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Publisher: Springer-Verlag   (Total: 2291 journals)

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Diabetology Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.273, h-index: 5)
Dialectical Anthropology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.314, h-index: 9)
Die Weltwirtschaft     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Differential Equations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.364, h-index: 15)
Differential Equations and Dynamical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.63, h-index: 7)
Digestive Diseases and Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.19, h-index: 89)
Directieve therapie     Hybrid Journal  
Discrete & Computational Geometry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.269, h-index: 40)
Discrete Event Dynamic Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.42, h-index: 32)
Distributed and Parallel Databases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.766, h-index: 30)
Distributed Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.41, h-index: 31)
DNP - Der Neurologe und Psychiater     Full-text available via subscription  
Documenta Ophthalmologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.946, h-index: 40)
Doklady Biochemistry and Biophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.2, h-index: 10)
Doklady Biological Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.248, h-index: 10)
Doklady Botanical Sciences     Hybrid Journal  
Doklady Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.272, h-index: 12)
Doklady Earth Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.48, h-index: 17)
Doklady Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.345, h-index: 13)
Doklady Physical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.299, h-index: 12)
Doklady Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.293, h-index: 17)
Douleur et Analg├ęsie     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.113, h-index: 6)
Drug Delivery and Translational Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.607, h-index: 8)
Drug Safety - Case Reports     Open Access  
Drugs : Real World Outcomes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Dynamic Games and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.481, h-index: 5)
Dysphagia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 97, SJR: 0.822, h-index: 52)
e & i Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.279, h-index: 9)
e-Neuroforum     Hybrid Journal  
Early Childhood Education J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.466, h-index: 16)
Earth Science Informatics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.282, h-index: 7)
Earth, Moon, and Planets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.303, h-index: 29)
Earthquake Engineering and Engineering Vibration     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.482, h-index: 21)
Earthquake Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.418, h-index: 9)
East Asia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.18, h-index: 9)
Eating and Weight Disorders - Studies on Anorexia, Bulimia and Obesity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.362, h-index: 27)
EcoHealth     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.88, h-index: 26)
Ecological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.847, h-index: 43)
Economia e Politica Industriale     Hybrid Journal  
Economia Politica     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.375, h-index: 6)
Economic Botany     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.527, h-index: 44)
Economic Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Economic Change and Restructuring     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.264, h-index: 9)
Economic Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 2.557, h-index: 34)
Economic Theory Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Economics of Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.408, h-index: 14)
Ecosystems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 1.909, h-index: 93)
Ecotoxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 1.333, h-index: 56)
Education and Information Technologies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 90, SJR: 0.366, h-index: 16)
Educational Assessment, Evaluation and Accountability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.374, h-index: 15)
Educational Psychology Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 2.776, h-index: 61)
Educational Research for Policy and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.273, h-index: 9)
Educational Studies in Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.825, h-index: 32)
Educational Technology Research and Development     Partially Free   (Followers: 81, SJR: 1.785, h-index: 52)
Electrical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.336, h-index: 18)
Electrocatalysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.883, h-index: 10)
Electronic Commerce Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.582, h-index: 16)
Electronic Markets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.411, h-index: 8)
Electronic Materials Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.407, h-index: 15)
Elemente der Mathematik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Emergency Radiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.678, h-index: 25)
Emission Control Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Empirica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.319, h-index: 16)
Empirical Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.489, h-index: 31)
Empirical Software Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.285, h-index: 39)
Employee Responsibilities and Rights J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.361, h-index: 15)
Endocrine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.878, h-index: 57)
Endocrine Pathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.638, h-index: 31)
Energy Efficiency     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.732, h-index: 14)
Energy Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 1.176, h-index: 7)
Engineering With Computers     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.433, h-index: 30)
Entomological Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.144, h-index: 5)
Environment Systems & Decisions     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Environment, Development and Sustainability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29, SJR: 0.419, h-index: 29)
Environmental and Ecological Statistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.458, h-index: 32)
Environmental and Resource Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.632, h-index: 54)
Environmental Biology of Fishes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.725, h-index: 58)
Environmental Chemistry Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.741, h-index: 28)
Environmental Earth Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.724, h-index: 63)
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.524, h-index: 4)
Environmental Evidence     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Environmental Fluid Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.437, h-index: 24)
Environmental Geochemistry and Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.013, h-index: 36)
Environmental Geology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Environmental Health and Preventive Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.522, h-index: 19)
Environmental Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32, SJR: 0.942, h-index: 66)
Environmental Modeling & Assessment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.533, h-index: 31)
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.685, h-index: 52)
Environmental Science and Pollution Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.885, h-index: 46)
Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations     Open Access   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.4, h-index: 17)
Epileptic Disorders     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.608, h-index: 38)
EPJ A - Hadrons and Nuclei     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.287, h-index: 63)
EPJ B - Condensed Matter and Complex Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.731, h-index: 89)
EPJ direct     Hybrid Journal  
EPJ E - Soft Matter and Biological Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.641, h-index: 62)
EPMA J.     Open Access   (SJR: 0.284, h-index: 6)
ERA-Forum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.128, h-index: 3)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.621, h-index: 16)
Erwerbs-Obstbau     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.206, h-index: 9)
Esophagus     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.311, h-index: 10)

  First | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Last

Journal Cover   Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.621]   [H-I: 16]   [14 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2291 journals]
  • The Propensity Interpretation of Probability: A Re-evaluation
    • Abstract: Abstract Single-case and long-run propensity theories are among the main objective interpretations of probability. There have been various objections to these theories, e.g. that it is difficult to explain why propensities should satisfy the probability axioms and, worse, that propensities are at odds with these axioms, that the explication of propensities is circular and accordingly not informative, and that single-case propensities are metaphysical and accordingly non-scientific. We consider various propensity theories of probability and their prospects in light of these objections. We argue that while propensity theories face challenges, these challenges do not undermine their validity as prospective interpretations of probability in science.
      PubDate: 2015-07-07
       
  • Extended Knowledge-How
    • Abstract: Abstract According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g. Stanley and Williamson in J Philos 411–44, 2001; Stanley in Know how. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Brogaard in Grazer Philos Stud 77(1):147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78(2):439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist (e.g. Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press , Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind (e.g. the extended mind thesis and the hypothesis of extended cognition), we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how (e.g. Ryle in Proc Aristot Soc 46, 1945; The concept of mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949) are a viable option, there is an overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active externalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper explores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowledge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in (on an anti-intellectualist construal) when one knows how to do something, and how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance.
      PubDate: 2015-06-14
       
  • The Ethics of Delusional Belief
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to (1) acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, (2) establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and (3) introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation.
      PubDate: 2015-06-13
       
  • Quid Quidditism Est?
    • Abstract: Abstract Over the last decade or so, there has been a renewed interest in a view about properties known as quidditism. However, a review of the literature reveals that ‘quidditism’ is used to cover a range of distinct views. In this paper I explore the logical space of distinct types of quidditism. The first distinction noted is between quidditism as a thesis explicitly about property individuation and quidditism as a principle of unrestricted property recombination. The distinction recently drawn by Dustin Locke between extravagant quidditism and austere quidditism is a distinction between quidditisms of the first type. It is then argued that austere quidditism may itself be further sub-divided into what I call ‘extremely austere quidditism’ and ‘moderately austere quidditism’. Moderately austere quidditism is argued to be preferable to extremely austere quidditism and further to be able to address many of the arguments leveled against quidditism in general.
      PubDate: 2015-06-12
       
  • Atoms, Gunk, and the Limits of ‘Composition’
    • Abstract: Abstract It is customary practice to define ‘x is composed of the ys’ as ‘x is a sum of the ys and the ys are pairwise disjoint (i.e., no two of them have any parts in common)’. This predicate has played a central role in the debate on the special composition question and on related metaphysical issues concerning the mereological structure of objects. In this note we show that the customary characterization is nonetheless inadequate. We do so by constructing a mereological model where everything qualifies as composed of atoms even though some elements in the domain are gunky, i.e., can be divided indefinitely into smaller and smaller proper parts.
      PubDate: 2015-06-05
       
  • On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to
           Steglich-Petersen
    • Abstract: Abstract In a recent paper in this journal (2014), we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Steglich-Petersen (Erkenntnis 1–9, 2014) claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.
      PubDate: 2015-06-05
       
  • On What Actually Is
    • Abstract: Abstract The actually-operator, understood as a rigidifier, has been employed for a range of purposes in natural language semantics. In this article I argue that the properties of the operator do not correspond to any feature of natural language or feature natural language users have access to. Nor is it needed to provide a formal representation of natural language sentences—the examples usually provided to illustrate the indispensability of the operator are much more plausibly interpreted using plural quantifiers. This lack of connection to natural language is a serious worry for accounts that appeal to rigidifying operations to explain natural language phenomena, as well as a challenge to theories that appeal to the operator to capture the difference between different kinds of necessity expressed in natural language.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Dependence, Justification and Explanation: Must Reality be
           Well-Founded?
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper is about metaphysical ‘infinitism’, the view that there are, or could be, infinite chains of ontological dependence. Its main aim is to show that, contrary to widespread opinion, metaphysical infinitism is a coherent position. On the basis of this, it is then additionally argued that metaphysical infinitism need not fare worse than the more canonical ‘foundationalist’ alternatives when it comes to formulating metaphysical explanations. In the course of the discussion, a rather unexplored parallel with the debate concerning infinitism about justification is suggested.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • No Match Point for the Permissibility Account
    • Abstract: Abstract In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of the plausible principles; whereas the other allows us to save them both. The fact that it allows us to save both of the plausible principles might well be considered a strong reason in favour of the relevant account. The permissibility-account-based resolution of the lottery paradox suggests that the permissibility account is a candidate for being supported in this way, since the account seems to save two plausible principles of rational belief and rational degrees of belief. I argue that even if the permissibility account were supported in this way the support would be defeated, since one cannot provide an analogous resolution of the preface paradox. The principles remain unsaved by the permissibility account.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • You Can’t Always Get What You Want Some Considerations Regarding
           Conditional Probabilities
    • Abstract: Abstract The standard treatment of conditional probability leaves conditional probability undefined when the conditioning proposition has zero probability. Nonetheless, some find the option of extending the scope of conditional probability to include zero-probability conditions attractive or even compelling. This article reviews some of the pitfalls associated with this move, and concludes that, for the most part, probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions are more trouble than they are worth.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Intuitions in Philosophical Semantics
    • Abstract: Abstract We argue that the term “intuition”, as it is used in metaphilosophy, is ambiguous between at least four different senses. In philosophy of language, the relevant “intuitions” are either the outputs of our competence to interpret and produce linguistic expressions, or the speakers’ or hearers’ own reports of these outputs. The semantic facts that philosophers of language are interested in are determined by the outputs of our competence. Hence, philosophers of language should be interested in investigating these, and they do this by testing what we would say or understand in hypothetical communication situations. In the final section of the paper we suggest some methods for investigating these outputs which are independent of whether subjects report them, and hence which might be used as an alternative to the standard use of hypothetical cases.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Logicism as Making Arithmetic Explicit
    • Abstract: Abstract This paper aims to shed light on the broader significance of Frege’s logicism (and hence the phenomenon of modern logic) against the background of discussing and comparing Wittgenstein’s ‘showing/saying’-distinction with Brandom’s idiom of logic as the enterprise of making the implicit rules of our linguistic practices (something we do) explicit (by something we say). The main thesis of this paper is that the problem of Frege’s logicism lies deeper than in its inconsistency (which has since turned out to be reparable, as the neologicists have shown): it lies in the basic idea that in arithmetic (and prospectively in language in general) one can, and should, express everything that is implicitly presupposed so that nothing is left unsaid. This, in fact, is the target of Wittgenstein’s critique. Rather than the Tractatus, with its claim that logicism attempts to say something that can only be shown (e.g. what ‘object’, ‘function’ or ‘number’ are), it is the Philosophical Investigations, with its argument by regress against the thesis that every rule which one can follow must be of an explicit nature, that is of real significance here.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Alisa Bokulich and Peter Bokulich (eds): Scientific Structuralism (Boston
           Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 281)
    • PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • The Role Functionalist Theory of Absences
    • Abstract: Abstract Functionalist theories have been proposed for just about everything: mental states, dispositions, moral properties, truth, causation, and much else. The time has come for a functionalist theory of nothing. Or, more accurately, a role functionalist theory of those absences (omissions, negative events) that are causes and effects.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited
    • Abstract: Abstract Probabilistic dependence and independence are among the key concepts of Bayesian epistemology. This paper focuses on the study of one specific quantitative notion of probabilistic dependence. More specifically, section 1 introduces Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and shows how it is related to pivotal aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, the explanatory and unificatory power of theories, and the diversity of evidence. The intimate connection between Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and scientific reasoning raises the question of how Keynes’s coefficient of dependence is related to truth, and how it can be made fruitful for epistemological considerations. This question is answered in section 2 of the paper. Section 3 outlines the consequences the results have for epistemology and the philosophy of science from a Bayesian point of view.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Nikolaj Nottelmann: Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism
    • PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference
    • Abstract: Abstract The Principle of Indifference (POI) was once regarded as a linchpin of probabilistic reasoning, but has now fallen into disrepute as a result of the so-called problem of multiple of partitions. In ‘Evidential symmetry and mushy credence’ Roger White suggests that we have been too quick to jettison this principle and argues that the problem of multiple partitions rests on a mistake. In this paper I will criticise White’s attempt to revive POI. In so doing, I will argue that what underlies the problem of multiple partitions is a fundamental tension between POI and the very idea of evidential incomparability.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Belief Retention: A Fregean Account
    • Abstract: Abstract Concerning cases involving temporal indexicals Kaplan has argued that Fregean thoughts cannot be the bearers of cognitive significance due to the alleged fact that one can think the same thought from one occasion to the next without realizing this—thus linking the issue of cognitive significance to that of belief retention. Kaplan comes up with his own version of the Fregean strategy for accounting for belief retention that does not face this kind of a problem; but he finds it deficient because it leads us to implausibly deny that one who is lost in time retains the beliefs one held before this occurred. I take issue with Kaplan though in conformity with his plausible demands about belief retention and argue that a situation does not arise in which one can fail to realize that one is thinking the same thought from one occasion to the next. I also argue that thoughts are the bearers of cognitive significance as well as explanatory of belief retention.
      PubDate: 2015-06-01
       
  • Colors, Dispositions, and Similarity
    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, it is argued that those who claim that the dispositionalist theory of color has even a prima facie advantage over color physicalism in accommodating the similarity relations that seem to hold among the colors are mistaken. The appearance that dispositionalists can handle the relevant similarity claims (e.g. that red is more similar to orange than it is to green) stems from the unexamined assumption that the similarity of two dispositions is simply a matter of the similarity of the manifestations of those dispositions. A more careful treatment of the ways in which two dispositions can be similar to, or different from, one another must consider both the bases and the manifestation conditions of those dispositions in addition to their manifestations. After examining cases of dispositions from outside the domain of colors, it is argued that attention to conditions of manifestation provides a particularly strong reason for rejecting the assumption that similarity of manifestations entails similarity of dispositions. Without this assumption, dispositionalists about color are shown to be in the same position as non-dispositionalists regarding similarity relations among the colors. This way of responding to color dispositionalism is compared with two other responses [offered by Byrne (Philos Phenomenol Res 66(3):641–665, 2003) and McLaughlin (Consciousness: new philosophical perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003)], and shown to be a candidate to strengthen, rather than replace, either one.
      PubDate: 2015-05-29
       
  • Spreading the Credit: Virtue Reliabilism and Weak Epistemic
           Anti-Individualism
    • Abstract: Abstract Mainstream epistemologists have recently made a few isolated attempts to demonstrate the particular ways, in which specific types of knowledge are partly social. Two promising cases in point are Lackey’s (Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Goldberg’s (Relying on others: an essay in epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) process reliabilist treatment of testimonial and coverage-support justification. What seems to be missing from the literature, however, is a general approach to knowledge that could reveal the partly social nature of the latter anytime this may be the case. Indicatively, even though Lackey (Synthese 158(3):345–361, 2007) has recently launched an attack against the Credit Account of Knowledge (CAK) on the basis of testimony, she has not classified her view of testimonial knowledge into any of the alternative, general approaches to knowledge. Similarly, even if Goldberg’s attempt to provide a process reliabilist explanation of the social nature of testimonial knowledge is deemed satisfactory, his attempt to do the same in the case of coverage-support justification does not deliver the requisite result. This paper demonstrates that CAK can in fact provide, pace Lackey’s renunciation of the view, a promising account of the social nature of both testimonial and coverage-supported knowledge. Additionally, however, it can display further explanatory power by also revealing the social nature of knowledge produced on the basis of epistemic artifacts. Despite their disparities, all these types of knowledge count as partly social in nature, because in all these cases, according to CAK, the epistemic credit for the individual agent’s true belief must spread between the individual agent and certain parts of her epistemic community. Accordingly, CAK is a promising candidate for providing a unified approach to several and, perhaps all possible, instances of what we may call ‘weak epistemic anti-individualism’ within mainstream epistemology: i.e., the claim that the nature of knowledge can occasionally be both social and individual at the same time.
      PubDate: 2015-05-29
       
 
 
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