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Publisher: Springer-Verlag   (Total: 2355 journals)

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Showing 1 - 200 of 2355 Journals sorted alphabetically
3D Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.214, h-index: 10)
4OR: A Quarterly J. of Operations Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 1.073, h-index: 25)
AAPS J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 1.192, h-index: 74)
AAPS PharmSciTech     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.718, h-index: 54)
Abdominal Imaging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.723, h-index: 60)
Abhandlungen aus dem Mathematischen Seminar der Universitat Hamburg     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.447, h-index: 12)
Academic Psychiatry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.492, h-index: 32)
Academic Questions     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.135, h-index: 6)
Accreditation and Quality Assurance: J. for Quality, Comparability and Reliability in Chemical Measurement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26, SJR: 0.378, h-index: 30)
Acoustical Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.355, h-index: 20)
Acoustics Australia     Hybrid Journal  
Acta Analytica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.387, h-index: 6)
Acta Applicandae Mathematicae     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.624, h-index: 34)
Acta Biotheoretica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.419, h-index: 25)
Acta Diabetologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.318, h-index: 46)
Acta Endoscopica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.113, h-index: 8)
acta ethologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.465, h-index: 23)
Acta Geochimica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Acta Geodaetica et Geophysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.294, h-index: 13)
Acta Geotechnica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.818, h-index: 22)
Acta Informatica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.524, h-index: 32)
Acta Mathematica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 8.021, h-index: 47)
Acta Mathematica Hungarica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.53, h-index: 29)
Acta Mathematica Sinica, English Series     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.406, h-index: 30)
Acta Mathematica Vietnamica     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.451, h-index: 5)
Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.22, h-index: 20)
Acta Mechanica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.898, h-index: 52)
Acta Mechanica Sinica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.426, h-index: 29)
Acta Metallurgica Sinica (English Letters)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.525, h-index: 18)
Acta Meteorologica Sinica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.524, h-index: 14)
Acta Neurochirurgica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.833, h-index: 73)
Acta Neurologica Belgica     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.348, h-index: 27)
Acta Neuropathologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 6.61, h-index: 117)
Acta Oceanologica Sinica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.295, h-index: 17)
Acta Parasitologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.581, h-index: 28)
Acta Physiologiae Plantarum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.551, h-index: 39)
Acta Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.658, h-index: 20)
Activitas Nervosa Superior     Hybrid Journal  
adhäsion KLEBEN & DICHTEN     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.103, h-index: 4)
ADHD Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorders     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.871, h-index: 15)
Adhesion Adhesives & Sealants     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research     Partially Free   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.795, h-index: 40)
Adsorption     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.774, h-index: 52)
Advances in Applied Clifford Algebras     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.319, h-index: 15)
Advances in Atmospheric Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34, SJR: 0.959, h-index: 44)
Advances in Computational Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 1.255, h-index: 44)
Advances in Contraception     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Advances in Data Analysis and Classification     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 53, SJR: 1.113, h-index: 14)
Advances in Gerontology     Partially Free   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.141, h-index: 3)
Advances in Health Sciences Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23, SJR: 1.397, h-index: 42)
Advances in Manufacturing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.2, h-index: 4)
Advances in Polymer Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 41, SJR: 0.637, h-index: 89)
Advances in Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.79, h-index: 44)
Aegean Review of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Aequationes Mathematicae     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.882, h-index: 23)
Aerobiologia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.511, h-index: 36)
Aesthetic Plastic Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.821, h-index: 49)
African Archaeological Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.612, h-index: 24)
Afrika Matematika     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.248, h-index: 6)
AGE     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.358, h-index: 33)
Ageing Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.337, h-index: 10)
Aggiornamenti CIO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Aging Clinical and Experimental Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.529, h-index: 55)
Agricultural Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Agriculture and Human Values     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 1.197, h-index: 49)
Agroforestry Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.64, h-index: 56)
Agronomy for Sustainable Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 1.732, h-index: 59)
AI & Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.171, h-index: 19)
AIDS and Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 2.006, h-index: 71)
Air Quality, Atmosphere & Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.706, h-index: 19)
Akupunktur & Aurikulomedizin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Algebra and Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.566, h-index: 18)
Algebra Universalis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.388, h-index: 22)
Algebras and Representation Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.868, h-index: 20)
Algorithmica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.898, h-index: 56)
Allergo J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.183, h-index: 20)
Allergo J. Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Alpine Botany     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.729, h-index: 20)
ALTEX : Alternatives to Animal Experimentation     Open Access   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.392, h-index: 32)
AMBIO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 1.094, h-index: 87)
American J. of Cardiovascular Drugs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.864, h-index: 39)
American J. of Community Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 1.237, h-index: 83)
American J. of Criminal Justice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.634, h-index: 13)
American J. of Cultural Sociology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.283, h-index: 3)
American J. of Dance Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.175, h-index: 13)
American J. of Potato Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.558, h-index: 35)
American J. of Psychoanalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.293, h-index: 13)
American Sociologist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.18, h-index: 13)
Amino Acids     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 1.362, h-index: 83)
AMS Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 4)
Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.21, h-index: 37)
Analysis and Mathematical Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.665, h-index: 7)
Analysis in Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal  
Analysis of Verbal Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28, SJR: 1.096, h-index: 123)
Anatomical Science Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.301, h-index: 26)
Angewandte Schmerztherapie und Palliativmedizin     Hybrid Journal  
Angiogenesis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 2.212, h-index: 69)
Animal Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 1.122, h-index: 55)
Annales françaises de médecine d'urgence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.156, h-index: 4)
Annales Henri Poincaré     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.377, h-index: 32)
Annales mathématiques du Québec     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Annali dell'Universita di Ferrara     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.504, h-index: 14)
Annali di Matematica Pura ed Applicata     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.167, h-index: 26)
Annals of Behavioral Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 2.112, h-index: 98)
Annals of Biomedical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 1.182, h-index: 94)
Annals of Combinatorics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.849, h-index: 15)
Annals of Data Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Annals of Dyslexia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.857, h-index: 40)
Annals of Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28, SJR: 0.686, h-index: 14)
Annals of Forest Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.929, h-index: 57)
Annals of Global Analysis and Geometry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.136, h-index: 23)
Annals of Hematology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.117, h-index: 62)
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.593, h-index: 42)
Annals of Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.402, h-index: 26)
Annals of Nuclear Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.68, h-index: 45)
Annals of Operations Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 1.186, h-index: 78)
Annals of Ophthalmology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Annals of Regional Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.405, h-index: 42)
Annals of Software Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Annals of Solid and Structural Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.553, h-index: 8)
Annals of Surgical Oncology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 1.902, h-index: 127)
Annals of Telecommunications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.315, h-index: 25)
Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.931, h-index: 31)
Antonie van Leeuwenhoek     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.992, h-index: 87)
Apidologie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.14, h-index: 57)
APOPTOSIS     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 1.554, h-index: 87)
Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Communication and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.354, h-index: 27)
Applications of Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.274, h-index: 20)
Applied Biochemistry and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 44, SJR: 0.575, h-index: 80)
Applied Biochemistry and Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.267, h-index: 26)
Applied Cancer Research     Open Access  
Applied Categorical Structures     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.361, h-index: 21)
Applied Composite Materials     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47, SJR: 0.705, h-index: 35)
Applied Entomology and Zoology     Partially Free   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.554, h-index: 34)
Applied Geomatics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.323, h-index: 9)
Applied Geophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.541, h-index: 13)
Applied Intelligence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.777, h-index: 43)
Applied Magnetic Resonance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.358, h-index: 34)
Applied Mathematics & Optimization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.955, h-index: 33)
Applied Mathematics - A J. of Chinese Universities     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.275, h-index: 8)
Applied Mathematics and Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.37, h-index: 26)
Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 60, SJR: 1.262, h-index: 161)
Applied Physics A     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.535, h-index: 121)
Applied Physics B: Lasers and Optics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23, SJR: 0.983, h-index: 104)
Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.677, h-index: 47)
Applied Research in Quality of Life     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.288, h-index: 15)
Applied Solar Energy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.251, h-index: 6)
Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.351, h-index: 9)
Aquaculture Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.613, h-index: 40)
Aquarium Sciences and Conservation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Aquatic Ecology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30, SJR: 0.646, h-index: 44)
Aquatic Geochemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.764, h-index: 39)
Aquatic Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 1.172, h-index: 53)
Arabian J. for Science and Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.345, h-index: 20)
Arabian J. of Geosciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.417, h-index: 16)
Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 1.056, h-index: 15)
Archaeologies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.397, h-index: 13)
Archiv der Mathematik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.597, h-index: 29)
Archival Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 53, SJR: 0.804, h-index: 22)
Archive for History of Exact Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.28, h-index: 15)
Archive for Mathematical Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.946, h-index: 23)
Archive for Rational Mechanics and Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 4.091, h-index: 66)
Archive of Applied Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.865, h-index: 40)
Archives and Museum Informatics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 119)
Archives of Computational Methods in Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 2.841, h-index: 40)
Archives of Dermatological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.9, h-index: 65)
Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.846, h-index: 84)
Archives of Gynecology and Obstetrics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.695, h-index: 47)
Archives of Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.702, h-index: 85)
Archives of Orthopaedic and Trauma Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 1.039, h-index: 56)
Archives of Osteoporosis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.092, h-index: 13)
Archives of Sexual Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 1.198, h-index: 74)
Archives of Toxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 1.595, h-index: 76)
Archives of Virology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.086, h-index: 90)
Archives of Women's Mental Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 1.264, h-index: 50)
Archivio di Ortopedia e Reumatologia     Hybrid Journal  
Archivum Immunologiae et Therapiae Experimentalis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.2, h-index: 42)
ArgoSpine News & J.     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.102, h-index: 3)
Argumentation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.295, h-index: 18)
Arid Ecosystems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Arkiv för Matematik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.948, h-index: 22)
Arnold Mathematical J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Arthropod-Plant Interactions     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.797, h-index: 17)
Arthroskopie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.145, h-index: 8)
Artificial Intelligence and Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.288, h-index: 25)
Artificial Intelligence Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.948, h-index: 48)
Artificial Life and Robotics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.231, h-index: 14)
Asia Europe J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.247, h-index: 9)
Asia Pacific Education Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.371, h-index: 17)
Asia Pacific J. of Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 1.676, h-index: 50)
Asia-Pacific Education Researcher     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.353, h-index: 13)
Asia-Pacific Financial Markets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.19, h-index: 15)
Asia-Pacific J. of Atmospheric Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 1.006, h-index: 14)
Asian Business & Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.41, h-index: 10)
Asian J. of Business Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Asian J. of Criminology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.263, h-index: 8)
AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.681, h-index: 15)
AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.195, h-index: 5)
ästhetische dermatologie & kosmetologie     Full-text available via subscription  

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Journal Cover Acta Analytica
  [SJR: 0.387]   [H-I: 6]   [7 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 1874-6349 - ISSN (Online) 0353-5150
   Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2355 journals]
  • The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction, Locations and Symmetry
           Operations
    • Authors: Vassilis Livanios
      Pages: 133 - 144
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0303-2
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • Modal Truthmakers, Truth Conditions, and Analyses: or, How to Avoid the
           Humphrey Objection
    • Authors: Chad Vance
      Pages: 145 - 159
      Abstract: Truthmakers, truth conditions, and analyses are closely related, but distinct in rather important ways. A failure to properly appreciate their differences has led to some confusion regarding the role that possible worlds ought to play with respect to modality. Those philosophers who initially proposed the existence of possible worlds were understood as providing an analysis of modality. More recently, many have interpreted them as providing modal truthmakers. But, possible worlds are (at best) only suited to serve as truth conditions for modal truths (or so I will argue). My goals are as follows: First, to dispel this confusion by detailing the differences between these three concepts. Second, to apply the lesson learned to the famous Humphrey objection against possible worlds. While this objection, if successful, does undermine Lewisian modal realism, it only partially undermines ersatzism, and leaves available a route by which ersatzers may avoid the objection altogether.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0299-7
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • Fregean Facts
    • Authors: Dalia Drai
      Pages: 161 - 168
      Abstract: Two important Fregean ideas appear to conflict. The first is that a thought can be decomposed in different ways, and the second is that a thought is constituted by the senses of its constituents. This paper is a defense of Dummett’s suggestion of a way to reconcile between those two theses through the claim that although the same thought can be structured in different ways by different sentences; one of the structures is privileged. My defense focuses on the charge raised by Levine (Ratio (new series), XIX, 43–63, 2006) that Dummett’s claim about the privileged structure of a thought conflicts with the Slingshot argument. I show that this charge is misconceived; a careful examination of the Slingshot argument’s methodology reveals that Dummett’s claim does not conflict with it.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0306-z
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative
           Possibilities
    • Authors: Nadine Elzein
      Pages: 169 - 191
      Abstract: Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples (FSCs) generally accept that we cannot construct successful FSCs in which there are no alternative possibilities present. But they maintain that we can construct successful FSCs in which there are no morally significant alternatives present and that such examples succeed in breaking any conceptual link between alternative possibilities and free will. I argue that it is not possible to construct an FSC that succeeds even in this weaker sense. In cases where any alternatives are clearly insignificant, it does not appear at all obvious that the agent can be held responsible. Present popular FSCs include alternatives that are ambiguous in their significance, and when the examples are sharpened to remove this ambiguity, they lose their force. Moreover, the proponent of such examples faces a problem: We can easily construct scenarios in which any alternatives are obviously insignificant, and in such scenarios, we are not intuitively inclined to suppose the agent is responsible. The proponent of new FSCs must therefore distinguish any alternatives she includes from the sorts included in these scenarios. The difference must now be such that (a) this helps to make it seem intuitively likely that the agent is responsible where the agent otherwise would not appear responsible, and (b) these alternatives are irrelevant to any judgment about whether the agent is responsible. I maintain that it is impossible to achieve both of these goals at once.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0305-0
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity
    • Authors: Jussi Suikkanen
      Pages: 193 - 212
      Abstract: In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that (i) normative judgments are beliefs; (ii) that some normative beliefs are true; (iii) that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and (iv) that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim of this article is to argue that Parfit’s theory is problematic because its defenders have no resources to make sense of the nature of normative truth, which is an essential element of their view. I do this by showing how the traditional theories of truth are not available for the non-realist cognitivists.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0300-5
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • The Uniformity Principle vs. the Disuniformity Principle
    • Authors: Seungbae Park
      Pages: 213 - 222
      Abstract: The pessimistic induction is built upon the uniformity principle that the future resembles the past. In daily scientific activities, however, scientists sometimes rely on what I call the disuniformity principle that the future differs from the past. They do not give up their research projects despite the repeated failures. They believe that they will succeed although they failed repeatedly, and as a result they achieve what they intended to achieve. Given that the disuniformity principle is useful in certain cases in science, we might reasonably use it to infer that present theories are true unlike past theories. Hence, pessimists have the burden to show that our prediction about the fate of present theories is more likely to be true if we use the uniformity principle than if we use the disuniformity principle.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0302-3
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study
    • Authors: Cameron Boult
      Pages: 223 - 244
      Abstract: In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this is not possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we need a view about the relationship between agents’ capacities to accord with normative requirements and the conditions under which those normative requirements obtain. I offer an account of the epistemic dimension of this relationship. The goal is to provide enough of a story about the natural reaction to make accounting for it look like an important desideratum for any theory of the nature of normative requirements—whether these are moral or epistemic. To focus the discussion, I use Timothy Williamson’s knowledge-first view of evidence as an example of a view in epistemology that generates the natural reaction. One upshot of the discussion, then, is a detailed account of what is troubling about Williamson’s influential but controversial view of evidence.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0301-4
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • Self-Knowledge, Deliberation, and the Fruit of Satan
    • Authors: Josep E. Corbí
      Pages: 245 - 261
      Abstract: Robert Dunn (2006) and Richard Moran (2001) have emphasized the importance of deliberation to account for the privileged authority of self-ascriptions. They oppose a theoretical attitude toward oneself to a deliberative attitude that they regard as more intimate, as purely first-personal. In this paper, I intend to challenge Dunn’s and Moran’s understanding of how the deliberative attitude is to be conceived of and, in particular, I will call into question their claim that this attitude is wholly non-observational. More positively, I will elaborate on the sort of self-observation that must play a central role in an agent’s deliberation if she is to recognize a certain belief, decision, or intention as genuinely her own and, therefore, as expressing a purely first-person point of view. In the elaboration of my argument, I will rely on a number of situations as they are described in Peter Carey’s novel Oscar and Lucinda.
      PubDate: 2017-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0304-1
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • Hale on the Absoluteness of Logical Necessity
    • Authors: Hashem Morvarid
      Pages: 1 - 11
      Abstract: Hale (Metaphysics, 10, 93–117, 1996, 2013) has argued that logical necessities are absolute in the sense that there is no competing kind of modality under which they may be false. In this paper, I argue that there are competing kinds of modality, which I call “essentialist modalities,” under which logical necessities may be false. Since it is counter-intuitive to say that logical necessities are not absolute, my argument, if correct, shows that Hale’s characterization of absolute necessity does not adequately capture the intuitive notion of absolute necessity. Then, a qualified version of Hale’s characterization of absolute necessity is proposed. On the qualified version, the absoluteness of logical necessities is no longer defeated by essentialist possibilities.
      PubDate: 2017-03-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0290-3
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel
    • Authors: Erhan Demircioglu
      Pages: 125 - 132
      Abstract: In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism (the thesis that humans are cognitively closed with respect to the solution of the mind-body problem). Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.
      PubDate: 2017-03-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0295-y
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 1 (2017)
       
  • Trivial Languages
    • Authors: Arvid Båve
      Abstract: I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth (TT), to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT). A specific formulation of (TT) is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I first argue that the facts about speakers’ reactions to such Curry derivations do not constitute a problem for (TT) specifically. Rather, they follow from independent, uncontroversial facts. I then propose a solution which coheres with (TT) as I understand it. Finally, I consider a normative reading of their objection and offer a response.
      PubDate: 2017-07-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0328-1
       
  • A Notion of Logical Concept Based on Plural Reference
    • Authors: Massimiliano Carrara; Enrico Martino
      Abstract: In To be is to be the object of a possible act of choice (Studia Logica, 96, 289–313, 2010) the authors defended Boolos’ thesis that plural quantification is part of logic. To this purpose, plural quantification was explained in terms of plural reference, and a semantics of plural acts of choice, performed by an ideal team of agents, was introduced. In this paper, following that approach, we develop a theory of concepts that—in a sense to be explained—can be labeled as a theory of logical concepts. Within this theory, we propose a new logicist approach to natural numbers. Then, we compare our logicism with Frege’s traditional logicism.
      PubDate: 2017-06-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0327-2
       
  • A Reverse Interpretation Model of Testimony
    • Authors: Hamid Vahid
      PubDate: 2017-05-31
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0325-4
       
  • What Norm of Assertion?
    • Authors: Casey Rebecca Johnson
      Abstract: I argue that the debates over which norm constitutes assertion can be abandoned by challenging the three main motivations for a constitutive norm. The first motivation is the alleged analogy between language and games. The second motivation is the intuition that some assertions are worthy of criticism. The third is the discursive responsibilities incurred by asserting. I demonstrate that none of these offer good reasons to believe in a constitutive norm of assertion, as such a norm is understood in the literature. Others who have made similar arguments conclude that assertion does not exist at all—that there is no such thing as assertion. I disagree: we do not have to relinquish the category of assertion just because it is not normatively constituted. There are alternative ways to understand and individuate assertion that do not rely on a constitutive norm.
      PubDate: 2017-05-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0326-3
       
  • Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: a
           Reply to Glass and McCartney
    • Authors: William Roche
      Abstract: Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Zalabardo (2009) focuses on the probability difference measure, the probability ratio measure, the likelihood difference measure, and the likelihood ratio measure. He argues that the likelihood ratio measure is adequate, but each of the other three measures is not. He argues for this by setting out three adequacy conditions on confirmation measures and arguing in effect that all of them are met by the likelihood ratio measure but not by any of the other three measures. Glass and McCartney (2015), hereafter “G&M,” accept the conclusion of Zalabardo’s argument along with each of the premises in it. They nonetheless try to improve on Zalabardo’s argument by replacing his third adequacy condition with a weaker condition. They do this because of a worry to the effect that Zalabardo’s third adequacy condition runs counter to the idea behind his first adequacy condition. G&M have in mind confirmation in the sense of increase in probability: the degree to which E confirms H is a matter of the degree to which E increases H’s probability. I call this sense of confirmation “IP.” I set out four ways of precisifying IP. I call them “IP1,” “IP2,” “IP3,” and “IP4.” Each of them is based on the assumption that the degree to which E increases H’s probability is a matter of the distance between p(H E) and a certain other probability involving H. I then evaluate G&M’s argument (with a minor fix) in light of them.
      PubDate: 2017-05-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0322-7
       
  • Perceptual Experience and Aspect
    • Authors: Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez
      Abstract: A number of contemporary philosophers of mind have brought considerations from the study of aspect to bear on the ontological question how perceptual experiences persist over time. But, apart from rare exceptions, relatively little attention has been devoted to assess whether the way we talk about perceptual occurrences is of any relevance for discussions of ontological matters in general, let alone discussions about the ontological nature of perception. This piece examines whether considerations derived from the study of lexical aspect have a significant bearing on what ontological views of perception we should endorse: I shall argue that such aspectual considerations are in fact of very little use for settling the relevant ontological issue.
      PubDate: 2017-04-20
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0323-6
       
  • The Ambiguity Theory of “Knows”
    • Authors: Mark Satta
      Abstract: The ambiguity theory of “knows” is the view that knows and its cognates have more than one propositional sense—i.e., more than one sense that can properly be used in “knows that” etc. constructions. The ambiguity theory of “know” has received relatively little attention as an account of the truth-conditions for knowledge ascriptions and denials—especially compared to views like classical, moderate invariantism and epistemic contextualism. In this paper, it is argued that the ambiguity theory of knows has an advantage over both classical, moderate invariantism and epistemic contextualism. This advantage is that it is the only one of these views that can account for “diverging knowledge responses without inconsistency” (DRWI)—i.e., cases in which, for the same subject S and proposition p, one and the same speaker says truly “S knows p” but instead could have truly said “S does not know p” and vice versa. This paper argues both for the existence of DRWI scenarios and the ability of the ambiguity theory of knows to best explain their existence.
      PubDate: 2017-04-12
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0324-5
       
  • A Note on Belief Reports and Context Dependence
    • Authors: Tadeusz Ciecierski
      Abstract: The aim of this paper is to pose a problem for theories that claim that belief reports are context dependent. Firstly, I argue that the claim (interpreted in the spirit of moderate contextualism) is committed to verbalism, a theory that derives the context sensitivity of belief reports from the context sensitivity of the psychological verbs used in such reports. Secondly, I argue that verbalism is not an attractive theoretical option because it is in conflict with the non-proto-rigidity of verbs like ‘believe’. Finally, I describe various consequences that the argument has for invariantism and moderate contextualism.
      PubDate: 2017-03-30
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0320-9
       
  • Transcendental Kantianism, Naturalized Kantianism, and the Bounds of
           Psychology
    • Authors: Yakir Levin
      Abstract: Are there sensory states (“perceptions”) that, unlike mere sensory registrations, require an explanatory framework (“psychology”) that goes beyond biology? Based on a reconstruction of Kant’s a priori, transcendental psychology, contemporary Kantians answer this question in the positive but dramatically limit the scope of psychology. In contrast, naturalistically oriented deflationists answer it in the negative, thereby not giving psychology any explanatory role whatsoever. In his recent monumental book Origins of Objectivity, Burge argues against both of these approaches and seeks to develop an intermediate approach between them. This he does by embedding Kantian transcendental psychology in contemporary science of perception, thereby naturalizing the former and considerably broadening the scope of psychology. In this paper I critically examine Burge’s naturalized Kantianism, thereby defending transcendental Kantianism. To this end, I first outline Kantian transcendental psychology of perception, highlighting the features that distinguish it from biology. I then show how Burge naturalizes this psychology by embedding its most fundamental notions in contemporary science of perception. Based on all this, I conclude the paper by arguing for two closely related claims. First, that transformed into empirical psychology, Kantian transcendental psychology loses the features that distinguish it from biology. Second, that genuine perception starts at the high cognitive level for which transcendental psychology accounts and not at the rather low or elementary level on which Burge focuses.
      PubDate: 2017-03-11
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0321-8
       
  • Necessarily Incompatible Consistent Wants
    • Authors: Peter Baumann
      Abstract: This paper argues that the wants or desires of a person can be consistent with each other and still necessarily incompatible with each other and for interesting reasons. It is argued here that this problem is not rare and that there is no solution in sight.
      PubDate: 2017-03-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-017-0319-2
       
 
 
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