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International Journal of Evidence and Proof
Number of Followers: 12

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ISSN (Print) 1365-7127 - ISSN (Online) 1740-5572
Published by Sage Publications

[1090 journals]

A comparison between the standard of proof applicable in arbitration and
formal adjudication
- Authors: Jesus Ezurmendia, Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez
  Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  This article aims to describe the application of the standard of proof in arbitration and to question whether the standard to be applied should be the same as or lower than in ordinary civil justice as a result of the contractual origin of the dispute. The determination of the applicable standard takes into consideration the equality of arms and other guarantees of due process, along with the fact of the absence of the standard rule in the Arbitration Act 1996. The arbitrator shall establish these aspects at the beginning of the process, considering also the rules of burden of proof.
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-08-04T09:24:06Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720943333
Corrigendum to Tapes, transcripts and trials: The routine contamination of
police interview evidence
- Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-07-29T11:21:12Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720948970
Laudan’s error: Reasonable doubt and acquittals of guilty people
- Authors: Diego Dei Vecchi
  First page: 211
  Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) is one of the most fundamental requirements of American criminal law and other legal systems. Professor Larry Laudan has criticised this requirement for several reasons. His main contention is that the BARD formula converts evidential support into subjective confidence, and is therefore not a genuine standard of proof. At the same time, Laudan holds that BARD produces a large number of guilty defendant’s acquittals due to its excessive demand for evidence. The aim of this article is to show that Laudan’s argument regarding the number of guilty defendant’s acquittals is unacceptable. Perhaps the real ratio of false negatives to false positives were what Laudan holds them to be, yet he fails to provide any suitable argument to support his claim, or to attribute the alleged frequency of errors to a particular standard of proof—BARD or otherwise.
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-03-30T11:29:07Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720914649
Explaining and trusting expert evidence: What is a ‘sufficiently
reliable scientific basis’'
- Authors: Tony Ward
  First page: 233
  Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  Through a series of judicial decisions and Practice Directions, the English courts have developed a rule that expert evidence must have ‘a sufficiently reliable scientific basis to be admitted’. There is a dearth of case-law as to what degree of reliability is ‘sufficient’. This article argues that the test should be interpreted as analogous to one developed in the law of hearsay: expert evidence (scientific or otherwise) must be ‘potentially safely reliable’ in the context of the evidence as a whole. The implications of this test will vary according to the relationship between the expert evidence and the other evidence in the case. The article identifies three main patterns into which this relationship falls. Whether the jury relies upon the evidence will depend upon what they regard as the best explanation of the evidence and how far they trust the expert. Whether their reliance is safe (as a basis for conviction) depends on whether they could rationally rule out explanations consistent with innocence, and whether the degree to which they take the expert’s evidence on trust is consistent with prosecution’s burden of proving the essential elements of its case, including the reliability of any scientific techniques on which it relies.
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-06-10T10:10:37Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720927622
What do we know about rape myths and juror decision making'
- Authors: Fiona Leverick
  First page: 255
  Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  This paper presents overwhelming evidence that prejudicial and false beliefs held by jurors about rape affect their evaluation of the evidence and their decision making in rape cases. The paper draws together for the first time the available evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies (most of which are not found in law journals, but rather in scientific outlets, most commonly those focusing on experimental psychology). The quantitative research demonstrates that mock jurors’ scores on so-called ‘rape myth scales’ are significant predictors of their judgments about responsibility, blame and (most importantly) verdict. The qualitative research indicates that jurors frequently express problematic views about how ‘real’ rape victims would behave and what ‘real’ rape looks like during mock jury deliberations and that even those who score relatively low on abstract rape myth scales can express prejudicial beliefs when deliberating in a particular case. The studies vary in terms of their realism, but it is important to note that some of the studies reported here were highly realistic trial reconstructions, involving representative samples of jurors drawn from the community, live trial reconstructions, evidence-in-chief and cross-examination, accurate legal directions and deliberation in groups. The review concludes by examining the evidence on whether juror education—whether in the form of judicial directions or expert evidence—might be effective in addressing problematic attitudes.
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-05-08T10:32:53Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720923157
Addressing vulnerability in Ireland’s criminal justice system a survey
of recent statutory developments
- Authors: Alan Cusack
  First page: 280
  Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  For over a quarter of century Ireland’s statutory special measures framework, as originally enacted by the Criminal Evidence Act 1992, remained largely unchanged, falling beyond the reformative gaze of successive Irish governments. This period of political inertia, however, came to an abrupt end in 2017 when Irish policymakers, motivated by developments at a European Union level, introduced two landmark legislative instruments which promised to reimagine the availability and diversity of Ireland’s store of statutory testimonial accommodations, namely the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 and the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017. By interrogating these newly-commenced instruments in light of the experience of crime victims with intellectual disabilities, this paper surveys the current procedural landscape governing the treatment of vulnerable crime victims in Ireland and is intended to go some way towards exposing the embedded evidential barriers which continue to prejudice efforts aimed at securing their best evidence in court.
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-05-06T10:46:53Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720922753
Embodied truths and authentic selves: The constitution of evidence and
credibility in rape cases
- Authors: Solveig Laugerud
  First page: 307
  Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  In this article, I use the concept of chronotope, which means time-space, to analyse knowledge production at the intersection of science, technology and law. I do a comparative study of written legal decisions regarding criminal injuries compensation in rape cases from two different legal institutions in Norway—namely, the Compensation Authority and the criminal courts. In these written decisions, the two institutions state the reasons and justifications for their decisions by invoking, relying on and dismissing various kinds of knowledge, such as forensic, medical and psychological knowledge. The aim of this comparison is to investigate how these reasons and justifications constitute evidence and credibility. I argue that the two institutions attach themselves to different kinds of expert knowledge because they are chronotopically different and consequently constitute evidence and credibility in different ways.
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-06-02T10:44:02Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720928668
State of Ohio v. Ross Compton: Internet-enabled medical device data
introduced as evidence of arson and insurance fraud
- Authors: Marie-Helen Maras, Adam Scott Wandt
  First page: 321
  Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  The data generated by Internet of Things devices is increasingly being introduced as evidence in court. The first US case involving the introduction of medical data from a pacemaker as evidence of arson and insurance fraud was State of Ohio v Compton. The purpose of this article is three-fold. First, the article explores this case, looking in particular at the facts of the case and the charges brought against the defendant. Second, the article critically examines the decision of the trial court judge during the suppression hearing for the evidence from the pacemaker. In this hearing, the judge ruled that the search and seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant and allowed the pacemaker data to be entered as evidence against him. Third, the article considers the implications of this decision for future cases involving Internet-of-Things (IoT) medical data. Ultimately, the constitutional protections of IoT medical device data and the circumstances under which the data from these devices will be collected and used as evidence, are issues that currently demand the attention of legal and digital forensics professionals and warrant public debate.
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-06-04T12:06:56Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720930600
The fate of evidence law: Two paths of development
- Authors: Zhuhao Wang
  First page: 329
  Abstract: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, Ahead of Print.
  Evidence law was famously deemed ‘the child of the jury’, its development widely perceived as a by-product of the jury trial. Conventional wisdom tells us that juries, because of their cognitive and epistemic failings, can hardly be trusted and thus need rules of evidence to steer them in the right direction. Therefore, given that jury trials are vanishing in the United States and other common law countries, we must question whether the traditional evidence-law model is sustainable. At the same time that juries have been on the decline, rapid developments in science and technology have led to new forms of evidence, including scientific evidence, electronic evidence and process-based evidence. Presenting these new types of evidence at trials, however, often creates a mismatch with the traditional evidence-law framework. A systematic redesign of 21st-century evidence law to better accommodate the intensified interplay between science, technology and the law seems to be the next natural development. This essay explores these two distinct paths of evidence law—the old, jury-driven model and a new, science-directed model—and argues for preserving the old path while at the same time spending more resources and making greater effort to accommodate these new forms of evidence.
  Citation: The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
  PubDate: 2020-06-15T07:14:59Z
  DOI: 10.1177/1365712720930797