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Publisher: Springer-Verlag (Total: 2353 journals)

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Showing 1201 - 1400 of 2353 Journals sorted alphabetically
J. of Clinical Geropsychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
J. of Clinical Immunology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.332, h-index: 75)
J. of Clinical Monitoring and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.661, h-index: 37)
J. of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.46, h-index: 34)
J. of Cluster Science     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.416, h-index: 31)
J. of Coal Science and Engineering (China)     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.188, h-index: 8)
J. of Coastal Conservation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.474, h-index: 25)
J. of Coatings Technology and Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.425, h-index: 25)
J. of Combinatorial Optimization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.093, h-index: 34)
J. of Communications Technology and Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.29, h-index: 16)
J. of Community Genetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.727, h-index: 14)
J. of Community Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.921, h-index: 44)
J. of Comparative Physiology A: Neuroethology, Sensory, Neural, and Behavioral Physiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 1.087, h-index: 74)
J. of Comparative Physiology B : Biochemical, Systemic, and Environmental Physiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.126, h-index: 59)
J. of Compassionate Health Care     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
J. of Computational Analysis and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.291, h-index: 19)
J. of Computational Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.511, h-index: 20)
J. of Computational Neuroscience     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25, SJR: 1.068, h-index: 60)
J. of Computer and Systems Sciences Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.27, h-index: 13)
J. of Computer Science and Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.437, h-index: 31)
J. of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.151, h-index: 2)
J. of Computer-Aided Molecular Design     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.995, h-index: 78)
J. of Computers in Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
J. of Computing in Higher Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.363, h-index: 21)
J. of Consumer Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.704, h-index: 30)
J. of Contemporary Mathematical Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.237, h-index: 5)
J. of Contemporary Physics (Armenian Academy of Sciences)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.197, h-index: 6)
J. of Contemporary Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.397, h-index: 23)
J. of Control Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.359, h-index: 19)
J. of Control, Automation and Electrical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.231, h-index: 9)
J. of Crop Science and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
J. of Cross-Cultural Gerontology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.631, h-index: 29)
J. of Cryptographic Engineering     Partially Free   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.989, h-index: 11)
J. of Cryptology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.443, h-index: 55)
J. of Cultural Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.539, h-index: 29)
J. of Database Marketing & Customer Strategy Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.149, h-index: 8)
J. of Derivatives & Hedge Funds     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.114, h-index: 5)
J. of Developmental and Physical Disabilities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.574, h-index: 29)
J. of Digital Imaging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.578, h-index: 35)
J. of Direct Data and Digital Marketing Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.154, h-index: 6)
J. of Dynamical and Control Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.4, h-index: 26)
J. of Dynamics and Differential Equations     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 1.418, h-index: 31)
J. of Earth Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.483, h-index: 16)
J. of Earth System Science     Open Access   (Followers: 47, SJR: 0.448, h-index: 32)
J. of East Asian Linguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.537, h-index: 20)
J. of Echocardiography     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.22, h-index: 3)
J. of Ecology and Environment     Open Access  
J. of Economic Growth     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29, SJR: 3.273, h-index: 63)
J. of Economic Interaction and Coordination     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.263, h-index: 12)
J. of Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.418, h-index: 23)
J. of Economics and Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.272, h-index: 19)
J. of Educational Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.961, h-index: 21)
J. of Elasticity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.851, h-index: 45)
J. of Electroceramics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.577, h-index: 57)
J. of Electronic Materials     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.609, h-index: 75)
J. of Electronic Testing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.372, h-index: 27)
J. of Electronics (China)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.112, h-index: 9)
J. of Elementary Science Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
J. of Elliptic and Parabolic Equations     Hybrid Journal  
J. of Engineering Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.347, h-index: 37)
J. of Engineering Physics and Thermophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.288, h-index: 11)
J. of Engineering Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.145, h-index: 5)
J. of Engineering Thermophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.763, h-index: 9)
J. of Environmental Studies and Sciences     Partially Free   (Followers: 2)
J. of Ethology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.609, h-index: 25)
J. of Evolution Equations     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.826, h-index: 26)
J. of Evolutionary Biochemistry and Physiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.145, h-index: 11)
J. of Evolutionary Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.492, h-index: 52)
J. of Experimental and Theoretical Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.458, h-index: 39)
J. of Experimental Criminology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 49, SJR: 1.445, h-index: 28)
J. of Failure Analysis and Prevention     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.261, h-index: 15)
J. of Family and Economic Issues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.396, h-index: 32)
J. of Family Violence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38, SJR: 0.639, h-index: 56)
J. of Financial Services Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.273, h-index: 10)
J. of Financial Services Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.572, h-index: 36)
J. of Fixed Point Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.644, h-index: 13)
J. of Fluorescence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.465, h-index: 56)
J. of Food Measurement and Characterization     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.307, h-index: 4)
J. of Food Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.441, h-index: 29)
J. of Forest Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.495, h-index: 27)
J. of Forestry Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 14)
J. of Fourier Analysis and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.18, h-index: 42)
J. of Friction and Wear     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.373, h-index: 7)
J. of Fusion Energy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.387, h-index: 19)
J. of Gambling Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.171, h-index: 57)
J. of Gastroenterology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 1.651, h-index: 88)
J. of Gastrointestinal Cancer     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 39)
J. of Gastrointestinal Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 1.64, h-index: 99)
J. of General Internal Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.804, h-index: 134)
J. of General Plant Pathology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.554, h-index: 22)
J. of Genetic Counseling     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.902, h-index: 39)
J. of Genetics     Open Access   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.458, h-index: 28)
J. of Geodesy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 2.173, h-index: 56)
J. of Geographical Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.8, h-index: 23)
J. of Geographical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.822, h-index: 39)
J. of Geometric Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.491, h-index: 27)
J. of Geometry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.272, h-index: 15)
J. of Global Optimization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.992, h-index: 60)
J. of Global Policy and Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
J. of Grid Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.414, h-index: 37)
J. of Happiness Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25, SJR: 0.881, h-index: 39)
J. of Hematopathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.2, h-index: 13)
J. of Heuristics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.308, h-index: 50)
J. of High Energy Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 1.052, h-index: 153)
J. of Homotopy and Related Structures     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.232, h-index: 2)
J. of Housing and the Built Environment     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.648, h-index: 28)
J. of Huazhong University of Science and Technology [Medical Sciences]     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.344, h-index: 19)
J. of Ichthyology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.304, h-index: 10)
J. of Immigrant and Minority Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.759, h-index: 37)
J. of Inclusion Phenomena and Macrocyclic Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.331, h-index: 46)
J. of Indian Council of Philosophical Research     Hybrid Journal  
J. of Indian Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.127, h-index: 12)
J. of Industrial Microbiology and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.966, h-index: 80)
J. of Industry, Competition and Trade     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.327, h-index: 15)
J. of Infection and Chemotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.673, h-index: 46)
J. of Information Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 54, SJR: 1.474, h-index: 55)
J. of Information Technology Teaching Cases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
J. of Infrared, Millimeter and Terahertz Waves     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.25, h-index: 36)
J. of Inherited Metabolic Disease     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.389, h-index: 77)
J. of Inorganic and Organometallic Polymers and Materials     Partially Free   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.338, h-index: 33)
J. of Insect Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.569, h-index: 39)
J. of Insect Conservation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.872, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent and Robotic Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.629, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent Information Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.691, h-index: 43)
J. of Intelligent Manufacturing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.397, h-index: 54)
J. of Interventional Cardiac Electrophysiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.93, h-index: 43)
J. of Intl. Business Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34, SJR: 4.208, h-index: 130)
J. of Intl. Entrepreneurship     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.549, h-index: 23)
J. of Intl. Migration and Integration / Revue de l integration et de la migration internationale     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.308, h-index: 13)
J. of Intl. Relations and Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.793, h-index: 22)
J. of Labor Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.394, h-index: 27)
J. of Logic, Language and Information     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.288, h-index: 25)
J. of Low Temperature Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.531, h-index: 52)
J. of Machinery Manufacture and Reliability     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.203, h-index: 7)
J. of Mammalian Evolution     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.134, h-index: 37)
J. of Mammary Gland Biology and Neoplasia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 2.252, h-index: 83)
J. of Management and Governance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.805, h-index: 33)
J. of Management Control     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.605, h-index: 6)
J. of Marine Science and Application     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.439, h-index: 11)
J. of Marine Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.235, h-index: 19)
J. of Maritime Archaeology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.228, h-index: 8)
J. of Market-Focused Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Marketing Analytics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
J. of Material Cycles and Waste Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.449, h-index: 22)
J. of Materials Engineering and Performance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.544, h-index: 40)
J. of Materials Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.836, h-index: 123)
J. of Materials Science : Materials in Electronics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
J. of Materials Science : Materials in Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
J. of Mathematical Biology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 1.011, h-index: 71)
J. of Mathematical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.497, h-index: 45)
J. of Mathematical Fluid Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.22, h-index: 22)
J. of Mathematical Imaging and Vision     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.901, h-index: 53)
J. of Mathematical Modelling and Algorithms     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.414, h-index: 23)
J. of Mathematical Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.272, h-index: 23)
J. of Mathematics Teacher Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.062, h-index: 20)
J. of Maxillofacial and Oral Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
J. of Mechanical Science and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.589, h-index: 26)
J. of Medical and Biological Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.387, h-index: 18)
J. of Medical Humanities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.299, h-index: 18)
J. of Medical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.717, h-index: 44)
J. of Medical Toxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.874, h-index: 28)
J. of Medical Ultrasonics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.18, h-index: 13)
J. of Medicine and the Person     Hybrid Journal  
J. of Membrane Biology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.738, h-index: 82)
J. of Micro-Bio Robotics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.28, h-index: 3)
J. of Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.741, h-index: 43)
J. of Mining Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.317, h-index: 16)
J. of Molecular Evolution     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.952, h-index: 108)
J. of Molecular Histology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.755, h-index: 48)
J. of Molecular Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 2.165, h-index: 113)
J. of Molecular Modeling     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.466, h-index: 50)
J. of Molecular Neuroscience     Partially Free   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.988, h-index: 69)
J. of Mountain Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.418, h-index: 15)
J. of Muscle Research and Cell Motility     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.264, h-index: 55)
J. of Nanoparticle Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.583, h-index: 84)
J. of Natural Medicines     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.602, h-index: 28)
J. of Near-Death Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Nephrology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.689, h-index: 55)
J. of Network and Systems Management     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.466, h-index: 26)
J. of Neural Transmission     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.034, h-index: 86)
J. of Neuro-Oncology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.274, h-index: 90)
J. of Neuroimmune Pharmacology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.662, h-index: 45)
J. of Neurology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.429, h-index: 105)
J. of NeuroVirology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.979, h-index: 69)
J. of Nondestructive Evaluation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.863, h-index: 27)
J. of Nonlinear Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.887, h-index: 42)
J. of Nonverbal Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.723, h-index: 47)
J. of Nuclear Cardiology     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 1.024, h-index: 68)
J. of Nutrition, Health and Aging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25, SJR: 0.919, h-index: 60)
J. of Obstetrics and Gynecology of India     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.214, h-index: 6)
J. of Occupational Rehabilitation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.811, h-index: 51)
J. of Ocean Engineering and Marine Energy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Ocean University of China (English Edition)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.237, h-index: 11)
J. of Oceanography     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.796, h-index: 52)
J. of Ocular Biology, Diseases, and Informatics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.183, h-index: 11)
J. of Optical and Fiber Communications Reports     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
J. of Optics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.214, h-index: 8)
J. of Optimization Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.898, h-index: 65)
J. of Ornithology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
J. of Orofacial Orthopedics / Fortschritte der Kieferorthopädie     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.574, h-index: 33)

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Journal Cover Erkenntnis
  [SJR: 0.699]   [H-I: 24]   [18 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2353 journals]
  • Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism
    • Authors: Daniel Enrique Kalpokas
      Pages: 715 - 738
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection (only an accepted content can be a reason), that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9840-8
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated
    • Authors: Colin R. Caret
      Pages: 739 - 760
      Abstract: Abstract According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9841-7
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Boltzmannian Immortality
    • Authors: Christian Loew
      Pages: 761 - 776
      Abstract: Abstract Plausible assumptions from Cosmology and Statistical Mechanics entail that it is overwhelmingly likely that there will be exact duplicates of us in the distant future long after our deaths. Call such persons “Boltzmann duplicates,” after the great pioneer of Statistical Mechanics. In this paper, I argue that if survival of death is possible at all, then we almost surely will survive our deaths because there almost surely will be Boltzmann duplicates of us in the distant future that stand in appropriate relations to us to guarantee our survival.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9842-6
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • A Multiply Qualified Conditional Analysis of Disposition Ascription:
           Mapping the Conceptual Topography of Ceteris Paribus
    • Authors: Jesse R. Steinberg; Alan M. Steinberg
      Pages: 777 - 793
      Abstract: Abstract Given that an analysis of disposition ascription cannot be made in terms of a simple subjunctive conditional, we present a multiply qualified conditional analysis that places disposition ascription within an implicit fundamental causal conceptual typography within which a disposition ascription is embedded, framed, and understood. By placing the multiply qualified analysis within an implicit causal matrix involving a focal cause, pathway of influence, mechanism of action (via the intrinsic property responsible for the disposition), contributing/partial cause, mediator (i.e., transmitting agent), extrinsic moderator, (protective factor, inhibitory factor), intrinsic moderator, and manifestation (causal consequence), we show how this analysis evades counterexamples and arguments raised against the simple conditional analysis. We then indicate how the causal conceptual landscape provides a roadmap for unpacking and explicating parameters of the ceteris paribus qualifier to acquit the analysis of charges of being vacuous or irredeemably vague.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9843-5
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Time Scales and Levels of Organization
    • Authors: James DiFrisco
      Pages: 795 - 818
      Abstract: Abstract The concept of levels of organization, despite its widespread scientific currency, has recently been criticized by a number of philosophers of science. This paper diagnoses the main source of problems facing theories of levels. On this basis, the problems with the usual criteria for distinguishing levels are evaluated: compositional relations, organizational types, and spatial scales. Drawing on some work on hierarchies in ecology, I argue in favor of an alternative conception of levels defined by the criterion of rates or time scales of processes.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9844-4
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • An Argument for Shape Internalism
    • Authors: Jan Almäng
      Pages: 819 - 836
      Abstract: Abstract This paper is a defense of an internalist view of the perception of shapes. A basic assumption of the paper is that perceptual experiences have certain parts which account both for the phenomenal character associated with perceiving shapes—phenomenal shapes—and for the intentional content presenting shapes—intentional shapes. Internalism about perceptions of shapes is defined as the claim that phenomenal shapes determine the intentional shapes. Externalism is defined as the claim that perceptual experiences represent whatever shape the phenomenal shape reliably tracks. The argument against externalism proceeds in three steps. First, it is argued that phenomenal shapes are modality specific, such that a phenomenal shape that features in a visual perceptual experience cannot feature in a haptic perceptual experience, and vice versa. Second, it is argued that intentional shapes are amodal. Third, it is argued that externalism is incompatible with the fact that phenomenal shapes are modality specific and intentional shapes amodal.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9845-3
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of
           Central Philosophical and Practical Importance
    • Authors: Gregg D. Caruso; Stephen G. Morris
      Pages: 837 - 855
      Abstract: Abstract Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense (see, e.g., Pereboom in Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001; Pereboom in Free will, agency, and meaning in life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; Strawson in Freedom and belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986; Strawson in Philos Stud 75(1):5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144(1):45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom and others that the compatibilist’s burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist’s burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility—which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity—and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9846-2
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Counting on Strong Composition as Identity to Settle the Special
           Composition Question
    • Authors: Joshua Spencer
      Pages: 857 - 872
      Abstract: Abstract Strong Composition as Identity (SCAI) is the thesis that necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are non-distributively identical to y. Some have argued against this view as follows: if some many things are non-distributively identical to one thing, then what’s true of the many must be true of the one. But since the many are many in number whereas the one is not, the many cannot be identical to the one. Hence (SCAI) is mistaken. Although I am sympathetic to this objection, in this paper, I present two responses on behalf of the (SCAI) theorist. I also show that once the defender of (SCAI) accepts one of these two responses, that defender will be able to answer The Special Composition Question.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9847-1
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External
           Distinction
    • Authors: Sander Verhaegh
      Pages: 873 - 890
      Abstract: Abstract Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine’s own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine’s perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine’s position is much closer to Carnap’s than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9848-0
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Unjustified Defeaters
    • Authors: David Alexander
      Pages: 891 - 912
      Abstract: Abstract A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann (Justification without awareness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) and Pryor (Philos Issues 14:349–378, 2004). It then offers a revised version of Pryor’s account. On this proposal, an unjustified belief can be a defeater if it is rational, all things considered. If a belief is rational, all things considered, it can require one to abandon other beliefs with which it conflicts—even if it is unjustified. Finally, this paper shows that the proposed account of unjustified defeaters is one that can and should be embraced by leading accounts of justified belief as diverse as reliabilism and evidentialism.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9849-z
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Contextualism, Relativism and the Liar
    • Authors: Gil Sagi
      Pages: 913 - 928
      Abstract: Abstract Contextualist theories of truth appeal to context to solve the liar paradox: different stages of reasoning occur in different contexts, and so the contradiction is dispelled. The word ‘true’ is relativized by the contextualists to contexts of use. This paper shows that contextualist approaches to the liar are committed to a form of semantic relativism: that the truth value of some sentences depends on the context of assessment, as well as the context of use. In particular, it is shown how Simmons’s and Glanzberg’s contextualist approaches entail relativism. In both cases, the liar sentence gets different semantic evaluations as uttered in a fixed context of use but assessed from different contexts. Shift in context of use alone cannot provide the full explanation of the liar. These contextualist approaches, as originally presented, were thus mischaracterised and they should be re-evaluated according to their full implications.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9850-6
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions
    • Authors: Lorraine Juliano Keller
      Pages: 929 - 946
      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions (hereafter, ‘NCP’) faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.
      PubDate: 2017-08-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9851-5
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 4 (2017)
       
  • What is Wrong with Self-Grounding'
    • Authors: David Mark Kovacs
      Abstract: Abstract Many philosophers embrace grounding, supposedly a central notion of metaphysics. Grounding is widely assumed to be irreflexive, but recently a number of authors have questioned this assumption: according to them, it is at least possible that some facts ground themselves. The primary purpose of this paper is to problematize the notion of self-grounding through the theoretical roles usually assigned to grounding. The literature typically characterizes grounding as at least playing two central theoretical roles: a structuring role and an explanatory role. Once we carefully spell out what playing these roles includes, however, we find that any notion of grounding that isn’t irreflexive fails to play these roles when they are interpreted narrowly, and is redundant for playing them when they are interpreted more broadly. The upshot is that no useful notion of grounding can allow a fact to ground itself.
      PubDate: 2017-09-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9934-y
       
  • No Interpretation of Probability
    • Authors: Wolfgang Schwarz
      Abstract: Abstract I argue that none of the usual interpretations of probability provide an adequate interpretation of probabilistic theories in science. Assuming that the aim of such theories is to capture noisy relationships in the world, I suggest that we do not have to give them classical truth-conditional content at all: their probabilities can remain uninterpreted. Indirectly, this account turns out to explain what is right about the frequency interpretation, the best-systems interpretation, and the epistemic interpretation.
      PubDate: 2017-09-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9936-9
       
  • Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects
    • Authors: Graham Clay
      Abstract: Abstract There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell’s argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps between causes and effects. It is argued that whether one accepts or denies this condition, one is implicated in taking on substantial and wide-ranging philosophical positions. Therefore, it is not a trivial necessary condition of causal relations and it merits further inquiry.
      PubDate: 2017-09-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9939-6
       
  • Epistemic Modals and Alternative Possibilities
    • Authors: John Turri
      Abstract: Abstract Indicative judgments pertain to what is true. Epistemic modal judgments pertain to what must or might be true relative to a body of information. A standard view is that epistemic modals implicitly quantify over alternative possibilities, or ways things could turn out. On this view, a proposition must be true just in case it is true in all the possibilities consistent with the available information, and a proposition might be true just in case it is true in at least one possibility consistent with the available information. I report three experiments testing this view of epistemic modals. The results show that although modal judgments are sensitive to information about alternative possibilities, the standard quantification theory mischaracterizes the ordinary meaning of modals. I then report two more experiments testing the hypothesis that epistemic modals express willingness to attribute knowledge based on the available information. The results support this hypothesis. The results also show that the difference between “inside” and “outside” probabilistic information, familiar from the judgment and decision-making literature, affects epistemic modal judgments.
      PubDate: 2017-08-11
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9929-8
       
  • Explication, H-D Confirmation, and Simplicity
    • Authors: Lukáš Bielik
      Abstract: Abstract Explication usually plays the role of the method of language revision. The paper sticks to the Carnapian project of explication and develops some of the formal requirements imposed on the explicatum. However, it departs from Carnap’s view when it comes to how to construe the simplicity condition. It is suggested that in some cases the simplicity condition, which in the Carnapian project plays the derived role with respect to the other three conditions—the similarity, exactness, and fruitfulness conditions—may be substantive for the overall evaluation of explications. Based on a case study of three different explications of the H-D concept of confirmation (provided by Schurz in Erkenntnis 35(1-3):391–437, 1991; Erkenntnis 41:183–188, 1994; Gemes in Philos Sci 60(3):477–487, 1993; Erkenntnis 49(1):1–20, 1998; Sprenger in Philos Compass 6(7):497–508, 2011), we show that there are cases where competing explicata of a common explicandum satisfy the first three conditions equally well. In those cases, then, the simplicity condition is supposed to make the difference. However, instead of using Carnap’s construal of simplicity, we suggest a Principle of instrumental simplicity according to which, ceteris paribus, the simpler the explicatum is, the more likely is its ‘survival’ in competition with other explicata. Moreover, it is suggested that whereas the similarity, exactness and fruitfulness conditions are, in some sense, formal criteria, the simplicity condition is rather tested empirically.
      PubDate: 2017-08-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9930-2
       
  • Perspectival Tenses and Dynamic Tenses
    • Authors: Giuliano Torrengo
      Abstract: Abstract As far as our experience goes, we live in a dynamic present. Those two phenomenal features of experience—presentness and dynamism—are obviously connected. However, how they are connected is not obvious at all. In this paper, I criticise the view according to which the former can explain the latter, which I call sophisticated representationalism. My criticism will be based on an ambiguity in the notion of tense found in the philosophical literature, that between the perspectival understanding and the dynamic understanding of tenses. The distinction is not just of independent interest, but it has a role in providing indirect evidence for the claim that the feeling of passage of time should be understood in non-representationalist terms.
      PubDate: 2017-08-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9928-9
       
  • Constitution and Identity
    • Authors: John Biro
      Abstract: Abstract A widely held view has it that sometimes there is more than one thing in exactly the same place, as is the case, allegedly, with a clay statue. There is the statue, but there also is a piece of clay—both obviously in the same place yet distinct in virtue of their differing properties, if only modal ones. Those holding this view—pluralists—often describe the relation between such objects as one of constitution, with the piece of clay being said to constitute the statue. In the first part of this paper I consider ways in which the supposed relation of constitution may be understood. I conclude that the only coherent interpretation of ‘x constitutes y’ is one on which it is presupposed that x and y are identical. While this does not, by itself, show that pluralism is false, it is something that should make us suspicious of it. In the second part of the paper I propose a simple way with the temporal and modal facts the pluralist appeals to, showing that they do not force us into accepting his puzzling doctrine.
      PubDate: 2017-08-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9932-0
       
  • What Makes Evolution a Defeater'
    • Authors: Matt Lutz
      Abstract: Abstract Evolutionary Debunking Arguments purport to show that our moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge because these beliefs are “debunked” by the fact that our moral beliefs are, in some way, the product of evolutionary forces. But there is a substantial gap in this argument between its main evolutionary premise and the skeptical conclusion. What is it, exactly, about the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs that would create problems for realist views in metaethics' I argue that evolutionary debunking arguments are best understood as offering up defeaters for our moral beliefs. Moreover, the defeater in question is a paradigmatic instance of undercutting defeat. If anything is an undercutting defeater, then learning about the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs is a defeater for those beliefs.
      PubDate: 2017-08-07
      DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9931-1
       
 
 
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