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  Subjects -> HUMANITIES (Total: 1096 journals)
    - ASIAN STUDIES (219 journals)
    - CLASSICAL STUDIES (179 journals)
    - DEMOGRAPHY AND POPULATION STUDIES (207 journals)
    - ETHNIC INTERESTS (156 journals)
    - GENEALOGY AND HERALDRY (7 journals)
    - HUMANITIES (241 journals)
    - NATIVE AMERICAN STUDIES (87 journals)

HUMANITIES (241 journals)                  1 2 3     

Aboriginal and Islander Health Worker Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Aboriginal Child at School     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
About Performance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Access     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 23)
ACCESS: Critical Perspectives on Communication, Cultural & Policy Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Acta Academica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Acta Universitaria     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Adeptus     Open Access  
Advocate: Newsletter of the National Tertiary Education Union     Full-text available via subscription  
African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
African Historical Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
AFRREV IJAH : An International Journal of Arts and Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Agriculture and Human Values     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Altre Modernità     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Amaltea. Revista de mitocrítica     Open Access  
American Imago     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
American Review of Canadian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Anabases     Open Access  
Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Anglo-Saxon England     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 224)
Antik Tanulmányok     Full-text available via subscription  
Antipode     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
Arbutus Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentation et analyse du discours     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Arion : A Journal of Humanities and the Classics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Arts and Humanities in Higher Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
Asia Europe Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Asian Perspectives in the Arts and Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Journal of Popular Culture, The     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Behaviour & Information Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 226)
Behemoth     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Bereavement Care     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Cahiers de civilisation espagnole contemporaine     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cahiers de praxématique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Canadian Journal of Popular Culture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Child Care     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Choreographic Practices     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Claroscuro     Open Access  
Co-herencia     Open Access  
Coaching: An International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Cogent Arts & Humanities     Open Access  
Colloquia Humanistica     Open Access  
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Comprehensive Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Congenital Anomalies     Hybrid Journal  
Conservation Science in Cultural Heritage     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
Cornish Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Creative Industries Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Critical Arts : South-North Cultural and Media Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Crossing the Border : International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies     Open Access  
Cuadernos de historia de España     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cuadernos de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Nacional de Jujuy     Open Access  
Cultural History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Cultural Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Culture, Theory and Critique     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Daedalus     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Dandelion : Postgraduate Arts Journal & Research Network     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Death Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Digital Humanities Quarterly     Open Access   (Followers: 37)
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doct-Us Journal     Open Access  
e-Hum : Revista das Áreas de Humanidade do Centro Universitário de Belo Horizonte     Open Access  
Early Modern Culture Online     Open Access   (Followers: 26)
Égypte - Monde arabe     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Eighteenth-Century Fiction     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Éire-Ireland     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
En-Claves del pensamiento     Open Access  
Enfoques     Open Access  
Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Études arméniennes contemporaines     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal of Cultural Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
European Journal of Social Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Expositions     Full-text available via subscription  
Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences     Hybrid Journal  
GAIA - Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
German Research     Hybrid Journal  
German Studies Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Germanic Review, The     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Globalizations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Gothic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Gruppendynamik und Organisationsberatung     Hybrid Journal  
Habitat International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Heritage & Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Hopscotch: A Cultural Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Human Affairs     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Human Nature     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Human Performance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Human Resources for Health     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Human Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
humanidades     Open Access  
Humanitaire     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Hungarian Studies     Full-text available via subscription  

        1 2 3     

Journal Cover   Journal for General Philosophy of Science
  [SJR: 0.294]   [H-I: 7]   [8 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8587 - ISSN (Online) 0925-4560
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2303 journals]
  • Editorial
    • PubDate: 2015-04-01
       
  • Theory-Ladenness Special Issue: Introduction
    • PubDate: 2015-04-01
       
  • Maturationally Natural Cognition, Radically Counter-Intuitive Science, and
           the Theory-Ladenness of Perception
    • Abstract: Abstract Theory-ladenness of perception and cognition is pervasive and variable. Emerging maturationally natural (MN) perception and cognition, which are on-line, fast, automatic, unconscious, and, by virtue of their selectivity, theoretical in import, if not in form, define normal development. They contrast with off-line, slow, deliberate, conscious perceptual and cognitive judgments that reflective theories, including scientific ones, inform. Although culture tunes MN systems, their emergence and operation do not rely on culturally distinctive inputs. The sciences advance radically counter-intuitive (RCI) representations that depart drastically from MN systems’ deliverances. Extensive experience with RCI scientific theories can result in a practiced naturalness with their perceptual and cognitive consequences; nevertheless, automatic MN verdicts persistently intrude. Fodor suggests that the uniformity of the biases MN systems introduce can serve as a theory-neutral means for adjudicating scientific disputes. Findings about vision challenge Fodor’s proposal for circumventing problems that MN theory-ladenness presents. These considerations indicate that RCI scientific ideas are difficult to learn, master, and deploy; consequently, the corrective import of science’s social and institutional arrangements plays a critical role in its epistemic stature.
      PubDate: 2015-04-01
       
  • Perception is Theory Laden: The Naturalized Evidence and Philosophical
           Implications
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper proposes a set of criteria for an appropriate experiment on the issue of the theory ladenness of perception. These criteria are used to select a number of experiments that use: belief-based ambiguous figures, fragmented figures, or memory color. Crucially, the data in experiments of this type are based on the participant’s qualitative visual experience. Across many different types of experimental designs, different types of stimuli, and different types of belief manipulation, these experiments show the impact of belief/theory on visual perception. Using an ecological validity argument, I conclude that attention-based interpretations of these findings are not successful because the relevant epistemological issues only require that we examine final perception, in the sense of visual awareness of the everyday world. Finally, I argue that the epistemological consequences of theory-ladenness can be reduced by using a top-down/bottom-up theoretical framework and by adopting appropriate methodological procedures to data derived from individual observations.
      PubDate: 2015-03-22
       
  • Skill, Nonpropositional Thought, and the Cognitive Penetrability of
           Perception
    • Abstract: Abstract In the current literature, discussions of cognitive penetrability focus largely either on interpreting empirical evidence in ways that is relevant to the question of modularity (Pylyshyn Behav Brain Sci 22(3):343–391, 1999; Wu Philos Stud 165(2):647–669, 2012; Macpherson Philos Phenomenol Res, 84(1):24–62, 2012) or in offering epistemological considerations regarding which properties are represented in perception (Siegel Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 481–503, 2006, Philos Q 59(236):519–540, 2009, Noûs 46(2):201–222, 2011; Prinz Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 434–460, 2006). In contrast to these debates, in this paper, I explore conceptual issues regarding how we ought to understand the “cognitive” side of cognitive penetrability. I argue that it is only on its most narrow construal that a full-fledged defense of cognitive impenetrability has been forwarded. Specifically, I argue that the defenders of modularity (DOM from hereon) have tacitly identified cognitive states with propositional states, and have thus only defended the idea that early perceptual systems are immune to the impacts of propositional knowledge. My aim then is to raise doubts about the identification of cognitive states with propositional ones. In particular, by focusing on skill, I will broaden the conceptual space for a greater number of states to have the potential to impact perceptual processing in a way that would constitute a genuine instance of cognitive penetrability.
      PubDate: 2015-03-22
       
  • The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I claim that since (a) there is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and (b) cognitive penetrability (CP) and theory-ladenness are coextensive, the CI of early vision entails that early vision content is theory neutral. This theory-neutral part undermines relativism. In this paper, I consider two objections against the thesis. The one adduces evidence from cases of rapid perceptual learning to undermine my thesis that early vision is CI. The other emphasizes that the early perceptual system, in order to solve various underdetermination problems, relies on certain principles, which may be taken to constitute a sort of a theory about the world that affect early vision, rendering it theory-laden. Both objections purport to show that early vision is CP and theory-laden. Against this thesis, I argue that the evidence on which the two objections are based does not show that early vision is CP and is fully compatible with the view that early vision is CI.
      PubDate: 2015-03-19
       
  • Microscopes and the Theory-Ladenness of Experience in Bas van
           Fraassen’s Recent Work
    • Abstract: Abstract Bas van Fraassen’s recent book Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (2008) modifies and refines the “constructive empiricism” of The Scientific Image (1980) in a number of ways. This paper investigates the changes concerning one of the most controversial aspects of the overall position, that is, van Fraassen’s agnosticism concerning the veridicality of microscopic observation. The paper tries to make plausible that the new formulation of this agnosticism is an advance over the older rendering. The central part of this investigation is an attempt to answer Marc Alspector-Kelly’s 2004-criticism of an early (2001) version of van Fraassen’s new position. Alspector-Kelly’s contribution it is to date the most extensive attack on van Fraassen’s twenty-first-century work on the topic of microscopic observation. One of the central ideas emerging from the present discussion is a link between the debate over the veridicality of microscopic observation and the issue of the theory-ladenness of experience.
      PubDate: 2015-03-19
       
  • Ostensive Learnability as a Test Criterion for Theory-Neutral Observation
           Concepts
    • Abstract: Abstract In the first part of my paper I discuss eight arguments in favour of the theory-dependence of observation: (1) realistic content, (2) guidance function of theories, (3) perception as cognitive construction, (4) expectation-dependence of perception, (5) theory-dependence of scientific data, (6) continuity between observational and theoretical concepts, (7) language-dependence, and (8) meaning holism. I argue that although these arguments make correct points, they do not exclude the existence of observations that are weakly theory-neutral in the sense that they don’t depend on acquired background knowledge. In the second part I suggest an experimental method, the method of ostensive learning experiments, by which the degree of theory- and language-independence of a concept can be tested.
      PubDate: 2015-03-19
       
  • Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of
           Nonconceptualism
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994b). I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver’s conception of objectivity; and second, even nonconceptual capacities of the individual cannot and need not be appealed to in order to account for objective perceptual content.
      PubDate: 2015-03-19
       
  • The Theory-Ladenness of Experiment
    • Abstract: Abstract Theory-ladenness is the view that observation cannot function in an unbiased way in the testing of theories because observational judgments are affected by the theoretical beliefs of the observer. Its more radical cousin, incommensurability, argues that because there is no theory-neutral language, paradigms, or worldviews, cannot be compared because in different paradigms the meaning of observational terms is different, even when the word used is the same. There are both philosophical and practical components to these problems. I argue, using a procedurally-defined, theory-neutral experiment that paradigms are indeed commensurable. The practical problems of theory ladenness include experimental design, failure to interpret observations correctly, possible experimenter bias, and difficulties in data acquisition. I suggest that there are methods to deal with these problems, although sometimes they cannot be dealt with completely. I believe that the philosophical problems of theory-ladenness have been solved, although the practical problems remain.
      PubDate: 2015-03-19
       
  • Berkeleys Kritik am Leibniz´schen calculus
    • Abstract: Abstract One of the most famous critiques of the Leibnitian calculus is contained in the essay “The Analyst” written by George Berkeley in 1734. His key argument is those on compensating errors. In this article, we reconstruct Berkeley's argument from a systematical point of view showing that the argument is neither circular nor trivial, as some modern historians think. In spite of this well-founded argument, the critique of Berkeley is with respect to the calculus not a fundamental one. Nevertheless, it highlights central aspects of the calculus that are characteristic of modern scientific theories.
      PubDate: 2015-02-15
       
  • Gerhard Schurz: Philosophy of Science—A Unified Approach
    • PubDate: 2015-01-28
       
  • Incommensurability, Comparability, and Non-reductive Ontological Relations
    • Abstract: Abstract We begin by highlighting some points related to Kuhn’s later thoughts on the incommensurability thesis and then show to what extent the standard version of the thesis given by the structuralist metatheory allows us to capture Kuhn’s ideas. Our main aim is to establish what constitutes the basis of comparability between incommensurable theories, even in cases of incommensurability with respect to theoretical and non-theoretical terms. We propose that comparability between (radical) incommensurable theories requires some connection between their respective ontologies that can be captured by means of an ontological non-reductive relation. At this point, the structuralist notion of “echeloned partial substructure” may be of help. When the incommensurability is very drastic, the existence of ontological connections between the theories involved may only be evident by common terms of their non-characteristic vocabularies. So, this notion of non-characteristic vocabulary becomes relevant in our proposal.
      PubDate: 2015-01-01
       
  • Astrid Schwarz: Experiments in Practice
    • PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Explaining Same-Sex Sexual Behavior: The Stagnation of the Genetic and
           Evolutionary Research Programs
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper is an attempt to reconstruct the history of genetic and evolutionary theories of same-sex sexual behavior using Imre Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP). Although distinct, those two programs are complementary. Whereas the genetic program maintains that homosexuality is genetically inherited, the evolutionary program attempts to explain how such a gene, which apparently reduces the reproductive fitness of its homozygous carrier, is maintained in the population. This appraisal reveals that the two research programs have not been empirically progressive in the Lakatosian sense. I argue that this situation has arisen precisely because of inappropriate over-commitment to the respective hard cores of the two research programs. As adherence to such cores is essential for success in research programs, according to Lakatos, I argue that Lakatos’ account of science may be descriptively adequate but is normatively inadequate. I provide grounds for generalizing this case as follows: the MSRP may successfully capture the logic of axiomised sciences, such as physics, but applies poorly to most sciences, including biological and social sciences, which do not lend themselves to axiomatic organization.
      PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Katrina Hutchison and Fiona Jenkins (eds): Women in Philosophy: What Needs
           to Change?
    • PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Husserl, Cassirer, Schlick: “Scientific Philosophy” Between
           Phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism and Logical Empiricism (Tübingen,
           November 23–25, 2012)
    • PubDate: 2014-12-18
       
  • Bohr’s Philosophy in the Light of Peircean Pragmatism
    • Abstract: Abstract Adopting Murdoch’s pragmatist reading of Bohr’s theory of meaning with regard to Bohr’s notion of complementarity, in this paper I try to see Bohr’s post-Como and, in particular, post-EPR philosophy of quantum mechanics in the light of Peircean pragmatism with the hope that such a construal can shed more light to Bohr’s philosophy. I supplement Murdoch’s position on Bohr’s pragmatism by showing that in addition to his complementarity, Bohr’s correspondence principle, instrumentalism and realism can be read on the basis of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and his notion of indeterminism has commonalities with Peirce’s tychism. Also, Bohr’s practice of applying the correspondence principle can be interpreted in the light of Peirce’s fallibilism. However, when it comes to Bohr’s understanding of the symbolic character of quantum mechanics, Bohr’s philosophy deviates from Peircean pragmatism. Bohr’s philosophy distinguishes between the symbolic language of quantum formalism, which counts as a tool practically useful for prediction, and observation sentences which are visualizable in space and time and refer to the so-called individual phenomena. Such an epistemologically significant distinction is not recognized by Peircean pragmatism.
      PubDate: 2014-12-14
       
  • Philosophy of Science in Neo-Kantianism (Universität Wien, November
           29th–December 1st 2012)
    • PubDate: 2014-12-14
       
  • Carnap, Kuhn, and the History of Science: A Reply to Thomas Uebel
    • Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this article is to respond to Thomas Uebel’s criticisms of my comments regarding the current revisionism of Carnap’s work and its relations to Kuhn. I begin by pointing out some misunderstandings in the interpretation of my article. I then discuss some aspects related to Carnap’s view of the history of science. First, I emphasize that it was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn’s conceptions and those of logical positivists that Kuhn was invited to write the monograph on the history of science for the Encyclopedia. Three other authors had been invited first, including George Sarton whose conception was entirely different from Kuhn’s. In addition, I try to show that Carnap attributes little importance to the history of science. He seldom refers to it and, when he does, he clearly defends (like Sarton) a Whig or an ‘old’ historiography of science, to which Kuhn opposes his “new historiography of science”. It is argued that this raises serious difficulties for those, like Uebel, who hold the view that Carnap includes the historical or the social within the rational.
      PubDate: 2014-12-13
       
 
 
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