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Publisher: Springer-Verlag   (Total: 2210 journals)

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Dynamic Games and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Dysphagia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 203, SJR: 0.684, h-index: 46)
e & i Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.146, h-index: 8)
e-Neuroforum     Hybrid Journal  
Early Childhood Education J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.367, h-index: 12)
Earth Science Informatics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.245, h-index: 5)
Earth, Moon, and Planets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.436, h-index: 28)
Earthquake Engineering and Engineering Vibration     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.433, h-index: 17)
Earthquake Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.486, h-index: 7)
East Asia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.165, h-index: 9)
Eating and Weight Disorders - Studies on Anorexia, Bulimia and Obesity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.289, h-index: 23)
EcoHealth     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.651, h-index: 22)
Ecological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.698, h-index: 38)
Economic Botany     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.666, h-index: 40)
Economic Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Economic Change and Restructuring     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.263, h-index: 6)
Economic Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 1.857, h-index: 31)
Economic Theory Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Economics of Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.367, h-index: 12)
Ecosystems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 1.793, h-index: 83)
Ecotoxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 1.041, h-index: 53)
Education and Information Technologies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 190, SJR: 0.207, h-index: 15)
Educational Assessment, Evaluation and Accountability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.519, h-index: 14)
Educational Psychology Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.781, h-index: 52)
Educational Research for Policy and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.211, h-index: 8)
Educational Studies in Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.946, h-index: 27)
Educational Technology Research and Development     Partially Free   (Followers: 192, SJR: 1.124, h-index: 45)
Electrical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.352, h-index: 17)
Electrocatalysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.542, h-index: 7)
Electronic Commerce Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.636, h-index: 14)
Electronic Markets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.326, h-index: 5)
Electronic Materials Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.566, h-index: 11)
Elemente der Mathematik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Emergency Radiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.446, h-index: 22)
Empirica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.185, h-index: 12)
Empirical Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.5, h-index: 29)
Empirical Software Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 2.319, h-index: 33)
Employee Responsibilities and Rights J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.21, h-index: 13)
Endocrine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.659, h-index: 55)
Endocrine Pathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.555, h-index: 27)
Energy Efficiency     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 1.056, h-index: 10)
Energy Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.589, h-index: 5)
Engineering With Computers     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.497, h-index: 26)
Entomological Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.128, h-index: 5)
Environment Systems & Decisions     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Environment, Development and Sustainability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28, SJR: 0.319, h-index: 26)
Environmental and Ecological Statistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.389, h-index: 29)
Environmental and Resource Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.651, h-index: 46)
Environmental Biology of Fishes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.486, h-index: 53)
Environmental Chemistry Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.664, h-index: 22)
Environmental Earth Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.601, h-index: 55)
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.35, h-index: 3)
Environmental Evidence     Open Access  
Environmental Fluid Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.732, h-index: 23)
Environmental Geochemistry and Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.909, h-index: 32)
Environmental Geology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Environmental Health and Preventive Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.388, h-index: 14)
Environmental Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 33, SJR: 0.773, h-index: 60)
Environmental Modeling & Assessment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.413, h-index: 27)
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.671, h-index: 46)
Environmental Science and Pollution Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.878, h-index: 42)
Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations     Open Access   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.002, h-index: 14)
Epileptic Disorders     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.669, h-index: 34)
EPJ A - Hadrons and Nuclei     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.435, h-index: 58)
EPJ B - Condensed Matter and Complex Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.749, h-index: 85)
EPJ direct     Hybrid Journal  
EPJ E - Soft Matter and Biological Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.661, h-index: 57)
EPMA J.     Open Access   (SJR: 0.161, h-index: 4)
ERA-Forum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.13, h-index: 2)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.62, h-index: 14)
Erwerbs-Obstbau     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.173, h-index: 8)
Esophagus     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.268, h-index: 9)
Estuaries and Coasts     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.111, h-index: 61)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.278, h-index: 8)
Ethics and Information Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 193, SJR: 0.363, h-index: 20)
Ethik in der Medizin     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.204, h-index: 6)
Euphytica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.709, h-index: 57)
Eurasian Soil Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.271, h-index: 10)
EURO J. of Transportation and Logistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
EURO J. on Computational Optimization     Hybrid Journal  
EURO J. on Decision Processes     Hybrid Journal  
Europaisches J. fur Minderheitenfragen     Hybrid Journal  
European Actuarial J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
European Archives of Oto-Rhino-Laryngology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.737, h-index: 37)
European Archives of Paediatric Dentistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.446, h-index: 12)
European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.334, h-index: 62)
European Biophysics J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.979, h-index: 53)
European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.269, h-index: 51)
European Clinics in Obstetrics and Gynaecology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
European Food Research and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.773, h-index: 49)
European J. for Education Law and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
European J. for Philosophy of Science     Partially Free   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.165, h-index: 2)
European J. of Ageing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.49, h-index: 17)
European J. of Applied Physiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 1.044, h-index: 74)
European J. of Clinical Microbiology & Infectious Diseases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.958, h-index: 74)
European J. of Clinical Pharmacology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.916, h-index: 69)
European J. of Dermatology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
European J. of Drug Metabolism and Pharmacokinetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.24, h-index: 25)
European J. of Epidemiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.946, h-index: 60)
European J. of Forest Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.864, h-index: 25)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
   [13 followers]  Follow    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
     ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
     Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2210 journals]   [SJR: 0.62]   [H-I: 14]
  • Logicism as Making Arithmetic Explicit
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper aims to shed light on the broader significance of Frege’s logicism (and hence the phenomenon of modern logic) against the background of discussing and comparing Wittgenstein’s ‘showing/saying’-distinction with Brandom’s idiom of logic as the enterprise of making the implicit rules of our linguistic practices (something we do) explicit (by something we say). The main thesis of this paper is that the problem of Frege’s logicism lies deeper than in its inconsistency (which has since turned out to be reparable, as the neologicists have shown): it lies in the basic idea that in arithmetic (and prospectively in language in general) one can, and should, express everything that is implicitly presupposed so that nothing is left unsaid. This, in fact, is the target of Wittgenstein’s critique. Rather than the Tractatus, with its claim that logicism attempts to say something that can only be shown (e.g. what ‘object’, ‘function’ or ‘number’ are), it is the Philosophical Investigations, with its argument by regress against the thesis that every rule which one can follow must be of an explicit nature, that is of real significance here.
      PubDate: 2014-12-23
       
  • Belief Retention: A Fregean Account
    • Abstract: Abstract Concerning cases involving temporal indexicals Kaplan has argued that Fregean thoughts cannot be the bearers of cognitive significance due to the alleged fact that one can think the same thought from one occasion to the next without realizing this—thus linking the issue of cognitive significance to that of belief retention. Kaplan comes up with his own version of the Fregean strategy for accounting for belief retention that does not face this kind of a problem; but he finds it deficient because it leads us to implausibly deny that one who is lost in time retains the beliefs one held before this occurred. I take issue with Kaplan though in conformity with his plausible demands about belief retention and argue that a situation does not arise in which one can fail to realize that one is thinking the same thought from one occasion to the next. I also argue that thoughts are the bearers of cognitive significance as well as explanatory of belief retention.
      PubDate: 2014-12-21
       
  • Heil’s Two-Category Ontology and Causation
    • Abstract: Abstract In his recent book, The Universe As We Find It, John Heil offers an updated account of his two-category (substance and property) ontology. One of his major goals is to avoid including relations in his basic ontology. While there can still be true claims positing relations, such as those of the form “x is taller than y” and “x causes y,” they will be true in virtue of substances and their monadic, non-relational properties. That is, Heil’s two-category ontology is deployed to provide non-relational truthmakers for relational truths. This paper challenges the success of Heil’s project with respect to causation. The arguments here are not entirely negative, however. An option is made available to Heil’s ontology so that it might, at least to some extent, regain non-relational causings.
      PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Social Construction, Mathematics, and the Collective Imposition of
           Function onto Reality
    • Abstract: Abstract Stereotypes of social construction suggest that the existence of social constructs is accidental and that such constructs have arbitrary and subjective features. In this paper, I explore a conception of social construction according to which it consists in the collective imposition of function onto reality and show that, according to this conception, these stereotypes are incorrect. In particular, I argue that the collective imposition of function onto reality is typically non-accidental and that the products of such imposition frequently have non-arbitrary and objective features. These conclusions are interesting in and of themselves since they debunk important aspects of our socially constructed conception of social construction. Yet, additionally, they have important implications for the viability of mathematical social constructivism since resistance to such constructivism is frequently grounded in the observation that mathematics is non-accidental, non-arbitrary, and objective. As a secondary focus, I explore these implications in this paper.
      PubDate: 2014-12-20
       
  • Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars (Baker in Persons and bodies: a constitution view. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 22, 20; Lowe in Erkenntnis 65(1):5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent advocates of this view, Lynne Rudder Baker and E.J. Lowe, suggest that emergent particulars have physical properties in virtue of the relations they bear to physical particulars—they ‘inherit’ their physical properties. In Sect. 1, I argue that having a property F this way is not instantiating F. In Sect. 2, I raise concerns that if emergent particulars don’t instantiate physical properties, then facts about emergent particulars don’t explain intentional actions. I suggest that emergent dualism would be more attractive if it could avoid this apparent consequence. In Sect. 3, I propose a view according to which some instances of physical properties are instantiated by both an emergent particular and its body.
      PubDate: 2014-12-19
       
  • Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-existent
           Without Meinongian Metaphysics
    • Abstract: Abstract Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what our relationship as thinkers is to them. However, I argue this assumption only holds if you think your language, and in particular that aspect of it to do with referring to entities works in a specific way. This is the specific way generally assumed by the discipline called ‘Semantics’. I sketch out an alternative, call it global expressivism, in which talk of referring is given an expressivist, speech-act theoretic treatment. If we accept that our talk of the non-existent works as the global expressivist tells us it does, then the question of the metaphysical nature of non-existent entities is utterly void. You might say that Pegasus is empty of any metaphysical nature. Since the non-existent lacks any metaphysical nature, the metaphysics of the non-existent, Meinongianism, as a form of inquiry, lacks a subject matter, despite the fact that we talk happily, and indeed unavoidably, of the non-existent.
      PubDate: 2014-12-06
       
  • The Other Francis Bacon: On Non-BARE Proper Names
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper I provide novel arguments for the predicative approach to proper names, which claims that argument proper names are definite descriptions containing a naming predicate (the individual called X). I first argue that modified proper names, such as the incomparable Maria Callas or the other Francis Bacon cannot be handled on the hypothesis that argument proper names have no internal structure and uniformly denote entities. I then discuss cases like every Adolf, which would normally be interpreted as every individual named Adolf and show that the predicative approach to proper names can straightforwardly account for the distribution of a detectable naming component in proper names. Finally, I address the issue of proper names used as common nouns (such as a Rembrandt or the new Madonna) and plural proper names (e.g., the Beatles) and demonstrate that they do not form a homogenous group yet can be clearly distinguished on both syntactic and semantic grounds from proper names involving a detectable naming component.
      PubDate: 2014-12-06
       
  • Ceteris Paribus Laws in Physics
    • Abstract: Abstract Earman and Roberts (in Synthese 118:439–478, 1999) claim that there is neither a persuasive account of the truth-conditions of ceteris paribus laws, nor of how such laws can be confirmed or disconfirmed. I will give an account of the truth conditions of ceteris paribus laws in physics in terms of dispositions. It will meet the objections standardly raised against such an account. Furthermore I will elucidate how ceteris paribus laws can be tested in physics. The essential point is that physics provides methodologies for dealing with disturbing factors. For this reason disturbing factors need not be listed explicitly in law-statements. In virtue of the methodologies it is possible to test how systems would behave if the disturbing factors were absent. I will argue that this suffices to establish the tenability of the dispositional account of ceteris paribus laws.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Do Statistical Laws Solve the ‘Problem of Provisos’?
    • Abstract: Abstract In their influential paper “Ceteris Paribus, There is No Problem of Provisos”, Earman and Roberts (Synthese 118:439–478, 1999) propose to interpret the non-strict generalizations of the special sciences as statistical generalizations about correlations. I call this view the “statistical account”. Earman and Roberts claim that statistical generalizations are not qualified by “non-lazy” ceteris paribus conditions. The statistical account is an attractive view, since it looks exactly like what everybody wants: it is a simple and intelligible theory of special science laws without the need for mysterious ceteris paribus conditions. I present two challenges to the statistical account. According to the first challenge, the statistical account does not get rid of so-called “non-lazy” ceteris paribus conditions. This result undermines one of the alleged and central advantages of the statistical account. The second challenge is that the statistical account, qua general theory of special science laws, is weakened by the fact that idealized law statements resist a purely statistical interpretation.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Ceteris Paribus Laws Need Machines to Generate Them
    • Abstract: Abstract Most of the regularities that get represented as ‘laws’ in our sciences arise from, and are to be found regularly associated with, the successful operation of a nomological machine. Reference to the nomological machine must be included in the cp-clause of a cp-law if the entire cp-claim is to be true. We agree, for example, ‘ceteris paribus aspirins cure headaches’, but insist that they can only do so when swallowed by someone with the right physiological makeup and a headache. Besides providing a necessary condition on the truth of the cp-law claim, recognising the nomological machine has great practical importance. Referring to the nomological machine makes explicit where the regularities are to be found, which is of central importance to the use of cp-laws for prediction and manipulation. Equally important, bringing the nomological machine to the fore brings into focus the make-up of the machine—its parts, their powers and their arrangements—and its context case-by-case.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • CP-Law Statements as Vague, Self-Referential, Self-Locating, Statistical,
           and Perfectly in Order
    • Abstract: Abstract I propose understanding CP-law statements as statements that assert the existence of vague statistical laws, not by fully specifying the contents of those laws, but by picking them out via a description that is both self-referential and self-locating. I argue that this proposal validates many common assumptions about CP-laws and correctly classifies many examples of putative CP-laws. It does this while avoiding the most serious worries that motivate some philosophers to be skeptical of CP-laws, namely the worry that they lack non-trivial truth conditions and that it is impossible for empirical evidence to disconfirm them.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Thinking about Non-Universal Laws
    • Abstract: Abstract What are ceteris paribus (cp) laws? Which disciplines appeal to cp laws and which semantics, metaphysical underpinning, and epistemological dimensions do cp law statements have? Firstly, we give a short overview of the recent discussion on cp laws, which addresses these questions. Secondly, we suggest that given the rich and diverse literature on cp laws a broad conception of cp laws should be endorsed which takes into account the different ways in which laws can be non-universal (by being "non-strict", "inexact", "exception-ridden", "idealized" and so forth). Finally, we provide an overview of the special issue on that basis and describe the individual contributions to the special issue according to the issues they address: (a) the range of applications of cp laws as well as the (b) semantics, (c) metaphysics, and (d) epistemology pertaining to cp law statements.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception
    • Abstract: Abstract Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have alluded to this alternative before, but I provide a comprehensive account of the view, show how my account significantly differs from past claims, and offer a novel argument for the view. Finally, I show that my account puts us in a position to provide a new objection to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth
    • Abstract: Abstract A standard objection to the suggestion that the fundamental norm of assertion is the truth norm (i.e., one must not assert p unless p) is that this norm cannot explain why warrant requires knowledge-level evidence. In a recent paper, Whiting has defended the truth-first approach to the norms of assertion by appeal to a distinction between the warrant there is to assert and the warrant one has to assert. I shall argue that this latest defensive strategy is unsuccessful.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Function Ascription and Explanation: Elaborating an Explanatory Utility
           Desideratum for Ascriptions of Technical Functions
    • Abstract: Abstract Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to ϕ?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to ϕ? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-à-vis functional explanations.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Demystifying Dilation
    • Abstract: Abstract Dilation occurs when an interval probability estimate of some event E is properly included in the interval probability estimate of E conditional on every event F of some partition, which means that one’s initial estimate of E becomes less precise no matter how an experiment turns out. Critics maintain that dilation is a pathological feature of imprecise probability models, while others have thought the problem is with Bayesian updating. However, two points are often overlooked: (1) knowing that E is stochastically independent of F (for all F in a partition of the underlying state space) is sufficient to avoid dilation, but (2) stochastic independence is not the only independence concept at play within imprecise probability models. In this paper we give a simple characterization of dilation formulated in terms of deviation from stochastic independence, propose a measure of dilation, and distinguish between proper and improper dilation. Through this we revisit the most sensational examples of dilation, which play up independence between dilator and dilatee, and find the sensationalism undermined by either fallacious reasoning with imprecise probabilities or improperly constructed imprecise probability models.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Charles R. Pigden (Ed.): Hume on Is and Ought
    • PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Description and the Problem of Priors
    • Abstract: Abstract Belief-revision models of knowledge describe how to update one’s degrees of belief associated with hypotheses as one considers new evidence, but they typically do not say how probabilities become associated with meaningful hypotheses in the first place. Here we consider a variety of Skyrms–Lewis signaling game (Lewis in Convention. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms in Signals evolution, learning, & information. Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) where simple descriptive language and predictive practice and associated basic expectations coevolve. Rather than assigning prior probabilities to hypotheses in a fixed language then conditioning on new evidence, the agents begin with no meaningful language or expectations then evolve to have expectations conditional on their descriptions as they evolve to have meaningful descriptions for the purpose of successful prediction. The model, then, provides a simple but concrete example of how the process of evolving a descriptive language suitable for inquiry might also provide agents with conditional expectations that reflect the type and degree of predictive success in fact afforded by their evolved predictive practice. This illustrates one way in which the traditional problem of priors may simply fail to apply to one’s model of evolving inquiry.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Humean Supervenience and Multidimensional Semantics
    • Abstract: Abstract What distinguishes indicative conditionals from subjunctive conditionals, according to one popular view, is that the so-called Adams’ thesis holds for the former kind of conditionals but the so-called Skyrms’ thesis for the latter. According to a plausible metaphysical view, both conditionals and chances supervene on non-modal facts. But since chances do not supervene on facts about particular events but facts about event-types, the past as well as the future is chancy. Some philosophers have worried that this metaphysical view is incompatible with the aforementioned view on the probability of conditionals. This paper however shows that there is no need to worry, as these views can all be simultaneously satisfied within the so-called Multidimensional Possible World Semantics for conditionals.
      PubDate: 2014-12-01
       
  • Radical Uncertainty: Beyond Probabilistic Models of Belief
    • PubDate: 2014-10-16
       
 
 
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