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Publisher: Springer-Verlag   (Total: 2336 journals)

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Showing 1201 - 1400 of 2336 Journals sorted alphabetically
J. of Community Genetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.727, h-index: 14)
J. of Community Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.921, h-index: 44)
J. of Comparative Physiology A: Neuroethology, Sensory, Neural, and Behavioral Physiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.087, h-index: 74)
J. of Comparative Physiology B : Biochemical, Systemic, and Environmental Physiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.126, h-index: 59)
J. of Compassionate Health Care     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
J. of Computational Analysis and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.291, h-index: 19)
J. of Computational Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.511, h-index: 20)
J. of Computational Neuroscience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 1.068, h-index: 60)
J. of Computer and Systems Sciences Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.27, h-index: 13)
J. of Computer Science and Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.437, h-index: 31)
J. of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.151, h-index: 2)
J. of Computer-Aided Molecular Design     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.995, h-index: 78)
J. of Computers in Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
J. of Computing in Higher Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.363, h-index: 21)
J. of Consumer Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.704, h-index: 30)
J. of Contemporary Mathematical Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.237, h-index: 5)
J. of Contemporary Physics (Armenian Academy of Sciences)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.197, h-index: 6)
J. of Contemporary Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.397, h-index: 23)
J. of Control Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.359, h-index: 19)
J. of Control, Automation and Electrical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.231, h-index: 9)
J. of Crop Science and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
J. of Cross-Cultural Gerontology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.631, h-index: 29)
J. of Cryptographic Engineering     Partially Free   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.989, h-index: 11)
J. of Cryptology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.443, h-index: 55)
J. of Cultural Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.539, h-index: 29)
J. of Database Marketing & Customer Strategy Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.149, h-index: 8)
J. of Derivatives & Hedge Funds     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.114, h-index: 5)
J. of Developmental and Physical Disabilities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.574, h-index: 29)
J. of Digital Imaging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.578, h-index: 35)
J. of Direct Data and Digital Marketing Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.154, h-index: 6)
J. of Dynamical and Control Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.4, h-index: 26)
J. of Dynamics and Differential Equations     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 1.418, h-index: 31)
J. of Earth Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.483, h-index: 16)
J. of Earth System Science     Open Access   (Followers: 43, SJR: 0.448, h-index: 32)
J. of East Asian Linguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.537, h-index: 20)
J. of Echocardiography     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.22, h-index: 3)
J. of Economic Growth     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23, SJR: 3.273, h-index: 63)
J. of Economic Interaction and Coordination     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.263, h-index: 12)
J. of Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.418, h-index: 23)
J. of Economics and Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.272, h-index: 19)
J. of Educational Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.961, h-index: 21)
J. of Elasticity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.851, h-index: 45)
J. of Electroceramics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.577, h-index: 57)
J. of Electronic Materials     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.609, h-index: 75)
J. of Electronic Testing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.372, h-index: 27)
J. of Electronics (China)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.112, h-index: 9)
J. of Elementary Science Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
J. of Engineering Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.347, h-index: 37)
J. of Engineering Physics and Thermophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.288, h-index: 11)
J. of Engineering Research     Open Access   (SJR: 0.145, h-index: 5)
J. of Engineering Thermophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.763, h-index: 9)
J. of Environmental Studies and Sciences     Partially Free   (Followers: 2)
J. of Ethology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.609, h-index: 25)
J. of Evolution Equations     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.826, h-index: 26)
J. of Evolutionary Biochemistry and Physiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.145, h-index: 11)
J. of Evolutionary Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.492, h-index: 52)
J. of Experimental and Theoretical Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.458, h-index: 39)
J. of Experimental Criminology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40, SJR: 1.445, h-index: 28)
J. of Failure Analysis and Prevention     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.261, h-index: 15)
J. of Family and Economic Issues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.396, h-index: 32)
J. of Family Violence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31, SJR: 0.639, h-index: 56)
J. of Financial Services Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.273, h-index: 10)
J. of Financial Services Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.572, h-index: 36)
J. of Fixed Point Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.644, h-index: 13)
J. of Fluorescence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.465, h-index: 56)
J. of Food Measurement and Characterization     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.307, h-index: 4)
J. of Food Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.441, h-index: 29)
J. of Forest Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.495, h-index: 27)
J. of Forestry Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 14)
J. of Fourier Analysis and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.18, h-index: 42)
J. of Friction and Wear     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.373, h-index: 7)
J. of Fusion Energy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.387, h-index: 19)
J. of Gambling Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.171, h-index: 57)
J. of Gastroenterology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 1.651, h-index: 88)
J. of Gastrointestinal Cancer     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 39)
J. of Gastrointestinal Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.64, h-index: 99)
J. of General Internal Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 1.804, h-index: 134)
J. of General Plant Pathology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.554, h-index: 22)
J. of Genetic Counseling     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.902, h-index: 39)
J. of Genetics     Open Access   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.458, h-index: 28)
J. of Geodesy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 2.173, h-index: 56)
J. of Geographical Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.8, h-index: 23)
J. of Geographical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.822, h-index: 39)
J. of Geometric Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 1.491, h-index: 27)
J. of Geometry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.272, h-index: 15)
J. of Global Optimization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.992, h-index: 60)
J. of Global Policy and Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
J. of Grid Computing     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 1.414, h-index: 37)
J. of Hand and Microsurgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
J. of Happiness Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.881, h-index: 39)
J. of Hematopathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.2, h-index: 13)
J. of Heuristics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.308, h-index: 50)
J. of High Energy Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 1.052, h-index: 153)
J. of Homotopy and Related Structures     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.232, h-index: 2)
J. of Housing and the Built Environment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.648, h-index: 28)
J. of Huazhong University of Science and Technology [Medical Sciences]     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.344, h-index: 19)
J. of Ichthyology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 10)
J. of Immigrant and Minority Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.759, h-index: 37)
J. of Inclusion Phenomena and Macrocyclic Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.331, h-index: 46)
J. of Indian Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.127, h-index: 12)
J. of Indian Prosthodontic Society     Open Access   (SJR: 0.164, h-index: 7)
J. of Industrial Microbiology and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.966, h-index: 80)
J. of Industry, Competition and Trade     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.327, h-index: 15)
J. of Infection and Chemotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.673, h-index: 46)
J. of Information Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 50, SJR: 1.474, h-index: 55)
J. of Information Technology Teaching Cases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
J. of Infrared, Millimeter and Terahertz Waves     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.25, h-index: 36)
J. of Inherited Metabolic Disease     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.389, h-index: 77)
J. of Inorganic and Organometallic Polymers and Materials     Partially Free   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.338, h-index: 33)
J. of Insect Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.569, h-index: 39)
J. of Insect Conservation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.872, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent and Robotic Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.629, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent Information Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.691, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent Manufacturing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.397, h-index: 54)
J. of Interventional Cardiac Electrophysiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.93, h-index: 43)
J. of Intl. Business Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28, SJR: 4.208, h-index: 130)
J. of Intl. Entrepreneurship     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.549, h-index: 23)
J. of Intl. Migration and Integration / Revue de l integration et de la migration internationale     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.308, h-index: 13)
J. of Intl. Relations and Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.793, h-index: 22)
J. of Labor Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.394, h-index: 27)
J. of Logic, Language and Information     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.288, h-index: 25)
J. of Low Temperature Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.531, h-index: 52)
J. of Machinery Manufacture and Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.203, h-index: 7)
J. of Mammalian Evolution     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.134, h-index: 37)
J. of Mammary Gland Biology and Neoplasia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 2.252, h-index: 83)
J. of Management and Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.805, h-index: 33)
J. of Management Control     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.605, h-index: 6)
J. of Marine Science and Application     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.439, h-index: 11)
J. of Marine Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.235, h-index: 19)
J. of Maritime Archaeology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.228, h-index: 8)
J. of Market-Focused Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Marketing Analytics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
J. of Material Cycles and Waste Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.449, h-index: 22)
J. of Materials Engineering and Performance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.544, h-index: 40)
J. of Materials Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.836, h-index: 123)
J. of Materials Science : Materials in Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
J. of Materials Science : Materials in Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
J. of Mathematical Biology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 1.011, h-index: 71)
J. of Mathematical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.497, h-index: 45)
J. of Mathematical Fluid Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 1.22, h-index: 22)
J. of Mathematical Imaging and Vision     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.901, h-index: 53)
J. of Mathematical Modelling and Algorithms     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.414, h-index: 23)
J. of Mathematical Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.272, h-index: 23)
J. of Mathematics Teacher Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 1.062, h-index: 20)
J. of Maxillofacial and Oral Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
J. of Mechanical Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.589, h-index: 26)
J. of Medical and Biological Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.387, h-index: 18)
J. of Medical Humanities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.299, h-index: 18)
J. of Medical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.717, h-index: 44)
J. of Medical Toxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.874, h-index: 28)
J. of Medical Ultrasonics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.18, h-index: 13)
J. of Medicine and the Person     Hybrid Journal  
J. of Membrane Biology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.738, h-index: 82)
J. of Micro-Bio Robotics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.28, h-index: 3)
J. of Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.741, h-index: 43)
J. of Mining Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.317, h-index: 16)
J. of Molecular Evolution     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.952, h-index: 108)
J. of Molecular Histology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.755, h-index: 48)
J. of Molecular Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 2.165, h-index: 113)
J. of Molecular Modeling     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.466, h-index: 50)
J. of Molecular Neuroscience     Partially Free   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.988, h-index: 69)
J. of Mountain Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.418, h-index: 15)
J. of Muscle Research and Cell Motility     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.264, h-index: 55)
J. of Nanoparticle Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.583, h-index: 84)
J. of Natural Medicines     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.602, h-index: 28)
J. of Near-Death Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Nephrology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.689, h-index: 55)
J. of Network and Systems Management     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.466, h-index: 26)
J. of Neural Transmission     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.034, h-index: 86)
J. of Neuro-Oncology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.274, h-index: 90)
J. of Neuroimmune Pharmacology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.662, h-index: 45)
J. of Neurology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 1.429, h-index: 105)
J. of NeuroVirology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.979, h-index: 69)
J. of Nondestructive Evaluation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.863, h-index: 27)
J. of Nonlinear Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.887, h-index: 42)
J. of Nonverbal Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.723, h-index: 47)
J. of Nuclear Cardiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 1.024, h-index: 68)
J. of Nutrition, Health and Aging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.919, h-index: 60)
J. of Obstetrics and Gynecology of India     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.214, h-index: 6)
J. of Occupational Rehabilitation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.811, h-index: 51)
J. of Ocean Engineering and Marine Energy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
J. of Ocean University of China (English Edition)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.237, h-index: 11)
J. of Oceanography     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.796, h-index: 52)
J. of Ocular Biology, Diseases, and Informatics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.183, h-index: 11)
J. of Optical and Fiber Communications Reports     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
J. of Optics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.214, h-index: 8)
J. of Optimization Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.898, h-index: 65)
J. of Ornithology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
J. of Orofacial Orthopedics / Fortschritte der Kieferorthop√§die     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.574, h-index: 33)
J. of Orthopaedic Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.708, h-index: 48)
J. of Paleolimnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.984, h-index: 64)
J. of Parasitic Diseases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.298, h-index: 9)
J. of Pediatric Neuropsychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
J. of Pest Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.341, h-index: 28)
J. of Pharmaceutical Health Care and Sciences     Open Access  
J. of Pharmaceutical Innovation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.524, h-index: 17)
J. of Pharmaceutical Investigation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.331, h-index: 6)
J. of Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.708, h-index: 46)
J. of Phase Equilibria and Diffusion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.433, h-index: 36)
J. of Philosophical Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.704, h-index: 26)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.699]   [H-I: 24]   [17 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2336 journals]
  • Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration
    • Authors: Valtteri Arstila
      Pages: 1151 - 1172
      Abstract: Abstract The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel’s claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties. If this is true, then the concepts we possess change the way things appear to us. The second candidate for cognitive penetration is Fiona Macpherson’s claim that, in addition to concepts, our beliefs can penetrate perceptual experiences. It is argued that neither candidate is a case of cognitive penetration. In doing so, I provide an explanation to both that is based on perceptual learning, a non-cognitive phenomenon where relatively slow and long-lasting modifications to an organism’s perceptual system bring about changes in perception. This explanation is theoretically more plausible and remains closer to the empirical data than the explanations based on cognitive penetration.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9785-3
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes
    • Authors: Claudio Calosi; Matteo Morganti
      Pages: 1173 - 1194
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses (at least those who do not simply deny the metaphysical import of empirical data and their proposed interpretation) claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9789-z
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • 3D Cohabitation
    • Authors: Simon Langford
      Pages: 1195 - 1210
      Abstract: Abstract The cohabitation theory is a popular solution to the problem of personal fission. It affirms that all the people who result from fission were there cohabiting the pre-fission body all along. Adopting this solution is an uncontroversial move for four-dimensionalists, but is it open to three-dimensionalists too? Some have thought so, but Katherine Hawley, Mark Johnston, and Eric Olson have argued to the contrary. They claim three-dimensionalists simply cannot be cohabitation theorists. In this paper, I explain how they can.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9790-6
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering
    • Authors: Georg Brun
      Pages: 1211 - 1241
      Abstract: Abstract Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for purely practical reasons. Finally, three limitations which call for further development of the method of explication are discussed.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9791-5
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Restall’s Proof-Theoretic Pluralism and Relevance Logic
    • Authors: Teresa Kouri
      Pages: 1243 - 1252
      Abstract: Abstract Restall (Erkenntnis 79(2):279–291, 2014) proposes a new, proof-theoretic, logical pluralism. This is in contrast to the model-theoretic pluralism he and Beall proposed in Beall and Restall (Aust J Philos 78(4):475–493, 2000) and in Beall and Restall (Logical pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). What I will show is that Restall has not described the conditions on being admissible to the proof-theoretic logical pluralism in such a way that relevance logic is one of the admissible logics. Though relevance logic is not hard to add formally, one critical component of Restall’s pluralism is that the relevance logic that gets added must have connectives which mean the same thing as the connectives in the already admitted logic. This is what I will show is not possible.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9792-4
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal
    • Authors: David Ludwig
      Pages: 1253 - 1272
      Abstract: Abstract The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the basis of these premises, I argue that it is often neither possible nor desirable to evaluate scientific statements independently of non-epistemic values. Finally, I suggest that considerations of ontological choices do not only challenge the value-free ideal but also help to specify positive roles of non-epistemic values in an often neglected area of scientific practice.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9793-3
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Platonism, Alienation, and Negativity
    • Authors: David Ingram
      Pages: 1273 - 1285
      Abstract: Abstract A platonic theory of possibility states that truths about what’s possible are determined by facts about properties not being instantiated (or being ‘uninstantiated’). Recently, Matthew Tugby has argued in favour of this sort of theory, arguing that adopting a platonic theory of possibility allows us to solve a paradox concerning alien properties: properties that might have been instantiated, but aren’t actually. In this paper, I raise a worry for Tugby’s proposal (and the platonic theory, more generally)—that it commits us to negative facts playing an important truth-making role—and offer a strategy to avoid the objectionable negativity.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9794-2
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Divergent Mathematical Treatments in Utility Theory
    • Authors: Davide Rizza
      Pages: 1287 - 1303
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I study how divergent mathematical treatments affect mathematical modelling, with a special focus on utility theory. In particular I examine recent work on the ranking of information states and the discounting of future utilities, in order to show how, by replacing the standard analytical treatment of the models involved with one based on the framework of Nonstandard Analysis, diametrically opposite results are obtained. In both cases, the choice between the standard and nonstandard treatment amounts to a selection of set-theoretical parameters that cannot be made on purely empirical grounds. The analysis of this phenomenon gives rise to a simple logical account of the relativity of impossibility theorems in economic theory, which concludes the paper.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9795-1
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • What Do We Mean When We Ask “Why is There Something Rather Than
           Nothing?”
    • Authors: Andrew Brenner
      Pages: 1305 - 1322
      Abstract: Abstract Let’s call the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” the Question. There’s no consensus, of course, regarding which proposed answer to the Question, if any, is correct, but occasionally there’s also controversy regarding the meaning of the Question itself. In this paper I argue that such controversy persists because there just isn’t one unique interpretation of the Question. Rather, the puzzlement expressed by the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” varies depending on the ontology implicitly or explicitly endorsed by the speaker. In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that other proposals according to which the Question has one uniquely adequate interpretation are false. Second, I give several examples of the way in which the meaning of the Question can vary depending on the ontology to which it is coupled. Third, I explore the implications of my thesis for the manner in which we should approach future attempts to answer the Question.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9796-0
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • On the Evolution of Truth
    • Authors: Jeffrey A. Barrett
      Pages: 1323 - 1332
      Abstract: Abstract This paper is concerned with how a simple metalanguage might coevolve with a simple descriptive base language in the context of interacting Skyrms–Lewis signaling games Lewis (Barrett and Skyrms in Br J Philos Sci, 2015; Lewis in Convention, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms in Signals evolution, learning, & information, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). We will first consider a metagame that evolves to track the successful and unsuccessful use of a coevolving base language, then we will consider a metagame that evolves a truth predicate for expressions in a coevolving base language. We will see how a metagame that tracks truth provides an endogenous way to break the symmetry between indicative and imperative interpretations of the base language. Finally, we will consider how composite signaling games provide a way to characterize alternative pragmatic notions of truth.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9797-z
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Truthmakers, Moral Responsibility, and an Alleged Counterexample to Rule A
    • Authors: Michael Robinson
      Pages: 1333 - 1339
      Abstract: Abstract Charles Hermes argues that the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility fails because one of the inference rules on which it relies, Rule A, is invalid. Rule A states that if a proposition p is broadly logically necessary, then p is true and no one is, or ever has been, even partly morally responsible for the fact that p. Hermes purports to offer a counterexample to Rule A which focuses on agents’ moral responsibility for disjunctions. Hermes’s objection is motivated by the idea that the logic of moral responsibility ought to be based on the logic of truthmakers rather than the logic of propositions. I show that the logic of moral responsibility does not track the logic of truthmakers and defend the validity of Rule A against Hermes’s objection.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9798-y
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • Is the Universe As Large As It Can Be?
    • Authors: John Byron Manchak
      Pages: 1341 - 1344
      Abstract: Abstract In this note, we cast doubt on the requirement of spacetime inextendibility; it is not at all clear that our universe is “as large as it can be.”
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9799-x
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement
    • Authors: Remco Heesen; Pieter van der Kolk
      Pages: 1345 - 1368
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers’ rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies—in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View—are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.
      PubDate: 2016-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9800-8
      Issue No: Vol. 81, No. 6 (2016)
       
  • The Moral Objection to Modal Realism
    • Authors: Bob Fischer
      Abstract: Abstract If David Lewis’s modal realism (MR) is true, then there are many, many people. According to Mark Heller, this is bad news. He takes MR to imply that “there are at least some cases in which it is permissible to let drowning children drown when it would be easy to save them.” But since he holds the reasonable view that this is never permissible, he thinks that MR is false. Here, I argue that Lewis needn’t be troubled by this objection: it provides no reason to reject MR for those who share Lewis’s moral outlook. Moreover, I argue that disagreement with common sense needn’t be severe if we can show both (a) that there’s a sense in which common sense is correct and (b) we have little reason to care about the sense in which common sense is mistaken.
      PubDate: 2016-11-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9856-0
       
  • Bent, Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for
           Eternalist Endurantism
    • Authors: Daniel Giberman
      Abstract: One premise in David Lewis’s well-known argument from temporary intrinsic properties in favor of temporal parts is the (putative) intuition that material objects exemplify such properties simpliciter, that is, without qualification. The argument has spawned a large critical literature, with commentators questioning the simpliciter premise’s motivation, content, dialectical force, and status as an intuition. The present essay has two chief goals: to provide a novel framework for clarifying Lewis’s simpliciter premise and to explain how the resulting clarification upends a wide range of attempts in the literature to evade his conclusion. Central to both goals is the observation that exemplification simpliciter best comports with our most fundamental notion of property exemplification, a notion that applies equally well to material and atemporal abstract objects.
      PubDate: 2016-11-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9852-4
       
  • Unjustified Defeaters
    • Authors: David Alexander
      Abstract: Abstract A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann (Justification without awareness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) and Pryor (Philos Issues 14:349–378, 2004). It then offers a revised version of Pryor’s account. On this proposal, an unjustified belief can be a defeater if it is rational, all things considered. If a belief is rational, all things considered, it can require one to abandon other beliefs with which it conflicts—even if it is unjustified. Finally, this paper shows that the proposed account of unjustified defeaters is one that can and should be embraced by leading accounts of justified belief as diverse as reliabilism and evidentialism.
      PubDate: 2016-11-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9849-z
       
  • Contextualism, Relativism and the Liar
    • Authors: Gil Sagi
      Abstract: Abstract Contextualist theories of truth appeal to context to solve the liar paradox: different stages of reasoning occur in different contexts, and so the contradiction is dispelled. The word ‘true’ is relativized by the contextualists to contexts of use. This paper shows that contextualist approaches to the liar are committed to a form of semantic relativism: that the truth value of some sentences depends on the context of assessment, as well as the context of use. In particular, it is shown how Simmons’s and Glanzberg’s contextualist approaches entail relativism. In both cases, the liar sentence gets different semantic evaluations as uttered in a fixed context of use but assessed from different contexts. Shift in context of use alone cannot provide the full explanation of the liar. These contextualist approaches, as originally presented, were thus mischaracterised and they should be re-evaluated according to their full implications.
      PubDate: 2016-11-02
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9850-6
       
  • Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions
    • Authors: Lorraine Juliano Keller
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions (hereafter, ‘NCP’) faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.
      PubDate: 2016-10-24
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9851-5
       
  • Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External
           Distinction
    • Authors: Sander Verhaegh
      Abstract: Abstract Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine’s own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine’s perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine’s position is much closer to Carnap’s than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects.
      PubDate: 2016-10-13
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9848-0
       
  • Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of
           Central Philosophical and Practical Importance
    • Authors: Gregg D. Caruso; Stephen G. Morris
      Abstract: Abstract Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense (see, e.g., Pereboom in Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001; Pereboom in Free will, agency, and meaning in life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; Strawson in Freedom and belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986; Strawson in Philos Stud 75(1):5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144(1):45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom and others that the compatibilist’s burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist’s burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility—which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity—and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility.
      PubDate: 2016-10-12
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9846-2
       
 
 
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