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Publisher: Springer-Verlag   (Total: 2302 journals)

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Diabetologia Notes de lecture     Hybrid Journal  
Diabetology Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.273, h-index: 5)
Dialectical Anthropology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.314, h-index: 9)
Die Weltwirtschaft     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Differential Equations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.364, h-index: 15)
Differential Equations and Dynamical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.63, h-index: 7)
Digestive Diseases and Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.19, h-index: 89)
Directieve therapie     Hybrid Journal  
Discrete & Computational Geometry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.269, h-index: 40)
Discrete Event Dynamic Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.42, h-index: 32)
Distributed and Parallel Databases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.766, h-index: 30)
Distributed Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.41, h-index: 31)
DNP - Der Neurologe und Psychiater     Full-text available via subscription  
Documenta Ophthalmologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.946, h-index: 40)
Doklady Biochemistry and Biophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.2, h-index: 10)
Doklady Biological Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.248, h-index: 10)
Doklady Botanical Sciences     Hybrid Journal  
Doklady Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.272, h-index: 12)
Doklady Earth Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.48, h-index: 17)
Doklady Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.345, h-index: 13)
Doklady Physical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.299, h-index: 12)
Doklady Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.293, h-index: 17)
Douleur et Analg├ęsie     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.113, h-index: 6)
Drug Delivery and Translational Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.607, h-index: 8)
Drug Safety - Case Reports     Open Access  
Drugs : Real World Outcomes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Dynamic Games and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.481, h-index: 5)
Dysphagia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 236, SJR: 0.822, h-index: 52)
e & i Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.279, h-index: 9)
e-Neuroforum     Hybrid Journal  
Early Childhood Education J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.466, h-index: 16)
Earth Science Informatics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.282, h-index: 7)
Earth, Moon, and Planets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.303, h-index: 29)
Earthquake Engineering and Engineering Vibration     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.482, h-index: 21)
Earthquake Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.418, h-index: 9)
East Asia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.18, h-index: 9)
Eating and Weight Disorders - Studies on Anorexia, Bulimia and Obesity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.362, h-index: 27)
EcoHealth     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.88, h-index: 26)
Ecological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.847, h-index: 43)
Economia e Politica Industriale     Hybrid Journal  
Economia Politica     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.375, h-index: 6)
Economic Botany     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.527, h-index: 44)
Economic Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Economic Change and Restructuring     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.264, h-index: 9)
Economic Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 2.557, h-index: 34)
Economic Theory Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Economics of Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.408, h-index: 14)
Ecosystems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 1.909, h-index: 93)
Ecotoxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 1.333, h-index: 56)
Education and Information Technologies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 232, SJR: 0.366, h-index: 16)
Educational Assessment, Evaluation and Accountability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.374, h-index: 15)
Educational Psychology Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 2.776, h-index: 61)
Educational Research for Policy and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.273, h-index: 9)
Educational Studies in Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.825, h-index: 32)
Educational Technology Research and Development     Partially Free   (Followers: 218, SJR: 1.785, h-index: 52)
Electrical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.336, h-index: 18)
Electrocatalysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.883, h-index: 10)
Electronic Commerce Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.582, h-index: 16)
Electronic Markets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.411, h-index: 8)
Electronic Materials Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.407, h-index: 15)
Elemente der Mathematik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Emergency Radiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.678, h-index: 25)
Emission Control Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal  
Empirica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.319, h-index: 16)
Empirical Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.489, h-index: 31)
Empirical Software Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.285, h-index: 39)
Employee Responsibilities and Rights J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.361, h-index: 15)
Endocrine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.878, h-index: 57)
Endocrine Pathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.638, h-index: 31)
Energy Efficiency     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.732, h-index: 14)
Energy Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 1.176, h-index: 7)
Engineering With Computers     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.433, h-index: 30)
Entomological Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.144, h-index: 5)
Environment Systems & Decisions     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Environment, Development and Sustainability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29, SJR: 0.419, h-index: 29)
Environmental and Ecological Statistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.458, h-index: 32)
Environmental and Resource Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 1.632, h-index: 54)
Environmental Biology of Fishes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.725, h-index: 58)
Environmental Chemistry Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.741, h-index: 28)
Environmental Earth Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.724, h-index: 63)
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.524, h-index: 4)
Environmental Evidence     Open Access  
Environmental Fluid Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.437, h-index: 24)
Environmental Geochemistry and Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.013, h-index: 36)
Environmental Geology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Environmental Health and Preventive Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.522, h-index: 19)
Environmental Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32, SJR: 0.942, h-index: 66)
Environmental Modeling & Assessment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.533, h-index: 31)
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.685, h-index: 52)
Environmental Science and Pollution Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.885, h-index: 46)
Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations     Open Access   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.4, h-index: 17)
Epileptic Disorders     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.608, h-index: 38)
EPJ A - Hadrons and Nuclei     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.287, h-index: 63)
EPJ B - Condensed Matter and Complex Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.731, h-index: 89)
EPJ direct     Hybrid Journal  
EPJ E - Soft Matter and Biological Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.641, h-index: 62)
EPMA J.     Open Access   (SJR: 0.284, h-index: 6)
ERA-Forum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.128, h-index: 3)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.621, h-index: 16)
Erwerbs-Obstbau     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.206, h-index: 9)

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Journal Cover   Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.621]   [H-I: 16]   [15 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2302 journals]
  • Tensed Truthmaker Theory
    • Abstract: Abstract Presentism faces a serious challenge from truthmaker theory. Standard solutions to the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed in one of two ways. Easy road presentists invoke new entities to satisfy the requirements of truthmaker theory. Hard road presentists, by contrast, flatly refuse to give in to truthmaker demands. Recently, a third way has been proposed. This response seeks to address the truthmaking problem by tensing our truthmaker principles. These views, though intuitive, are under-developed. In this paper, I get serious about a fundamentally tensed approach to truthmaking by sketching out the underlying ontological picture needed to make sense of tensed truthmaker theory.
      PubDate: 2015-03-07
       
  • Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper objects to internalist theories of justification from testimony on the grounds that they can’t accommodate intuitions about a pair of cases. The pair of cases involved is a testimonial version of the cases involved in the New Evil Demon Argument. The role of New Evil Demon cases in motivating contemporary internalist theories of knowledge and justification notwithstanding, it is argued here that testimonial cases make an intuitive case against internalist theories of justification from testimony.
      PubDate: 2015-03-05
       
  • No Match Point for the Permissibility Account
    • Abstract: Abstract In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of the plausible principles; whereas the other allows us to save them both. The fact that it allows us to save both of the plausible principles might well be considered a strong reason in favour of the relevant account. The permissibility-account-based resolution of the lottery paradox suggests that the permissibility account is a candidate for being supported in this way, since the account seems to save two plausible principles of rational belief and rational degrees of belief. I argue that even if the permissibility account were supported in this way the support would be defeated, since one cannot provide an analogous resolution of the preface paradox. The principles remain unsaved by the permissibility account.
      PubDate: 2015-03-05
       
  • Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge and Practical Reasoning
    • Abstract: Abstract Epistemic contrastivism is the view that knowledge is a ternary relation between a person, a proposition and a set of contrast propositions. This view is in tension with widely shared accounts of practical reasoning: be it the claim that knowledge of the premises is necessary for acceptable practical reasoning based on them or sufficient for the acceptability of the use of the premises in practical reasoning, or be it the claim that there is a looser connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. Given plausible assumptions, epistemic contrastivism implies that we should cut all links between knowledge and practical reasoning. However, the denial of any such link requires additional and independent arguments; if such arguments are lacking, then all the worse for epistemic contrastivism.
      PubDate: 2015-03-03
       
  • A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements
    • Abstract: Abstract The paper addresses the situation of a dispute in which one speaker says ϕ and a second speaker says not-ϕ. Proceeding on an idealising distinction between “basic” and “interesting” claims that may be formulated in a given idiolectal language, I investigate how it might be sorted out whether the dispute reflects a genuine (substantive) disagreement, or whether the speakers are only having a merely verbal (terminological) dispute, due to their using different interesting concepts. I show that four individually plausible principles for the determination of the nature of a dispute are incompatible. As an example, I discuss the question whether Sarai lied in the story told in Genesis 12.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative Grammar
    • Abstract: Abstract A generative grammar for a language L generates one or more syntactic structures for each sentence of L and interprets those structures both phonologically and semantically. A widely accepted assumption in generative linguistics dating from the mid-60s, the Generative Grammar Hypothesis (GGH), is that the ability of a speaker to understand sentences of her language requires her to have tacit knowledge of a generative grammar of it, and the task of linguistic semantics in those early days was taken to be that of specifying the form that the semantic component of a generative grammar must take. Then in the 70s linguistic semantics took a curious turn. Without rejecting GGH, linguists turned away from the task of characterizing the semantic component of a generative grammar to pursue instead the Montague-inspired project of providing for natural languages the same kind of model-theoretic semantics that logicians devise for the artificial languages of formal systems of logic, and “formal semantics” continues to dominate semantics in linguistics. This essay argues that the sort of compositional meaning theory that would verify GGH would not only be quite different from the theories formal semanticists construct, but would be a more fundamental theory that supersedes those theories in that it would explain why they are true when they are true, but their truth wouldn’t explain its truth. Formal semantics has undoubtedly made important contributions to our understanding of such phenomena as anaphora and quantification, but semantics in linguistics is supposed to be the study of meaning. This means that the formal semanticist can’t be unconcerned that the kind of semantic theory for a natural language that interests her has no place in a theory of linguistic competence; for if GGH is correct, then the more fundamental semantic theory is the compositional meaning theory that is the semantic component of the internally represented generative grammar, and if that is so, then linguistic semantics has so far ignored what really ought to be its primary concern.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • Major Parts of Speech
    • Abstract: Abstract According to the contemporary consensus, when reaching in the lexicon grammar looks for items like nouns, verbs, and prepositions while logic sees items like predicates, connectives, and quantifiers. In fact, there doesn’t seem to be a single lexical category contemporary grammar and logic both make use of. I hope to show that while a perfect match between the lexical categories of grammar and logic is impossible there can be a substantial overlap. I propose semantic definitions for all the major parts of speech (noun, verb, adjective, and adverb). I argue that the differences among these categories can be captured in terms of distinctions recognized in logic (referring expression vs. predicate, constant vs. variable).
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • The Implicit Dimension of Meaning: Ways of “Filling In” and
           “Filling Out” Content
    • Abstract: Abstract I distinguish between the classical Gricean approach to conversational implicatures (CIs), which I call the action-theoretic (AT) approach, and the approach to CIs taken in contemporary cognitive science. Once we free ourselves from the AT account, and see implicating as a form of what I call “conversational tailoring”, we can more easily see the many different ways that CIs arise in conversation. I will show that they arise not only on the basis of a speaker’s utterance of complete sentences (CIs which most resemble classical Gricean CIs) but also on the basis of sub-sentential clauses—cases of so-called embedded implicatures—as well as from discourse segments containing several sentences—cases that Geurts (2006, 2009) calls ‘multiplicatures’. I will argue that they arise also from contents that are themselves implicit, such as presupposed contents or other implicatures. All but the first sort of case are difficult for the traditional Gricean AT account to handle, whereas they fall naturally out of an account that sees conversational participants as engaged in conversational tailoring—i.e., as engaged in a process of shaping informational and discourse structural properties of utterances in their successive conversational turns, and hence shaping their interlocutors’ cognitive environments.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • Contextualism and Disagreement
    • Abstract: Abstract My aim in the paper will be to better understand what faultless disagreement could possibly consist in and what speakers disagree over when they faultlessly do so. To that end, I will first look at various examples of faultless disagreement. Since I will eventually claim that different forms of faultless disagreement can be modeled semantically on different forms of context-sensitivity I will, in a second step, discuss three different semantic accounts that all promise to successfully accommodate certain forms of context-sensitivity: Indexical Contextualism, Nonindexcal Contextualism (aka Moderate Relativism) and Radical Relativism (aka Assessment-sensitive Relativism). Focussing on the controversy between Indexical and Nonindexical Contextualists the remainder of the paper will be devoted to the question which theory is best suited to handle what kind of disagreement.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • Framing Event Variables
    • Abstract: Abstract Davidsonian analyses of action reports like ‘Alvin chased Theodore around a tree’ are often viewed as supporting the hypothesis that sentences of a human language H have truth conditions that can be specified by a Tarski-style theory of truth for H. But in my view, simple cases of adverbial modification add to the reasons for rejecting this hypothesis, even though Davidson rightly diagnosed many implications involving adverbs as cases of conjunct-reduction in the scope of an existential quantifier. I think the puzzles in this vicinity reflect “framing effects,” which reveal the implausibility of certain assumptions about how linguistic meaning is related to truth and logical form. We need to replace these assumptions with alternatives, instead of positing implausible values of event-variables or implausible relativizations of truth to linguistic descriptions of actual events.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • Introductory Remark
    • PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • Expressing Disagreement: A Presuppositional Indexical Contextualist
           Relativist Account
    • Abstract: Abstract Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of (existent) disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis (Proc Aristot Soc 63(Suppl):113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa (Relative truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of (existent) disagreement.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • Nonsense Made Intelligible
    • Abstract: Abstract My topic is the relation between nonsense and (un-)intelligibility, and the contrast between nonsense and falsehood which played a pivotal role in the rise of analytic philosophy (sct. 1). I shall pursue three lines of inquiry. First I shall briefly consider the positive case, namely linguistic understanding (sct. 2). Secondly, I shall consider the negative case—different breakdowns of understanding and connected forms of failure to make sense (sct. 3–4). Third, I shall criticize three important misconceptions of nonsense and unintelligibility: the austere conception of nonsense propounded by the New Wittgensteinians (scts. 5–6); the “no nonsense position” which roundly denies that there are cases of nonsense—Chomsky’s semantic anomalies or Ryle’s category mistakes–that are grammatically well-formed, without even having the potential for being used to make a truth-apt statement (scts. 7–8); the individualistic conception of language and of semantic mistakes championed by Davidson (scts. 9–10). All three positions, I shall argue, ignore or deny combinatorial nonsense, the fact that perfectly meaningful sentence-components can be combined in a way that may be grammatical, yet without resulting in a sentence that is itself “meaningful”, i.e. endowed with linguistic sense. At a more strategic level, the first and the third position deny or ignore that natural languages are communal historical practices that go beyond idiolects and the employments of expressions in specific contexts and that are guided by semantic rules—standards for the meaningful use of words.
      PubDate: 2015-03-01
       
  • Overdetermination Underdetermined
    • Abstract: Abstract Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
      PubDate: 2015-02-21
       
  • Reasons, Causes, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper we develop a novel argument against the extended mind hypothesis. Our argument constitutes an advance in the debate, insofar as we employ only premises that are acceptable to a coarse-grained functionalist, and we do not rely on functional disanalogies between putative examples of extended minds and ordinary human beings that are just a matter of fine detail or degree. Thus, we beg no questions against proponents of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather, our argument consists in making use of the following necessary condition on holding a belief for a reason: To believe something for a reason, one must come to believe it in virtue of attitudes that epistemically rationalize the belief that is formed, and one must come to believe in virtue of the fact that these attitudes epistemically rationalize the new belief. We show that many external objects that defenders of the extended mind hypothesis have claimed are (in conjunction with an internal cognitive system) beliefs cannot (even partly) constitute a belief had for a reason, as they necessarily fail to satisfy the necessary condition. Our first thesis, then, is that beliefs had for reasons cannot be extended in the most interesting way specified by the extended mind hypothesis. Furthermore, if we add to our argument the premise that every token belief is something that could have been had for a reason, we can derive the stronger thesis that no beliefs can be extended in this way.
      PubDate: 2015-02-20
       
  • The Recycling Problem for Event Individuation
    • Abstract: Abstract If the wedding had taken place an hour later, it would have been rained out. When we make counterfactual claims like this, we indicate that events are not terribly fragile things. That is, we typically think of events as particulars which can survive small changes in nearby possible worlds, such that one and the same event could have occurred under slightly different circumstances. I argue, however, that any account of “non-fragile” event individuation is subject to what is known as the recycling problem. This was a problem initially raised against origin essentialism, or the view that individuals are individuated by their origins, and is roughly the difficulty that arises in cases where the criteria of individuation for a particular individual are duplicated. I then examine a potential solution, which takes its cue from predecessor essentialism, the leading response to the recycling problem in the origins literature. I argue that the predecessor essentialist’s solution yields unacceptably counter-intuitive results when applied to the recycling problem for event individuation, and conclude that, if events have qualitative individuating essences, then they must be—contrary to intuition—modally fragile entities. I then suggest three alternatives to qualitative essentialism which could accommodate our intuitions about the modal non-fragility of events.
      PubDate: 2015-02-19
       
  • Inner Achievement
    • Abstract: Abstract The appealing idea that knowledge is best understood as a kind of achievement faces significant criticisms, among them Matthew Chrisman’s charge that the whole project rests on a kind of ontological category mistake. Chrisman argues that while knowledge and belief are states, the kind of normativity found in, for example, Sosa’s famous ‘Triple-A’ structure of assessment is only applicable to performances, end-directed events that unfold over time, and never to states. What is overlooked, both by Chrisman and those he criticizes, is a whole range of projects, those like friendship, health, marriage, and sobriety, where the end is not distinct from our pursuit of it. I suggest that such ‘inner projects’ are in fact stative achievements and thus provide a different sort of model for thinking about knowledge as an achievement. Reconceiving the project along these lines also helps to solve another outstanding problem, the charge that being an achievement is not necessary for knowledge because some knowledge, especially testimonial knowledge, is come by with little or no effort.
      PubDate: 2015-02-08
       
  • Titelbaum’s Theory of De Se Updating and Two Versions of Sleeping
           Beauty
    • Abstract: Abstract In his “Relevance of Self-locating Belief” (2008), Titelbaum suggests a general theory about how to update one’s degrees of self-locating belief. He applies it to the Sleeping Beauty problem, more specifically, Lewis’s (Analysis 61(3):171–176, 2001) version of that problem. By doing so, he defends the Thirder solution to the puzzle. Unfortunately, if we modify the puzzle very slightly, and if we apply his general updating theory to the thus modified version, we get the Halfer view as a result. In this paper, we will argue that the difference between the two versions of Sleeping Beauty isn’t sufficient for justifying the different verdicts on them. Since this is a counter-intuitive result, we should reject Titelbaum’s theory of de se updating.
      PubDate: 2015-02-07
       
  • Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s (PC) phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that (PC) is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification of a belief: the direct way and the indirect way. We identify a straightforward reason for claiming that the justification contributed indirectly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. Then we show that the same reason doesn’t extend to the claim that the justification contributed directly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. As (PC) is the view that seemings or appearances contribute justification directly, we infer that Bergmann’s contention that his dilemma applies to (PC) is unmotivated. In the final part, we suggest that our line of response to Bergmann can be used to shield other types of internalist justification from Bergmann’s objection. We also propose that seeming-grounded justification can be combined with justification of one of these types to form the basis of a promising version of internalist foundationalism.
      PubDate: 2015-02-04
       
  • Finding the History and Philosophy of Science
    • Abstract: Abstract History of science and philosophy of science have experienced a somewhat turbulent relationship over the last century. At times it has been said that philosophy needs history, or that history needs philosophy. Very occasionally, something entirely new is said to need them both. Often, however, their relationship is seen as little more than a marriage of convenience. This article explores that marriage by analyzing the citations of over 7,000 historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science. The data reveal that a small but tightly-knit bridge does exist between the disciplines, and raises suggestions about how to understand that bridge in a more nuanced fashion.
      PubDate: 2015-02-01
       
 
 
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