Publisher: Cambridge University Press   (Total: 387 journals)

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Showing 1 - 200 of 387 Journals sorted alphabetically
Acta Neuropsychiatrica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.733, CiteScore: 2)
Acta Numerica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 6.709, CiteScore: 10)
Advances in Animal Biosciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14)
Advances in Applied Mathematics and Mechanics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.441, CiteScore: 1)
Aeronautical J., The     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Africa     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.582, CiteScore: 1)
African Studies Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.437, CiteScore: 1)
Ageing & Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43, SJR: 0.756, CiteScore: 2)
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review     Open Access   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.414, CiteScore: 1)
AI EDAM     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.375, CiteScore: 1)
AJIL Unbound     Open Access  
AJS Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.128, CiteScore: 0)
American Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 346, SJR: 5.587, CiteScore: 4)
Anatolian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.528, CiteScore: 1)
Ancient Mesoamerica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.478, CiteScore: 1)
Anglo-Saxon England     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 36, SJR: 0.1, CiteScore: 0)
animal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.842, CiteScore: 2)
Animal Health Research Reviews     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.69, CiteScore: 2)
Animal Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Annals of Actuarial Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Annual of the British School at Athens     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.177, CiteScore: 0)
Annual Review of Applied Linguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47, SJR: 3.223, CiteScore: 4)
Antarctic Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.643, CiteScore: 1)
Antichthon     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Antiquaries J., The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.106, CiteScore: 0)
Antiquity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
ANZIAM J.     Open Access   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.216, CiteScore: 0)
Applied Psycholinguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27, SJR: 0.945, CiteScore: 2)
APSIPA Transactions on Signal and Information Processing     Open Access   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.404, CiteScore: 2)
Arabic Sciences and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Arbor Clinical Nutrition Updates     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Archaeological Dialogues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35, SJR: 0.898, CiteScore: 1)
Archaeological Reports     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.128, CiteScore: 0)
Architectural History     Full-text available via subscription  
arq: Architectural Research Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.123, CiteScore: 0)
Art Libraries J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Asian J. of Comparative Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.129, CiteScore: 0)
Asian J. of Intl. Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.135, CiteScore: 0)
Asian J. of Law and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.195, CiteScore: 0)
Astin Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.878, CiteScore: 1)
Australasian J. of Organisational Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.154, CiteScore: 1)
Australian J. of Environmental Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.403, CiteScore: 1)
Australian J. of Indigenous Education, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.26, CiteScore: 1)
Australian J. of Rehabilitation Counseling     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.144, CiteScore: 0)
Austrian History Yearbook     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.161, CiteScore: 0)
Behavioral and Brain Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38, SJR: 0.595, CiteScore: 1)
Behaviour Change     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.508, CiteScore: 1)
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 189, SJR: 0.976, CiteScore: 2)
Bilingualism: Language and Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 46, SJR: 1.446, CiteScore: 2)
Biofilms     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bird Conservation Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25, SJR: 0.581, CiteScore: 1)
BJPsych Advances     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 57, SJR: 0.275, CiteScore: 0)
BJPsych Intl.     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
BJPsych Open     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Brain Impairment     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.321, CiteScore: 1)
Breast Cancer Online     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Britannia     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.111, CiteScore: 0)
British Actuarial J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
British Catholic History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.133, CiteScore: 1)
British J. for the History of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27, SJR: 0.235, CiteScore: 0)
British J. of Anaesthetic and Recovery Nursing     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
British J. of Music Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.564, CiteScore: 1)
British J. Of Nutrition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 96, SJR: 1.612, CiteScore: 4)
British J. of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 235, SJR: 4.661, CiteScore: 4)
British J. of Psychiatry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 244, SJR: 2.844, CiteScore: 3)
Bulletin of Entomological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.805, CiteScore: 2)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.555, CiteScore: 1)
Bulletin of the Australian Mathematical Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.44, CiteScore: 0)
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.146, CiteScore: 0)
Business and Human Rights J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.536, CiteScore: 1)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19, SJR: 1.098, CiteScore: 2)
Business History Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.347, CiteScore: 1)
Cambridge Archaeological J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 169, SJR: 1.121, CiteScore: 1)
Cambridge Classical J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Cambridge J. of Postcolonial Literary Inquiry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Cambridge Law J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 224, SJR: 0.213, CiteScore: 0)
Cambridge Opera J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.14, CiteScore: 0)
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.299, CiteScore: 1)
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Camden Fifth Series     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Canadian Entomologist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.482, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. of Emergency Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.624, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. of Law & Jurisprudence     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.237, CiteScore: 0)
Canadian J. of Law and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.259, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. of Mathematics / J. canadien de mathématiques     Hybrid Journal  
Canadian J. of Neurological Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (SJR: 0.549, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25, SJR: 0.385, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. on Aging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.426, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian Mathematical Bulletin     Hybrid Journal  
Canadian Yearbook of Intl. Law / Annuaire canadien de droit international     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Cardiology in the Young     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34, SJR: 0.372, CiteScore: 1)
Central European History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 33, SJR: 0.159, CiteScore: 0)
Children Australia     Partially Free   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.255, CiteScore: 0)
China Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 55, SJR: 2.289, CiteScore: 3)
Chinese J. of Agricultural Biotechnology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Church History : Studies in Christianity and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 78, SJR: 0.106, CiteScore: 0)
Classical Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 36, SJR: 0.204, CiteScore: 0)
Classical Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 29)
CNS Spectrums     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.391, CiteScore: 3)
Cognitive Behaviour Therapist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Combinatorics, Probability and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.839, CiteScore: 1)
Communications in Computational Physics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.048, CiteScore: 2)
Comparative Studies in Society and History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 51, SJR: 0.585, CiteScore: 1)
Compositio Mathematica     Full-text available via subscription   (SJR: 3.139, CiteScore: 1)
Contemporary European History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 36, SJR: 0.263, CiteScore: 1)
Continuity and Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.107, CiteScore: 0)
Dance Research J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.211, CiteScore: 0)
Development and Psychopathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 2.068, CiteScore: 4)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.156, CiteScore: 0)
Diamond Light Source Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.471, CiteScore: 1)
Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.561, CiteScore: 1)
Early China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Early Music History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Earth and Environmental Science Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
East Asian J. on Applied Mathematics     Full-text available via subscription   (SJR: 0.418, CiteScore: 1)
Ecclesiastical Law J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.114, CiteScore: 0)
Econometric Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 2.915, CiteScore: 1)
Economics and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.622, CiteScore: 1)
Edinburgh J. of Botany     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.283, CiteScore: 1)
Educational and Developmental Psychologist     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.146, CiteScore: 0)
Eighteenth-Century Music     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.113, CiteScore: 0)
English Language and Linguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.52, CiteScore: 1)
English Profile J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
English Today     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.279, CiteScore: 0)
Enterprise & Society : The Intl. J. of Business History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.245, CiteScore: 1)
Environment and Development Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39, SJR: 0.617, CiteScore: 1)
Environmental Conservation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 61, SJR: 1.028, CiteScore: 2)
Environmental Practice     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.145, CiteScore: 0)
Epidemiology & Infection     Open Access   (Followers: 22, SJR: 1.128, CiteScore: 2)
Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 4, SJR: 1.494, CiteScore: 2)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.756, CiteScore: 1)
Ergodic Theory and Dynamical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.193, CiteScore: 1)
Ethics & Intl. Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.557, CiteScore: 1)
European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst)     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 40, SJR: 1.009, CiteScore: 1)
European J. of Applied Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.52, CiteScore: 1)
European J. of Intl. Security     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
European J. of Sociology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37, SJR: 0.643, CiteScore: 1)
European Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28, SJR: 1.816, CiteScore: 2)
European Psychiatry     Open Access   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.819, CiteScore: 3)
European Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.131, CiteScore: 0)
Evolutionary Human Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Experimental Agriculture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.542, CiteScore: 1)
Expert Reviews in Molecular Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.647, CiteScore: 4)
Fetal and Maternal Medicine Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Financial History Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.238, CiteScore: 1)
Foreign Policy Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Forum of Mathematics, Pi     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Forum of Mathematics, Sigma     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Genetics Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.483, CiteScore: 1)
Geological Magazine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.966, CiteScore: 2)
Glasgow Mathematical J.     Full-text available via subscription   (SJR: 0.604, CiteScore: 0)
Global Constitutionalism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Global Mental Health     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Global Sustainability     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Government and Opposition     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.965, CiteScore: 2)
Greece & Rome     Partially Free   (Followers: 30, SJR: 0.113, CiteScore: 0)
Hague J. on the Rule of Law     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.271, CiteScore: 1)
Harvard Theological Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 78, SJR: 0.165, CiteScore: 0)
Health Economics, Policy and Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28, SJR: 0.745, CiteScore: 1)
Hegel Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
High Power Laser Science and Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.901, CiteScore: 3)
Historical J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 42, SJR: 0.247, CiteScore: 1)
History in Africa     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Horizons     Partially Free   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.129, CiteScore: 0)
Industrial and Organizational Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27, SJR: 0.916, CiteScore: 1)
Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 48, SJR: 1.97, CiteScore: 3)
Intl. & Comparative Law Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 265, SJR: 0.369, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. Annals of Criminology     Full-text available via subscription  
Intl. J. of Asian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.143, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. J. of Astrobiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.548, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Cultural Property     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.253, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Disability Management Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.105, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. J. of Law in Context     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.275, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Legal Information     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 349)
Intl. J. of Microwave and Wireless Technologies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.184, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Middle East Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 72, SJR: 0.434, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. J. of Technology Assessment in Health Care     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.714, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. Labor and Working-Class History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.182, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. Organization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 109, SJR: 8.527, CiteScore: 5)
Intl. Psychogeriatrics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 1.048, CiteScore: 2)
Intl. Review of Social History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 29, SJR: 0.315, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. Review of the Red Cross     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.214, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. Theory: A J. of Intl. Politics, Law and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 2.293, CiteScore: 2)
Iraq     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Irish Historical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.103, CiteScore: 0)
Irish J. of Psychological Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.221, CiteScore: 0)
Israel Law Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.165, CiteScore: 0)
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Itinerario     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.158, CiteScore: 0)
J. of African History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23, SJR: 0.348, CiteScore: 1)
J. of African Law     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.113, CiteScore: 0)
J. of Agricultural and Applied Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.263, CiteScore: 1)
J. of Agricultural Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.563, CiteScore: 1)
J. of American Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.164, CiteScore: 0)
J. of Anglican Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
J. of Applied Animal Nutrition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
J. of Asian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 43, SJR: 0.591, CiteScore: 1)
J. of Benefit-Cost Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
J. of Biosocial Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.48, CiteScore: 1)

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Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.595
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 38  
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0140-525X - ISSN (Online) 1469-1825
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [387 journals]
  • Thinking through prior bodies: autonomic uncertainty and interoceptive
    • Authors: Micah Allen; Nicolas Legrand, Camile Maria Costa Correa, Francesca Fardo
      Abstract: The Bayesian brain hypothesis, as formalized by the free-energy principle, is ascendant in cognitive science. But, how does the Bayesian brain obtain prior beliefs' Veissière and colleagues argue that sociocultural interaction is one important source. We offer a complementary model in which “interoceptive self-inference” guides the estimation of expected uncertainty both in ourselves and in our social conspecifics.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002899
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • with+other+minds&rft.title=Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.issn=0140-525X&">Thinking with other minds
    • Authors: Edward Baggs; Anthony Chemero
      Abstract: We applaud the ambition of Veissière et al.'s account of cultural learning, and the attempt to ground higher order thinking in embodied theory. However, the account is limited by loose terminology, and by its commitment to a view of the child learner as inference-maker. Vygotsky offers a more powerful view of cultural learning, one that is fully compatible with embodiment.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002747
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • “Through others we become ourselves”: The dialectics of predictive
           coding and active inference
    • Authors: Dimitris Bolis; Leonhard Schilbach
      Abstract: Thinking through other minds creatively situates the free-energy principle within real-life cultural processes, thereby enriching both sociocultural theories and Bayesian accounts of cognition. Here, shifting the attention from thinking-through to becoming-with, we suggest complementing such an account by focusing on the empirical, computational, and conceptual investigation of the multiscale dynamics of social interaction.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002917
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Have we lost the thinker in other minds' Human thinking beyond social
    • Authors: Nabil Bouizegarene
      Abstract: Veissière and colleagues suggest that thinking is entirely based on social norms. I point out that despite the fact that social norms are commonly used to alleviate cognitive processing, some individuals are willing and able to go about the costly process of questioning them and exploring other valuable ways of thinking.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002875
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Unification at the cost of realism and precision
    • Authors: Rachael L. Brown; Carl Brusse, Bryce Huebner, Ross Pain
      Abstract: Veissière et al. must sacrifice explanatory realism and precision in order to develop a unified formal model. Drawing on examples from cognitive archeology, we argue that this makes it difficult for them to derive the kinds of testable predictions that would allow them to resolve debates over the nature of human social cognition and cultural acquisition.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002760
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Normativity, social change, and the epistemological framing of culture
    • Authors: Andrew Buskell
      Abstract: The authors deploy an epistemic framework to represent culture and model the acquisition of cultural behavior. Yet, the framing inherits familiar problems with explaining the acquisition of norms. Such problems are conspicuous with regard to human societies where norms are ubiquitous. This creates a new difficulty for the authors in explaining change to mutually exclusive organizational structures of human life.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002681
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The multicultural mind as an epistemological test and extension for the
           thinking through other minds approach
    • Authors: George I. Christopoulos; Ying-yi Hong
      Abstract: The multicultural experience (i.e., multicultural individuals and cross-cultural experiences) offers the intriguing possibility for (i) an empirical examination of how free-energy principles explain dynamic cultural behaviors and pragmatic cultural phenomena and (ii) a challenging but decisive test of thinking through other minds (TTOM) predictions. We highlight that TTOM needs to treat individuals as active cultural agents instead of passive learners.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002711
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Digital life, a theory of minds, and mapping human and machine cultural
    • Authors: Kevin B. Clark
      Abstract: Emerging cybertechnologies, such as social digibots, bend epistemological conventions of life and culture already complicated by human and animal relationships. Virtually-augmented niches of machines and organic life promise new free-energy-governed selection of intelligent digital life. These provocative eco-evolutionary contexts demand a theory of (natural and artificial) minds to characterize and validate the immersive social phenomena universally-shaping cultural affordances.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002838
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Affective Social Learning serves as a quick and flexible complement to
    • Authors: Fabrice Clément; Daniel Dukes
      Abstract: Although we applaud the general aims of the target article, we argue that Affective Social Learning completes TTOM by pointing out how emotions can provide another route to acquiring culture, a route which may be quicker, more flexible, and even closer to an axiological definition of culture (less about what is, and more about what should be) than TTOM itself.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002784
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Maladaptive social norms, cultural progress, and the free-energy principle
    • Authors: Matteo Colombo
      Abstract: Veissière and collaborators ground their account of culture and social norms in the free-energy principle, which postulates that the utility (or adaptive value) of an outcome is equivalent to its probability. This equivalence would mean that their account entails that complying with social norms has always adaptive value. But, this is false, because many social norms are obviously maladaptive.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002723
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Explaining or redefining mindreading'
    • Authors: Krzysztof Dołęga; Tobias Schlicht, Daniel C. Dennett
      Abstract: Veissière et al. disrupt current debates over the nature of mindreading by bringing multiple positions under the umbrella of free-energy. However, it is not clear whether integrating the opposing sides under a common formal framework will yield new insights into how mindreading is achieved, rather than offering a mere redescription of the target phenomenon.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002772
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • “Social physiology” for psychiatric semiology: How TTOM can initiate
           an interactive turn for computational psychiatry'
    • Authors: Guillaume Dumas; Tudi Gozé, Jean-Arthur Micoulaud-Franchi
      Abstract: Thinking through other minds (TTOM) encompasses new dimensions in computational psychiatry: social interaction and mutual sense-making. It questions the nature of psychiatric manifestations (semiology) in light of recent data on social interaction in neuroscience. We propose the concept of “social physiology” in response to the call by the conceivers of TTOM for the renewal of computational psychiatry.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002735
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Enculturation without TTOM and Bayesianism without FEP: Another Bayesian
           theory of culture is needed
    • Authors: Martin Fortier-Davy
      Abstract: First, I discuss cross-cultural evidence showing that a good deal of enculturation takes place outside of thinking through other minds. Second, I review evidence challenging the claim that humans seek to minimize entropy. Finally, I argue that optimality claims should be avoided, and that descriptive Bayesianism offers a more promising avenue for the development of a Bayesian theory of culture.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002905
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The role of communication in acquisition, curation, and transmission of
    • Authors: Hyowon Gweon
      Abstract: Veissière et al.'s proposal aims to explain how cognition enables cultural learning, but fails to acknowledge a distinctively human behavior critical to this process: communication. Recent advances in developmental and computational cognitive science suggest that the social-cognitive capacities central to TTOM also support sophisticated yet remarkably early-emerging inferences and communicative behaviors that allow us to learn and share abstract knowledge.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002863
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The cost of over-intellectualizing the free-energy principle
    • Authors: Daniel D. Hutto
      Abstract: This commentary raises a question about the target article's proposed explanation of what goes on when we think through other minds. It highlights a tension between non-mindreading characterizations of everyday social cognition and the individualist, cognitivist assumptions that target article's explanatory proposal inherits from the predictive processing framework it favours.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002851
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Skill-based engagement with a rich landscape of affordances as an
           alternative to thinking through other minds
    • Authors: Julian Kiverstein; Erik Rietveld
      Abstract: Veissière and colleagues make a valiant attempt at reconciling an internalist account of implicit cultural learning with an externalist account that understands social behaviour in terms of its environment-involving dynamics. However, unfortunately the author's attempt to forge a middle way between internalism and externalism fails. We argue their failure stems from the overly individualistic understanding of the perception of cultural affordances they propose.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900284X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Culture and the plasticity of perception
    • Authors: Michael Lifshitz; T. M. Luhrmann
      Abstract: Culture shapes our basic sensory experience of the world. This is particularly striking in the study of religion and psychosis, where we and others have shown that cultural context determines both the structure and content of hallucination-like events. The cultural shaping of hallucinations may provide a rich case-study for linking cultural learning with emerging prediction-based models of perception.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002887
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • How does social cognition shape enculturation'
    • Authors: John Michael; Leon de Bruin
      Abstract: Other people in our culture actively transform our behavioral dispositions and mental states by shaping them in various ways. In the following, we highlight three points which Veissière et al. may consider in leveraging their account to illuminate the dynamics by which this occurs, and in particular, to shed light on how social cognition supports, and is supported by, enculturation.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002814
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Encultured minds, not error reduction minds
    • Authors: Robert Mirski; Mark H. Bickhard, David Eck, Arkadiusz Gut
      Abstract: There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002826
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Importance of the “thinking through other minds” process explored
           through motor correlates of motivated social interactions
    • Authors: Harold Mouras
      Abstract: We wanted to gather recent results supporting the idea of the central role of sharing agency in socioaffective and motivational information processing. Here, we want to support the idea that this process is quite arbitrary, early in the temporal chain of processes and not only influence the psychological, but also the motor correlates of socioaffective information processes.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002656
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The future of TTOM
    • Authors: Søren Overgaard
      Abstract: “Thinking through other minds,” or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it refers to something people do – for example, inferences they make about others’ expectations. On the other hand, it refers to a particular theoretical model of those things that people do. If the concept of TTOM is to have any future, this ambiguity must be redressed.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002668
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Choosing a Markov blanket
    • Authors: Thomas Parr
      Abstract: This commentary focuses upon the relationship between two themes in the target article: the ways in which a Markov blanket may be defined and the role of precision and salience in mediating the interactions between what is internal and external to a system. These each rest upon the different perspectives we might take while “choosing” a Markov blanket.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002632
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Social epistemic actions
    • Authors: Giovanni Pezzulo; Laura Barca, Domenico Maisto, Francesco Donnarumma
      Abstract: We consider the ways humans engage in social epistemic actions, to guide each other's attention, prediction, and learning processes towards salient information, at the timescale of online social interaction and joint action. This parallels the active guidance of other's attention, prediction, and learning processes at the longer timescale of niche construction and cultural practices, as discussed in the target article.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002802
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Thinking through others’ emotions: Incorporating the role of emotional
           state inference in thinking through other minds
    • Authors: Ryan Smith; Richard D. Lane
      Abstract: The active inference framework offers an attractive starting point for understanding cultural cognition. Here, we argue that affective dynamics are essential to include when constructing this type of theory. We highlight ways in which interactions between emotional responses and the perception of those responses, both within and between individuals, can play central roles in both motivating and constraining sociocultural practices.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002644
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • A deeper and distributed search for culture
    • Authors: Paul S. Strand
      Abstract: The target article does not address the neural mediation of complex social behavior. I review evidence that such mediation may be compatible with proposed Bayesian information-processing principles. Notably, however, such mediation occurs subcortically as well as cortically, concerns reward uncertainty and information uncertainty, and impacts culture via group-level payoff structures that define individualism and collectivism.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002693
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The dark side of thinking through other minds
    • Authors: Sander Van de Cruys; Francis Heylighen
      Abstract: We show that TTOM has a lot to offer for the study of the evolution of cultures, but that this also brings to the fore the dark implications of TTOM, unexposed in Veissière et al. Those implications lead us to move beyond meme-centered or an organism-centered concept of fitness based on free-energy minimization, toward a social system-centered view.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002796
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Participating in a musician's stream of consciousness
    • Authors: Björn Vickhoff
      Abstract: Do we acquire culture through other minds, or do we get access to other minds through culture' Music culture is a practice as well as the people involved. Sounding music works as a script guiding action, as do, to varying degrees, many rituals and customs. Collective co-performance of the script enables inter-subjectivity, which arguably contributes to the formation of subcultures. Shared-emotional experiences give material to the narrative of who we are.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002759
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • A unified account of culture should accommodate animal cultures
    • Authors: Andrew Whiten
      Abstract: Discoveries about social learning and culture in non-human animals have burgeoned this century, yet despite aspiring to offer a unified account of culture, the target article neglects these discoveries almost totally. I offer an overview of principal findings in this field including phylogenetic reach, intraspecies pervasiveness, stability, fidelity, and attentional funnelling in social learning. Can the authors’ approach accommodate these'
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900270X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Integrating models of cognition and culture will require a bit more math
    • Authors: Matthew R. Zefferman; Paul E. Smaldino
      Abstract: We support the goal to integrate models of culture and cognition. However, we are not convinced that the free energy principle and Thinking Through Other Minds will be useful in achieving it. There are long traditions of modeling both cultural evolution and cognition. Demonstrating that FEP or TTOM can integrate these models will require a bit more math.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900267X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • TTOM in action: Refining the variational approach to cognition and culture
    • Authors: Samuel P. L. Veissière; Axel Constant, Maxwell J. D. Ramstead, Karl J. Friston, Laurence J. Kirmayer
      Abstract: The target article “Thinking Through Other Minds” (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was both synthetic – building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; and prescriptive – showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and cultural ecologies of mind. In this reply to commentators, we address key issues, including: (1) refining the concept of culture to show how TTOM and the free-energy principle (FEP) can capture essential elements of human adaptation and functioning; (2) addressing cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances; (3) clarifying the significance of the FEP formalism related to entropy minimization, Bayesian inference, Markov blankets, and enactivist views; (4) developing empirical tests and applications of the TTOM model; (5) incorporating cultural diversity and context at the level of intra-cultural variation, individual differences, and the transition to digital niches; and (6) considering some implications for psychiatry. The commentators’ critiques and suggestions point to useful refinements and applications of the model. In ongoing collaborations, we are exploring how to augment the theory with affective valence, take into account individual differences and historicity, and apply the model to specific domains including epistemic bias.
      PubDate: 2020-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X20000011
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Differentiating between different forms of moral obligations
    • Authors: Rajen A. Anderson; Benjamin C. Ruisch, David A. Pizarro
      Abstract: We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what one should do) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what one should not do). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002589
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Obligations to whom, obligations to what' A philosophical perspective
           on the objects of our obligations
    • Authors: Kati Kish Bar-On
      Abstract: Tomasello strives to understand the underlying psychology behind the human sense of obligation, but he only addresses a specific kind of obligation: to other human beings. We argue that in order to account for the psychological underpinning of human behavior, one should also consider people's sense of commitment to non-human entities, such as ideals, values, and moral principles.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002395
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Children's everyday moral conversation speaks to the emergence of
    • Authors: Karen Bartsch
      Abstract: For Tomasello's proposed ontology of the human sense of moral obligation, observations of early moral language may provide useful evidence complementary to that afforded by experimental research. Extant reports of children's everyday moral talk reveal patterns of participation and content that accord with the proposal and hint at extensions addressing individual differences.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002358
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The role of affect in feelings of obligation
    • Authors: Stefen Beeler-Duden; Meltem Yucel, Amrisha Vaish
      Abstract: Tomasello offers a compelling account of the emergence of humans’ sense of obligation. We suggest that more needs to be said about the role of affect in the creation of obligations. We also argue that positive emotions such as gratitude evolved to encourage individuals to fulfill cooperative obligations without the negative quality that Tomasello proposes is inherent in obligations.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002449
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The sense of obligation is culturally modulated
    • Authors: Andrea Bender
      Abstract: Tomasello argues in the target article that, in generalizing the concrete obligations originating from interdependent collaboration to one's entire cultural group, humans become “ultra-cooperators.” But are all human populations cooperative in similar ways' Based on cross-cultural studies and my own fieldwork in Polynesia, I argue that cooperation varies along several dimensions, and that the underlying sense of obligation is culturally modulated.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002371
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Tomasello on “we” and the sense of obligation
    • Authors: Michael E. Bratman
      Abstract: Tomasello explores four interrelated phenomena: (1) joint intentional collaboration; (2) joint commitment; (3) “self-regulative pressure from ‘we’”; and (4) the sense of interpersonal obligation. He argues that the version of (1) that involves (2) is the “source” of (3) and so the source of (4). I note an issue that arises once we distinguish two versions of (3).
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002383
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The joy of obligation: Human cultural worldviews can enhance the rewards
           of meeting obligations
    • Authors: Emma E. Buchtel
      Abstract: Is it particularly human to feel coerced into fulfilling moral obligations, or is it particularly human to enjoy them' I argue for the importance of taking into account how culture promotes prosocial behavior, discussing how Confucian heritage culture enhances the satisfaction of meeting one's obligations.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002607
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Tomasello's tin man of moral obligation needs a heart
    • Authors: Jeremy I. M. Carpendale; Charlie Lewis
      Abstract: In place of Tomasello's explanation for the source of moral obligation, we suggest that it develops from the concern for others already implicit in the human developmental system. Mutual affection and caring make the development of communication and thinking possible. Humans develop as persons within such relationships and this develops into respect and moral obligation.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002462
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Intuitive theories inform children's beliefs about intergroup obligation
    • Authors: Lisa Chalik
      Abstract: In addition to emerging from children's direct experiences with collaborative partners and groups, children's beliefs about obligation also arise from a process of intuitive theory-building in early childhood. On this account, it is possible for at least some of children's beliefs to emerge in the absence of specific experiences where obligations are held among fellow members of a group “we.”
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002516
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Who are “we” and why are we cooperating' Insights from
           social psychology
    • Authors: Margaret S. Clark; Brian D. Earp, Molly J. Crockett
      Abstract: Tomasello argues in the target article that a sense of moral obligation emerges from the creation of a collaborative “we” motivating us to fulfill our cooperative duties. We suggest that “we” takes many forms, entailing different obligations, depending on the type (and underlying functions) of the relationship(s) in question. We sketch a framework of such types, functions, and obligations to guide future research in our commentary.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002528
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Integrating perspectives: How the development of second-personal
           competence lays the foundation for a second-personal morality
    • Authors: John Corbit; Chris Moore
      Abstract: The integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information within joint intentional collaboration provides the foundation for broad-based second-personal morality. We offer two additions to this framework: a description of the developmental process through which second-personal competence emerges from early triadic interactions, and empirical evidence that collaboration with a concrete goal may provide an essential focal point for this integrative process.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900236X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Psychological consequences of the normativity of moral obligation
    • Authors: Stephen Darwall
      Abstract: An adequate moral psychology of obligation must bear in mind that although the “sense of obligation” is psychological, what it is a sense of, moral obligation itself, is not. It is irreducibly normative. I argue, therefore, that the “we” whose demands the sense of obligation presupposes must be an ideal rather than an actual “we.”
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002437
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Obligation at zero acquaintance
    • Authors: David Dunning; Detlef Fetchenhauer, Thomas Schlösser
      Abstract: Social obligation begins far before people establish explicit cooperative relationships. Research on trust suggests that people feel obligated to trust other people even at zero acquaintance, thus trusting complete strangers even though they privately expect to be exploited. Such obligations promote mutually beneficial behavior among strangers and likely help people build goodwill needed for more long-lasting relationships.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002498
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The divided we and multiple obligations
    • Authors: Bradley Franks; Andrew Stewart
      Abstract: Tomasello's account of the origins and nature of moral obligation rightly emphasises the key roles of social relations and a cooperative sense of “we.” However, we suggest that it overlooks the complexity of those social relations and the resulting prevalence of a divided “we” in moral social groups. We argue that the social identity dynamics that arise can lead to competing obligations in a single group, and this has implications for the evolution of obligation.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002553
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation
    • Authors: Margaret Gilbert
      Abstract: Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002619
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Conflicting obligations in human social life
    • Authors: Jacob B. Hirsh; Garriy Shteynberg, Michele J. Gelfand
      Abstract: Tomasello describes how the sense of moral obligation emerges from a shared perspective with collaborative partners and in-group members. Our commentary expands this framework to accommodate multiple social identities, where the normative standards associated with diverse group memberships can often conflict with one another. Reconciling these conflicting obligations is argued to be a central part of human morality.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002425
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Personalizing the demands of reason
    • Authors: Charles Kalish
      Abstract: Children come to joint action with a generalized sense of “reason,” which carries normative implications, before personalizing reasons. A general sense of ought precedes specific notions of individual perspective.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002541
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Is that all there is' Or is chimpanzees group hunt “fair”
    • Authors: Angelica Kaufmann
      Abstract: Tomasello claims that we lack convincing evidence that nonhuman animals manifest a sense of moral obligation (i.e., the concept of fairness) in their group activities. The philosophical analysis of distinctive evidence from ethology, namely group hunting practices among chimpanzees, can help the author appreciate the distinctive character of this behaviour as a display of fairness put into practice.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002309
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The moral obligations of conflict and resistance
    • Authors: Melanie Killen; Audun Dahl
      Abstract: Morality has two key features: (1) moral judgments are not solely determined by what your group thinks, and (2) moral judgments are often applied to members of other groups as well as your own group. Cooperative motives do not explain how young children reject unfairness, and assert moral obligations, both inside and outside their groups. Resistance and experience with conflicts, alongside cooperation, is key to the emergence and development of moral obligation.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002401
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The sense of obligation in children's testimonial learning
    • Authors: Pearl Han Li; Annelise Pesch, Melissa A. Koenig
      Abstract: We extend Tomasello's discussion of children's developing sense of obligation to testimonial learning. First, we review a battery of behaviors in testimonial exchanges that parallel those described by Tomasello. Second, we explore the variable ways in which children hold others accountable, suggestive that children's evaluations of moral and epistemic responsibilities in joint collaborative activities are distinct.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002486
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • A lifelong preoccupation with the sociality of moral obligation
    • Authors: Zoe Liberman; John W. Du Bois
      Abstract: Tomasello provides compelling evidence that children understand that people are morally obligated toward members of their social group. We call for expanding the scope of inquiry to encompass the full developmental trajectory of humans’ understanding of the relation between moral obligation, sociality, and stancetaking in interaction. We suggest that humans display a lifelong preoccupation with the sociality of moral obligation.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900253X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The sense of moral obligation facilitates information agency and culture
    • Authors: Heather M. Maranges; Roy F. Baumeister, Kathleen D. Vohs
      Abstract: Tomasello argues that humans’ sense of moral obligation emerges early in development, relies on a shared “we,” and serves as the foundation of cooperation. This perspective complements our theoretical view of the human self as information agent. The shared “we” promotes not only proximal cooperative goals but also distal ones via the construction of shared understanding – it promotes culture.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002334
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Obligations without cooperation
    • Authors: Julia Marshall
      Abstract: Our sense of obligation is evident outside of joint collaborative activities. Most notably, children and adults recognize that parents are obligated to care for and love their children. This is presumably not because we think parents view their children as worthy cooperative partners, but because special obligations and duties are inherent in certain relational dynamics, namely the parent-child relationship.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002565
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The nature of obligation's special force
    • Authors: David Olbrich
      Abstract: Tomasello's characterization of obligation as demanding and coercive is not an implication of the centrality of collaborative commitment. Not only is this characterization contentious, it appears to be falsified in some cases of personal conviction. The theory would be strengthened if the nature of obligation's force and collaborative commitment were directly linked, possibly through Tomasello's notions of identity and identification.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002450
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • A hard choice for Tomasello
    • Authors: Philip Pettit
      Abstract: Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002346
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • How is the moral stance related to the intentional stance and group
    • Authors: Hannes Rakoczy
      Abstract: The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002413
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Caregiving relationships as evolutionary and developmental bases of
    • Authors: Rachna B. Reddy; Henry M. Wellman
      Abstract: Obligation as defined by Tomasello requires mutually capable parties, but one-sided caregiver relationships reveal its developmental and evolutionary precursors. Specifically, “coercive” emotions may prompt protective action by caregivers toward infant primates, and infants show distress toward caregivers when they appear to violate expectations in their relationships. We argue that these early social-relational expectations and emotions may form the base of obligation.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002504
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • obligation+develop+from+the+inside-out+or+outside-in'&rft.title=Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.issn=0140-525X&">Does the concept of obligation develop from the inside-out or
    • Authors: Marjorie Rhodes
      Abstract: Tomasello proposes that the concept of obligation develops “from the inside-out”: emerging first in experiences of shared agency and generalizing outward to shape children's broader understanding. Here I consider that obligation may also develop “from the outside-in,” emerging as a domain-specific instantiation of a more general conceptual bias to expect categories to prescribe how their members are supposed to behave.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002590
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Feelings of obligation are valuations of signaling-mediated social payoffs
    • Authors: Amanda Rotella; Adam Maxwell Sparks, Pat Barclay
      Abstract: We extend Tomasello's framework by addressing the functional challenge of obligation. If the long-run social consequences of a decision are sufficiently costly, obligation motivates the actor to forgo potential immediate benefits in favor of long-term social interests. Thus, obligation psychology balances the downstream socially-mediated payoffs from a decision. This perspective can predict when and why obligation will be experienced.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002322
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Who are “we”' Dealing with conflicting moral obligations
    • Authors: Alex Shaw; Shoham Choshen-Hillel
      Abstract: Satisfying one's obligations is an important part of being human. However, people's obligations can often prescribe contradictory behaviors. Moral obligations conflict (loyalty vs. fairness), and so do obligations to different groups (country vs. family when one is called to war). We propose that a broader framework is needed to account for how people balance different social and moral obligations.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002577
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • How does inequality affect our sense of moral obligation'
    • Authors: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
      Abstract: Tomasello's novel and insightful theory of obligation explains why we sometimes sense an obligation to treat each other equally, but he has not yet explained why human morality also allows and enables much inequality in wealth and power. Ullman-Margalit's (1977) account of norms of partiality suggested a different source and kind of norms that might help to fill out Tomasello's picture.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002310
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Cooperation and obligation in early parent-child relationships
    • Authors: Ross A. Thompson
      Abstract: Tomasello's moral psychology of obligation would be developmentally deepened by greater attention to early experiences of cooperation and shared social agency between parents and infants, evolved to promote infant survival. They provide a foundation for developing understanding of the mutual obligations of close relationships that contribute (alongside peer experiences) to growing collaborative skills, fairness expectations, and fidelity to social norms.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002474
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The many faces of obligation
    • Authors: Michael Tomasello
      Abstract: My response to the commentaries focuses on four issues: (1) the diversity both within and between cultures of the many different faces of obligation; (2) the possible evolutionary roots of the sense of obligation, including possible sources that I did not consider; (3) the possible ontogenetic roots of the sense of obligation, including especially children's understanding of groups from a third-party perspective (rather than through participation, as in my account); and (4) the relation between philosophical accounts of normative phenomena in general – which are pitched as not totally empirical – and empirical accounts such as my own. I have tried to distinguish comments that argue for extensions of the theory from those that represent genuine disagreement.
      PubDate: 2020-04-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002620
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalizations primarily serve reputation management, not decision
    • Authors: Sacha Altay; Hugo Mercier
      Abstract: We agree with Cushman that rationalizations are the product of biological adaptations, but we disagree about their function. The data available do not show that rationalizations allow us to reason better and make better decisions. The data suggest instead that rationalizations serve reputation management goals, and that they affect our behaviors because we are held accountable by our peers.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002115
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Means and ends of habitual action
    • Authors: Samantha Berthelette; Christopher Kalbach
      Abstract: Cushman claims that post hoc rationalization of habitual behavior can improve future reasoning. His characterization of habits includes two components: (1) habitual behavior is a non-rational process, and (2) habitual behavior is sometimes rationalized. We argue that Cushman fails to show any habits that are apt targets for rationalization. Thus, it's unclear when – if ever – rationalizing habits would improve reasoning.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002127
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization is a suboptimal defense mechanism associated with clinical
           and forensic problems
    • Authors: Stuart Brody; Rui Miguel Costa
      Abstract: Cushman argues that “rationalization is rational.” We show that there is reasonable empirical clinical and forensic psychological evidence to support viewing rationalization as a quite suboptimal defense mechanism. Rationalization has been found to be associated not only with poorer emotional development, but also with a broad range of antisocial behavior, including not only shoplifting, but also pedophilia and murder.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002073
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization and self-sabotage
    • Authors: Jason D'Cruz
      Abstract: In making the case that “rationalization is rational,” Cushman downplays its signature liability: Rationalization exposes a person to the hazard of delusion and self-sabotage. In paradigm cases, rationalization undermines instrumental rationality by introducing inaccuracies into the representational map required for planning and effective agency.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002231
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization is rare, reasoning is pervasive
    • Authors: Audun Dahl; Talia Waltzer
      Abstract: If rationalization were ubiquitous, it would undermine a fundamental premise of human discourse. A review of key evidence indicates that rationalization is rare and confined to choices among comparable options. In contrast, reasoning is pervasive in human decision making. Within the constraints of reasoning, rationalization may operate in ambiguous situations. Studying these processes requires careful definitions and operationalizations.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002140
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rational rationalization and System 2
    • Authors: Wim De Neys
      Abstract: In this commentary, I highlight the relevance of Cushman's target article for the popular dual-process framework of thinking. I point to the problematic characterization of rationalization in traditional dual-process models and suggest that in line with recent advances, Cushman's rational rationalization account offers a way out of the rationalization paradox.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002048
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization in the pejorative sense: Cushman's account overlooks the
           scope and costs of rationalization
    • Authors: Jonathan Ellis; Eric Schwitzgebel
      Abstract: According to Cushman, rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. We argue that this isn't the paradigmatic form of rationalization. Consequently, Cushman's explanation of the function and usefulness of rationalization is less broad-reaching than he intends. Cushman's account also obscures some of rationalization's pernicious consequences.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002152
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Belief as a non-epistemic adaptive benefit
    • Authors: Rebekah Gelpi; William Andrew Cunningham, Daphna Buchsbaum
      Abstract: Although rationalization about one's own beliefs and actions can improve an individual's future decisions, beliefs can provide other benefits unrelated to their epistemic truth value, such as group cohesion and identity. A model of resource-rational cognition that accounts for these benefits may explain unexpected and seemingly irrational thought patterns, such as belief polarization.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002206
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Ideology, shared moral narratives, and the dark side of collective
    • Authors: Jesse Graham
      Abstract: This commentary extends the target article's useful concepts to consider collective instances of representational exchange. When groups collectively rationalize their actions, entire networks of beliefs and desires can be created and maintained in the form of shared moral narratives and system-justifying ideologies. These collective rationalization cases illustrate how adaptive advantages can come at the expense of the truth.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002267
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Cognitive dissonance processes serve an action-oriented adaptive function
    • Authors: Eddie Harmon-Jones; Cindy Harmon-Jones
      Abstract: The action-based model of cognitive dissonance proposes an adaptive function for rationalization that differs from the one offered by Cushman. The one proposed by Cushman is concerned more with the cold construction of cognitions, whereas the one proposed by the action-based model is a motivated protection of a strongly held cognition.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002176
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • What kind of rationalization is system justification'
    • Authors: Kristin Laurin; William M. Jettinghoff
      Abstract: Cushman uses rationalization to refer to people's explanations for their own actions. In system justification theory, scholars use the same term to refer to people's efforts to cast their current status quo in an exaggeratedly positive light. We try to reconcile these two meanings, positing that system justification could result from people trying to explain their own failure to take action to combat inequality. We highlight two novel and contested predictions emerging from this interpretation.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002243
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization enables cooperation and cultural evolution
    • Authors: Neil Levy
      Abstract: Cushman argues that the function of rationalization is to attribute mental representations to ourselves, thereby making these representations available for future planning. I argue that such attribution is often not necessary and sometimes maladaptive. I suggest a different explanation of rationalization: making representations available to other agents, to facilitate cooperation, transmission, and the ratchet effect that underlies cumulative cultural evolution.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002061
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Letting rationalizations out of the box
    • Authors: Philip Pärnamets; Petter Johansson, Lars Hall
      Abstract: We are very happy that someone has finally tried to make sense of rationalization. But we are worried about the representational structure assumed by Cushman, particularly the “boxology” belief-desire model depicting the rational planner, and it seems to us he fails to accommodate many of the interpersonal aspects of representational exchange.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900219X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization is irrational and self-serving, but useful
    • Authors: Jake Quilty-Dunn
      Abstract: Rationalization through reduction of cognitive dissonance does not have the function of representational exchange. Instead, cognitive dissonance is part of the “psychological immune system” (Gilbert 2006; Mandelbaum 2019) and functions to protect the self-concept against evidence of incompetence, immorality, and instability. The irrational forms of attitude change that protect the self-concept in dissonance reduction are useful primarily for maintaining motivation.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002218
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization of emotion is also rational
    • Authors: Peter Railton
      Abstract: Cushman seeks to explain rationalization in terms of fundamental mental processes, and he hypotheses a selected-for function: information exchange between “rational” and “non-rational” processes in the brain. While this is plausible, his account overlooks the importance – and information value – of rationalizing the emotions of ourselves and others. Incorporating such rationalization would help explain the effectiveness of rationalization and its connection with valuation, as well as raise a challenge to his way of bifurcating “rational” and “non-rational” processes.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002292
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization and the status of folk psychology
    • Authors: Adina L. Roskies
      Abstract: Cushman's theory has implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of folk psychological states, for it entails realism about propositional attitudes. I point out a tension within his view and suggest a different view upon which rationalization emerges as a consequence of the adaptiveness of mentalizing. This alternative avoids the strong metaphysical implications of Cushman's theory.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002139
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization: Why, when, and what for'
    • Authors: Rebecca Saxe; Daniel Nettle
      Abstract: In this commentary, we ask when rationalization is most likely to occur and to not occur, and about where to expect, and how to measure, its benefits.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002255
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Antecedent rationalization: Rationalization prior to action
    • Authors: Eric Thomas Sievers
      Abstract: Often times we find ourselves wrestling with the urge to commit a non-rational action. When this happens, we are quite good at adopting quasi-beliefs that, if true, would make the action rational. In other words, rationalization often occurs antecedent to a behavioral choice. A complete account of the evolutionary history of rationalization must include antecedent rationalization.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002188
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Ex ante coherence shifts
    • Authors: Dan Simon; Keith J. Holyoak
      Abstract: Cushman characterizes rationalization as the inverse of rational reasoning, but this distinction is psychologically questionable. Coherence-based reasoning highlights a subtler form of bidirectionality: By distorting task attributes to make one course of action appear superior to its rivals, a patina of rationality is bestowed on the choice. This mechanism drives choice and action, rather than just following in their wake.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002103
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Evidence for the rationalisation phenomenon is exaggerated
    • Authors: Tom Stafford
      Abstract: The evidence for rationalisation, which motivates the target article, is exaggerated. Experimental evidence shows that rationalisation effects are small rather than gross and, I argue, largely silent on the pervasiveness and persistence of the phenomenon. At least some examples taken to show rationalisation also have an interpretation compatible with deliberate, knowing reason-responsiveness on the part of participants.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002085
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization may improve predictability rather than accuracy
    • Authors: P. Kyle Stanford; Ashley J. Thomas, Barbara W. Sarnecka
      Abstract: We present a theoretical and an empirical challenge to Cushman's claim that rationalization is adaptive because it allows humans to extract more accurate beliefs from our non-rational motivations for behavior. Rationalization sometimes generates more adaptive decisions by making our beliefs about the world less accurate. We suggest that the most important adaptive advantage of rationalization is instead that it increases our predictability (and therefore attractiveness) as potential partners in cooperative social interactions.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002279
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Quantifying the prevalence and adaptiveness of behavioral rationalizations
    • Authors: Warren Tierney; Eric Luis Uhlmann
      Abstract: Critical aspects of the “rationality of rationalizations” thesis are open empirical questions. These include the frequency with which past behavior determines attitudes (as opposed to attitudes causing future behaviors), the extent to which post hoc justifications take on a life of their own and shape future actions, and whether rationalizers experience benefits in well-being, social influence, performance, or other desirable outcomes.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900205X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Heroes of our own story: Self-image and rationalizing in thought
    • Authors: Tomer David Ullman
      Abstract: Cushman's rationalization account can be extended to cover another part of his portrayal of representational exchange: thought experiments that lead to conclusions about the self. While Cushman's argument is compelling, a full account of rationalization as adaptive will need to account for the divergence in rationalizing one's actions compared to the actions of others.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002280
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The social function of rationalization: An identity perspective
    • Authors: Jay J. Van Bavel; Anni Sternisko, Elizabeth Harris, Claire Robertson
      Abstract: In this commentary, we offer an additional function of rationalization. Namely, in certain social contexts, the proximal and ultimate function of beliefs and desires is social inclusion. In such contexts, rationalization often facilitates distortion of rather than approximation to truth. Understanding the role of social identity is not only timely and important, but also critical to fully understand the function(s) of rationalization.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002097
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The rationale of rationalization
    • Authors: Walter Veit; Joe Dewhurst, Krzysztof Dołęga, Max Jones, Shaun Stanley, Keith Frankish, Daniel C. Dennett
      Abstract: While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (1) the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and (2) the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002164
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Hard domains, biased rationalizations, and unanswered empirical questions
    • Authors: Stephen E. Weinberg; Jonathan M. Weinberg
      Abstract: Cushman raises the intriguing possibility that rationalization accesses/constructs intuitions that are not otherwise cognitively available. However, he substantially over-reaches in arguing that rationalization is mostly right on average, based on claims that the process must have emerged adaptively. The adaptiveness of “bounded rationalization” is domain specific and is unlikely to be adaptive in a large number of important applications.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900222X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Rationalization as representational exchange: Scope and mechanism
    • Authors: Fiery Cushman
      Abstract: The commentaries suggest many important improvements to the target article. They clearly distinguish two varieties of rationalization – the traditional “motivated reasoning” model, and the proposed representational exchange model – and show that they have distinct functions and consequences. They describe how representational exchange occurs not only by post hoc rationalization but also by ex ante rationalization and other more dynamic processes. They argue that the social benefits of representational exchange are at least as important as its direct personal benefits. Finally, they construe our search for meaning, purpose, and narrative – both individually and collectively – as a variety of representational exchange. The result is a theory of rationalization as representational exchange both wider in scope and better defined in mechanism.
      PubDate: 2020-04-15T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19003261
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • What are the appropriate axioms of rationality for reasoning under
           uncertainty with resource-constrained systems'
    • Authors: Harald Atmanspacher; Irina Basieva, Jerome R. Busemeyer, Andrei Y. Khrennikov, Emmanuel M. Pothos, Richard M. Shiffrin, Zheng Wang
      Abstract: When constrained by limited resources, how do we choose axioms of rationality' The target article relies on Bayesian reasoning that encounter serious tractability problems. We propose another axiomatic foundation: quantum probability theory, which provides for less complex and more comprehensive descriptions. More generally, defining rationality in terms of axiomatic systems misses a key issue: rationality must be defined by humans facing vague information.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001535
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The importance of constraints on constraints
    • Authors: Christopher J. Bates; Chris R. Sims, Robert A. Jacobs
      Abstract: The “resource-rational” approach is ambitious and worthwhile. A shortcoming of the proposed approach is that it fails to constrain what counts as a constraint. As a result, constraints used in different cognitive domains often have nothing in common. We describe an alternative framework that satisfies many of the desiderata of the resource-rational approach, but in a more disciplined manner.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001572
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Optimal, resource-rational or sub-optimal' Insights from cognitive
    • Authors: Vikranth R. Bejjanki; Richard N. Aslin
      Abstract: We agree with the authors regarding the utility of viewing cognition as resulting from an optimal use of limited resources. Here, we advocate for extending this approach to the study of cognitive development, which we feel provides particularly powerful insight into the debate between bounded optimality and true sub-optimality, precisely because young children have limited computational and cognitive resources.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001614
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Resource-rationality as a normative standard of human rationality
    • Authors: Matteo Colombo
      Abstract: Lieder and Griffiths introduce resource-rational analysis as a methodological device for the empirical study of the mind. But they also suggest resource-rationality serves as a normative standard to reassess the limits and scope of human rationality. Although the methodological status of resource-rational analysis is convincing, its normative status is not.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001596
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Another claim for cognitive history
    • Authors: Henry M. Cowles; Jamie Kreiner
      Abstract: History can help refine the resource-rational model by uncovering how cultural and cognitive forces act together to shape decision-making. Specifically, history reveals how the meanings of key terms like “problem” and “solution” shift over time. Studying choices in their cultural contexts illuminates how changing perceptions of the decision-making process affect how choices are made on the ground.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001547
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Computational limits don't fully explain human cognitive limitations
    • Authors: Ernest S. Davis; Gary F. Marcus
      Abstract: The project of justifying all the limits and failings of human cognition as inevitable consequences of strategies that are actually “optimal” relative to the limits on computational resources available may have some value, but it is far from a complete explanation. It is inconsistent with both common observation and a large body of experimentation, and it is of limited use in explaining human cognition.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001651
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Uncovering cognitive constraints is the bottleneck in resource-rational
    • Authors: Cvetomir Dimov
      Abstract: A major constraint in resource-rational analysis is cognitive resources. Yet, uncovering the nature of individual components of the human mind has progressed slowly, because even the simplest behavior is a function of most (if not all) of the mind. Accelerating our understanding of the mind's structure requires more efforts in developing cognitive architectures.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001675
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Resource-rationality beyond individual minds: the case of interactive
           language use
    • Authors: Mark Dingemanse
      Abstract: Resource-rational approaches offer much promise for understanding human cognition, especially if they can reach beyond the confines of individual minds. Language allows people to transcend individual resource limitations by augmenting computation and enabling distributed cognition. Interactive language use, an environment where social rational agents routinely deal with resource constraints together, offers a natural laboratory to test resource-rationality in the wild.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001638
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Generalization of the resource-rationality principle to neural control of
           goal-directed movements
    • Authors: Natalia Dounskaia; Yury P. Shimansky
      Abstract: We review evidence that the resource-rationality principle generalizes to human movement control. Optimization of the use of limited neurocomputational resources is described by the inclusion of the “neurocomputational cost” of sensory information processing and decision making in the optimality criterion of movement control. A resulting tendency to decrease this cost can account for various phenomena observed during goal-directed movements.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001559
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Holistic resource-rational analysis
    • Authors: Julia Haas; Colin Klein
      Abstract: We argue that Lieder and Griffiths’ method for analyzing rational process models cannot capture an important constraint on resource allocation, which is competition between different processes for shared resources (Klein 2018, Biology and Philosophy33:36). We suggest that holistic interactions between processes on at least three different timescales – episodic, developmental, and evolutionary – must be taken into account by a complete resource-bounded explanation.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001493
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Heuristics and the naturalistic fallacy
    • Authors: Christopher J. Kalbach
      Abstract: Lieder and Griffith's account of resource-rationality relies heavily on a notion of teleology. In this commentary, I criticize their teleocentric view as being incompatible with evolutionary theory, in which they aim to ground their analysis. As such, to save their view, I argue that they must jettison the notion of teleology, and their teleologically laden conclusions.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001523
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The biology of emotion is missing
    • Authors: Katherine Peil Kauffman
      Abstract: Although augmenting rational models with cognitive constraints is long overdue, the emotional system – our innately evaluative “affective” constraints – is missing from the model. Factoring in the informational nature of emotional perception, its explicit self-regulatory functional logic, and the predictable pitfalls of its hardwired behavioral responses (including a maladaptive form of “identity management”) can offer dramatic enhancements.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001511
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Cognitively bounded rational analyses and the crucial role of theories of
           subjective utility
    • Authors: Richard L. Lewis; Andrew Howes
      Abstract: We agree that combining rational analysis with cognitive bounds, what we previously introduced as Cognitively Bounded Rational Analysis, is a promising and under-used methodology in psychology. We further situate the framework in the literature, and highlight the important issue of a theory of subjective utility, which is not addressed sufficiently clearly in the framework or related previous work.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001729
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Multiple conceptions of resource rationality
    • Authors: Wei Ji Ma; Michael Woodford
      Abstract: Resource rationality holds great promise as a unifying principle across theories in neuroscience, cognitive science, and economics. The target article clearly lays out this potential for unification. However, resource-rational models are more diverse and less easily unified than might appear from the target article. Here, we explore some of that diversity.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001754
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Can resources save rationality' “Anti-Bayesian” updating
           in cognition and perception
    • Authors: Eric Mandelbaum; Isabel Won, Steven Gross, Chaz Firestone
      Abstract: Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should' We present two phenomena – belief polarization and the size-weight illusion – that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them'
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001717
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Towards a quantum-like cognitive architecture for decision-making
    • Authors: Catarina Moreira; Lauren Fell, Shahram Dehdashti, Peter Bruza, Andreas Wichert
      Abstract: We propose an alternative and unifying framework for decision-making that, by using quantum mechanics, provides more generalised cognitive and decision models with the ability to represent more information compared to classical models. This framework can accommodate and predict several cognitive biases reported in Lieder & Griffiths without heavy reliance on heuristics or on assumptions of the computational resources of the mind.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001687
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Opportunities and challenges integrating resource-rational analysis with
           developmental perspectives
    • Authors: Kimele Persaud; Ilona Bass, Joseph Colantonio, Carla Macias, Elizabeth Bonawitz
      Abstract: Lieder and Griffiths present the computational framework “resource-rational analysis” to address the reverse-engineering problem in cognition. Here we discuss how developmental psychology affords a unique and critical opportunity to employ this framework, but which is overlooked in this piece. We describe how developmental change provides an avenue for ongoing work as well as inspiration for expansion of the resource-rational approach.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001560
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Resource-rational analysis versus resource-rational humans
    • Authors: Dobromir Rahnev
      Abstract: Lieder and Griffiths advocate for resource-rational analysis as a methodological device employed by the experimenter. However, at times this methodological device appears to morph into the substantive claim that humans are actually resource-rational. Such morphing is problematic; the methodological approach used by the experimenter and claims about the nature of human behavior ought to be kept completely separate.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001699
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Resource-rationality and dynamic coupling of brains and social
    • Authors: Don Ross
      Abstract: Leider and Griffiths clarify the basis for unification between mechanism-driven and solution-driven disciplines and methodologies in cognitive science. But, two outstanding issues arise for their model of resource-rationality: human brains co-process information with their environments, rather than merely adapt to them; and this is expressed in methodological differences between disciplines that complicate Leider and Griffiths’ proposed structural unification.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900150X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Opportunities for emotion and mental health research in the
           resource-rationality framework
    • Authors: Evan M. Russek; Rani Moran, Daniel McNamee, Andrea Reiter, Yunzhe Liu, Raymond J. Dolan, Quentin J.M. Huys
      Abstract: We discuss opportunities in applying the resource-rationality framework toward answering questions in emotion and mental health research. These opportunities rely on characterization of individual differences in cognitive strategies; an endeavor that may be at odds with the normative approach outlined in the target article. We consider ways individual differences might enter the framework and the translational opportunities offered by each.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001663
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Sampling as a resource-rational constraint
    • Authors: Adam N. Sanborn; Jianqiao Zhu, Jake Spicer, Nick Chater
      Abstract: Resource rationality is useful for choosing between models with the same cognitive constraints but cannot settle fundamental disagreements about what those constraints are. We argue that sampling is an especially compelling constraint, as optimizing accumulation of evidence or hypotheses minimizes the cost of time, and there are well-established models for doing so which have had tremendous success explaining human behavior.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001584
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • The evolutionary foundations of resource-rational analysis
    • Authors: Armin W. Schulz
      Abstract: Resource-rational analysis would profit from being integrated more explicitly with an evolutionary psychological perspective. In particular, by taking more strongly into consideration the fact that efficiency considerations are a key driver of the evolution of human and animal minds, it becomes clearer: (1) why it is reasonable to assume that cognitive mechanisms trade-off accuracy against effort, (2) how this trade-off occurs, and (3) how to overcome some of the challenges of resource-rational analysis.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900164X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Representing utility and deploying the body
    • Authors: David Spurrett
      Abstract: Comprehensive accounts of resource-rational attempts to maximise utility shouldn't ignore the demands of constructing utility representations. This can be onerous when, as in humans, there are many rewarding modalities. Another thing best not ignored is the processing demands of making functional activity out of the many degrees of freedom of a body. The target article is almost silent on both.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001602
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • What is the purpose of cognition'
    • Authors: Aba Szollosi; Ben R. Newell
      Abstract: The purpose of human cognition depends on the problem people try to solve. Defining the purpose is difficult, because people seem capable of representing problems in an infinite number of ways. The way in which the function of cognition develops needs to be central to our theories.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001626
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Beginning with biology: “Aspects of cognition” exist in the service of
           the brain's overall function as a resource-regulator
    • Authors: Jordan E. Theriault; Matt Coleman, Mallory J. Feldman, Joseph D. Fridman, Eli Sennesh, Lisa Feldman Barrett, Karen S. Quigley
      Abstract: Lieder and Griffiths rightly urge that computational cognitive models be constrained by resource usage, but they should go further. The brain's primary function is to regulate resource usage. As a consequence, resource usage should not simply select among algorithmic models of “aspects of cognition.” Rather, “aspects of cognition” should be understood as existing in the service of resource management.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001705
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Advancing rational analysis to the algorithmic level
    • Authors: Falk Lieder; Thomas L. Griffiths
      Abstract: The commentaries raised questions about normativity, human rationality, cognitive architectures, cognitive constraints, and the scope or resource rational analysis (RRA). We respond to these questions and clarify that RRA is a methodological advance that extends the scope of rational modeling to understanding cognitive processes, why they differ between people, why they change over time, and how they could be improved.
      PubDate: 2020-03-11T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19002012
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2020)
  • Thinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and
    • Authors: Samuel P. L. Veissière; Axel Constant, Maxwell J. D. Ramstead, Karl J. Friston, Laurence J. Kirmayer
      Abstract: The processes underwriting the acquisition of culture remain unclear. How are shared habits, norms, and expectations learned and maintained with precision and reliability across large-scale sociocultural ensembles' Is there a unifying account of the mechanisms involved in the acquisition of culture' Notions such as “shared expectations,” the “selective patterning of attention and behaviour,” “cultural evolution,” “cultural inheritance,” and “implicit learning” are the main candidates to underpin a unifying account of cognition and the acquisition of culture; however, their interactions require greater specification and clarification. In this article, we integrate these candidates using the variational (free-energy) approach to human cognition and culture in theoretical neuroscience. We describe the construction by humans of social niches that afford epistemic resources called cultural affordances. We argue that human agents learn the shared habits, norms, and expectations of their culture through immersive participation in patterned cultural practices that selectively pattern attention and behaviour. We call this process “thinking through other minds” (TTOM) – in effect, the process of inferring other agents’ expectations about the world and how to behave in social context. We argue that for humans, information from and about other people's expectations constitutes the primary domain of statistical regularities that humans leverage to predict and organize behaviour. The integrative model we offer has implications that can advance theories of cognition, enculturation, adaptation, and psychopathology. Crucially, this formal (variational) treatment seeks to resolve key debates in current cognitive science, such as the distinction between internalist and externalist accounts of theory of mind abilities and the more fundamental distinction between dynamical and representational accounts of enactivism.
      PubDate: 2019-05-30T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001213
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2019)
  • The moral psychology of obligation
    • Authors: Michael Tomasello
      Abstract: Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the sense of obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key features: First, it has a peremptory, demanding force, with a kind of coercive quality, and second, it is often tied to agreement-like social interactions (e.g., promises) in which breaches prompt normative protest, on the one side, and apologies, excuses, justifications, and guilt on the other. Drawing on empirical research in comparative and developmental psychology, I provide here a psychological foundation for these unique features by showing that the human sense of obligation is intimately connected developmentally with the formation of a shared agent “we,” which not only directs collaborative efforts but also self-regulates them. Thus, children's sense of obligation is first evident inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner, and it is later evident in attitudes toward in-group, but not out-group, members connected by collective agency. When you and I voluntarily place our fate in one another's hands in interdependent collaboration – scaled up to our lives together in an interdependent cultural group – this transforms the instrumental pressure that individuals feel when pursuing individual goals into the pressure that “we” put on me (who needs to preserve my cooperative identity in this “we”) to live up to our shared expectations: a we > me self-regulation. The human sense of obligation may therefore be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.
      PubDate: 2019-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001742
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2019)
  • Rationalization is rational
    • Authors: Fiery Cushman
      Abstract: Rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts the beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. Then, people often adjust their own beliefs and desires to match the concocted ones. While many studies demonstrate rationalization, and a few theories describe its underlying cognitive mechanisms, we have little understanding of its function. Why is the mind designed to construct post hoc rationalizations of its behavior, and then to adopt them' This may accomplish an important task: transferring information between the different kinds of processes and representations that influence our behavior. Human decision making does not rely on a single process; it is influenced by reason, habit, instinct, norms, and so on. Several of these influences are not organized according to rational choice (i.e., computing and maximizing expected value). Rationalization extracts implicit information – true beliefs and useful desires – from the influence of these non-rational systems on behavior. This is a useful fiction – fiction, because it imputes reason to non-rational psychological processes; useful, because it can improve subsequent reasoning. More generally, rationalization belongs to the broader class of representational exchange mechanisms, which transfer information between many different kinds of psychological representations that guide our behavior. Representational exchange enables us to represent any information in the manner best suited to the particular tasks that require it, balancing accuracy, efficiency, and flexibility in thought. The theory of representational exchange reveals connections between rationalization and theory of mind, inverse reinforcement learning, thought experiments, and reflective equilibrium.
      PubDate: 2019-05-28T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X19001730
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2019)
  • Resource-rational analysis: Understanding human cognition as the optimal
           use of limited computational resources
    • Authors: Falk Lieder; Thomas L. Griffiths
      Abstract: Modeling human cognition is challenging because there are infinitely many mechanisms that can generate any given observation. Some researchers address this by constraining the hypothesis space through assumptions about what the human mind can and cannot do, while others constrain it through principles of rationality and adaptation. Recent work in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and linguistics has begun to integrate both approaches by augmenting rational models with cognitive constraints, incorporating rational principles into cognitive architectures, and applying optimality principles to understanding neural representations. We identify the rational use of limited resources as a unifying principle underlying these diverse approaches, expressing it in a new cognitive modeling paradigm called resource-rational analysis. The integration of rational principles with realistic cognitive constraints makes resource-rational analysis a promising framework for reverse-engineering cognitive mechanisms and representations. It has already shed new light on the debate about human rationality and can be leveraged to revisit classic questions of cognitive psychology within a principled computational framework. We demonstrate that resource-rational models can reconcile the mind's most impressive cognitive skills with people's ostensive irrationality. Resource-rational analysis also provides a new way to connect psychological theory more deeply with artificial intelligence, economics, neuroscience, and linguistics.
      PubDate: 2019-02-04T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1900061X
      Issue No: Vol. 43 (2019)
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
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