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Publisher: Springer-Verlag (Total: 2351 journals)

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Showing 1 - 200 of 2351 Journals sorted alphabetically
3D Printing in Medicine     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
3D Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.222, CiteScore: 1)
4OR: A Quarterly J. of Operations Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.825, CiteScore: 1)
AAPS J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26, SJR: 1.118, CiteScore: 4)
AAPS PharmSciTech     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.752, CiteScore: 3)
Abdominal Radiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.866, CiteScore: 2)
Abhandlungen aus dem Mathematischen Seminar der Universitat Hamburg     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.439, CiteScore: 0)
Academic Psychiatry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 29, SJR: 0.53, CiteScore: 1)
Academic Questions     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.106, CiteScore: 0)
Accreditation and Quality Assurance: J. for Quality, Comparability and Reliability in Chemical Measurement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31, SJR: 0.316, CiteScore: 1)
Acoustical Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.359, CiteScore: 1)
Acoustics Australia     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.232, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Analytica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.367, CiteScore: 0)
Acta Applicandae Mathematicae     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.675, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Biotheoretica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.284, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Diabetologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 1.587, CiteScore: 3)
Acta Endoscopica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
acta ethologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.769, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Geochimica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.24, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Geodaetica et Geophysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.305, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Geophysica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.312, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Geotechnica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.588, CiteScore: 3)
Acta Informatica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.517, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Mathematica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 7.066, CiteScore: 3)
Acta Mathematica Hungarica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.452, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Mathematica Sinica, English Series     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.379, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Mathematica Vietnamica     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.27, CiteScore: 0)
Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.208, CiteScore: 0)
Acta Mechanica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 1.04, CiteScore: 2)
Acta Mechanica Sinica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.607, CiteScore: 2)
Acta Metallurgica Sinica (English Letters)     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.576, CiteScore: 2)
Acta Meteorologica Sinica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.638, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Neurochirurgica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.822, CiteScore: 2)
Acta Neurologica Belgica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.376, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Neuropathologica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 7.589, CiteScore: 12)
Acta Oceanologica Sinica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.334, CiteScore: 1)
Acta Physiologiae Plantarum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.574, CiteScore: 2)
Acta Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.605, CiteScore: 1)
Activitas Nervosa Superior     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.147, CiteScore: 0)
adhäsion KLEBEN & DICHTEN     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.103, CiteScore: 0)
ADHD Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorders     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25, SJR: 0.72, CiteScore: 2)
Adhesion Adhesives & Sealants     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research     Partially Free   (Followers: 18, SJR: 1.005, CiteScore: 2)
Adsorption     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.703, CiteScore: 2)
Advances in Applied Clifford Algebras     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.698, CiteScore: 1)
Advances in Atmospheric Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37, SJR: 0.956, CiteScore: 2)
Advances in Computational Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.812, CiteScore: 1)
Advances in Contraception     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Advances in Data Analysis and Classification     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 58, SJR: 1.09, CiteScore: 1)
Advances in Gerontology     Partially Free   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.144, CiteScore: 0)
Advances in Health Sciences Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32, SJR: 1.64, CiteScore: 2)
Advances in Manufacturing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.475, CiteScore: 2)
Advances in Polymer Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 45, SJR: 1.04, CiteScore: 3)
Advances in Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.075, CiteScore: 3)
Aegean Review of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Aequationes Mathematicae     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.517, CiteScore: 1)
Aerobiologia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.673, CiteScore: 2)
Aesthetic Plastic Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.825, CiteScore: 1)
African Archaeological Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.862, CiteScore: 1)
Afrika Matematika     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.235, CiteScore: 0)
AGE     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Ageing Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.39, CiteScore: 1)
Aggiornamenti CIO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Aging Clinical and Experimental Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.67, CiteScore: 2)
Agricultural Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.276, CiteScore: 1)
Agriculture and Human Values     Open Access   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.173, CiteScore: 3)
Agroforestry Systems     Open Access   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.663, CiteScore: 1)
Agronomy for Sustainable Development     Open Access   (Followers: 15, SJR: 1.864, CiteScore: 6)
AI & Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.227, CiteScore: 1)
AIDS and Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.792, CiteScore: 3)
Air Quality, Atmosphere & Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.862, CiteScore: 3)
Akupunktur & Aurikulomedizin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Algebra and Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.531, CiteScore: 0)
Algebra Universalis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.583, CiteScore: 1)
Algebras and Representation Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.095, CiteScore: 1)
Algorithmica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.56, CiteScore: 1)
Allergo J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.234, CiteScore: 0)
Allergo J. Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Alpine Botany     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 1.11, CiteScore: 3)
ALTEX : Alternatives to Animal Experimentation     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
AMBIO     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 1.569, CiteScore: 4)
American J. of Cardiovascular Drugs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.951, CiteScore: 3)
American J. of Community Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29, SJR: 1.329, CiteScore: 2)
American J. of Criminal Justice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.772, CiteScore: 1)
American J. of Cultural Sociology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.46, CiteScore: 1)
American J. of Dance Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.181, CiteScore: 0)
American J. of Potato Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.611, CiteScore: 1)
American J. of Psychoanalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.314, CiteScore: 0)
American Sociologist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.35, CiteScore: 0)
Amino Acids     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 1.135, CiteScore: 3)
AMS Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 4)
Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.211, CiteScore: 1)
Analysis and Mathematical Physics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.536, CiteScore: 1)
Analysis in Theory and Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Analysis of Verbal Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32, SJR: 0.978, CiteScore: 3)
Anatomical Science Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.367, CiteScore: 1)
Angewandte Schmerztherapie und Palliativmedizin     Hybrid Journal  
Angiogenesis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 2.177, CiteScore: 5)
Animal Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 1.389, CiteScore: 3)
Annales françaises de médecine d'urgence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.192, CiteScore: 0)
Annales Henri Poincaré     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.097, CiteScore: 2)
Annales mathématiques du Québec     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.438, CiteScore: 0)
Annali dell'Universita di Ferrara     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.429, CiteScore: 0)
Annali di Matematica Pura ed Applicata     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.197, CiteScore: 1)
Annals of Biomedical Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.042, CiteScore: 3)
Annals of Combinatorics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.932, CiteScore: 1)
Annals of Data Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Annals of Dyslexia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.85, CiteScore: 2)
Annals of Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34, SJR: 0.579, CiteScore: 1)
Annals of Forest Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.986, CiteScore: 2)
Annals of Global Analysis and Geometry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.228, CiteScore: 1)
Annals of Hematology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 1.043, CiteScore: 2)
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.413, CiteScore: 1)
Annals of Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.479, CiteScore: 2)
Annals of Nuclear Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.687, CiteScore: 2)
Annals of Operations Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.943, CiteScore: 2)
Annals of Ophthalmology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Annals of Regional Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.614, CiteScore: 1)
Annals of Software Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Annals of Solid and Structural Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.239, CiteScore: 1)
Annals of Surgical Oncology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 1.986, CiteScore: 4)
Annals of Telecommunications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.223, CiteScore: 1)
Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.495, CiteScore: 1)
Antonie van Leeuwenhoek     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.834, CiteScore: 2)
Apidologie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.22, CiteScore: 3)
APOPTOSIS     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 1.424, CiteScore: 4)
Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Communication and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.294, CiteScore: 1)
Applications of Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.602, CiteScore: 1)
Applied Biochemistry and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 44, SJR: 0.571, CiteScore: 2)
Applied Biochemistry and Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.21, CiteScore: 1)
Applied Categorical Structures     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.49, CiteScore: 0)
Applied Composite Materials     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 50, SJR: 0.58, CiteScore: 2)
Applied Entomology and Zoology     Partially Free   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.422, CiteScore: 1)
Applied Geomatics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.733, CiteScore: 3)
Applied Geophysics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.488, CiteScore: 1)
Applied Intelligence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.6, CiteScore: 2)
Applied Magnetic Resonance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.319, CiteScore: 1)
Applied Mathematics & Optimization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.886, CiteScore: 1)
Applied Mathematics - A J. of Chinese Universities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.17, CiteScore: 0)
Applied Mathematics and Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.461, CiteScore: 1)
Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 66, SJR: 1.182, CiteScore: 4)
Applied Physics A     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.481, CiteScore: 2)
Applied Physics B: Lasers and Optics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25, SJR: 0.74, CiteScore: 2)
Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.519, CiteScore: 2)
Applied Research in Quality of Life     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.316, CiteScore: 1)
Applied Solar Energy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.225, CiteScore: 0)
Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.542, CiteScore: 1)
Aquaculture Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26, SJR: 0.591, CiteScore: 2)
Aquarium Sciences and Conservation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Aquatic Ecology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37, SJR: 0.656, CiteScore: 2)
Aquatic Geochemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.591, CiteScore: 1)
Aquatic Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.109, CiteScore: 3)
Arabian J. for Science and Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.303, CiteScore: 1)
Arabian J. of Geosciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.319, CiteScore: 1)
Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 1.052, CiteScore: 2)
Archaeologies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.224, CiteScore: 0)
Archiv der Mathematik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.725, CiteScore: 1)
Archival Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 68, SJR: 0.745, CiteScore: 2)
Archive for History of Exact Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.186, CiteScore: 1)
Archive for Mathematical Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.909, CiteScore: 1)
Archive for Rational Mechanics and Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 3.93, CiteScore: 3)
Archive of Applied Mechanics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.79, CiteScore: 2)
Archives and Museum Informatics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 156, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Archives of Computational Methods in Engineering     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 1.41, CiteScore: 5)
Archives of Dermatological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 1.006, CiteScore: 2)
Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.773, CiteScore: 2)
Archives of Gynecology and Obstetrics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.956, CiteScore: 2)
Archives of Microbiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.644, CiteScore: 2)
Archives of Orthopaedic and Trauma Surgery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 1.146, CiteScore: 2)
Archives of Osteoporosis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.71, CiteScore: 2)
Archives of Sexual Behavior     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 1.493, CiteScore: 3)
Archives of Toxicology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.541, CiteScore: 5)
Archives of Virology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.973, CiteScore: 2)
Archives of Women's Mental Health     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 1.274, CiteScore: 3)
Archivio di Ortopedia e Reumatologia     Hybrid Journal  
Archivum Immunologiae et Therapiae Experimentalis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.946, CiteScore: 3)
ArgoSpine News & J.     Hybrid Journal  
Argumentation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.349, CiteScore: 1)
Arid Ecosystems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.2, CiteScore: 0)
Arkiv för Matematik     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.766, CiteScore: 1)
Arnold Mathematical J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.355, CiteScore: 0)
Arthropod-Plant Interactions     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.839, CiteScore: 2)
Arthroskopie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.131, CiteScore: 0)
Artificial Intelligence and Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.937, CiteScore: 2)
Artificial Intelligence Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.833, CiteScore: 4)
Artificial Life and Robotics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.226, CiteScore: 0)
Asia Europe J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.504, CiteScore: 1)
Asia Pacific Education Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.479, CiteScore: 1)
Asia Pacific J. of Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 1.185, CiteScore: 2)
Asia-Pacific Education Researcher     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.353, CiteScore: 1)
Asia-Pacific Financial Markets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.187, CiteScore: 0)
Asia-Pacific J. of Atmospheric Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.855, CiteScore: 1)
Asian Business & Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.378, CiteScore: 1)
Asian J. of Business Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Asian J. of Criminology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.543, CiteScore: 1)
AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.548, CiteScore: 1)
AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.183, CiteScore: 0)
ästhetische dermatologie & kosmetologie     Full-text available via subscription  
Astronomy and Astrophysics Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 3.385, CiteScore: 5)

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Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Acta Analytica
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.367
Number of Followers: 7  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1874-6349 - ISSN (Online) 0353-5150
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2351 journals]
  • A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence
    • Abstract: Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and (iii) A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm of belief is correct, it cannot explain some deontic requirements governing belief.
      PubDate: 2019-03-19
       
  • Has Smith Solved the Moral Problem'
    • Abstract: Michael Smith attempts to solve the moral problem by arguing that our moral beliefs constitute a rational constraint on our desires. In particular, Smith defends the ‘practicality requirement’, which says that rational agents who believe that an action is right must have some desire to perform that action. We clarify and examine Smith’s argument. We argue that, for the argument to be sound, it must make two crucial assumptions about the rational agent in question: (a) that facts about her desires are transparent to her, and (b) that she believes that she is rational. We conclude that if Smith has solved the moral problem then he has done so only for a restricted class of subjects—those who satisfy these two assumptions.
      PubDate: 2019-03-16
       
  • Relevance and Non-Factive Knowledge Attributions
    • PubDate: 2019-03-01
       
  • Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property
    • Abstract: Anaphoric deflationism is a prosententialist account of the use of “true.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of “true” (especially in Brandom’s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that “true” is not understood as a predicate and that truth is not a property. Primitivism, defended by Frege, Moore, and Davidson, is associated with two ideas: (1) that truth is a primitive and central trait of our conceptual system and (2) that truth, as such, cannot be defined. This second claim can be called “negative primitivism,” and it especially points out the facts about the “indefinability” of truth generally advocated by primitivists. In what follows, a connection is established between the deflationist’s rejection of the predicate and of the property and facts (and primitivist ideas) about the indefinability of truth. This connection establishes a common framework to lend further explanatory power to both options. According to the resulting view, this indefinability can explain the appeal and soundness of a deflationist dismissal of predicates and properties dealing with truth.
      PubDate: 2019-03-01
       
  • Rescuing the Assertability of Measurement Reports
    • Abstract: It is wholly uncontroversial that measurements or, more properly, propositions that are measurement reports are often paradigmatically good cases of propositions that serve the function of evidence. In normal cases, it is also obvious that stating such a report is an utterly pedestrian case of successful assertion. So, for example, there is nothing controversial about the claims that (1) a proposition to the effect that a particular thermometer reads 104 °C when properly used to determine the temperature of a particular patient is evidence that the patient in question has a fever and (2) there is nothing wrong with asserting the proposition that a particular thermometer reads 104 °C for appropriate reasons of communication, etc. when the thermometer has been properly used to determine the temperature of a particular patient. Here, it will be shown that Timothy Williamson’s commitments to a number of principles about knowledge and assertion imply that a whole class of utterly ordinary statements like these that are used as evidence are not really evidence because they are not knowledge and so are (perversely) unassertable according to his principled commitments. This paper deals primarily with the second of these two problems, and an alternative account of the norms of assertion is introduced which allows for the assertability of such measurement reports.
      PubDate: 2019-03-01
       
  • Testimonial Knowledge and Context-Sensitivity: a New Diagnosis of the
           Threat
    • Abstract: Epistemologists typically assume that the acquisition of knowledge from testimony is not threatened at the stage at which audiences interpret what proposition a speaker has asserted. Attention is instead typically paid to the epistemic status of a belief formed on the basis of testimony that it is assumed has the same content as the speaker’s assertion. Andrew Peet has pioneered an account of how linguistic context sensitivity can threaten the assumption. His account locates the threat in contexts in which an audience’s evidence under-determines which proposition a speaker is asserting. I argue that Peet’s epistemic uncertainty account of the threat is mistaken and I propose an alternative. The alternative locates the threat in contexts that provide factors that give audiences a mistaken psychological certainty or confidence that a speaker has asserted a proposition she has not.
      PubDate: 2019-03-01
       
  • Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth
    • Abstract: Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
      PubDate: 2019-02-20
       
  • Philosophical Accounts of First-Order Logical Truths
    • Abstract: Starting from certain metalogical results (the completeness theorem, the soundness theorem, and Lindenbaum-Scott theorem), I argue that first-order logical truths of classical logic are a priori and necessary. Afterwards, I formulate two arguments for the idea that first-order logical truths are also analytic, namely, I first argue that there is a conceptual connection between aprioricity, necessity, and analyticity, such that aprioricity together with necessity entails analyticity; then, I argue that the structure of natural deduction systems for FOL displays the analyticity of its truths. Consequently, each philosophical approach to these truths should account for this evidence, i.e., that first-order logical truths are a priori, necessary, and analytic, and it is my contention that the semantic account is a better candidate.
      PubDate: 2019-02-08
       
  • Structure and Completeness: A Defense of Factualism in Categorial Ontology
    • Abstract: The aim of this paper is to offer two novel solutions to two perennial problems of categorial ontology, namely, the problem of the categorial structure: how are the categories related to one another' And the problem of categorial completeness: how is the completeness of a proposed list of categories justified' First, I argue that a system of categories should have a structure such that there is a most basic category that is a bearer of all other categories and that has what I shall call “combinatorial conditions”. To do so, I compare this approach to categorial structure with the approaches given by substantialist (Heil 2012), mereological (Betti 2016), factualist (Armstrong 1997), and geo (Tambassi 2018) ontologies. Second, I argue that the problem of categorial completeness is only a problem for certain ontologies. In this connection, I explore views on categorial completeness proposed by substantialists and geo-ontologists. Lastly, I conclude that factualism does a better job of accounting for categorial structure and categorial completeness than other categorial ontologies.
      PubDate: 2019-01-14
       
  • Hylomorphism: a Critical Analysis
    • Abstract: In this essay, I examine those versions of hylomorphism that attribute to form a very strong explicative role. According to them, form is both the source of new emergent powers and expression of the finalist structure of organisms. The main aim of this essay is to show that these two aspects do not holdup because the form only exercises a structural function, but does not exert an autonomous explanatory function. The form only allows the material components to develop those powers that are not manifest in themselves, outside the configuration that forms as structure gives them. If the higher faculties of the human mind are really emergent over the neurophysiological ones, hylomorphism cannot explain it. As a consequence, hylomorphism does not have the resources to oppose materialism, on the one hand, and dualism, on the other.
      PubDate: 2019-01-12
       
  • Knowledge How, Procedural Knowledge, and the Type-Token Action Clause
    • Abstract: This paper argues that the propositions “S knowing how to Φ entails that S has the ability to Φ” and “S knowing how to Φ does not entail the ability to Φ” can both be true and non-contradictory when true, so long as one distinguishes between Φ as an action-type and Φ as an action-token. In order to defend this claim, recent work by Young (on the type-token action clause), Levy (on knowledge how and motor representations), and Gaultier (on procedural knowledge) is discussed with a view to integrating into a coherent and novel position certain commonalities within their respective views. As a consequence of this integration, a revised version of Young’s type-token action clause is suggested that provides comprehensive support for the assertion that knowing how to Φ both does and does not necessitate the ability to Φ, depending on whether one is talking about action types or action tokens.
      PubDate: 2019-01-08
       
  • Garrett on the Irrationality of Pure Time Preferences
    • Abstract: In “Experience and Time,” Brian Garrett poses a challenge to friends of the rationality of pure time preferences. In this discussion note, we accept the challenge and provide two kinds of cases wherein some pure time preferences could be deemed rational.
      PubDate: 2019-01-02
       
  • In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought
    • Abstract: Consider the Unshareability View, namely, the view that first person thought or self-thought—thought as typically expressed via the first person pronoun—is not shareable from subject to subject. In this article, I (i) show that a significant number of Fregean and non-Fregean commentators of Frege have taken the Unshareability View to be the default Fregean position, (ii) rehearse Frege’s chief claims about self-thought and suggest that their combination entails the Unshareability View only on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between way of thinking and thought-individuating cognitive value, (iii) outline an account of self-thought that rejects the assumption and keeps intact all of Frege’s chief claims, and (iv) respond to a number of worries to the effect that this proposal yields undesirable results from the point of view of the individuation of self-thought at the level of cognitive value.
      PubDate: 2019-01-02
       
  • Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice'
    • Abstract: I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse' If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophers’ reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think about the role of intuitions in philosophy.
      PubDate: 2018-12-29
       
  • Mental Files and Naïve Semantic Accounts of Substitution Failure
    • Abstract: Ever since Kripke’s influential arguments against descriptivism philosophers have attempted to provide solutions to Frege’s puzzle of substitution failure that adhere to Naïve Semantics—the view that names contribute their referents and referents alone to propositions expressed by sentences containing them. Recently, philosophers have also appealed to psychological objects called mental files, which are used to represent and store information on individuals, in solving the puzzle. Combining the two promises to revive a simple commonsensical theory while, at least prima facie, doing away with the need to rely on Fregean senses. Though I welcome the combined approach, I argue that the only plausible version of it is a pretense-based one.
      PubDate: 2018-12-11
       
  • Understanding, Problem-Solving, and Conscious Reflection
    • Authors: Andrei Mărăşoiu
      Abstract: According to Zagzebski (2001), understanding something is justified by the exercise of cognitive skills and intellectual virtues the knower possesses. Zagzebski develops her view by suggesting that “understanding has internalist conditions for success” (2001, p. 246). Against this view, Grimm (2017) raises an objection: what justifies understanding is the reliability of the processes by which we come to understand, and we need not be aware of the outcome of all reliable processes. Understanding is no exception, so, given that understanding something results from reliable processes, we need not always be aware of what we understand. I reply to Grimm’s objection; I argue that Zagzebski’s internalist requirement is best conceived as accessibility to conscious reflection. The accessibility condition is satisfied because understanding solves problems on the knower’s research agenda. And whenever problem-solving is non-trivial (in most real-life cognitive situations), the knower needs to reflect on what the best solving strategy is.
      PubDate: 2018-05-21
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-018-0355-6
       
  • Linking Necessity to Apriority
    • Authors: Tristan Haze
      Abstract: There is an important and fairly straightforward link between necessity and apriority which can shed light on our knowledge of the former, but initially plausible, attempts to spell out what it is fall victim to counterexamples. Casullo (2003) discusses one such proposal, argues—following Anderson (Philosophical Topics 21(2):1–20, (1993))—that it fails, and suggests an alternative. In this paper, I argue that Casullo’s alternative also fails, before making a suggestion for which I can find no counterexamples and which, notably, handles some recent examples due to Kipper and Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri.
      PubDate: 2018-05-16
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-018-0354-7
       
  • Corroboration: Sensitivity, Safety, and Explanation
    • Authors: David Godden
      Abstract: Corroborative evidence may be understood as having two epistemic effects: a primary effect by which it offers direct evidence for some claim, and a secondary effect by which it bolsters the appraised probative, or evidential, value of some other piece of evidence for that claim. This paper argues that the bolstering effect of corroborative evidence is epistemically legitimate because corroboration provides a reason to count the belief based on the initial evidence as sensitive to, and safe from, defeat in a way that it was not previously recognized to be. Discovering that our initial evidence tracks the truth in a way we previously did not recognize provides a reason to positively reappraise the probative value of that evidence. The final section of the paper relates the proposed sensitivity- and safety-based account of corroboration to an explanation-based account.
      PubDate: 2018-05-07
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-018-0351-x
       
  • Blum’s Puzzle and the Analiticity of Kripkean Identity Statements
    • Authors: Laureano Luna
      Abstract: We rely on a recent puzzle by Alex Blum to offer a new argument for the old Fitch’s thesis that what we learn a posteriori in Kripkean identity statements like ‘Tully is Cicero’ is contingent and what is not contingent in such statements is analytical, hence hardly a posteriori.
      PubDate: 2018-04-14
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-018-0346-7
       
  • On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality
    • Authors: Mohammad Saleh Zarepour
      Abstract: The intuition that we can think about non-existent objects seems to be in tension with philosophical concerns about the relationality of intentionality. Tim Crane’s psychologism removes this tension by proposing a psychologistic account of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects, and as such is insufficiently plausible to convince us to reject the relationality of intentionality.
      PubDate: 2018-03-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-018-0342-y
       
 
 
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