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  Subjects -> HUMANITIES (Total: 1102 journals)
    - ASIAN STUDIES (220 journals)
    - CLASSICAL STUDIES (180 journals)
    - DEMOGRAPHY AND POPULATION STUDIES (208 journals)
    - ETHNIC INTERESTS (156 journals)
    - GENEALOGY AND HERALDRY (7 journals)
    - HUMANITIES (242 journals)
    - NATIVE AMERICAN STUDIES (89 journals)

HUMANITIES (242 journals)                  1 2 3     

Aboriginal and Islander Health Worker Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Aboriginal Child at School     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
About Performance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Access     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24)
ACCESS: Critical Perspectives on Communication, Cultural & Policy Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Acta Academica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Acta Universitaria     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Adeptus     Open Access  
Advocate: Newsletter of the National Tertiary Education Union     Full-text available via subscription  
African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
African Historical Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
AFRREV IJAH : An International Journal of Arts and Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Agriculture and Human Values     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Altre Modernità     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Amaltea. Revista de mitocrítica     Open Access  
American Imago     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
American Review of Canadian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Anabases     Open Access  
Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Anglo-Saxon England     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 61)
Antik Tanulmányok     Full-text available via subscription  
Antipode     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
Arbutus Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentation et analyse du discours     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Arion : A Journal of Humanities and the Classics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Arts and Humanities in Higher Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
Asia Europe Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Asian Perspectives in the Arts and Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Australasian Journal of Popular Culture, The     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Behaviour & Information Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 63)
Behemoth     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Bereavement Care     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Cahiers de civilisation espagnole contemporaine     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cahiers de praxématique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Child Care     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Choreographic Practices     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Claroscuro     Open Access  
Co-herencia     Open Access  
Coaching: An International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Cogent Arts & Humanities     Open Access  
Colloquia Humanistica     Open Access  
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Comprehensive Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Congenital Anomalies     Hybrid Journal  
Conservation Science in Cultural Heritage     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Cornish Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Creative Industries Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Critical Arts : South-North Cultural and Media Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Crossing the Border : International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de historia de España     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cuadernos de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Nacional de Jujuy     Open Access  
Cultural History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Cultural Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Culture, Theory and Critique     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Daedalus     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Dandelion : Postgraduate Arts Journal & Research Network     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Death Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Digital Humanities Quarterly     Open Access   (Followers: 42)
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Doct-Us Journal     Open Access  
e-Hum : Revista das Áreas de Humanidade do Centro Universitário de Belo Horizonte     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Early Modern Culture Online     Open Access   (Followers: 28)
Égypte - Monde arabe     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Eighteenth-Century Fiction     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Éire-Ireland     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
En-Claves del pensamiento     Open Access  
Enfoques     Open Access  
Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Études arméniennes contemporaines     Open Access  
Études de lettres     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
European Journal of Cultural Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
European Journal of Social Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Expositions     Full-text available via subscription  
Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences     Hybrid Journal  
GAIA - Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
German Research     Hybrid Journal  
German Studies Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Germanic Review, The     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Globalizations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Gothic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Gruppendynamik und Organisationsberatung     Hybrid Journal  
Habitat International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Heritage & Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Hopscotch: A Cultural Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Human Affairs     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Human Nature     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Human Performance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Human Resources for Health     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Human Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
humanidades     Open Access  
Humanitaire     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Hungarian Studies     Full-text available via subscription  

        1 2 3     

Journal Cover   Journal for General Philosophy of Science
  [SJR: 0.294]   [H-I: 7]   [6 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8587 - ISSN (Online) 0925-4560
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2292 journals]
  • Popper and Wittgenstein on the Metaphysics of Experience
    • Abstract: Abstract In the Tractatus Wittgenstein argued that there are metaphysical truths. But these are ineffable, for metaphysical sentences try to say what can only be shown. Accordingly, they are pseudo-propositions because they are ill-formed. In the Investigations he no longer thought that metaphysical propositions are pseudo-propositions, but argued that they are either nonsense or norms of descriptions. Popper criticized Wittgenstein’s ideas and argued that metaphysical truths are effable. Yet it is by now clear that he misunderstood Wittgenstein’s arguments (namely that metaphysical propositions are ill-formed because they employ unbound variables) and misguidedly thought that Wittgenstein used the principle of verification for distinguishing empirical propositions from metaphysical propositions. Because Popper developed his philosophy in part as a critique of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, this invites the question of whether these misunderstandings have consequences for his own philosophy. I discuss this question and argue that Popper’s attempt to distinguish metaphysics and science with the aid of a criterion of testability is from Wittgenstein’s perspective misguided. The main problem facing Popper’s philosophy is that alleged metaphysical propositions are not theoretical propositions but rules for descriptions (in the misleading guise of empirical propositions). If Wittgenstein’s ideas are correct, then metaphysical problems are not scientific but grammatical problems which can only be resolved through conceptual investigations.
      PubDate: 2015-06-12
       
  • Moritz Schlick: Nietzsche und Schopenhauer (Vorlesungen) herausgegeben und
           eingeleitet von Mathias Iven, 2013. Band 5.1 der Moritz Schlick
           Gesamtausgabe (MSGA)
    • PubDate: 2015-05-29
       
  • Peter Vickers: Understanding Inconsistent Science
    • PubDate: 2015-05-29
       
  • Georg Toepfer: Historisches Wörterbuch der Biologie. Geschichte und
           Theorie der Biologischen Grundbegriffe
    • PubDate: 2015-05-22
       
  • Social Objectivity Under Scrutiny in the Pasteur–Pouchet Debate
    • Abstract: Abstract Under the influence of naturalistic approaches, contemporary philosophy of science tends to characterize scientific objectivity not by virtue of the individualistic following of rules or satisfying epistemic utilities, but as a property arising from the organisational features of groups. This paper presents a critical review of one such proposal, that of Helen Longino, probing some of its main features against the debate between Pasteur and Pouchet in mid-nineteenth-century France regarding the spontaneous generation of life. After considering some weaknesses and strengths, it is argued that Longino’s social epistemology is only able to generate normativity by implicitly assuming a classic procedural notion of epistemic acceptability. The paper also aims to use this historical case to shed light on the complex, multidimensional nature of the dynamics of actual science, arguing both against purely epistemic and exclusively social approaches in a satisfactory meta-scientific explanation of controversies.
      PubDate: 2015-05-20
       
  • Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived
           Objections
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”. From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy, it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that denying a key premise in the reductio only forces antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science into a dilemma: either antirealism falls under the axe of Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science or it falls under the axe of the New Induction on the History of Philosophy.
      PubDate: 2015-05-20
       
  • Causality, Teleology, and Thought Experiments in Biology
    • Abstract: Abstract Thought experiments (henceforth TEs) de facto play many different roles in biology: economical, ethical, technical and so forth. This paper, however, is interested in whether there are any distinctive features of biological TEs as such. The question may be settled in the affirmative because TEs in biology have a function that is intimately connected with the epistemological and methodological status of biology. Peculiar to TEs in biology is the fact that the reflexive, typically human concept of finality may be profitably employed to discover mechanical-experimental causal relations in all living beings—with the obvious caveat that we do not hypostatise and interpret this concept as an ontological quality, since this would land one in an implicitly animistic, pre-Galilean view of nature. From a methodical point of view, the concept of finality is an essential assumption as well as a powerful heuristic tool in the practice of biology, that is, in the investigation of living beings in an intersubjectively testable and reproducible way.
      PubDate: 2015-05-20
       
  • Editorial
    • PubDate: 2015-04-01
       
  • Theory-Ladenness Special Issue: Introduction
    • PubDate: 2015-04-01
       
  • Maturationally Natural Cognition, Radically Counter-Intuitive Science, and
           the Theory-Ladenness of Perception
    • Abstract: Abstract Theory-ladenness of perception and cognition is pervasive and variable. Emerging maturationally natural (MN) perception and cognition, which are on-line, fast, automatic, unconscious, and, by virtue of their selectivity, theoretical in import, if not in form, define normal development. They contrast with off-line, slow, deliberate, conscious perceptual and cognitive judgments that reflective theories, including scientific ones, inform. Although culture tunes MN systems, their emergence and operation do not rely on culturally distinctive inputs. The sciences advance radically counter-intuitive (RCI) representations that depart drastically from MN systems’ deliverances. Extensive experience with RCI scientific theories can result in a practiced naturalness with their perceptual and cognitive consequences; nevertheless, automatic MN verdicts persistently intrude. Fodor suggests that the uniformity of the biases MN systems introduce can serve as a theory-neutral means for adjudicating scientific disputes. Findings about vision challenge Fodor’s proposal for circumventing problems that MN theory-ladenness presents. These considerations indicate that RCI scientific ideas are difficult to learn, master, and deploy; consequently, the corrective import of science’s social and institutional arrangements plays a critical role in its epistemic stature.
      PubDate: 2015-04-01
       
  • Skill, Nonpropositional Thought, and the Cognitive Penetrability of
           Perception
    • Abstract: Abstract In the current literature, discussions of cognitive penetrability focus largely either on interpreting empirical evidence in ways that is relevant to the question of modularity (Pylyshyn Behav Brain Sci 22(3):343–391, 1999; Wu Philos Stud 165(2):647–669, 2012; Macpherson Philos Phenomenol Res, 84(1):24–62, 2012) or in offering epistemological considerations regarding which properties are represented in perception (Siegel Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 481–503, 2006, Philos Q 59(236):519–540, 2009, Noûs 46(2):201–222, 2011; Prinz Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 434–460, 2006). In contrast to these debates, in this paper, I explore conceptual issues regarding how we ought to understand the “cognitive” side of cognitive penetrability. I argue that it is only on its most narrow construal that a full-fledged defense of cognitive impenetrability has been forwarded. Specifically, I argue that the defenders of modularity (DOM from hereon) have tacitly identified cognitive states with propositional states, and have thus only defended the idea that early perceptual systems are immune to the impacts of propositional knowledge. My aim then is to raise doubts about the identification of cognitive states with propositional ones. In particular, by focusing on skill, I will broaden the conceptual space for a greater number of states to have the potential to impact perceptual processing in a way that would constitute a genuine instance of cognitive penetrability.
      PubDate: 2015-03-22
       
  • Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of
           Nonconceptualism
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994b). I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver’s conception of objectivity; and second, even nonconceptual capacities of the individual cannot and need not be appealed to in order to account for objective perceptual content.
      PubDate: 2015-03-19
       
  • The Theory-Ladenness of Experiment
    • Abstract: Abstract Theory-ladenness is the view that observation cannot function in an unbiased way in the testing of theories because observational judgments are affected by the theoretical beliefs of the observer. Its more radical cousin, incommensurability, argues that because there is no theory-neutral language, paradigms, or worldviews, cannot be compared because in different paradigms the meaning of observational terms is different, even when the word used is the same. There are both philosophical and practical components to these problems. I argue, using a procedurally-defined, theory-neutral experiment that paradigms are indeed commensurable. The practical problems of theory ladenness include experimental design, failure to interpret observations correctly, possible experimenter bias, and difficulties in data acquisition. I suggest that there are methods to deal with these problems, although sometimes they cannot be dealt with completely. I believe that the philosophical problems of theory-ladenness have been solved, although the practical problems remain.
      PubDate: 2015-03-19
       
  • Berkeleys Kritik am Leibniz´schen calculus
    • Abstract: Abstract One of the most famous critiques of the Leibnitian calculus is contained in the essay “The Analyst” written by George Berkeley in 1734. His key argument is those on compensating errors. In this article, we reconstruct Berkeley's argument from a systematical point of view showing that the argument is neither circular nor trivial, as some modern historians think. In spite of this well-founded argument, the critique of Berkeley is with respect to the calculus not a fundamental one. Nevertheless, it highlights central aspects of the calculus that are characteristic of modern scientific theories.
      PubDate: 2015-02-15
       
  • Gerhard Schurz: Philosophy of Science—A Unified Approach
    • PubDate: 2015-01-28
       
  • Astrid Schwarz: Experiments in Practice
    • PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Katrina Hutchison and Fiona Jenkins (eds): Women in Philosophy: What Needs
           to Change?
    • PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Husserl, Cassirer, Schlick: “Scientific Philosophy” Between
           Phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism and Logical Empiricism (Tübingen,
           November 23–25, 2012)
    • PubDate: 2014-12-18
       
  • Philosophy of Science in Neo-Kantianism (Universität Wien, November
           29th–December 1st 2012)
    • PubDate: 2014-12-14
       
  • Carnap, Kuhn, and the History of Science: A Reply to Thomas Uebel
    • Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this article is to respond to Thomas Uebel’s criticisms of my comments regarding the current revisionism of Carnap’s work and its relations to Kuhn. I begin by pointing out some misunderstandings in the interpretation of my article. I then discuss some aspects related to Carnap’s view of the history of science. First, I emphasize that it was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn’s conceptions and those of logical positivists that Kuhn was invited to write the monograph on the history of science for the Encyclopedia. Three other authors had been invited first, including George Sarton whose conception was entirely different from Kuhn’s. In addition, I try to show that Carnap attributes little importance to the history of science. He seldom refers to it and, when he does, he clearly defends (like Sarton) a Whig or an ‘old’ historiography of science, to which Kuhn opposes his “new historiography of science”. It is argued that this raises serious difficulties for those, like Uebel, who hold the view that Carnap includes the historical or the social within the rational.
      PubDate: 2014-12-13
       
 
 
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