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Publisher: Springer-Verlag   (Total: 2329 journals)

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Showing 1201 - 1400 of 2329 Journals sorted alphabetically
J. of Compassionate Health Care     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
J. of Computational Analysis and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.291, h-index: 19)
J. of Computational Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.511, h-index: 20)
J. of Computational Neuroscience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 1.068, h-index: 60)
J. of Computer and Systems Sciences Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.27, h-index: 13)
J. of Computer Science and Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.437, h-index: 31)
J. of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.151, h-index: 2)
J. of Computer-Aided Molecular Design     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.995, h-index: 78)
J. of Computers in Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
J. of Computing in Higher Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.363, h-index: 21)
J. of Consumer Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.704, h-index: 30)
J. of Contemporary Mathematical Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.237, h-index: 5)
J. of Contemporary Physics (Armenian Academy of Sciences)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.197, h-index: 6)
J. of Contemporary Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.397, h-index: 23)
J. of Control Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.359, h-index: 19)
J. of Control, Automation and Electrical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.231, h-index: 9)
J. of Crop Science and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
J. of Cross-Cultural Gerontology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.631, h-index: 29)
J. of Cryptographic Engineering     Partially Free   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.989, h-index: 11)
J. of Cryptology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.443, h-index: 55)
J. of Cultural Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.539, h-index: 29)
J. of Database Marketing & Customer Strategy Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.149, h-index: 8)
J. of Derivatives & Hedge Funds     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.114, h-index: 5)
J. of Developmental and Physical Disabilities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.574, h-index: 29)
J. of Digital Imaging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.578, h-index: 35)
J. of Direct Data and Digital Marketing Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.154, h-index: 6)
J. of Dynamical and Control Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.4, h-index: 26)
J. of Dynamics and Differential Equations     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 1.418, h-index: 31)
J. of Earth Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.483, h-index: 16)
J. of Earth System Science     Open Access   (Followers: 43, SJR: 0.448, h-index: 32)
J. of East Asian Linguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.537, h-index: 20)
J. of Echocardiography     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.22, h-index: 3)
J. of Economic Growth     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27, SJR: 3.273, h-index: 63)
J. of Economic Interaction and Coordination     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.263, h-index: 12)
J. of Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.418, h-index: 23)
J. of Economics and Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.272, h-index: 19)
J. of Educational Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.961, h-index: 21)
J. of Elasticity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.851, h-index: 45)
J. of Electroceramics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.577, h-index: 57)
J. of Electronic Materials     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.609, h-index: 75)
J. of Electronic Testing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.372, h-index: 27)
J. of Electronics (China)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.112, h-index: 9)
J. of Elementary Science Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
J. of Engineering Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.347, h-index: 37)
J. of Engineering Physics and Thermophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.288, h-index: 11)
J. of Engineering Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.145, h-index: 5)
J. of Engineering Thermophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.763, h-index: 9)
J. of Environmental Studies and Sciences     Partially Free   (Followers: 2)
J. of Ethology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.609, h-index: 25)
J. of Evolution Equations     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.826, h-index: 26)
J. of Evolutionary Biochemistry and Physiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.145, h-index: 11)
J. of Evolutionary Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.492, h-index: 52)
J. of Experimental and Theoretical Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.458, h-index: 39)
J. of Experimental Criminology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43, SJR: 1.445, h-index: 28)
J. of Failure Analysis and Prevention     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.261, h-index: 15)
J. of Family and Economic Issues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.396, h-index: 32)
J. of Family Violence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35, SJR: 0.639, h-index: 56)
J. of Financial Services Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.273, h-index: 10)
J. of Financial Services Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.572, h-index: 36)
J. of Fixed Point Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.644, h-index: 13)
J. of Fluorescence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.465, h-index: 56)
J. of Food Measurement and Characterization     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.307, h-index: 4)
J. of Food Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.441, h-index: 29)
J. of Forest Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.495, h-index: 27)
J. of Forestry Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 14)
J. of Fourier Analysis and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.18, h-index: 42)
J. of Friction and Wear     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.373, h-index: 7)
J. of Fusion Energy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.387, h-index: 19)
J. of Gambling Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 1.171, h-index: 57)
J. of Gastroenterology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 1.651, h-index: 88)
J. of Gastrointestinal Cancer     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 39)
J. of Gastrointestinal Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 1.64, h-index: 99)
J. of General Internal Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 1.804, h-index: 134)
J. of General Plant Pathology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.554, h-index: 22)
J. of Genetic Counseling     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.902, h-index: 39)
J. of Genetics     Open Access   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.458, h-index: 28)
J. of Geodesy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 2.173, h-index: 56)
J. of Geographical Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.8, h-index: 23)
J. of Geographical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.822, h-index: 39)
J. of Geometric Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.491, h-index: 27)
J. of Geometry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.272, h-index: 15)
J. of Global Optimization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.992, h-index: 60)
J. of Global Policy and Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
J. of Grid Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.414, h-index: 37)
J. of Hand and Microsurgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
J. of Happiness Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.881, h-index: 39)
J. of Hematopathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.2, h-index: 13)
J. of Heuristics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.308, h-index: 50)
J. of High Energy Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 1.052, h-index: 153)
J. of Homotopy and Related Structures     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.232, h-index: 2)
J. of Housing and the Built Environment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.648, h-index: 28)
J. of Huazhong University of Science and Technology [Medical Sciences]     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.344, h-index: 19)
J. of Ichthyology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 10)
J. of Immigrant and Minority Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.759, h-index: 37)
J. of Inclusion Phenomena and Macrocyclic Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.331, h-index: 46)
J. of Indian Council of Philosophical Research     Hybrid Journal  
J. of Indian Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.127, h-index: 12)
J. of Industrial Microbiology and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.966, h-index: 80)
J. of Industry, Competition and Trade     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.327, h-index: 15)
J. of Infection and Chemotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.673, h-index: 46)
J. of Information Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 53, SJR: 1.474, h-index: 55)
J. of Information Technology Teaching Cases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
J. of Infrared, Millimeter and Terahertz Waves     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.25, h-index: 36)
J. of Inherited Metabolic Disease     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.389, h-index: 77)
J. of Inorganic and Organometallic Polymers and Materials     Partially Free   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.338, h-index: 33)
J. of Insect Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.569, h-index: 39)
J. of Insect Conservation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.872, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent and Robotic Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.629, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent Information Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.691, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent Manufacturing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.397, h-index: 54)
J. of Interventional Cardiac Electrophysiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.93, h-index: 43)
J. of Intl. Business Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31, SJR: 4.208, h-index: 130)
J. of Intl. Entrepreneurship     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.549, h-index: 23)
J. of Intl. Migration and Integration / Revue de l integration et de la migration internationale     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.308, h-index: 13)
J. of Intl. Relations and Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.793, h-index: 22)
J. of Labor Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.394, h-index: 27)
J. of Logic, Language and Information     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.288, h-index: 25)
J. of Low Temperature Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.531, h-index: 52)
J. of Machinery Manufacture and Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.203, h-index: 7)
J. of Mammalian Evolution     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.134, h-index: 37)
J. of Mammary Gland Biology and Neoplasia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 2.252, h-index: 83)
J. of Management and Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.805, h-index: 33)
J. of Management Control     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.605, h-index: 6)
J. of Marine Science and Application     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.439, h-index: 11)
J. of Marine Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.235, h-index: 19)
J. of Maritime Archaeology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.228, h-index: 8)
J. of Market-Focused Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Marketing Analytics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
J. of Material Cycles and Waste Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.449, h-index: 22)
J. of Materials Engineering and Performance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.544, h-index: 40)
J. of Materials Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.836, h-index: 123)
J. of Materials Science : Materials in Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
J. of Materials Science : Materials in Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
J. of Mathematical Biology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 1.011, h-index: 71)
J. of Mathematical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.497, h-index: 45)
J. of Mathematical Fluid Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.22, h-index: 22)
J. of Mathematical Imaging and Vision     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.901, h-index: 53)
J. of Mathematical Modelling and Algorithms     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.414, h-index: 23)
J. of Mathematical Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.272, h-index: 23)
J. of Mathematics Teacher Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 1.062, h-index: 20)
J. of Maxillofacial and Oral Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Mechanical Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.589, h-index: 26)
J. of Medical and Biological Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.387, h-index: 18)
J. of Medical Humanities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.299, h-index: 18)
J. of Medical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.717, h-index: 44)
J. of Medical Toxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.874, h-index: 28)
J. of Medical Ultrasonics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.18, h-index: 13)
J. of Medicine and the Person     Hybrid Journal  
J. of Membrane Biology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.738, h-index: 82)
J. of Micro-Bio Robotics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.28, h-index: 3)
J. of Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.741, h-index: 43)
J. of Mining Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.317, h-index: 16)
J. of Molecular Evolution     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.952, h-index: 108)
J. of Molecular Histology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.755, h-index: 48)
J. of Molecular Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 2.165, h-index: 113)
J. of Molecular Modeling     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.466, h-index: 50)
J. of Molecular Neuroscience     Partially Free   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.988, h-index: 69)
J. of Mountain Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.418, h-index: 15)
J. of Muscle Research and Cell Motility     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.264, h-index: 55)
J. of Nanoparticle Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.583, h-index: 84)
J. of Natural Medicines     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.602, h-index: 28)
J. of Near-Death Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Nephrology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.689, h-index: 55)
J. of Network and Systems Management     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.466, h-index: 26)
J. of Neural Transmission     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.034, h-index: 86)
J. of Neuro-Oncology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.274, h-index: 90)
J. of Neuroimmune Pharmacology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.662, h-index: 45)
J. of Neurology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 1.429, h-index: 105)
J. of NeuroVirology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.979, h-index: 69)
J. of Nondestructive Evaluation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.863, h-index: 27)
J. of Nonlinear Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.887, h-index: 42)
J. of Nonverbal Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.723, h-index: 47)
J. of Nuclear Cardiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 1.024, h-index: 68)
J. of Nutrition, Health and Aging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.919, h-index: 60)
J. of Obstetrics and Gynecology of India     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.214, h-index: 6)
J. of Occupational Rehabilitation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.811, h-index: 51)
J. of Ocean Engineering and Marine Energy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Ocean University of China (English Edition)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.237, h-index: 11)
J. of Oceanography     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.796, h-index: 52)
J. of Ocular Biology, Diseases, and Informatics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.183, h-index: 11)
J. of Optical and Fiber Communications Reports     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
J. of Optics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.214, h-index: 8)
J. of Optimization Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.898, h-index: 65)
J. of Ornithology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
J. of Orofacial Orthopedics / Fortschritte der Kieferorthopädie     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.574, h-index: 33)
J. of Orthopaedic Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.708, h-index: 48)
J. of Paleolimnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.984, h-index: 64)
J. of Parasitic Diseases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.298, h-index: 9)
J. of Pediatric Neuropsychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
J. of Pest Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.341, h-index: 28)
J. of Pharmaceutical Health Care and Sciences     Open Access  
J. of Pharmaceutical Innovation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.524, h-index: 17)
J. of Pharmaceutical Investigation     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.331, h-index: 6)
J. of Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.708, h-index: 46)
J. of Phase Equilibria and Diffusion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.433, h-index: 36)
J. of Philosophical Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.704, h-index: 26)
J. of Physiology and Biochemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.87, h-index: 33)
J. of Plant Biochemistry and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.511, h-index: 20)
J. of Plant Biology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.596, h-index: 22)
J. of Plant Growth Regulation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.884, h-index: 57)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.699]   [H-I: 24]   [18 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2329 journals]
  • The Fragility of Common Knowledge
    • Authors: Cédric Paternotte
      Pages: 451 - 472
      Abstract: Abstract Ordinary common knowledge is formally expressed by strong probabilistic common belief. How strong exactly? The question can be answered by drawing from the similar equivalence, recently explored, between plain and probabilistic individual beliefs. I argue that such a move entails that common knowledge displays a double fragility: as a description of a collective state and as a phenomenon, because it can respectively disappear as group size increases, or more worryingly as the epistemic context changes. I argue that despite this latter fragility, the effects of common knowledge on action are robust. Unfortunately, this in turn leads to a third fragility, that of the concept of common knowledge, which threatens to collapse on probabilistic common belief. This also reveals a disanalogy between the individual and the collective cases. I finally pinpoint the subtle difference entailed by the two concepts, expressed in terms of the attitude towards contrary evidence or of the agents’ awareness. As a result, common knowledge can be defended as a concept, which refers to a fragile yet distinct collective attitude.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9828-4
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • “That Will Do”: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency
    • Authors: Frederik Van De Putte
      Pages: 473 - 511
      Abstract: Abstract We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency (often interpreted as obligation, resp. strong permission), as originally proposed in van Benthem (Bull Sect Log 8(1):36–41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of “obligation as weakest permission” from Anglberger et al. (Rev Symb Log 8(4):807–827, 2015).
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9829-3
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions
    • Authors: David Bourget
      Pages: 513 - 530
      Abstract: Abstract This paper defends the view that perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees a cat” are sometimes intensional. I offer a range of examples of intensional perceptual ascriptions, respond to objections to intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions, and show how widely accepted semantic accounts of intensionality can explain the key features of intensional perceptual ascriptions.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9830-x
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Logical Investigation
    • Authors: Jan Heylen
      Pages: 531 - 559
      Abstract: Abstract From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why there is something rather than nothing (henceforth, the Question). Why-questions request a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version of the Question, namely ‘Why is there something contingent rather than nothing contingent?’ (except that possibility of answers with neutral free logic in the background is not explored). The categorial version of the Question, namely ‘Why is there something concrete rather than nothing concrete?’, is also discussed. The conclusion is reached that deductive explanations are question-begging, whether one works with classical logic or positive or negative free logic. I also look skeptically at the prospects of giving causal-counterfactual or probabilistic answers to the Question, although the discussion of the options is less comprehensive and the conclusions are more tentative. The meta-question, viz. ‘Should we not stop asking the Question’, is accordingly tentatively answered affirmatively.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9831-9
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a
           Normative Reason
    • Authors: Susanne Mantel
      Pages: 561 - 582
      Abstract: Abstract Agents sometimes act for normative reasons—for reasons that objectively favor their actions. Jill, for instance, calls a doctor for the normative reason that Kate is injured. In this article I explore a dispositional approach to acting for a normative reason. I argue for the need of epistemic, motivational, and executional dispositional elements of a theory of acting for a normative reason. Dispositions play a mediating role between, on the one hand, the normative reason and its normative force, and the action on the other hand. Thereby, they help to deal with problem cases such as cases of deviant causal chains and improper instrumental motivation.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9832-8
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Learning from Simple Indicative Conditionals
    • Authors: Leendert M. Huisman
      Pages: 583 - 601
      Abstract: Abstract An agent who receives information in the form of an indicative conditional statement and who trusts her source will modify her credences to bring them in line with the conditional. I will argue that the agent, upon the acquisition of such information, should, in general, expand her prior credence function to an indeterminate posterior one; that is, to a set of credence functions. Two different ways the agent might interpret the conditional will be presented, and the properties of the resulting indeterminate posteriors compared. The cause of the expansion from a single prior credence function to a set of credence functions forming the indeterminate posterior one will be explained. The expansion undermines the Bayesian dogma that the result of assimilating new information into a determinate prior credence functions is always a determinate posterior one.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9833-7
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Three Questions About Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
    • Authors: Giovanni Merlo
      Pages: 603 - 623
      Abstract: Abstract It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the fact that mental self-ascriptions exhibit this sort of immunity? The aim of this paper is to bring these questions into focus, propose some tentative answers and use them to show that one prominent attempt to explain the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions is unsuccessful.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9834-6
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Content Externalism and Quine’s Criterion are Incompatible
    • Authors: T. Parent
      Pages: 625 - 639
      Abstract: Abstract Externalism holds that the content of our utterances and thoughts are determined partly by the environment. Here, I offer an argument which suggests that externalism is incompatible with a natural view about ontological commitment–namely, the Quinean view that such commitments are fixed by the range of the variables in your theory. The idea briefly is that, if Oscar mistakenly believes that water = XYZ, the externalist ontologically commits Oscar to two watery kinds. In contrast, the Quinean commits him to one such kind (albeit a metaphysically impossible kind). The penultimate section addresses a variety of objections to the argument.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9835-5
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • The Real Trouble with Recalcitrant Emotions
    • Authors: Alex Grzankowski
      Pages: 641 - 651
      Abstract: Abstract Cognitivists (sometimes called ‘Judgementalists’) about the emotions minimally hold that it is a necessary condition for being in an emotional state that one make a certain judgement or have a certain belief. For example, if I am angry with Sam, then I must believe that Sam has wronged me. Perhaps I must also elicit a certainly bodily response or undergo some relevant experience, but crucial to the view is the belief or judgement. In the face of ‘recalcitrant emotions’, this once very popular view has come under heavy criticism that has led many theorists to either abandon the view or to offer more nuanced representational views of the emotions. Against what seems to now be received wisdom, I argue that cognitivists have tools at their disposal that allow them to alleviate the apparent conflicts presented by cases of recalcitrance. But I also believe that cognitivists are still in trouble. Although cognitivists have a range of underexplored resources, their use comes at a high cost. In particular, cognitivists must adopt a widespread and thoroughgoing inaccessibility to our own thoughts and judgements that should strike one as implausible. It is mental opacity rather than mental conflict that is the real problem posed by recalcitrance.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9836-4
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • The Contingency Problem for Neo-Conventionalism
    • Authors: Jonathan Livingstone-Banks
      Pages: 653 - 671
      Abstract: Abstract Traditional conventionalism about modality claims that a proposition is necessarily true iff it is true by convention. In the wake of the widespread repudiation of truth-byconvention, traditional conventionalism has fallen out of favour. However, a family of theories of modality have arisen that, whilst abandoning truth-by-convention, retain the spirit of traditional conventionalism. These ‘neo-conventionalist’ theories surpass their forebears and don’t fall victim to the criticisms inherited through truth-by-convention. However, not all criticisms levelled at traditional conventionalism target truth-by-convention. Any conventional theory of modality must face the contingency problem. This claims that the contingency of our linguistic conventions jeopardises the necessity of the necessities they determine. I present the contingency problem as relevant to both the traditional conventionalist and the neo-conventionalist. I examine a response from Einheuser that builds upon a response from Wright. I show that the Einheuser response does more to accommodate the conventionalist’s modal beliefs, but that it does not fully satisfy some further conditions that ought to be laid upon such a response. I then suggest how the response can be revised so as to satisfy these conditions. The resulting model of conventionalism is compatible with the validity of S4, and suitably in the spirit of conventionalism.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9837-3
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Why Truth-Conditional Semantics in Generative Linguistics is Still the
           Better Bet
    • Authors: Toby Napoletano
      Pages: 673 - 692
      Abstract: Abstract In his “Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative Grammar” (Erkenntnis 80(1):61–87, 2015), Stephen Schiffer argues that truth-conditional semantics is a poor fit with generative linguistics. In particular, he thinks that it fails to explain speakers’ abilities to understand the sentences of their language. In its place, he recommends his “Best Bet Theory”—a theory which aims to directly explain speakers’ abilities to mean things by their utterances and know what others mean by their utterances. I argue that Schiffer does not provide good reason to prefer the Best Bet Theory over truth-conditional semantics in the context of generative linguistics. First, his negative arguments against the truth-conditional approach are unpersuasive, and second, the Best Bet Theory involves an explanatory circularity which makes it unfit for linguistic theorizing. I conclude that the Best Bet Theory is thus not even a viable competitor to truth-conditional semantics in generative linguistics.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9838-2
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Language from the Ground Up: A Study of Homesign Communication
    • Authors: Endre Begby
      Pages: 693 - 714
      Abstract: Abstract Philosophers are often beholden to a picture of language as a largely static, well-defined structure which is handed over from generation to generation by an arduous process of learning: language, on this view, is something that we are given, and that we can make use of, but which we play no significant role in creating ourselves. This picture is often maintained in conjunction with the idea that several distinctively human cognitive capacities could only develop via the language acquisition process, as thus understood. This paper argues that the phenomenon of homesign, i.e., spontaneous gesture systems devised by deaf children for the purpose of communicating with their non-signing peers, can shed valuable empirical light on these convictions. Contrary to grounding assumptions of Wittgensteinian, Gricean, and Peircean approaches to language, homesign shows how core properties of language—including semantic properties—can be built from the ground up in idiosyncratic ways to serve the communicative needs of individuals.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9839-1
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2017)
       
  • Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand
           Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters
    • Authors: Michael Roche; William Roche
      Abstract: Abstract Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the (potential) knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the (potential) knowledge denied by its negative side? The second puzzle, PUZZLE 2, is substantive. Each of the following theses has some prima facie plausibility: (a) there is introspective knowledge of thoughts, (b) knowledge requires evidence, and (c) there are no experiences of thoughts. It is unclear, though, that these claims form a consistent set. These puzzles are not unrelated. Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is a potential solution to PUZZLE 2 in that Dretske’s theory is meant to show how (a), (b), and (c) can all be true. We provide a solution to PUZZLE 1 by appeal to Dretske’s early work in the philosophy of language on contrastive focus. We then distinguish between “Closure” and “Transmissibility”, and raise and answer a worry to the effect that Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge runs counter to Transmissibility. These results help to secure Dretske’s theory as a viable solution to PUZZLE 2.
      PubDate: 2017-05-11
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9854-2
       
  • Derivational Robustness and Indirect Confirmation
    • Authors: Aki Lehtinen
      Abstract: Abstract Derivational robustness may increase the degree to which various pieces of evidence indirectly confirm a robust result. There are two ways in which this increase may come about. First, if one can show that a result is robust, and that the various individual models used to derive it also have other confirmed results, these other results may indirectly confirm the robust result. Confirmation derives from the fact that data not known to bear on a result are shown to be relevant when it is shown to be robust. Second, robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly confirmed if it increases the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms it. This may happen when it strengthens the connection between the core and the robust result by showing that auxiliaries are not responsible for the result.
      PubDate: 2017-05-11
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9902-6
       
  • Persons, Stages, and Tensed Belief
    • Authors: Nicholas Rimell
      Abstract: Abstract Perdurantists hold that we persons—just like other ordinary objects—persist by perduring, by having temporal parts, or stages, located over time. Perdurantists also standardly endorse the B-theory of time. And, in light of this endorsement, they typically characterize our tensed beliefs as self-ascriptions of properties, made not by us but by our stages. For instance, for me to believe that Angela Merkel is currently the chancellor of Germany is for my now-located stage to self-ascribe the property of being simultaneous with Merkel’s chancellorship. The problem with this way of understanding tensed belief is that it undermines—if not outright contradicts—the perdurantist’s best options for resisting the Too Many Thinkers objection. In what follows, I show why this is. I then consider what I take to be the perdurantist’s most promising alternative account of tensed belief. I argue that this alternative either leaves perdurantists no better off with respect to the Too Many Thinkers objection or, instead, leaves them vulnerable to another objection, one that they would otherwise have no problem resisting.
      PubDate: 2017-05-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9903-5
       
  • Who is Afraid of Commitment? On the Relation of Scientific Evidence
           and Conceptual Theory
    • Authors: Steffen Steinert; Joachim Lipski
      Abstract: Abstract Can scientific evidence prompt us to revise philosophical theories or folk theoretical accounts of phenomena of the mind? We will argue that it can—but only under the condition that they make a so-called ‘ontological commitment’ to something that is actually subject to empirical inquiry. In other words, scientific evidence pertaining to neuroanatomical structure or causal processes only has a refuting effect if philosophical theories and folk notions subscribe to either account. We will illustrate the importance of ‘ontological commitment’ with the ‘neuroanatomical approach’ to amusement as proposed in a recent paper by Palencik (Dialogue 46(3):419–434, 2007). We will show that the scientific evidence presented in said neuroanatomical approach has no bearing on the conceptual issues, in that the philosophical theories and folk distinction that are criticized do not subscribe to any account of the underlying neuroanatomical structure or causal processes. Our suggestions in this paper are not limited to philosophical accounts of humor but apply to the relationship of philosophy, common sense and science in general.
      PubDate: 2017-05-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9899-x
       
  • The Problem of Error: The Moral Psychology Argument for Atheism
    • Authors: John Jung Park
      Abstract: Abstract The problem of error is an old argument for atheism that can be found in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Although it is not widely discussed in the contemporary literature in the Philosophy of Religion, I resurrect it and give it a modern spin. By relying on empirical studies in moral psychology that demonstrate that moral judgments from human beings are generally susceptible to certain psychological biases, such as framing and order effects, I claim that if God is responsible for making human beings such that we have these biases, this means that God is not a perfect being. The findings in empirical moral psychology create a problem for the existence of God, traditionally conceived.
      PubDate: 2017-05-06
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9900-8
       
  • The Moral Agency of Group Agents
    • Authors: Christopher Thompson
      Abstract: Abstract Christian List and Philip Pettit have recently developed a model of group agency on which an autonomous group agent can be formed, by deductive inference, from the beliefs and preferences of the individual group members. In this paper I raise doubts as to whether this type of group agent is a moral agent. The sentimentalist approach to moral responsibility sees a constitutive role for moral emotions, such as blame, guilt, and indignation, in our practices of attributing moral responsibility. These moral emotions are important for the alignment of moral understandings, and for valuing other members of the moral community. I argue that while the intentional objects of beliefs and preferences are propositions, the intentional objects of moral emotions are other agents. Because agents are not subject to rules of inference, we cannot generate group agent emotions—such as guilt—in the same way as we can generate group agent beliefs and preferences. And because the group agents lack moral emotions, we have reason to resist treating them as moral agents.
      PubDate: 2017-05-06
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9901-7
       
  • Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity
    • Authors: Matthew Tugby
      Abstract: Abstract The Platonic account of modality says, roughly, that truths about alien possibilities are grounded in uninstantiated universals. Recently, Ingram has raised a problem for this kind of view, which is that it apparently requires negative facts to play a truthmaking role. Ingram offers an alternative Platonic account which makes use of modal instantiation relations. In this paper, I highlight some of the costs of Ingram’s new account and argue that a more appealing version of Platonism—and modal theory in general—is one that is supplemented with an ontology of totality facts.
      PubDate: 2017-04-22
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9898-y
       
  • Objectivity, Historicity, Taxonomy
    • Authors: Joeri Witteveen
      Abstract: Abstract In Objectivity (2007), Daston and Galison argue that scientific objectivity has a history. Objectivity emerged as a distinct nineteenth-century “epistemic virtue,” flanked in time by other epistemic virtues. The authors trace the origins of scientific objectivity by identifying changes in images from scientific atlases from different periods, but they emphasize that the same history could be narrated using different sorts of scientific objects. One could, for example, focus on the changing uses of “type specimens” in biological taxonomy. Daston (Crit Inq 31(1):153–182, 2004) indeed provides a detailed account of the history of the type specimen which purports to show this. I argue that this attempt hinges on a conceptual confusion and therefore fails. I show that the actual history of the type specimen does not reinforce the account of epistemic virtues from Objectivity, but rather threatens to subvert it.
      PubDate: 2017-04-20
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9897-z
       
 
 
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