Subjects -> BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS (Total: 3619 journals)
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    - ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, THEORIES AND HISTORY (252 journals)
    - FASHION AND CONSUMER TRENDS (20 journals)
    - HUMAN RESOURCES (85 journals)
    - INSURANCE (26 journals)
    - INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE (135 journals)
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    - PUBLIC FINANCE, TAXATION (42 journals)
    - TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL DIRECTORIES (2 journals)

INSURANCE (26 journals)

Showing 1 - 26 of 26 Journals sorted alphabetically
Annals of Actuarial Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Assurances et gestion des risques     Full-text available via subscription  
Astin Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Banks in Insurance Report     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Blätter der DGVFM     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
British Actuarial Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Geneva Risk and Insurance Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Health Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 80)
Insurance Markets and Companies     Open Access  
Insurance: Mathematics and Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
International Journal of Business Continuity and Risk Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
International Journal of Forensic Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Forensic Engineering and Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Health Economics and Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
International Social Security Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Journal for Labour Market Research     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Journal of Derivatives & Hedge Funds     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Journal of Risk and Insurance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Risk Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Risk Management & Insurance Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Scandinavian Actuarial Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
SourceOECD Finance & Investment/Insurance & Pensions     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
The Geneva Reports     Free   (Followers: 2)
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.57
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 7  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1554-964X - ISSN (Online) 1554-9658
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2626 journals]
  • Are all mutuals the same' Evidence from CEO turnover in the US
           property–casualty insurance industry
    • Abstract: Organizational form in insurance has been widely studied in the prior literature. Although researchers have recognized sub-types of stock insurers, mutuals have always been considered as a single homogeneous category. To the extent that mutual sub-types behave differently, considering all mutuals the same can result in misleading conclusions. The present study aims to remedy this gap in the literature by considering the full range of mutual firm types. Mutuals are classified as family-controlled, association-controlled, and pure mutuals with various sub-types within each group. We analyze corporate governance among mutual sub-types in the U.S. property–casualty (P–C) insurance industry by studying CEO turnover, particularly nonroutine turnover. Multinomial probit analysis is used to test for relationships between mutual sub-types and turnover. The principal finding is that all mutuals are not the same. The probability of nonroutine CEO turnover is lowest for family-controlled, non-association mutuals and highest for association-controlled mutuals. Non-association mutuals with family-member CEOs have the lowest turnover rates among all ownership types. Thus, future research should utilize more detailed organizational form categories than the traditional literature.
      PubDate: 2020-11-10
       
  • Pensions, annuities, and long-term care insurance: on the impact of risk
           screening
    • Abstract: We examine the interaction between an individual’s pension scheme and her purchase of long-term care insurance in a context where individuals learn their longevity risk type over time. We show that the structure of an individual’s retirement pension scheme is an important component of her selection of long-term care insurance coverage. When individuals purchase their retirement product and long-term care insurance after learning their risk type, low-risk individuals signal their type solely on the retirement product market, which allows all individuals, irrespective of their risk type, to perfectly insure against the incidence of long-term care shocks. When individuals purchase their retirement product before learning their risk type, then the retirement product will pool all risk types, which prevents any signaling in that market. If individuals still learn their type before purchasing long-term care insurance, then having to signal their type in the long-term care insurance market considerably reduces the take-up rate for such protection for all risk types.
      PubDate: 2020-11-02
       
  • Covid-19: implications for insurer risk management and the insurability of
           pandemic risk
    • Abstract: This paper analyzes the insurability of pandemic risk and outlines how underwriting policies and scenario analysis are used to build resilience upfront and plan contingency actions for crisis scenarios. It then summarizes the unique “lessons learned” from the Covid-19 crisis by baselining actual developments against a reasonable, pre-Covid-19 pandemic scenario based on the 2002 SARS epidemic and 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic. Actual developments support the pre-Covid-19 hypothesis that financial market developments dominate claims losses due to the demographics of pandemics and other factors. However, Covid-19 “surprised” relative to the pre-Covid-19 scenario in terms of its impact on the real economy as well as on the property and casualty segment as business interruption property triggers and exclusions are challenged, something that may adversely impact the insurability of pandemics as well as the perception of the industry for some time to come. The unique lessons of Covid-19 reinforce the need for resilience upfront in solvency and liquidity, the need to improve business interruption wordings and re-underwrite the book, and the recognition that business interruption caused by pandemics may not be an insurable risk due to its large accumulation potential and the threat of external moral hazard. These insurability limitations lead to a discussion about the structure and financing of protection against the impact of future pandemics.
      PubDate: 2020-09-22
       
  • Insurance for economic losses caused by pandemics
    • Abstract: Private insurance coverage for economic losses caused by pandemics is limited. While many factors contribute to reduced demand and supply, we attribute the low amount of coverage to the high levels of capital that would be required to credibly insure pandemic economic losses with cross-sectional pooling mechanisms. Pooling over time significantly reduces the required capital and therefore the cost of insurance, but as a practical matter likely requires a government with the ability to borrow and tax. We also argue that insurance for economic losses due to pandemics likely generates positive externalities for the macroeconomy. We therefore analyze the general tradeoffs associated with different ways that a government can promote such insurance.
      PubDate: 2020-09-14
       
  • Stay-at-home orders and second waves: a graphical exposition
    • Abstract: Integrated epidemiological-economics models have recently appeared to study optimal government policy, especially stay-at-home orders (mass “quarantines”). But these models are challenging to interpret due to the lack of closed-form solutions. This note provides an intuitive and graphical explanation of optimal quarantine policy. To be optimal, a quarantine requires “the cavalry” (e.g., mass testing, strong therapeutics, or a vaccine) to arrive just in time, not too early or too late. The graphical explanation accommodates numerous extensions, including hospital constraints, sick worker, age differentiation, and learning. The effect of uncertainty about the arrival time of “the cavalry” is also discussed.
      PubDate: 2020-09-10
       
  • Special issue “Covid-19: the economics of pandemic risks and
           insurance” of the Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
    • PubDate: 2020-09-01
       
  • Pricing ambiguity in catastrophe risk insurance
    • Abstract: Ambiguity about the probability of loss is a salient feature of catastrophe risk insurance. Evidence shows that insurers charge higher premiums under ambiguity, but that they rely on simple heuristics to do so, rather than being able to turn to pricing tools that formally link ambiguity with the insurer’s underlying economic objective. In this paper, we apply an \(\alpha\) -maxmin model of insurance pricing to two catastrophe model data sets relating to hurricane risk. The pricing model considers an insurer who maximises expected profit, but is sensitive to how ambiguity affects its risk of ruin. We estimate ambiguity loads and show how these depend on the insurer’s attitude to ambiguity, \(\alpha\) . We also compare these results with those derived from applying model blending techniques that have recently gained popularity in the actuarial profession, and show that model blending can imply relatively low aversion to ambiguity, possibly ambiguity seeking.
      PubDate: 2020-08-27
       
  • Pandemic economics: optimal dynamic confinement under uncertainty and
           learning
    • Abstract: Most integrated models of the covid pandemic have been developed under the assumption that the policy-sensitive reproduction number is certain. The decision to exit from the lockdown has been made in most countries without knowing the reproduction number that would prevail after the deconfinement. In this paper, I explore the role of uncertainty and learning on the optimal dynamic lockdown policy. I limit the analysis to suppression strategies where the SIR dynamics can be approximated by an exponential infection decay. In the absence of uncertainty, the optimal confinement policy is to impose a constant rate of lockdown until the suppression of the virus in the population. I show that introducing uncertainty about the reproduction number of deconfined people reduces the optimal initial rate of confinement.
      PubDate: 2020-08-17
       
  • Willingness to pay for morbidity and mortality risk reductions during an
           epidemic. Theory and preliminary evidence from COVID-19
    • Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic and the strong social distancing measures adopted by governments around the world provide an ideal scenario to evaluate the trade-off between lives saved and morbidity avoided on the one hand and reduced economic resources on the other. We adapt the standard model of willingness to pay (WTP) for mortality/morbidity risk reductions by incorporating a number of aspects that are highly relevant during an epidemic; namely, health-care capacity constraints, dynamic aspects of prevention (i.e., interventions aimed at flattening the epidemic curve), and distributional issues due to high heterogeneity in the underlying risks. The calibration of the model generates a WTP of the order of 24% of GDP. We conclude that the benefits in terms of lives saved and morbidity avoided can well justify the enormous economic costs generated by social distancing interventions. There is, however, significant that heterogeneity in WTP estimates depending on the degree of vulnerability to infection risk (e.g., by age), implying a large redistribution of income and well-being.
      PubDate: 2020-08-13
       
  • Public and private incentives for self-protection
    • Abstract: Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.
      PubDate: 2020-07-21
       
  • Optimal insurance coverage of low-probability catastrophic risks
    • Abstract: Catastrophic risks are often characterised by a low probability, a high severity and a large number of affected individuals. Taking these specificities into account, we analyse the capacity of insurance contracts to provide coverage for those risks, independently from the market failures frequently observed in practice. On the demand side, we characterise individual preferences under which the willingness to pay for the coverage of large losses remains significant, although their occurrence probability is very small. On the supply side, the correlation between individual losses affects the insurance pricing through the insurers’ cost of capital. Analysing the interaction between demand and supply yields the key determinants of insurability and of a socially optimal risk sharing strategy.
      PubDate: 2020-03-31
       
  • Risk aversion, moral hazard, and gender differences in health care
           utilization
    • Abstract: This paper uses truncated count model with endogeneity and simulated maximum likelihood estimation technique to estimate gender differences in moral hazard in health care insurance. We use the dataset that consists of invoices for all outpatient services from a regional hospital in Croatia. Our theoretical model predicts that higher risk aversion is associated with smaller ex-post moral hazard effect. If women are more risk averse than men, then the moral hazard effect due to health insurance should be lower in women than in men. After adjusting for the sample selection in the estimation, we found a statistically significant evidence of moral hazard for the general population but statistically insignificant difference in moral hazard between men and women.
      PubDate: 2020-01-30
       
  • The economics of dishonest insurance companies
    • Abstract: This paper investigates the dynamics of an insurance market on which insurance companies may dishonestly deny eligible claims. Behaving dishonestly can increase the current profit but also entails the risk of losing profit in the future due to a worse reputation. Depending on the reputation cost imposed by policyholders, the analysis either predicts the emergence of reputation cycles or convergence to a stable equilibrium in which all eligible claims are accepted and the insurers’ reputations remain at a high level. I also show that policyholders may discipline insurers using a buying strategy based on an image-scoring rule. My results lead to important insights. For instance, reputation campaigns may have a pro-cyclic effect which leads to more severe reputation crises in the future.
      PubDate: 2020-01-13
       
  • Probabilistic independence axiom
    • Abstract: One of the most well-known theories of decision making under risk is expected utility theory based on the independence axiom. The independence axiom postulates that decision maker’s preferences between two lotteries are not affected by mixing both lotteries with the same third lottery (in identical proportions). The probabilistic independence axiom (also known as the cancelation axiom) extends this classic independence axiom to situations when a decision maker chooses in a probabilistic manner (i.e., she does not necessarily prefer the same choice alternative when repeatedly presented with the same choice set). Probabilistic choice may occur for a variety of reasons such as unobserved attributes of choice alternatives, imprecision of preferences, random errors/noise in decisions. According to probabilistic independence axiom, the probability that a decision maker chooses one lottery over another does not change when both lotteries are mixed with the same third lottery (in identical proportions). This paper presents a model of probabilistic binary choice under risk based on this probabilistic independence axiom. The presented model generalizes an incremental expected utility advantage model of Fishburn (Int Econ Rev 19(3):633–646, 1978) and stronger utility model of Blavatskyy (Theory Decis 76(2):265–286, 2014).
      PubDate: 2020-01-08
       
  • The insurance role of the firm
    • Abstract: We review the recent literature on the risk-sharing role of the firm. We provide a framework for studying risk sharing between workers and firm owners vis-à-vis firm's specific shocks of different nature. We show how this framework can be taken to the data to provide estimates of the extent of insurance within the firm. Estimates from a large number of Western countries strongly support the view that in capitalist economies the firm is a large albeit far from complete wage insurance instrument. We quantify the welfare benefits of firm-provided wage insurance, show evidence on how workers react to firm's shocks passed through wages, and discuss the future role of the firm as a wage insurance provider.
      PubDate: 2020-01-04
       
  • Does flood experience modify risk preferences' Evidence from an
           artefactual field experiment in Vietnam
    • Abstract: We conducted an artefactual field experiment in Vietnam to investigate whether and how experiencing a natural disaster affects individual attitudes toward risks. Using experimental and real household data, we show that households in villages affected by a flood in recent years exhibit more risk aversion, compared with individuals living in similar but unaffected villages. Interestingly, this result holds for the loss domain, but not the gain domain. In line with Prospect Theory, Vietnamese households distort probabilities. The distortion is related to aid received and social networks participation, but is unrelated to flood experience.
      PubDate: 2019-12-11
       
  • The behavioral welfare economics of insurance
    • Abstract: Behavioral economics poses a challenge for the welfare evaluation of insurance products and policy. It demands that we recognize that the descriptive account of behavior toward insurance depends on risk and time preferences that might not be the ones we were all taught, and still teach, and that subjective beliefs might not accord with actuarial assessments of loss probabilities. Challenging as that can be, things become even harder when we jettison naive notions of revealed preferences as the basis for evaluating the individual welfare of insurance decisions. These challenges demand theory, datasets that allow us to identify structural models, datasets that allow us to observe those that do not purchase insurance, appropriate econometric methods, and particularly pay close attention to the methodological nonsense that is often used to justify policy interventions.
      PubDate: 2019-10-17
       
  • Are compulsory insurance and self-insurance substitutes or
           complements' A matter of risk attitudes
    • Abstract: This article analyzes the effects of compulsory insurance on the demand for self-insurance. We show that although a risk lover invests neither in insurance nor in self-insurance when insurance is voluntary, she invests in self-insurance when insurance is compulsory. On the contrary, when insurance is mandatory, a risk averter would substitute self-insurance for insurance. Economic policy implications of these antagonistic effects on self-insurance are discussed.
      PubDate: 2019-10-15
       
  • The demand for life insurance in a heterogeneous-agent life cycle
           economy with joint decisions
    • Authors: Ning Wang
      Abstract: A life cycle model is developed to explain how and why life insurance demand of household participants varies and to further explore risk sharing effects within a household. The model includes endogenous labor supply and joint decisions of life insurance demand for men and women, and generates consumption with a sudden drop around retirement and hump-shaped wealth and life insurance. The results show that life insurance demand peaks earlier in single-parent households than married-couple households and that life insurance demand has an ambiguous relationship with mortality and wealth. The results suggest that gender disparity in life insurance demand is due to income gap. The results indicate that the effect of a spouse’s earnings on the other spouse’s demand for life insurance depends on the correlation of income between the spouses under mortality risk, and labor income risk diversification plays a role in this effect.
      PubDate: 2019-02-25
      DOI: 10.1057/s10713-019-00040-0
       
  • Large losses and equilibrium in insurance markets
    • Authors: Lisa L. Posey; Paul D. Thistle
      Abstract: We show that if losses are larger than wealth, then individuals with the option of declaring bankruptcy will not insure if the loss probability is above a threshold. In an insurance market with adverse selection, if the high risks’ loss probability is above the threshold, then no trade occurs at the Rothschild–Stiglitz equilibrium. Active trade in insurance requires cross-subsidization. When a subset of individuals with significant costs of bankruptcy and default is included in the market, then the equilibrium outcome always involves positive levels of insurance coverage for some individuals, but the parameters of the model determine whether all types receive coverage, or whether null contracts are received by both high and low risks with no bankruptcy costs or just the low risks from that group.
      PubDate: 2019-02-06
      DOI: 10.1057/s10713-019-00038-8
       
 
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