sector and influence the policy decisions of government, including those that affect the development and maintenance of public sector infrastructures. This leads to labor misallocation and inefficient fiscal policies. Thus, even though expanding public sector output has a positive effect on growth, eventually this is counterbalanced by the labor misallocation and inefficient tax policy outcomes leading to a growth reversal phenomenon. The model proposed in this paper may be applicable to other countries that have a similar politicoeconomic structure with Greece, namely other Southern European countries.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
  • Retirement, consumption of political information, and political knowledge
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 14 July 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Marcel Garz
      Democratic societies depend on citizens being informed about candidates and representatives, to allow for optimal voting and political accountability. As the Fourth Estate, news media have a crucial role in this context. However, due to selective exposure, media bias, and endogeneity it is not a priori clear if news consumption increases voter information. Focusing on the increase in leisure time that is associated with retirement, this study investigates whether changes in the consumption of political information affect campaign-related knowledge. For that purpose, I use survey data pertaining to the 2000, 2004, and 2008 US presidential elections. Instrumenting with eligibility for old age benefits, the results show that retirement improves respondents’ performance in answering knowledge questions. The effect is mostly driven by additional exposure to newscasts and newspapers. There is also evidence of increasing polarization due to retirement.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
  • Do equalization payments affect subnational borrowing' Evidence from
           regression discontinuity
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 13 July 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Monika Köppl–Turyna, Hans Pitlik
      According to the fiscal federalism literature, subcentral budget constraints become softer when local governments are more dependent on revenues over which they have no discretion. As a consequence of ‘transfer dependency’, subcentral governments can expect to be bailed out by the central government and therefore tend to accumulate higher levels of debt. We test this conjecture with data from Austrian municipalities. In fiscal terms, Austria is a highly centralized federation in which tax autonomy at the municipal level is rather weak. Our identification strategy is based on a discontinuity caused by the unique regulation of population weights in the tax-sharing agreement between central government and the municipalities. Our results indicate that, in line with theoretical expectations, municipalities with higher revenue dependency are responsible for higher net borrowing per capita. The size of the additional borrowing effect equals to about 5% of average municipal debt. We also find that almost one half of the observed discontinuity works through an investment channel.

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
  • The political economy of policy reform
    • Abstract: Publication date: June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 48
      Author(s): George Economides, Arye L. Hillman, Apostolis Philippopoulos

      PubDate: 2017-07-24T02:45:27Z
  • The Dynamics of Political Party Support and Egocentric Economic
           Evaluations: the Scottish Case
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 23 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Georgios Marios Chrysanthou, María Dolores Guilló
      We explore the dynamics of the Scottish National Party (SNP) support using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) during 1999-06. We study the relative importance of political sentiments and egocentric economic evaluations by disentangling the effects of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by gender. Egocentric economic evaluations constitute an important determinant of SNP support over the entire period, being this effect stronger among the male electorate. The results are consistent with the electors holding the incumbent Labour Party accountable for their personal financial situation, though financial security augments the nationalist propensity among partisan voters. Furthermore, retrospective economic evaluations form a significant determinant of incumbent Labour Party support in both the 1999-02 and 2003-06 intervening electoral cycles.

      PubDate: 2017-07-03T07:43:40Z
  • Populism and Institutional Capture
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 20 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Nicholas Chesterley, Paolo Roberti
      This paper analyzes the relationship between populism and institutional capture. Populist politicians provide voters with a utility boom followed by a subsequent bust. Non-populists provide a constant level of utility. Once elected, however, politicians of both types are able to seize control of institutions to ensure their re-election. We show that in equilibrium, populist politicians may capture institutions to avoid being voted out of power during the bust: non-populists do not. Voters rationally elect a populist if voters discount the future sufficiently or if it is too costly for the populist to seize control of institutions. Unfortunately, both types of politician may prefer not to strengthen institutions, either to allow their capture or to discourage the election of the populist.

      PubDate: 2017-06-22T11:33:33Z
  • (Un-)Intended Effects of Fiscal Rules
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 16 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Heiko T. Burret, Lars P. Feld
      The paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules’ coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the following: First, fiscal rules reduce public deficits. The effect is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt brakes exhibit some unintended effects, i.e., an evasion into unconstrained accounts, emphasizing the importance of constraining all accounts. Third, the existence of political budget cycles depends on the institutional context, i.e., the timing of elections and the presence of debt brakes. Fifth, cantonal debt brakes dampen the fiscal deterioration during unexpected deficit shocks by more rapid fiscal adjustments.

      PubDate: 2017-06-22T11:33:33Z
  • Immigration, Assimilation, and the Future of Public Education
    • Abstract: Publication date: Available online 10 June 2017
      Source:European Journal of Political Economy
      Author(s): Ryuichi Tanaka, Lidia Farre, Francesc Ortega
      This paper analyzes the effects of immigration on the size and quality of public education using a quantitative political economy model that allows for a heterogeneous immigrant population. Our analysis distinguishes between short and long-run effects and accounts for the consequences of naturalization and assimilation. We use the model to analyze Spain's large 2000-2008 immigration wave. We find that immigration led to a 15% increase in public enrollment in the short run, together with a 3% reduction in public education spending and almost a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of native households using private schools. Depending on the eventual degree of assimilation, these trends will be greatly intensified or mitigated once immigrants naturalize and gain the right to vote. Our analysis suggests that assimilation in terms of family size and the value assigned to children's education are the most relevant dimensions quantitatively. We also show that immigration policies that favor one group over another can significantly alter the overall effects of immigration on the schooling system.

      PubDate: 2017-06-12T11:06:30Z
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