Authors:OPHÉLIE DESMONS Pages: 473 - 497 Abstract: Those who criticize as well as those who nowadays defend constructivism in metaethics consider John Rawls’s constructivism to be incomplete. According to them, his ontological agnosticism makes evident this incompleteness; I question this widely accepted charge. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Rawls’s agnosticism is the effect of his metaethics rather than a lack of metaethics. Thanks to this interpretation, I question the originality and attractiveness of Rawls’s metaethics. My claim is that Rawls’s metaethics adequately captures the specific historical nature of political norms. PubDate: 2018-09-01T00:00:00.000Z DOI: 10.1017/S0012217318000276 Issue No:Vol. 57, No. 3 (2018)
Authors:JOCELYN MACLURE Pages: 499 - 523 Abstract: I defend a version of what Sharon Street has dubbed “Humean constructivism.” I’ll first sketch out why I think that contextual constructivism provides us with a more plausible understanding of the ontological status of values than both Kantian constructivism and moral realism. In addition to its recognition of the role of evolutionary pressures in the emergence of human morality, contextual constructivism must now clarify the role of historical intersubjectivity in the subsequent development of morality. I will then claim that adding a coherentist module to Humean constructivism provides a satisfactory answer to those who fear that contextual metaethical theories can only be non-cognitivist. Finally, I will sketch out why I think that the notion of a mind-independent “space of moral reasons” is largely compatible with Humean constructivism. PubDate: 2018-09-01T00:00:00.000Z DOI: 10.1017/S001221731800029X Issue No:Vol. 57, No. 3 (2018)
Authors:DAVID ROCHELEAU-HOULE Pages: 525 - 547 Abstract: In this paper, I reply to Sharon Street’s objection against quasi-realism, according to which this theory is subject to a problem of unexplained coincidence between the normative truths and our evaluative attitudes. I argue that this problem cannot be applied to quasi-realism because the necessary element for it to be applied is missing in this theory: an ontological commitment towards robust normative entities. This lack of commitment allows quasi-realists to argue for a minimalist conception of normative truths, and to escape the scope of the problem of unexplained coincidence. PubDate: 2018-09-01T00:00:00.000Z DOI: 10.1017/S0012217318000252 Issue No:Vol. 57, No. 3 (2018)
Authors:FÉLIX AUBÉ BEAUDOIN; PATRICK TURMEL Pages: 549 - 570 Abstract: We argue that Reasons Fundamentalism, as defended by T.M. Scanlon, faces two important difficulties—one ontological, the other epistemological—namely the ontological proliferation problem and the reliability challenge. We suggest that formal constructivism can avoid these difficulties, and that Scanlon would do well to adopt it. We also show that Scanlon’s three main objections to this view depend either on a misunderstanding of what formal constructivism is or on a question-begging argument in favour of realism. PubDate: 2018-09-01T00:00:00.000Z DOI: 10.1017/S0012217318000306 Issue No:Vol. 57, No. 3 (2018)
Authors:ÉTIENNE BROWN Pages: 571 - 590 Abstract: Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately fail. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of the claim that practical identities are normative. PubDate: 2018-09-01T00:00:00.000Z DOI: 10.1017/S0012217318000240 Issue No:Vol. 57, No. 3 (2018)
Authors:THOMAS M. BESCH Pages: 591 - 614 Abstract: The paper challenges the view that public justification sits well with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. I engage political liberalism’s view of public justification. A standard objection to this view is that public justification should be more inclusive in scope. This is both plausible and problematic in emancipatory and egalitarian terms. If inclusive public justification allocates discursive standing that has much discursive purchase, as seems desirable in emancipatory terms, it is unable to allocate equal discursive standing within relevant scopes. And, if it must allocate equal discursive standing, discursive equality should be construed in terms that allow for unequal discursive purchase. PubDate: 2018-09-01T00:00:00.000Z DOI: 10.1017/S0012217317000646 Issue No:Vol. 57, No. 3 (2018)
Authors:MICHAEL NEUMANN Pages: 615 - 631 Abstract: Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Dan Ariely and others detect irrationality when decision makers get led astray by how a decision problem is framed. They find that test subjects respond inconsistently when the same decision problem is described differently. But when are two decisions the same' The participants in their experiments are not decision theorists and cannot be counted on to read or approach the problems ‘properly.’ They may find sources of utility where researchers least suspect, and change payoffs that ‘ought’ to remain constant. PubDate: 2018-09-01T00:00:00.000Z DOI: 10.1017/S0012217318000094 Issue No:Vol. 57, No. 3 (2018)
Facts+in+Logical+Space:+A+Tractarian+Ontology+JASON+TURNER+Oxford:+Oxford+University+Press,+2016;+362+pp.;+$85.00+(hardcover)&rft.title=Dialogue+Canadian+Philosophical+Review/Revue+canadienne+de+philosophie&rft.issn=0012-2173&rft.date=2018&rft.volume=57&rft.spage=637&rft.epage=639&rft.aulast=BEVERLEY&rft.aufirst=JOHN&rft.au=JOHN+BEVERLEY&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/S0012217317000944">Facts in Logical Space: A Tractarian Ontology JASON TURNER Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016; 362 pp.; $85.00 (hardcover)
Emergence:+A+Philosophical+Account+PAUL+HUMPHREYS+New+York:+Oxford+University+Press,+2016;+288+pp.;+$74.00+(hardback)&rft.title=Dialogue+Canadian+Philosophical+Review/Revue+canadienne+de+philosophie&rft.issn=0012-2173&rft.date=2018&rft.volume=57&rft.spage=645&rft.epage=646&rft.aulast=KAAS&rft.aufirst=MARTEN&rft.au=MARTEN+KAAS&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/S001221731700066X">Emergence: A Philosophical Account PAUL HUMPHREYS New York: Oxford University Press, 2016; 288 pp.; $74.00 (hardback)
Laruelle:+Against+the+Digital+ALEXANDER+R.+GALLOWAY+Minneapolis:+University+of+Minnesota+Press,+2014;+304pp.;+$27.50+(paperback)&rft.title=Dialogue+Canadian+Philosophical+Review/Revue+canadienne+de+philosophie&rft.issn=0012-2173&rft.date=2018&rft.volume=57&rft.spage=661&rft.epage=663&rft.aulast=VICTOR&rft.aufirst=CARMEN&rft.au=CARMEN+VICTOR&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/S0012217315000761">Laruelle: Against the Digital ALEXANDER R. GALLOWAY Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014; 304pp.; $27.50 (paperback)
All+for+Nothing:+Hamlet’s+Negativity+ANDREW+CUTROFELLO+Cambridge:+MIT+Press,+2014;+xi+++226+pp.+$22.95+(paper).&rft.title=Dialogue+Canadian+Philosophical+Review/Revue+canadienne+de+philosophie&rft.issn=0012-2173&rft.date=2018&rft.volume=57&rft.spage=663&rft.epage=665&rft.aulast=LANGLOIS&rft.aufirst=CHRISTOPHER&rft.au=CHRISTOPHER+LANGLOIS&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/S0012217315000608">All for Nothing: Hamlet’s Negativity ANDREW CUTROFELLO Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014; xi + 226 pp. $22.95 (paper).
Existentialism.+An+Introduction.+KEVIN+AHO+Malden,+MA:+Polity+Press,2014;+xvii+++193+pp.+(paper)&rft.title=Dialogue+Canadian+Philosophical+Review/Revue+canadienne+de+philosophie&rft.issn=0012-2173&rft.date=2018&rft.volume=57&rft.spage=667&rft.epage=669&rft.aulast=BROWN&rft.aufirst=JEFF&rft.au=JEFF+BROWN&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/S0012217315000207">Existentialism. An Introduction. KEVIN AHO Malden, MA: Polity Press,2014; xvii + 193 pp. (paper)
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