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Publisher: Cambridge University Press   (Total: 372 journals)

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Showing 1 - 200 of 372 Journals sorted alphabetically
Acta Neuropsychiatrica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.733, CiteScore: 2)
Acta Numerica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 6.709, CiteScore: 10)
Advances in Animal Biosciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Advances in Applied Mathematics and Mechanics     Full-text available via subscription   (SJR: 0.441, CiteScore: 1)
Aeronautical J., The     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Africa     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.582, CiteScore: 1)
African Studies Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18, SJR: 0.437, CiteScore: 1)
Ageing & Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40, SJR: 0.756, CiteScore: 2)
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review     Open Access   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.414, CiteScore: 1)
AI EDAM     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.375, CiteScore: 1)
AJS Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.128, CiteScore: 0)
American Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 274, SJR: 5.587, CiteScore: 4)
Anatolian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.528, CiteScore: 1)
Ancient Mesoamerica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.478, CiteScore: 1)
Anglo-Saxon England     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35, SJR: 0.1, CiteScore: 0)
animal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.842, CiteScore: 2)
Animal Health Research Reviews     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.69, CiteScore: 2)
Animal Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Annals of Actuarial Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Annual of the British School at Athens     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.177, CiteScore: 0)
Annual Review of Applied Linguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37, SJR: 3.223, CiteScore: 4)
Antarctic Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.643, CiteScore: 1)
Antichthon     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Antiquaries J., The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.106, CiteScore: 0)
Antiquity     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31)
ANZIAM J.     Open Access   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.216, CiteScore: 0)
Applied Psycholinguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22, SJR: 0.945, CiteScore: 2)
APSIPA Transactions on Signal and Information Processing     Open Access   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.404, CiteScore: 2)
Arabic Sciences and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Arbor Clinical Nutrition Updates     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Archaeological Dialogues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38, SJR: 0.898, CiteScore: 1)
Archaeological Reports     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.128, CiteScore: 0)
arq: Architectural Research Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.123, CiteScore: 0)
Asian J. of Comparative Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.129, CiteScore: 0)
Asian J. of Intl. Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.135, CiteScore: 0)
Asian J. of Law and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.195, CiteScore: 0)
Astin Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.878, CiteScore: 1)
Australasian J. of Organisational Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.154, CiteScore: 1)
Australasian J. of Special Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.187, CiteScore: 0)
Australian J. of Environmental Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.403, CiteScore: 1)
Australian J. of Indigenous Education, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.26, CiteScore: 1)
Australian J. of Rehabilitation Counseling     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.144, CiteScore: 0)
Austrian History Yearbook     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.161, CiteScore: 0)
Behavioral and Brain Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35, SJR: 0.595, CiteScore: 1)
Behaviour Change     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.508, CiteScore: 1)
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 143, SJR: 0.976, CiteScore: 2)
Bilingualism: Language and Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38, SJR: 1.446, CiteScore: 2)
Biofilms     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Bird Conservation Intl.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.581, CiteScore: 1)
BJPsych Advances     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 54, SJR: 0.275, CiteScore: 0)
BJPsych Intl.     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
BJPsych Open     Open Access  
Brain Impairment     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.321, CiteScore: 1)
Breast Cancer Online     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Britannia     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7, SJR: 0.111, CiteScore: 0)
British Actuarial J.     Full-text available via subscription  
British Catholic History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.133, CiteScore: 1)
British J. for the History of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.235, CiteScore: 0)
British J. of Anaesthetic and Recovery Nursing     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
British J. of Music Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.564, CiteScore: 1)
British J. Of Nutrition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 78, SJR: 1.612, CiteScore: 4)
British J. of Political Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 173, SJR: 4.661, CiteScore: 4)
British J. of Psychiatry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 195, SJR: 2.844, CiteScore: 3)
Bulletin of Entomological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.805, CiteScore: 2)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.555, CiteScore: 1)
Bulletin of the Australian Mathematical Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.44, CiteScore: 0)
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.146, CiteScore: 0)
Business and Human Rights J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.536, CiteScore: 1)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14, SJR: 1.098, CiteScore: 2)
Business History Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15, SJR: 0.347, CiteScore: 1)
Cambridge Archaeological J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 132, SJR: 1.121, CiteScore: 1)
Cambridge Classical J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Cambridge J. of Postcolonial Literary Inquiry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Cambridge Law J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 168, SJR: 0.213, CiteScore: 0)
Cambridge Opera J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.14, CiteScore: 0)
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.299, CiteScore: 1)
Camden Fifth Series     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Canadian Entomologist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.482, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. of Emergency Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.624, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. of Law & Jurisprudence     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.237, CiteScore: 0)
Canadian J. of Law and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.259, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. of Neurological Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (SJR: 0.549, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 23, SJR: 0.385, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian J. on Aging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.426, CiteScore: 1)
Canadian Yearbook of Intl. Law / Annuaire canadien de droit international     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Cardiology in the Young     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 33, SJR: 0.372, CiteScore: 1)
Central European History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 30, SJR: 0.159, CiteScore: 0)
Children Australia     Partially Free   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.255, CiteScore: 0)
China Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52, SJR: 2.289, CiteScore: 3)
Chinese J. of Agricultural Biotechnology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 72, SJR: 0.106, CiteScore: 0)
Classical Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 32, SJR: 0.204, CiteScore: 0)
Classical Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 27)
CNS Spectrums     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.391, CiteScore: 3)
Cognitive Behaviour Therapist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Combinatorics, Probability and Computing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.839, CiteScore: 1)
Communications in Computational Physics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.048, CiteScore: 2)
Comparative Studies in Society and History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 47, SJR: 0.585, CiteScore: 1)
Compositio Mathematica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1, SJR: 3.139, CiteScore: 1)
Contemporary European History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26, SJR: 0.263, CiteScore: 1)
Continuity and Change     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.107, CiteScore: 0)
Dance Research J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.211, CiteScore: 0)
Development and Psychopathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 2.068, CiteScore: 4)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.156, CiteScore: 0)
Diamond Light Source Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription  
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.471, CiteScore: 1)
Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.561, CiteScore: 1)
Early China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Early Music History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
Earth and Environmental Science Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
East Asian J. on Applied Mathematics     Full-text available via subscription   (SJR: 0.418, CiteScore: 1)
Ecclesiastical Law J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.114, CiteScore: 0)
Econometric Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 2.915, CiteScore: 1)
Economics and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.622, CiteScore: 1)
Edinburgh J. of Botany     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.283, CiteScore: 1)
Eighteenth-Century Music     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11, SJR: 0.113, CiteScore: 0)
English Language and Linguistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.52, CiteScore: 1)
English Profile J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
English Today     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.279, CiteScore: 0)
Enterprise & Society : The Intl. J. of Business History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.245, CiteScore: 1)
Environment and Development Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 35, SJR: 0.617, CiteScore: 1)
Environmental Conservation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 60, SJR: 1.028, CiteScore: 2)
Environmental Practice     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.145, CiteScore: 0)
Epidemiology & Infection     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 1.128, CiteScore: 2)
Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.494, CiteScore: 2)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.756, CiteScore: 1)
Equine and Comparative Exercise Physiology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Ergodic Theory and Dynamical Systems     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 1.193, CiteScore: 1)
Ethics & Intl. Affairs     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.557, CiteScore: 1)
European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst)     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 34, SJR: 1.009, CiteScore: 1)
European J. of Applied Mathematics     Hybrid Journal   (SJR: 0.52, CiteScore: 1)
European J. of Sociology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 33, SJR: 0.643, CiteScore: 1)
European Political Science Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23, SJR: 1.816, CiteScore: 2)
European Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17, SJR: 0.131, CiteScore: 0)
Experimental Agriculture     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.542, CiteScore: 1)
Expert Reviews in Molecular Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 1.647, CiteScore: 4)
Fetal and Maternal Medicine Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Financial History Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 14, SJR: 0.238, CiteScore: 1)
Foreign Policy Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Forum of Mathematics, Pi     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Forum of Mathematics, Sigma     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Genetics Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4, SJR: 0.483, CiteScore: 1)
Geological Magazine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.966, CiteScore: 2)
Glasgow Mathematical J.     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.604, CiteScore: 0)
Global Constitutionalism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Global Mental Health     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Government and Opposition     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.965, CiteScore: 2)
Greece & Rome     Partially Free   (Followers: 24, SJR: 0.113, CiteScore: 0)
Hague J. on the Rule of Law     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.271, CiteScore: 1)
Harvard Theological Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 70, SJR: 0.165, CiteScore: 0)
Health Economics, Policy and Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25, SJR: 0.745, CiteScore: 1)
Hegel Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
High Power Laser Science and Engineering     Open Access   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.901, CiteScore: 3)
Historical J.     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34, SJR: 0.247, CiteScore: 1)
History in Africa     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Horizons     Partially Free   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.129, CiteScore: 0)
Industrial and Organizational Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.916, CiteScore: 1)
Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 36, SJR: 1.97, CiteScore: 3)
Intl. & Comparative Law Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 215, SJR: 0.369, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Asian Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.143, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. J. of Astrobiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.548, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Cultural Property     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.253, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Disability Management Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.105, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. J. of Law in Context     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16, SJR: 0.275, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Legal Information     Open Access   (Followers: 289)
Intl. J. of Microwave and Wireless Technologies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.184, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Middle East Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 68, SJR: 0.434, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. J. of Technology Assessment in Health Care     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.714, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. J. of Tropical Insect Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.334, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. Labor and Working-Class History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12, SJR: 0.182, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. Organization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 95, SJR: 8.527, CiteScore: 5)
Intl. Psychogeriatrics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12, SJR: 1.048, CiteScore: 2)
Intl. Review of Social History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 27, SJR: 0.315, CiteScore: 1)
Intl. Review of the Red Cross     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10, SJR: 0.214, CiteScore: 0)
Intl. Theory: A J. of Intl. Politics, Law and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18, SJR: 2.293, CiteScore: 2)
Iraq     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Irish Historical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5, SJR: 0.103, CiteScore: 0)
Irish J. of Psychological Medicine     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.221, CiteScore: 0)
Israel Law Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.165, CiteScore: 0)
Itinerario     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9, SJR: 0.158, CiteScore: 0)
J. of African History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 0.348, CiteScore: 1)
J. of African Law     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.113, CiteScore: 0)
J. of Agricultural and Applied Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.263, CiteScore: 1)
J. of Agricultural Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.563, CiteScore: 1)
J. of American Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20, SJR: 0.164, CiteScore: 0)
J. of Anglican Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6, SJR: 0.101, CiteScore: 0)
J. of Applied Animal Nutrition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
J. of Asian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 37, SJR: 0.591, CiteScore: 1)
J. of Benefit-Cost Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
J. of Biosocial Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 0.48, CiteScore: 1)
J. of British Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 32, SJR: 0.246, CiteScore: 0)
J. of Child Language     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21, SJR: 1.035, CiteScore: 2)
J. of Classics Teaching     Open Access  
J. of Dairy Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8, SJR: 0.573, CiteScore: 1)
J. of Demographic Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3, SJR: 1.227, CiteScore: 1)
J. of Developmental Origins of Health and Disease     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2, SJR: 0.843, CiteScore: 2)
J. of Diagnostic Radiography and Imaging     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
J. of East Asian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13, SJR: 0.59, CiteScore: 1)
J. of Ecclesiastical History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19, SJR: 0.138, CiteScore: 0)
J. of Economic History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 45, SJR: 1.82, CiteScore: 2)

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Journal Cover
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.595
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 35  
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0140-525X - ISSN (Online) 1469-1825
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [372 journals]
  • Spoiled for choice: Identifying the building blocks of folk-economic
    • Authors: Shaylene Nancekivell; Ori Friedman
      Abstract: Boyer & Petersen suggest that folk-economic beliefs result from evolved domain-specific cognitive systems concerned with social exchange. However, a major challenge for their account is that each folk-economic belief can be explained by different combinations of evolved cognitive systems. We illustrate this by offering alternative explanations for several economic beliefs they discuss.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000493
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Folk-economic beliefs: An evolutionary cognitive model
    • Authors: Pascal Boyer; Michael Bang Petersen
      Abstract: The domain of “folk-economics” consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people's political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001960
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Folk-economic beliefs as “evidential fiction”: Putting the economic
           public discourse back on track
    • Authors: Alberto Acerbi; Pier Luigi Sacco
      Abstract: Folk-economic beliefs may be regarded as “evidential fictions” that exploit the natural tendency of human cognition to organize itself in narrative form. Narrative counter-arguments are likely more effective than logical debunking. The challenge is to convey sound economic reasoning in narratively conspicuous forms – an opportunity for economics to rethink its role and agency in public discourse, in the spirit of its old classics.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000250
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Beyond market behavior: Evolved cognition and folk political economic
    • Authors: Talbot M. Andrews; Andrew W. Delton
      Abstract: Boyer & Petersen (B&P) lay out a compelling theory for folk-economic beliefs, focusing on beliefs about markets. However, societies also allocate resources through mechanisms involving power and group decision-making (e.g., voting), through the political economy. We encourage future work to keep folk political economic beliefs in mind, and sketch an example involving pollution and climate change mitigation policy.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000262
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Elaborating the role of reflection and individual differences in the study
           of folk-economic beliefs
    • Authors: Kevin Arceneaux
      Abstract: Intuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000274
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Fairness, more than any other cognitive mechanism, is what explains the
           content of folk-economic beliefs
    • Authors: Nicolas Baumard; Coralie Chevallier, Jean-Baptiste André
      Abstract: We applaud Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) article on economic folk beliefs. We believe that it is crucial for the future of democracy to identify the cognitive systems through which people form their beliefs about the working of the economy. In this commentary, we put forward the idea that, although many systems are involved, fairness is probably the main driver of folk-economic beliefs.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000286
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Not all folk-economic beliefs are best understood through our ancestral
    • Authors: Amit Bhattacharjee; Jason Dana
      Abstract: We applaud Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) approach to a fascinating topic. Their arguments against understanding folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) in terms of economic ignorance or specific biases, however, are overly pessimistic. Economic theory is the reason beliefs about such disparate phenomena are labeled “economic” and “folk.” More importantly, some FEBs are better understood by examining current rather than ancestral contexts of exchange.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000298
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Partisan elites shape citizens' economic beliefs
    • Authors: Martin Bisgaard; Rune Slothuus
      Abstract: Competition between political parties is a fundamental feature of democratic politics, but it is underplayed in the target article. We argue that a more comprehensive understanding of “folk-economic beliefs” (FEBs) must consider the ability of partisan elites to both shape citizens' economic beliefs and connect them to political choices. We review recent empirical findings supporting this theoretical perspective.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000304
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Challenges of folk-economic beliefs: Coverage, level of abstraction, and
           relation to ideology
    • Authors: Zeljka Buturovic
      Abstract: There are no clear criteria regarding what kind of beliefs should count as folk-economic beliefs (FEBs), or any way to make an exhaustive list that could be filtered through such criteria. This allows the target article authors, Boyer & Petersen, to cherry-pick FEBs, which results in the omission of some well-established FEBs. The authors do not sufficiently address a strong relationship between ideology and FEBs.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000316
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Fear of economic policies may be domain-specific, and social emotions can
           explain why
    • Authors: Avijit Chowdhury; Rongjun Yu
      Abstract: People are social animals who value social goods uniquely. In discussions about how economic policies are evaluated by the layperson, it is essential to consider how they may evoke repulsive social emotions such as disgust and anger. We propose that fear of economic policies is not general and that it is specific to items where markets tend to assault certain social values.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000328
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Homo+economicus+lost+her+mind+and+how+we+can+revive+her&rft.title=Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.issn=0140-525X&">How Homo economicus lost her mind and how we
           can revive her
    • Authors: Peter DeScioli
      Abstract: The target article by Boyer & Petersen (B&P) contributes a vital message: that people have folk economic theories that shape their thoughts and behavior in the marketplace. This message is all the more important because, in the history of economic thought, Homo economicus was increasingly stripped of mental capacities. Intuitive theories can help restore the mind of Homo economicus.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800033X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • How does “emporiophobia” develop'
    • Authors: Margaret Echelbarger; Susan A. Gelman, Charles W. Kalish
      Abstract: Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) evolutionary approach to folk-economic beliefs is insightful, with far-reaching implications. We add to their discussion by positing a complementary developmental approach to the study of “emporiophobia” – studying children whose behaviors provide insight into developmental origins. We hypothesize that emporiophobia emerges early in childhood through proximal mechanisms and propose that emporiophobia develops alongside emporiophilia.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000341
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The mind of the market: Lay beliefs about the economy as a willful,
           goal-oriented agent
    • Authors: Matthias Forstmann; Pascal Burgmer
      Abstract: We propose an extension to Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) framework for folk-economic beliefs, suggesting that certain evolutionarily acquired cognitive inference systems can cause modern humans to perceive abstract systems such as the economy as willful, goal-oriented agents. Such an anthropomorphized view, we argue, can have meaningful effects on people's moral evaluations of these agents, as well as on their political and economic behavior.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000353
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Social transmission bias and the cultural evolution of folk-economic
    • Authors: David Hirshleifer; Siew Hong Teoh
      Abstract: Evolved dispositions influence, but do not determine, how people think about economic problems. The evolutionary cognitive approach offers important insights but underweights the social transmission of ideas as a level of explanation. The need for a social explanation for the evolution of economic attitudes is evidenced, for example, by immense variations in folk-economic beliefs over time and across individuals.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000365
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • People are intuitive economists under the right conditions
    • Authors: Alan Jern
      Abstract: Boyer & Petersen (B&P) argue that a “rudimentary exchange psychology” is responsible for many of people's folk-economic beliefs that are at odds with the consensus views of economists. However, they focus primarily on macroeconomic beliefs. I argue that the same rudimentary exchange psychology could be expected to produce fairly accurate microeconomic intuitions. Existing evidence supports this prediction.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000377
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Why do people believe in a zero-sum economy'
    • Authors: Samuel G. B. Johnson
      Abstract: Zero-sum thinking and aversion to trade pervade our society, yet fly in the face of everyday experience and the consensus of economists. Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) evolutionary model invokes coalitional psychology to explain these puzzling intuitions. I raise several empirical challenges to this explanation, proposing two alternative mechanisms – intuitive mercantilism (assigning value to money rather than goods) and errors in perspective-taking.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000389
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Does evolutionary cognitive psychology crowd out the better angels of our
    • Authors: Cindy D. Kam
      Abstract: Although Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) target article provides an exciting framework for political communication studies of framing effects, I raise questions concerning the presumed importance of folk-economic beliefs, the relative utility of identifying such proximate (as opposed to more generalized) drivers of public opinion, and the extent to which their model can explain variability among individuals. I conclude with thoughts on the normative implications of the evolutionary cognitive model for democratic governance.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000390
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Broadening the role of “self-interest” in folk-economic
    • Authors: Mia Karabegović; Amanda Rotella, Pat Barclay
      Abstract: We extend Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) model of folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) by suggesting FEBs serve self-interest (broadly defined), which includes indirect benefits such as creating alliances, advancing self-beneficial ideologies, and signaling one's traits. By expanding the definition of self-interest, the model can predict who will hold what FEBs, which FEBs will propagate, when they will change, why, and in which direction.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000407
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • A grounded cognition perspective on folk-economic beliefs
    • Authors: Spike W. S. Lee; Norbert Schwarz
      Abstract: Thought about abstract concepts is grounded in more concrete physical experiences. Applying this grounded cognition perspective to Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) folk-economic beliefs, we highlight its implications for the activation, application, cultural acceptance, and context sensitivity of folk-economic beliefs.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000419
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Economic complexities and cognitive hurdles: Accounting for specific
           economic misconceptions without an ultimate cause
    • Authors: David Leiser; Yhonatan Shemesh
      Abstract: Do folk-economic beliefs have an ultimate cause' We argue that, in many cases, the answer is negative. Cognition is constrained in both scope (via long-term memory [LTM]) and depth (via working memory [WM]). Consequently, laypeople are challenged by concepts essential for understanding complex systems, economics included: aggregation, indirect causation, and equilibrium. We discuss several economic misconceptions arising from this acute mismatch.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000420
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Understanding the development of folk-economic beliefs
    • Authors: Zoe Liberman; Katherine D. Kinzler
      Abstract: Developmental psychology can shed light on (1) the intuitive systems that underlie folk-economic beliefs (FEBs), and (2) how FEBs are created and revised. Boyer & Petersen (B&P) acknowledge the first, but we argue that they do not seriously consider the second. FEBs vary across people (and within a person), and much of this variation may be explained by socialization, social context, and social learning.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000432
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • terra+incognita+of+economic+cognition+will+require+an+experimental+paradigm+that+incorporates+context&rft.title=Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.issn=0140-525X&">Mapping the terra incognita of economic cognition will require an
           experimental paradigm that incorporates context
    • Authors: Aaron D. Lightner; Edward H. Hagen
      Abstract: Researchers, including Boyer & Petersen (B&P), commonly use experimental economic studies to draw their conclusions. These studies conventionally strip away context and present participants only with abstract rules. Because context is a strictly necessary component of the decision-making process, it is not clear that inferences about high-level folk psychological concepts (e.g., rationality) can be drawn from decontextualized economic games.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000444
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Folk-economic beliefs as moral intuitions
    • Authors: Neil Malhotra
      Abstract: Although Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) cataloguing of and evolutionary explanations for folk-economic beliefs is important and valuable, the authors fail to connect their theories to existing explanations for why people do not think like economists. For instance, people often have moral intuitions akin to principles of fairness and justice that conflict with utilitarian approaches to resource allocation.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000456
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Coalitional rivalry may hurt in economic exchanges such as trade but help
           in war
    • Authors: Rose McDermott
      Abstract: Economic exchange constitutes the basis of many, but not all, aspects of human cooperation. The incentives overlap with, but remain distinct in important ways, from other fundamental aspects of cooperation, including the organization of collective violence for combat. The specific alignment of sometimes-conflicting goals helps inform the construction of political ideology.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000468
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Adding culture and context improves evolutionary theorizing about human
    • Authors: Rita Anne McNamara; Ronald Fischer
      Abstract: Boyer & Petersen (B&P) lay out an evolutionarily grounded framework to produce concrete, testable predictions about economic phenomena. We commend this step forward, but suggest the framework requires more consideration of cultural contexts that provide necessary input for cognitive systems to operate on. We discuss the role of culture when examining both evolved cognitive systems and social exchange contexts.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800047X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Developmental and cultural factors in economic beliefs
    • Authors: Helena Miton; Dan Sperber
      Abstract: Boyer & Petersen (B&P) assume that the intuitive systems underlying folk-economic beliefs (FEBs), and, in particular, emporiophobia, evolved in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA), before markets. This makes the historical development of markets puzzling. We suggest that what evolved in the EEA are templates that help children develop intuitive systems partly adjusted to their cultural environment. This helps resolve the puzzle.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000481
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Folk-economics: Inherited biases or misapplication of everyday
    • Authors: Don Ross
      Abstract: Evidence for an EEA-derived domain-specific inference system must point to an active, latent representational structure. Otherwise we need to hypothesize only passive, virtual belief not over-ridden on the basis of the individual's experience. The folk economic beliefs identified by Boyer & Petersen (B&P), being with one exception about macroeconomics, might be virtual beliefs that people extrapolate across the micro–macro scale shift based on their experiences with markets.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800050X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Zero-sum thinking and economic policy
    • Authors: Paul H. Rubin
      Abstract: A main tenet of folk economics is the assumption that the world is zero-sum. Many implications stem from this assumption. These include: beliefs regarding taxation; beliefs regarding economic regulation; beliefs regarding inequality; and the core of Marxist economics. Zero-sum folk economic thinking is short-term and deals with distribution; standard economic thinking deals with the size of the pie and is longer-term.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000511
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The challenge of accounting for individual differences in folk-economic
    • Authors: Benjamin C. Ruisch; Rajen A. Anderson, David A. Pizarro
      Abstract: We argue that existing data on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) present challenges to Boyer & Petersen's model. Specifically, the widespread individual variation in endorsement of FEBs casts doubt on the claim that humans are evolutionarily predisposed towards particular economic beliefs. Additionally, the authors' model cannot account for the systematic covariance between certain FEBs, such as those observed in distinct political ideologies.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000523
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • A theory of how evolved psychology underpins attitudes towards societal
           economics must go beyond exchanges and averages
    • Authors: Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington; Lotte Thomsen
      Abstract: We applaud Boyer & Petersen for the advancement of an ultimate explanation of the dynamics of folk-economic beliefs and the political actions linked to them. To our mind, however, key inference systems regulating societal interaction and resource distribution evolved for more core relations than those of proportionate exchange, and situational factors are not the only constraints on how such systems produce economic beliefs
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000535
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Evolutionary model of folk economics: That which is seen, and that which
           is not seen'
    • Authors: Dan Stastny; Petr Houdek
      Abstract: Although Boyer & Petersen (B&P) make the case for evolutionary roots of folk economics stronger, their evolutionary model ultimately does not deliver folk-economic explanations that are both novel and correct. We argue that (a) most current explanations are evolutionary already; (b) B&P's model is as ad hoc as other theories, and proves too much; and (c) it overrates evolution at the cost of discounting other crucial factors.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000547
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Why do people think that others should earn this or that'
    • Authors: Daniel Sznycer; Elsa Ermer, John Tooby
      Abstract: Some questions, such as when a statistical distribution of incomes becomes too unequal, seem highly attention-grabbing, inferentially productive, and morally vexing. Yet many other questions that are crucial to the functioning of a modern economy seem uninteresting non-issues. An evolutionary–psychological framework to study folk-economic beliefs has the potential to illuminate this puzzle.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000559
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Do the folk actually hold folk-economic beliefs'
    • Authors: Ben M. Tappin; Robert Ross, Ryan T. McKay
      Abstract: Boyer & Petersen (B&P) argue that folk-economic beliefs are widespread – shaped by evolved cognitive systems – and they offer exemplar beliefs to illustrate their thesis. In this commentary, we highlight evidence of substantial variation in one of these exemplars: beliefs about immigration. Contra claims by B&P, we argue that the balance of this evidence suggests the “folk” may actually hold positive beliefs about the economic impact of immigration.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000560
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • What is seen and what is not seen in the economy: An effect of our evolved
    • Authors: Pascal Boyer; Michael Bang Petersen
      Abstract: Specific features of our evolved cognitive architecture explain why some aspects of the economy are “seen” and others are “not seen.” Drawing from the commentaries of economists, psychologists, and other social scientists on our original proposal, we propose a more precise model of the acquisition and spread of folk-beliefs about the economy. In particular, we try to provide a clearer delimitation of the field of folk-economic beliefs (sect. R2) and to dispel possible misunderstandings of the role of variation in evolutionary psychology (sect. R3). We also comment on the difficulty of explaining folk-economic beliefs in terms of domain-general processes or biases (sect. R4), as developmental studies show how encounters with specific environments calibrate domain-specific systems (sect. R5). We offer a more detailed description of the connections between economic beliefs and political psychology (sect. R6) and of the probable causes of individual variation in that domain (sect. R7). Taken together, these arguments point to a better integration or consilience between economics and human evolution (sect. R8).
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000985
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Making replication mainstream
    • Authors: Rolf A. Zwaan; Alexander Etz, Richard E. Lucas, M. Brent Donnellan
      Abstract: Many philosophers of science and methodologists have argued that the ability to repeat studies and obtain similar results is an essential component of science. A finding is elevated from single observation to scientific evidence when the procedures that were used to obtain it can be reproduced and the finding itself can be replicated. Recent replication attempts show that some high profile results – most notably in psychology, but in many other disciplines as well – cannot be replicated consistently. These replication attempts have generated a considerable amount of controversy, and the issue of whether direct replications have value has, in particular, proven to be contentious. However, much of this discussion has occurred in published commentaries and social media outlets, resulting in a fragmented discourse. To address the need for an integrative summary, we review various types of replication studies and then discuss the most commonly voiced concerns about direct replication. We provide detailed responses to these concerns and consider different statistical ways to evaluate replications. We conclude there are no theoretical or statistical obstacles to making direct replication a routine aspect of psychological science.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001972
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • If we accept that poor replication rates are mainstream
    • Authors: David M. Alexander; Pieter Moors
      Abstract: We agree with the authors' arguments to make replication mainstream but contend that the poor replication record is symptomatic of a pre-paradigmatic science. Reliable replication in psychology requires abandoning group-level p-value testing in favor of real-time predictions of behaviors, mental and brain events. We argue for an approach based on analysis of boundary conditions where measurement is closely motivated by theory.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000572
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Replications can cause distorted belief in scientific progress
    • Authors: Michał Białek
      Abstract: If we want psychological science to have a meaningful real-world impact, it has to be trusted by the public. Scientific progress is noisy; accordingly, replications sometimes fail even for true findings. We need to communicate the acceptability of uncertainty to the public and our peers, to prevent psychology from being perceived as having nothing to say about reality.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000584
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Strong scientific theorizing is needed to improve replicability in
           psychological science
    • Authors: Timothy Carsel; Alexander P. Demos, Matt Motyl
      Abstract: The target article makes the important case for making replicability mainstream. Yet, their proposal targets a symptom, rather than the underlying cause of low replication rates. We argue that psychological scientists need to devise stronger theories that are more clearly falsifiable. Without strong, falsifiable theories in the original research, attempts to replicate the original research are nigh uninterpretable.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800078X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The costs and benefits of replication studies
    • Authors: Nicholas A. Coles; Leonid Tiokhin, Anne M. Scheel, Peder M. Isager, Daniël Lakens
      Abstract: The debate about whether replication studies should become mainstream is essentially driven by disagreements about their costs and benefits and the best ways to allocate limited resources. Determining when replications are worthwhile requires quantifying their expected utility. We argue that a formalized framework for such evaluations can be useful for both individual decision-making and collective discussions about replication.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000596
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The meaning of a claim is its reproducibility
    • Authors: Jan P. de Ruiter
      Abstract: A scientific claim is a generalization based on a reported statistically significant effect. The reproducibility of that claim is its scientific meaning. Anything not explicitly mentioned in a scientific claim as a limitation of the claim's scope means that it implicitly generalizes over these unmentioned aspects. Hence, so-called “conceptual” replications that differ in these unmentioned aspects from the original study are legitimate, and necessary to test the generalization implied by the original study's claim.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000602
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • To make innovations such as replication mainstream, publish them in
           mainstream journals
    • Authors: Boris Egloff
      Abstract: It was a pleasure to read Zwaan et al.'s wise and balanced target article. Here, I use it as a shining example for bolstering the argument that to make innovations such as replication mainstream, it seems advisable to move the debates from social media to respected “mainstream” psychology journals. Only then will mainstream psychologists be reached and, we hope, convinced.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000614
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • A pragmatist philosophy of psychological science and its implications for
    • Authors: Ana Gantman; Robin Gomila, Joel E. Martinez, J. Nathan Matias, Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Jordan Starck, Sherry Wu, Nechumi Yaffe
      Abstract: A pragmatist philosophy of psychological science offers to the direct replication debate concrete recommendations and novel benefits that are not discussed in Zwaan et al. This philosophy guides our work as field experimentalists interested in behavioral measurement. Furthermore, all psychologists can relate to its ultimate aim set out by William James: to study mental processes that provide explanations for why people behave as they do in the world.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000626
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Don't characterize replications as successes or failures
    • Authors: Andrew Gelman
      Abstract: No replication is truly direct, and I recommend moving away from the classification of replications as “direct” or “conceptual” to a framework in which we accept that treatment effects vary across conditions. Relatedly, we should stop labeling replications as successes or failures and instead use continuous measures to compare different studies, again using meta-analysis of raw data where possible.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000638
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Three ways to make replication mainstream
    • Authors: Morton Ann Gernsbacher
      Abstract: Zwaan et al. argue convincingly that replication needs to be more mainstream. Here, I suggest three practices for achieving that goal: Incremental Replications, which are built into each experiment in a series of experiments; Reciprocal Replications, which are reciprocal arrangements of co-replications across labs; and Didactic Replications, which are replications used for training.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800064X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Three strong moves to improve research and replications alike
    • Authors: Roger Giner-Sorolla; David M. Amodio, Gerben A. van Kleef
      Abstract: We suggest three additional improvements to replication practices. First, original research should include concrete checks on validity, encouraged by editorial standards. Second, the reasons for replicating a particular study should be more transparent and balance systematic positive reasons with selective negative ones. Third, methodological validity should also be factored into evaluating replications, with methodologically inconclusive replications not counted as non-replications.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000651
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Making replication prestigious
    • Authors: Krzysztof J. Gorgolewski; Thomas Nichols, David N. Kennedy, Jean-Baptiste Poline, Russell A. Poldrack
      Abstract: Making replication studies widely conducted and published requires new incentives. Academic awards can provide such incentives by highlighting the best and most important replications. The Organization for Human Brain Mapping (OHBM) has led such efforts by recently introducing the OHBM Replication Award. Other communities can adopt this approach to promote replications and reduce career cost for researchers performing them.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000663
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • A Bayesian decision-making framework for replication
    • Authors: Tom E. Hardwicke; Michael Henry Tessler, Benjamin N. Peloquin, Michael C. Frank
      Abstract: Replication is the cornerstone of science – but when and why' Not all studies need replication, especially when resources are limited. We propose that a decision-making framework based on Bayesian philosophy of science provides a basis for choosing which studies to replicate.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000675
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Putting replication in its place
    • Authors: Evan Heit; Caren M. Rotello
      Abstract: Direct replication is valuable but should not be elevated over other worthwhile research practices, including conceptual replication and checking of statistical assumptions. As noted by Rotello et al. (2015), replicating studies without checking the statistical assumptions can lead to increased confidence in incorrect conclusions. Finally, successful replications should not be elevated over failed replications, given that both are informative.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000687
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Bayesian belief updating after a replication experiment
    • Authors: Alex O. Holcombe; Samuel J. Gershman
      Abstract: Zwaan et al. and others discuss the importance of the inevitable differences between a replication experiment and the corresponding original experiment. But these discussions are not informed by a principled, quantitative framework for taking differences into account. Bayesian confirmation theory provides such a framework. It will not entirely solve the problem, but it will lead to new insights.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000699
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • An argument for how (and why) to incentivise replication
    • Authors: Piers D. L. Howe; Amy Perfors
      Abstract: Although Zwaan et al. (2018) have made a compelling case as to why direct replications should occur more frequently than they do, they do not address how such replications attempts can best be encouraged. We propose a novel method for incentivising replication attempts and discuss some issues surrounding its implementation.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000705
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • How to make replications mainstream
    • Authors: Hans IJzerman; Jon Grahe, Mark J. Brandt
      Abstract: Zwaan et al. integrated previous articles to promote making replications mainstream. We wholeheartedly agree. We extend their discussion by highlighting several existing initiatives – the Replication Recipe and the Collaborative Education and Research Project (CREP) - which aim to make replications mainstream. We hope this exchange further stimulates making replications mainstream.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000717
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Why replication has more scientific value than original discovery
    • Authors: John P. A. Ioannidis
      Abstract: The presumed dominance of “original discovery” over replication is an anomaly. Original discovery has more value than replication primarily when scientific investigation can immediately generate numerous discoveries most of which are true and accurate. This scenario is uncommon. A model shows how original discovery claims typically have small or even negative value. Science becomes worthy mostly because of replication.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000729
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Introducing a replication-first rule for Ph.D. projects
    • Authors: Arnold R. Kochari; Markus Ostarek
      Abstract: Zwaan et al. mention that young researchers should conduct replications as a small part of their portfolio. We extend this proposal and suggest that conducting and reporting replications should become an integral part of Ph.D. projects and be taken into account in their assessment. We discuss how this would help not only scientific advancement, but also Ph.D. candidates' careers.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000730
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Selecting target papers for replication
    • Authors: Anton Kuehberger; Michael Schulte-Mecklenbeck
      Abstract: Randomness in the selection process of to-be-replicated target papers is critical for replication success or failure. If target papers are chosen because of the ease of doing a replication, or because replicators doubt the reported findings, replications are likely to fail. To date, the selection of replication targets is biased.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000742
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Direct replication and clinical psychological science
    • Authors: Scott O. Lilienfeld
      Abstract: Zwaan et al. make a compelling case for the necessity of direct replication in psychological science. I build on their arguments by underscoring the necessity of direct implication for two domains of clinical psychological science: the evaluation of psychotherapy outcome and the construct validity of psychological measures.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000754
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • N+designs&rft.title=Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.issn=0140-525X&">Replication is already mainstream: Lessons from small-       class="italic">N designs
    • Authors: Daniel R. Little; Philip L. Smith
      Abstract: Replication is already mainstream in areas of psychology that use small-N designs. Replication failures often result from weak theory, weak measurement, and weak control over error variance. These are hallmarks of phenomenon-based research with sparse data. Small-N designs, which focus on understanding processes, treat the individual rather than the experiment as the unit of replication and largely circumvent these problems.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000766
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Enhancing research credibility when replication is not feasible
    • Authors: Robert J. MacCoun
      Abstract: Direct replications are not always affordable or feasible, and for some phenomena they are impossible. In such situations, methods of blinded data analysis can help minimize p-hacking and confirmation bias, increasing our confidence in a study's results.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000778
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Verify original results through reanalysis before replicating
    • Authors: Michèle B. Nuijten; Marjan Bakker, Esther Maassen, Jelte M. Wicherts
      Abstract: In determining the need to directly replicate, it is crucial to first verify the original results through independent reanalysis of the data. Original results that appear erroneous and that cannot be reproduced by reanalysis offer little evidence to begin with, thereby diminishing the need to replicate. Sharing data and scripts is essential to ensure reproducibility.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000791
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Direct replications in the era of open sampling
    • Authors: Gabriele Paolacci; Jesse Chandler
      Abstract: Data collection in psychology increasingly relies on “open populations” of participants recruited online, which presents both opportunities and challenges for replication. Reduced costs and the possibility to access the same populations allows for more informative replications. However, researchers should ensure the directness of their replications by dealing with the threats of participant nonnaiveté and selection effects.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000808
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • You are not your data
    • Authors: Gordon Pennycook
      Abstract: Scientists should, above all else, value the truth. To do this effectively, scientists should separate their identities from the data they produce. It will be easier to make replications mainstream if scientists are rewarded based on their stance toward the truth – such as when a scientist reacts positively to a failure to replicate – as opposed to a particular finding.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800081X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The importance of exact conceptual replications
    • Authors: Richard E. Petty
      Abstract: Although Zwaan et al. argue that original researchers should provide a replication recipe that provides great specificity about the operational details of one's study, I argue that it may be as important to provide a recipe that allows replicators to conduct a study that matches the original in as many conceptual details as possible (i.e., an exact conceptual replication).
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000821
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The replicability revolution
    • Authors: Ulrich Schimmack
      Abstract: Psychology is in the middle of a replicability revolution. High-profile replication studies have produced a large number of replication failures. The main reason why replication studies in psychology often fail is that original studies were selected for significance. If all studies were reported, original studies would fail to produce significant results as often as replication studies. Replications would be less contentious if original results were not selected for significance.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000833
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Constraints on generality statements are needed to define direct
    • Authors: Daniel J. Simons; Yuichi Shoda, D. Stephen Lindsay
      Abstract: Whether or not a replication attempt counts as “direct” often cannot be determined definitively after the fact as a result of flexibility in how procedural differences are interpreted. Specifying constraints on generality in original articles can eliminate ambiguity in advance, thereby leading to a more cumulative science.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000845
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • What the replication reformation wrought
    • Authors: Barbara A. Spellman; Daniel Kahneman
      Abstract: Replication failures were among the triggers of a reform movement which, in a very short time, has been enormously useful in raising standards and improving methods. As a result, the massive multilab multi-experiment replication projects have served their purpose and will die out. We describe other types of replications – both friendly and adversarial – that should continue to be beneficial.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000857
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Verifiability is a core principle of science
    • Authors: Sanjay Srivastava
      Abstract: Scientific knowledge is supposed to be verifiable. Replications promote verifiability in several ways. Most straightforwardly, replications can verify empirical claims. Replication research also promotes dissemination of information needed for other aspects of verification; creates meta-scientific knowledge about what results to treat as credible even in the absence of replications; and reinforces a broader norm of scientists checking each other's work.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000869
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • have+we+learned'+What+can+we+learn'&rft.title=Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.issn=0140-525X&">What have we learned' What can we learn'
    • Authors: Fritz Strack; Wolfgang Stroebe
      Abstract: We advocate that replications should be an integral part of the scientific discourse and provide insights about the conditions under which an effect occurs. By themselves, mere nonreplications are not informative about the “truth” of an effect. As a consequence, the mechanistic continuation of multilab replications should be replaced by diagnostic studies providing insights about the underlying causes and mechanisms.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000870
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Conceptualizing and evaluating replication across domains of behavioral
    • Authors: Jennifer L. Tackett; Blakeley B. McShane
      Abstract: We discuss the authors' conceptualization of replication, in particular the false dichotomy of direct versus conceptual replication intrinsic to it, and suggest a broader one that better generalizes to other domains of psychological research. We also discuss their approach to the evaluation of replication results and suggest moving beyond their dichotomous statistical paradigms and employing hierarchical/meta-analytic statistical models.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000882
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Making prepublication independent replication mainstream
    • Authors: Warren Tierney; Martin Schweinsberg, Eric Luis Uhlmann
      Abstract: The widespread replication of research findings in independent laboratories prior to publication is suggested as a complement to traditional replication approaches. The pre-publication independent replication approach further addresses three key concerns from replication skeptics by systematically taking context into account, reducing reputational costs for original authors and replicators, and increasing the theoretical value of failed replications.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000894
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Scientific progress is like doing a puzzle, not building a wall
    • Authors: Alexa M. Tullett; Simine Vazire
      Abstract: We contest the “building a wall” analogy of scientific progress. We argue that this analogy unfairly privileges original research (which is perceived as laying bricks and, therefore, constructive) over replication research (which is perceived as testing and removing bricks and, therefore, destructive). We propose an alternative analogy for scientific progress: solving a jigsaw puzzle.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000900
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Holding replication studies to mainstream standards of evidence
    • Authors: Duane T. Wegener; Leandre R. Fabrigar
      Abstract: Replications can make theoretical contributions, but are unlikely to do so if their findings are open to multiple interpretations (especially violations of psychometric invariance). Thus, just as studies demonstrating novel effects are often expected to empirically evaluate competing explanations, replications should be held to similar standards. Unfortunately, this is rarely done, thereby undermining the value of replication research.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000912
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Data replication matters to an underpowered study, but replicated
           hypothesis corroboration counts
    • Authors: Erich H. Witte; Frank Zenker
      Abstract: Before replication becomes mainstream, the potential for generating theoretical knowledge better be clear. Replicating statistically significant nonrandom data shows that an original study made a discovery; replicating a specified theoretical effect shows that an original study corroborated a theory. Yet only in the latter case is replication a necessary, sound, and worthwhile strategy.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000924
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Improving social and behavioral science by making replication mainstream:
           A response to commentaries
    • Authors: Rolf A. Zwaan; Alexander Etz, Richard E. Lucas, M. Brent Donnellan
      Abstract: The commentaries on our target article are insightful and constructive. There were some critical notes, but many commentaries agreed with, or even amplified our message. The first section of our response addresses comments pertaining to specific parts of the target article. The second section provides a response to the commentaries' suggestions to make replication mainstream. The final section contains concluding remarks.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000961
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The difference between ice cream and Nazis: Moral externalization and the
           evolution of human cooperation
    • Authors: P. Kyle Stanford
      Abstract: A range of empirical findings is first used to more precisely characterize our distinctive tendency to objectify or externalize moral demands and obligations, and it is then argued that this salient feature of our moral cognition represents a profound puzzle for evolutionary approaches to human moral psychology that existing proposals do not help resolve. It is then proposed that such externalization facilitated a broader shift to a vastly more cooperative form of social life by establishing and maintaining a connection between the extent to which an agent is herself motivated by a given moral norm and the extent to which she uses conformity to that same norm as a criterion in evaluating candidate partners in social interaction generally. This connection ensures the correlated interaction necessary to protect those prepared to adopt increasingly cooperative, altruistic, and other prosocial norms of interaction from exploitation, especially as such norms were applied in novel ways and/or to novel circumstances and as the rapid establishment of new norms allowed us to reap still greater rewards from hypercooperation. A wide range of empirical findings is then used to support this hypothesis, showing why the status we ascribe to moral demands and considerations exhibits the otherwise puzzling combination of objective and subjective elements that it does, as well as showing how the need to effectively advertise our externalization of particular moral commitments generates features of our social interaction so familiar that they rarely strike us as standing in need of any explanation in the first place.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001911
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Moral cues from ordinary behaviour
    • Authors: Suraiya Allidina; William A. Cunningham
      Abstract: People want to form impressions of others based on their moral behaviours, but the most diagnostic behaviours are rarely seen. Therefore, societies develop symbolic forms of moral behaviour such as conventional rituals and games, which are used to predict how others are likely to act in more serious moral situations. This framework helps explain why everyday behaviours are often moralized.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000018
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The difference between the scope of a norm and its apparent source
    • Authors: Jonathan Birch
      Abstract: We should distinguish between the apparent source of a norm and the scope of the norm's satisfaction conditions. Wide-scope social norms need not be externalised, and externalised social norms need not be wide in scope. Attending to this distinction leads to a problem for Stanford: The adaptive advantages he attributes to externalised norms are actually advantages of wide-scope norms.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800002X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The brighter the light, the deeper the shadow: Morality also fuels
           aggression, conflict, and violence
    • Authors: Robert Böhm; Isabel Thielmann, Benjamin E. Hilbig
      Abstract: We argue that, in addition to the positive effects and functionality of morality for interactions among in-group members as outlined in the target article, morality may also fuel aggression and conflict in interactions between morality-based out-groups. We summarize empirical evidence showing that negative cognitions, emotions, and behaviors are particularly likely to appear between out-groups with opposing moral convictions.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000031
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Coordination, conflict, and externalization
    • Authors: Justin P. Bruner
      Abstract: I argue that the set of moralized norms and beliefs is more expansive than Stanford appears to suggest. In particular, I contend that norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems are likely to be moralized.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000043
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Moral externalisation fails to scale
    • Authors: Carl Joseph Brusse; Kim Sterelny
      Abstract: We argue that Stanford's picture of the evolution of externalised norms is plausible mostly because of the idealisations implicit in his defence of it. Once we take into account plausible amounts of normative disagreement, plausible amounts of error and misunderstanding, and the knock-on consequences of shunning, it is plausible that Stanford under-counts the costs of externalisation.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000055
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Norms, not moral norms: The boundaries of morality do not matter
    • Authors: Taylor Davis; Daniel Kelly
      Abstract: We endorse Stanford's project, which calls attention to features of human psychology that exhibit a “puzzling combination of objective and subjective elements,” and that are central to cooperation. However, we disagree with his delineation of the explanatory target. What he calls “externalization or objectification” conflates two separate properties, neither of which can serve as the mark of the moral.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000067
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • How does moral objectification lead to correlated interactions'
    • Authors: Geoffrey P. Goodwin
      Abstract: The objectification of moral norms is purported to occur because it enables correlated interactions between individuals who share the same cooperative norms. But how does this process take place' I suggest two mechanisms beyond those Stanford identifies. I also ask whether there is predictable variation in which moral norms engender the strongest coupling between objectification and discomfort with disagreement.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000079
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Green beards and signaling: Why morality is not indispensable
    • Authors: Toby Handfield; John Thrasher, Julian García
      Abstract: We argue that although objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to explain extreme human behaviors.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000080
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Externalization is common to all value judgments, and norms are motivating
           because of their intersubjective grounding
    • Authors: Carme Isern-Mas; Antoni Gomila
      Abstract: We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000092
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • From objectivized morality to objective morality
    • Authors: Joseph Jebari; Bryce Huebner
      Abstract: Stanford holds that the externalization and objectivization of moral judgments are what sustain human cooperative lifeways. We reply that the central function of human moral psychology is to track and respond to the structural features of our social environment, and we argue that moral obligations are grounded in the relationship between individual agents and the stability of their social groups.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000109
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Moral externalization is an implausible mechanism for cooperation, let
           alone “hypercooperation”
    • Authors: Tim Johnson
      Abstract: To facilitate cooperation, moral externalization requires truthful and meticulous information about others’ moral commitments (Stanford target article, sect. 6). By definition, this information does not exist in the low-information environments where humans display their “hypercooperativeness.” Furthermore, collecting that information – if possible – entails costs that other mechanisms for correlated interaction avoid. Hence, moral externalization is an unlikely mechanism for cooperation, let alone “hypercooperation.”
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000110
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Moral externalization may precede, not follow, subjective preferences
    • Authors: Artem Kaznatcheev; Thomas R. Shultz
      Abstract: We offer four counterarguments against Stanford's dismissal of moral externalization as an ancestral condition, based on requirements for ancestral states, mismatch between theoretical and empirical games, passively correlated interactions, and social interfaces that prevent agents’ knowing game payoffs. The fact that children's externalized phenomenology precedes their discovery of subjectivized phenomenology also suggests that externalized phenomenology is an ancestral condition.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000122
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Generalization and the experience of obligations as externally imposed:
           Distinct contributors to the evolution of human cooperation
    • Authors: Elizabeth O'Neill
      Abstract: It is worth distinguishing two phenomena involved in moral externalization: the experience of moral obligations as externally imposed and the tendency to generalize moral obligations. I propose that each played a distinct role in creating the conditions under which characteristically human cooperation could evolve.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000134
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Do the folk need a meta-ethics'
    • Authors: Shivam Patel; Edouard Machery
      Abstract: Stanford argues that cooperators achieve and maintain correlated interaction through the objectification of moral norms. We first challenge the moral/non-moral distinction that frames Stanford's discussion. We then argue that to the extent that norms are objectified (and we hold that they are at most objectified in a very thin sense), it is not for the sake of achieving correlated interaction.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000146
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Is all morality or just prosociality externalized'
    • Authors: Michael J. Poulin
      Abstract: It is more likely that externalized morality that facilitated cooperation (externalized prosociality) was selected for versus other types of moral impulses. Recent research suggests that those other moral impulses may actually be at root prosocial, in that judgments about them are indirectly about avoidance of harm. Externalized prosociality may help explain why prosocial behavior benefits individuals.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000158
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Moralization of preferences and conventions and the dynamics of tribal
    • Authors: Don Ross
      Abstract: Stanford casts original light on the question of why humans moralize some preferences. However, his account leaves some ambiguity around the relationship between the evolutionary function of moralization and the dynamics of tribal formation. Does the model govern these dynamics, or only explain why there are moralizing dispositions that more conventional modeling of the dynamics can exploit'
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800016X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Externalization of moral demands does not motivate exclusion of
           non-cooperators: A defense of a subjectivist moral psychology
    • Authors: Armin W. Schulz
      Abstract: It is not clear how a moral demand alone can motivate an agent to exclude those who fail to act as the demand states. A more plausible hypothesis for the evolution of human moral cognition is based on seeing moral demands as subjective, but inherently conjunctive. This subjectivist-conjunctive proposal can still account for the apparent externalization of moral demands.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000171
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Do we really externalize or objectivize moral demands'
    • Authors: Stephen Stich
      Abstract: Stanford's goal is to explain the uniquely human tendency to externalize or objectify “distinctively moral” demands, norms, and obligations. I maintain that there is no clear phenomenon to explain. Stanford's account of which norms are distinctively moral relies on Turiel's problematic work. Stanford's justification of the claim that we “objectify” moral demands ignores recent studies indicating that often we do not.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000183
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Not as distinct as you think: Reasons to doubt that morality comprises a
           unified and objective conceptual category
    • Authors: Jordan Theriault; Liane Young
      Abstract: That morality comprises a distinct and objective conceptual category is a critical claim for Stanford's target article. We dispute this claim. Statistical conclusions about a distinct moral domain were not justified in prior work, on account of the “stimuli-as-fixed-effects” fallacy. Furthermore, we have found that, behaviorally and neurally, morals share more in common with preferences than facts.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000195
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • are+externally+imposed&rft.title=Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.issn=0140-525X&">Moral demands truly are externally imposed
    • Authors: Jan-Willem van Prooijen
      Abstract: Most moral demands indeed are externally imposed, as violations are subject to social condemnation. While in modern society objectified moral demands may serve as a cue for desirable interaction partners, human morality evolved in small tribes that offered little choice regarding with whom to cooperate. Instead, it was adaptive to objectify moral demands to avoid the costs of social exclusion.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000201
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The objectivity of moral norms is a top-down cultural construct
    • Authors: Burton Voorhees; Dwight Read, Liane Gabora
      Abstract: Encultured individuals see the behavioral rules of cultural systems of moral norms as objective. In addition to prescriptive regulation of behavior, moral norms provide templates, scripts, and scenarios regulating the expression of feelings and triggered emotions arising from perceptions of norm violation. These allow regulated defensive responses that may arise as moral idea systems co-opt emotionally associated biological survival instincts.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000213
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Disgust as a mechanism for externalization: Coordination and
    • Authors: Isaac Wiegman
      Abstract: I extend Stanford's proposal in two ways by focusing on a possible mechanism of externalization: disgust. First, I argue that externalization also has value for solving coordination problems where interests of different groups coincide. Second, Stanford's proposal also holds promise for explaining why people “over-comply” with norms through disassociation, or the avoidance of actions that merely appear to violate norms.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000225
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • A cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism
    • Authors: Jason Zinser
      Abstract: A general feature of our moral psychology is that we feel that some moral demands are motivated externally. Stanford explains this feature with an evolutionary account, such that moral externalism was selected for its ability to facilitate prosocial interactions. Alternatively, I argue that a cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism is a more parsimonious explanation.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000237
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Moral externalization and normativity: The errors of our ways
    • Authors: P. Kyle Stanford
      Abstract: I respond to the many thoughtful suggestions and concerns of my commentators on a wide variety of questions. These include whether moral norms form a unified category, whether they have a distinctive phenomenology, and/or whether moral normativity is a cultural construct; whether moral externalization is necessary for correlated interaction or human prosociality; precisely how such externalization generates correlated interactions among prosocial agents; and whether there are any convincing alternative explanations for it.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002254
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • On properly characterizing moral agency – CORRIGENDUM
    • Authors: Blaine J. Fowers; Austen R. Anderson, Samantha F. Lang
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000973
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • An unsettled debate: Key empirical and theoretical questions are still
           open – CORRIGENDUM
    • Authors: Stefano Vincini; Yuna Jhang, Eugene H. Buder, Shaun Gallagher
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1800095X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The cultural evolution of shamanism
    • Authors: Manvir Singh
      Abstract: Shamans, including medicine men, mediums, and the prophets of religious movements, recur across human societies. Shamanism also existed among nearly all documented hunter-gatherers, likely characterized the religious lives of many ancestral humans, and is often proposed by anthropologists to be the “first profession,” representing the first institutionalized division of labor beyond age and sex. In this article, I propose a cultural evolutionary theory to explain why shamanism consistently develops and, in particular, (1) why shamanic traditions exhibit recurrent features around the world; (2) why shamanism professionalizes early, often in the absence of other specialization; and (3) how shifting social conditions affect the form or existence of shamanism. According to this theory, shamanism is a set of traditions developed through cultural evolution that adapts to people's intuitions to convince observers that a practitioner can influence otherwise unpredictable, significant events. The shaman does this by ostensibly transforming during initiation and trance, violating folk intuitions of humanness to assure group members that he or she can interact with the invisible forces that control uncertain outcomes. Entry requirements for becoming a shaman persist because the practitioner's credibility depends on his or her “transforming.” This contrasts with dealing with problems that have identifiable solutions (such as building a canoe), in which credibility hinges on showing results and outsiders can invade the jurisdiction by producing the outcome. Shamanism is an ancient human institution that recurs because of the capacity of cultural evolution to produce practices adapted to innate psychological tendencies.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001893
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Increased affluence, life history theory, and the decline of shamanism
    • Authors: Nicolas Baumard
      Abstract: I applaud Singh's proposition to use evolutionary psychology to explain the recurrence of shamanistic beliefs. Here, I suggest that evolutionary mechanisms (i.e., life history theory) also can explain the variability of the distribution of shamanism. When resources are abundant, individuals become more patient and more open minded to the point that science becomes cognitively attractive and may replace magic.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001984
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Shamanism within a general theory of religious action (no cheesecake
    • Authors: Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi
      Abstract: Singh places the understanding of shamanism within the cognitive/evolutionary psychology of religion but is then sidetracked by presenting unhelpful analogies. The concepts of “superstition” as a general term for religious rituals and of “superstitious learning” as a mechanism accounting for the creation of rituals in humans reflect an underestimation of the human imagination, which is guided by cognitive/evolutionary constraints. Mentalizing, hypervigilance in agent detection, and anthropomorphism explain the behaviors involved in religious illusions (or delusions).
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001996
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Shamanism and efficacious exceptionalism
    • Authors: Aaron D. Blackwell; Benjamin Grant Purzycki
      Abstract: Shamans can have efficacy at healing through botanical remedies and in observational and advisory functions through cognitive strengths, while shamanic acts of strangeness are likely honest signals of these qualities. Given this potential for shamanic practices to have true efficacy and the capacity for honest signaling, we expect efficacy will influence the spread, persistence, and loss of shamanic practices.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700200X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Enjoying your cultural cheesecake: Why believers are sincere and shamans
           are not charlatans
    • Authors: Maarten Boudry
      Abstract: Cultural evolution explains not just when people tend to develop superstitions, but also what forms these beliefs take. Beliefs that are more resilient in the face of apparent refutations and more susceptible to occasional confirmation stand a greater chance of cultural success. This argument helps to dispel the impression that shamans are mere charlatans and believers are “faking it.”
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002011
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Missing links: The psychology and epidemiology of shamanistic beliefs
    • Authors: Pascal Boyer
      Abstract: Singh provides the skeletal elements of a possible account of shamanism-like beliefs in many human societies. To be developed into a proper theory, this model needs to be supplemented at several crucial points, in terms of anthropological evidence, psychological processes, and cultural transmission.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002023
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Some needed psychological clarifications on the experience(s) of shamanism
    • Authors: Etzel Cardeña; Stanley Krippner
      Abstract: The target article's use of core concepts is confused and excessively broad. Two main types of experiences have been described in relation to shamanism: magical flight and mediumship/possession. The first refers to visual and remembered experiences of events in other realms, the second to embodied experiences of ceding mental control and personality to a preternatural entity. These experiences grossly correspond to two main experience modalities exhibited by highly hypnotizable individuals in a secular setting.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002035
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Genetic predilections and predispositions for the development of shamanism
    • Authors: Jacob A. Fiala; Frederick L. Coolidge
      Abstract: Singh's cultural evolutionary theory of shamanism provides a valuable framework for understanding shamanism. We argue, however, that a full understanding of shamanism should incorporate the psychological predilections and genetic predispositions commonly found in individual shamans. In other words, only a small subset of individuals in a culture is prone or attracted to shamanistic practices, regardless of the evolutionary value of those practices.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002047
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The cultural evolution of war rituals
    • Authors: Luke Glowacki
      Abstract: The cultural evolutionary processes outlined by Singh illuminate why ritualized behaviors aimed at controlling unseen forces and overcoming fear are common in warfare among many small-scale societies. They also suggest an explanation for the development of ritual specialists for war who are distinct from war leaders.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002059
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Do shamans violate notions of humanness'
    • Authors: Nick Haslam
      Abstract: Singh proposes that shamans violate notions of humanness in patterned ways that signal supernatural capacities. I argue that his account, based on a notion of humanness that contrasts humans with non-human animals, does not capture people's understandings of supernatural beings. Shamanic behavior may simply violate human norms in unstructured, improvised ways rather than contrast with a coherent concept of humanness.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002060
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Biological foundations and beneficial effects of trance
    • Authors: Michael J. Hove; Johannes Stelzer
      Abstract: Singh proposes a cultural evolutionary theory of shamanic practices, including trance. We argue that cultural factors are deeply intertwined with biological aspects in shaping shamanic practices, and the underlying biology is critical. We discuss the neural underpinnings of rhythm-induced trance, how they can facilitate insight, and how altered states can promote healing.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002072
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Shamans as healers: When magical structure becomes practical function
    • Authors: Nicholas Humphrey
      Abstract: Singh's analysis has much to be said for it. When considering the treatment of illness, however, he begins from a shaky premise about uncontrollability and, so, fails to make the most of what shamanic treatments – as placebos – can deliver.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002084
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Financial alchemists and financial shamans
    • Authors: Samuel G. B. Johnson
      Abstract: Professional money management appears to require little skill, yet its practitioners command astronomical salaries. Singh's theory of shamanism provides one possible explanation: Financial professionals are the shamans of the global economy. They cultivate the perception of superhuman traits, maintain grueling initiation rituals, and rely on esoteric divination rituals. An anthropological view of markets can usefully supplement economic and psychological approaches.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002096
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • A ritual by any other name
    • Authors: Rohan Kapitány; Christopher Kavanagh
      Abstract: We question the privileged role of trance within the framework presented. The features that Singh suggests make it unique are not well demarcated from those of rituals more generally, and we challenge the depth of explanation presented for the mechanisms of trance. We outline the form of a solution, which may facilitate increased operational utility for the presented framework.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002102
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Commitment enforcement also explains shamanism's culturally shared
    • Authors: Stefan Linquist
      Abstract: The proposed explanation for the evolution of shamanism is not the only viable option. I sketch an alternative commitment hypothesis that views shamanism as an adaptation at the level of biological individuals or cultural groups. To the extent that these hypotheses make overlapping predictions about the culturally shared features of shamanism, we lack adequate evidence to discriminate among them.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002114
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Shamanism and the social nature of cumulative culture
    • Authors: Mark Nielsen; Ronald Fischer, Yoshihisa Kashima
      Abstract: Our species-unique capacity for cumulative culture relies on a complex interplay between social and cognitive motivations. Attempting to understand much of human behaviour will be incomplete if one of these motivations is the focus at the expense of the other. Anchored in gene-culture co-evolution theory, we stake a claim for the importance of social drivers in determining why shamans exist.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002126
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Psychosis is episodically required for the enduring integrity of shamanism
    • Authors: Joseph Polimeni
      Abstract: The target article advances several original concepts about shamanism, including prospective explanations for how shamanism could express itself in different cultural settings. Although the potential for “innate psychological tendencies” is acknowledged, the target article prematurely dismisses one such hard-wired feature of shamanism: psychosis.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002138
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Shamanism and psychosis: Shared mechanisms'
    • Authors: Albert R. Powers; Philip R. Corlett
      Abstract: Individual-specific predispositions may precede the cultural evolution of shamanism and may be linked to it via principles of predictive coding. We have used these principles to identify commonalities between clinical and shaman-like non-clinical voice-hearers. The author may find this approach helpful in relating the experiences of shamans to those of their clients.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700214X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Shamanism and the psychosis continuum
    • Authors: Robert M. Ross; Ryan McKay
      Abstract: Singh's cultural evolutionary theory of shamanism is impressive, but it does not explain why some people become shamans while others do not. We propose that individual differences in where people lie on a “psychosis continuum” could play an important causal role.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002151
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • An existential perspective on the psychological function of shamans
    • Authors: Simon Schindler; Jeff Greenberg, Stefan Pfattheicher
      Abstract: Shamans deal with events that involve the threat of death. They help buffer death anxiety because, through their claimed supernatural abilities, they can provide both hope for averting death and evidence for existence of a spirit world offering continuance beyond death. Thus, managing the threat of mortality probably played a major role in the development and maintenance of shamanism.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002163
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Therapeutic encounters and the elicitation of community care
    • Authors: Leander Steinkopf; Mícheál de Barra
      Abstract: Singh's analysis of shamanism is regarded as a contribution to the evolutionary study of healing encounters and evolutionary medicine. Shamans must create convincing healing spectacles, while sick individuals must convincingly express symptoms and suffering to motivate community care. Both have a shared interest in convincing onlookers. This is not restricted to shamanic treatment, but is still true in modern medical care.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002175
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Toward a neurophysiological foundation for altered states of consciousness
    • Authors: Shadab Tabatabaeian; Carolyn Dicey Jennings
      Abstract: Singh's cultural evolutionary theory posits that methods of inducing shamanic altered states of consciousness differ, resulting in profoundly different cognitive states. We argue that, despite different methods of induction, altered states of consciousness share neurophysiological features and cause shared cognitive and behavioral effects. This common foundation enables further cross-cultural comparison of shamanic activities that is currently left out of Singh's theory.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002187
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The social functions of shamanism
    • Authors: Rachel E. Watson-Jones; Cristine H. Legare
      Abstract: Cultural evolutionary accounts of shamanism must explain the cross-cultural recurrence and variation in associated practices. We suggest that Singh's account of shamanism would be strengthened by considering the social functions of shamanism in groups. Shamanism increases social group cohesion, making it distinct from other magico-religious practices.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002199
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The evolution of the shaman's cultural toolkit
    • Authors: Aiyana K. Willard; Yo Nakawake, Jonathan Jong
      Abstract: A complete picture of shamanism's cultural evolution requires an understanding of how the professionalization of shamanism affects the distribution of knowledge within societies. We suggest that limiting knowledge to fewer people could impede the accumulation of functional knowledge within shamanism. On this basis, we make further predictions about how the domain of shamanism could change and collapse.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002205
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Identifying the nature of shamanism
    • Authors: Michael James Winkelman
      Abstract: Singh conflates diverse religious statuses into a single category that includes practitioners with roles that differ significantly from empirical characteristics of shamans. The rejection of biological models of trance and conspicuous display models misses the evolutionary roots of shamanism involving the social functions of ritual in producing psychological and social integration and ritual healing.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002217
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Complexity and possession: Gender and social structure in the variability
           of shamanic traits
    • Authors: Connor P. Wood; Kate J. Stockly
      Abstract: Singh deploys cultural evolution to explain recurrent features of shamanistic trance forms, but fails to substantively address important distinctions between these forms. Possession trance (vs. trance without possession) is disproportionately female-dominated and found in complex societies. The effects of cultural conditions on shamanism thus extend beyond its presence or absence and are vital for modeling its professionalization and spread.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002229
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Why is there shamanism' Developing the cultural evolutionary theory
           and addressing alternative accounts
    • Authors: Manvir Singh
      Abstract: The commentators endorse the conceptual and ethnographic synthesis presented in the target article, suggest extensions and elaborations of the theory, and generalize its logic to explain apparently similar specializations. They also demand clarity about psychological mechanisms, argue against conclusions drawn about empirical phenomena, and propose alternative accounts for why shamanism develops. Here, I respond.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002230
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Talking+to+Our+Selves:+Reflection,+Ignorance,+and+Agency&rft.title=Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.issn=0140-525X&">Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection,
           Ignorance, and Agency
    • Authors: John M. Doris
      Abstract: Does it make sense for people to hold one another responsible for what they do, as happens in countless social interactions every day' One of the most unsettling lessons from recent psychological research is that people are routinely mistaken about the origins of their behavior. Yet philosophical orthodoxy holds that the exercise of morally responsible agency typically requires accurate self-awareness. If the orthodoxy is right, and the psychology is to be believed, people characteristically fail to meet the standards of morally responsible agency, and we are faced with the possibility of skepticism about agency. Unlike many philosophers, I accept the unsettling lesson from psychology. I insist, however, that we are not driven to skepticism. Instead, we should reject the requirement of accurate self-awareness for morally responsible agency. In Talking to Our Selves I develop a dialogic theory, where the exercise of morally responsible agency emerges through a collaborative conversational process by which human beings, although afflicted with a remarkable degree of self-ignorance, are able to realize their values in their lives.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X16002016
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The Nietzschean precedent for anti-reflective, dialogical agency
    • Authors: Mark Alfano
      Abstract: Nietzsche anticipates both the anti-reflective and the dialogical aspects of Doris's theory of agency. Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power presupposes that agency does not require reflection but emerges from interacting drives, affects, and emotions. Furthermore, Nietzsche identifies two channels through which dialogical processes of person-formation flow: sometimes a person announces what she is and meets with social acceptance of that claim; sometimes someone else announces what the person is, and she accepts the attribution.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000620
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Innate valuation, existential framing, and one head for multiple moral
    • Authors: Bree Beal; Philippe Rochat
      Abstract: We support John Doris's criticism of “reflectivism” but identify three shortcomings: (1) his neglect of humans' evolved predispositions and tendencies, (2) his failure to appreciate that identity and responsibility arise first from parsing our world ontologically, in a process we call “existential framing,” and (3) a potentially alarming implication of his “dialogic” model of identity formation: if identity is negotiated across diverse social situations, why isn't dissociative identity disorder more common'
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000632
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The participatory dimension of individual responsibility
    • Authors: Sofia Bonicalzi; Mattia Gallotti
      Abstract: Collaborativism is the view that moral reasoning is better when it is socially embedded. We propose that, when people take part in dialogic exchanges, they align in ways that open up novel avenues for sharing values and rationality criteria and, therefore, for exercising responsible agency. The hypothesis that collaborative interactions unfold through the alignment of minds and bodies helps articulate Doris's participatory approach to morality.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000644
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Seeing for ourselves: Insights into the development of moral behaviour
           from models of visual perception and misperception
    • Authors: Daniel Collerton; Elaine Perry
      Abstract: Parallels from visual processing support Doris's cognitive architecture underlying moral agency. Unconscious visual processes change with conscious reflection. The sparse and partial representations of vision, its illusions, and hallucinations echo biases in moral reasoning and behaviour. Traditionally, unconscious moral processes are developed by teaching and reflection. Modern neuroscience could bypass reflection and directly influence unconscious processes, creating new dangers.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000656
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The dark side of dialog
    • Authors: Justin J. Couchman; Gwenievere A. Birster, Mariana V. C. Coutinho
      Abstract: We agree that the self is constructed through a collaborative dialog. But hostile interlocutors could use various cognitive techniques to hijack the dialog, resulting in beliefs, values, and even selves that are out of line with reality. The implications of this problem are dire, but we suggest that increased metacognitive awareness could help guide this process to a truthful conclusion.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000668
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Moral agency among the ruins
    • Authors: David Dunning
      Abstract: Doris suggests thought-provoking directions for rehabilitating moral agency within a self that is unaware and incoherent. These directions suggest more radical proposals. First, moral reasoning may serve many different functions beyond merely expressing a person's values. Second, social collaboration may not focus on moral reasoning as much as it does on the “defeaters” of that agency. Ultimately, moral agency may not reside in the individual but in social communities or within external situations.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001157
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • On properly characterizing moral agency
    • Authors: Blaine J. Fowers; Austen R. Anderson, Samantha M. Lang
      Abstract: Doris (2015b) develops a theory of moral agency to avoid a skeptical challenge arising from psychology studies indicating that (im)moral behavior is caused by trivial situational factors. His theory is flawed in attending only to situational influences on behavior and neglecting individual differences such as moral identity and virtue. A focus on individual differences in resilience to influence from trivial situational factors defangs the skeptical challenge and offers a better account of moral agency.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700067X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • What does agency afford the self'
    • Authors: Bradley Franks; Benjamin G. Voyer
      Abstract: We welcome Doris's dual systems, social account of agency and self. However, we suggest that a level of affordances regarding agency is interpolated between those dual systems. We also suggest a need to consider joint (“we”) agency in addition to individual (“I”) agency, and we suggest a more fundamental role for culture in configuring both the values entering the dialogue that generates the sense of agency and self, and the nature of the dialogue itself.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000681
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Learning to talk to ourselves: Development, ignorance, and agency
    • Authors: Stuart I. Hammond
      Abstract: Although anti-reflectivism seems to preclude a role for reflection, this dichotomy could be synthesized in a Piagetian developmental framework. Development integrates a role for error and ignorance in reflection, and supports Doris's espousal of valuation, collaboration, and pluralism, and the importance of extrinsic factors to the self.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000693
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Talking to others: The importance of responsibility attributions by
    • Authors: Stefanie Hechler; Thomas Kessler
      Abstract: This commentary extends Doris's approach of agency by highlighting the importance of responsibility attributions by observers. We argue that (a) social groups determine which standards are relevant and which actors are responsible, (b) consensus about these attributions may correct individual defeaters, and (c) the attribution of moral responsibility reveals agency of observers and may foster the actors' agency.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700070X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Grounding responsibility in something (more) solid
    • Authors: William Hirstein; Katrina Sifferd
      Abstract: The cases that Doris chronicles of confabulation are similar to perceptual illusions in that, while they show the interstices of our perceptual or cognitive system, they fail to establish that our everyday perception or cognition is not for the most part correct. Doris's account in general lacks the resources to make synchronic assessments of responsibility, partially because it fails to make use of knowledge now available to us about what is happening in the brains of agents.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000711
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Getting by with a little help from our friends
    • Authors: Enoch Lambert; Daniel C. Dennett
      Abstract: We offer two kinds of constructive criticism in the spirit of support for Doris's socially scaffolded pluralism regarding agency. First: The skeptical force of potential “goofy influences” is not as straightforward as Doris argues. Second: Doris's positive theory must address more goofy influences due to social processes that appear to fall under his criteria for agency-promoting practices. Finally, we highlight “arms race” phenomena in Doris's social dynamics that invite closer attention in further development of his theory.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000723
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Agency is realized by subpersonal mechanisms too
    • Authors: Neil Levy
      Abstract: John Doris argues that, when behaviors are caused by processes that we would not endorse, our agency is defeated. I argue that this test for defeaters is inappropriate. What matters is not what we would but what we should endorse. The subpersonal mechanisms he identifies as defeaters enable us to track and respond to reasons. They realize agency, rather than defeating it.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000735
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Acting without knowledge
    • Authors: Heidi Lene Maibom
      Abstract: I question whether psychological effects that an agent is unaware of can express her values and, if they can, whether this allows us to hold her responsible in the range of cases that we would like to.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000747
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Talking to others' selves: Why a valuational paradigm of agency fails to
           provide an adequate theoretical framework for moral responsibility, social
           accountability, and legal liability
    • Authors: Tobias A. Mattei
      Abstract: In this commentary, I highlight the importance of a proper discussion of the pragmatic implications of John Doris's paradigm for allocation of personal responsibility proposed in his new book Talking to Our Selves. By employing some classic concepts of the American common law tradition, I discuss why Doris's valuational understanding of agency fails to provide an adequate framework for moral responsibility, social accountability, and legal liability.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000759
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • A limited skeptical threat
    • Authors: Joshua May
      Abstract: Doris argues that our choices are heavily influenced by forces that we wouldn't count as genuine reasons. This unsettling conclusion is motivated by a debunking argument so wide-ranging that it isn't foisted upon us by the sciences. Doris sometimes seems to lower his ambitions when offering instead a skeptical hypothesis argument, but that conflicts with his aims in the book.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000760
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • A related proposal: An interactionist perspective on reason
    • Authors: Hugo Mercier
      Abstract: This comment introduces the interactionist perspective on reason that Dan Sperber and I developed. In this perspective, reason is a specific cognitive mechanism that evolved so that humans can exchange justifications and arguments with each other. The interactionist perspective significantly aligns with Doris's views in rejecting reflectivism and individualism. Indeed, I suggest that it offers different, and maybe stronger arguments to reject these views.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000772
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Why value values'
    • Authors: Samuel Murray
      Abstract: Doris argues that an agent is responsible for her behavior only if that behavior expresses (a relevant subset of) the agent's values. This view has problems explaining responsibility for mistakes or episodes of forgetfulness. These problems highlight a conceptual problem with Doris's theory of responsible agency and give us reasons to prefer an alternative (non-valuational) theory of responsible agency.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000784
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Acknowledging and managing deep constraints on moral agency and the self
    • Authors: Laura Niemi; Jesse Graham
      Abstract: Doris proposes that the exercise of morally responsible agency unfolds as a collaborative dialogue among selves expressing their values while being subject to ever-present constraints. We assess the fit of Doris's account with recent data from psychology and neuroscience related to how people make judgments about moral agency (responsibility, blame), and how they understand the self after traumatic events.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001182
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Another rescue mission: Does it make sense'
    • Authors: Piotr M. Patrzyk
      Abstract: Two misguided ideas dominate philosophical thinking on moral responsibility: (1) the idea that it obviously exists, and (2) the idea that even if it does not, it is nevertheless needed for the society to function properly. In his book, Doris (2015b) discusses the first illusion, while uncritically accepting the second. In this commentary, I question the utility of such endeavors.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000796
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The tangled web of agency
    • Authors: Alain Pe-Curto; Julien A. Deonna, David Sander
      Abstract: We characterize Doris's anti-reflectivist, collaborativist, valuational theory along two dimensions. The first dimension is social entanglement, according to which cognition, agency, and selves are socially embedded. The second dimension is disentanglement, the valuational element of the theory that licenses the anchoring of agency and responsibility in distinct actors. We then present an issue for the account: the problem of bad company.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001170
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Negotiating responsibility
    • Authors: Tamler Sommers
      Abstract: I argue that John Doris should apply his dialogic or collaborationist approach to agency more fully to questions of moral responsibility. To do so, he must discard his form of pluralism that aims to accommodate a variety of theoretical approaches to responsibility in favor of a pluralism that rejects theorizing about responsibility altogether.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001169
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Agency enhancement and social psychology
    • Authors: Matthew Taylor
      Abstract: This commentary has two aims. First, I raise a practical challenge for accounts of responsible agency: Provide empirically informed strategies for enhancing responsible agency so that actors can become more resistant to the influence of defeaters. Second, I offer an initial sketch of a solution to this practical challenge. My solution is supported by empirical evidence suggesting that responsible agency can be enhanced via self-regulatory strategies (expertise and implementation intentions).
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000802
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Responsibility: Cognitive fragments and collaborative coherence'
    • Authors: James S. Uleman; Yael Granot, Yuki Shimizu
      Abstract: We describe additional research that expands upon many of Doris's points, focusing on collaboration (Ch. 5), selves, and identity (Ch. 8). We also suggest some elaboration of his treatment of dual process theories (Ch. 3). Finally, we ask whether collaborationist accounts confer logical consistency.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000814
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Manipulation, oppression, and the deep self
    • Authors: Manuel R. Vargas
      Abstract: This essay considers various kinds of manipulation cases (local and global, dispositional and situational), and how Doris's Deep Self-style theory of responsibility fares in light of them. Agents acting with preferences adaptively formed under oppression are an especially interesting challenge for this sort of view, and the article considers what options may be available to Doris and others.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000826
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • To kill a bee: The aptness and moralistic heuristics of reactive attitudes
    • Authors: Hugo Viciana; Antonio Gaitán, Fernando Aguiar
      Abstract: Although we are sensitive to the advantages of reactive attitudes as a starting point, we are concerned that confusion on the level of analysis can easily plague this type of account. We argue that what is needed here is a serious appraisal of the effects on the promotion of values of moralistic responses toward different types of agency.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000838
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • “Defeaters” don't matter
    • Authors: Zina B. Ward; Edouard Machery
      Abstract: We argue that the exercise of agency is compatible with the presence of what Doris calls “defeaters.” In order to undermine reflectivist theories of agency and support his valuational alternative, Doris must not simply show that defeaters exist but rather establish that some agentive behaviors do express a person's values without involving reflection.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700084X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The practice of everyday life provides supporters and inviters of morally
           responsible agency
    • Authors: Jörg Zinken; Vasudevi Reddy
      Abstract: Drawing on research from conversation analysis and developmental psychology, we point to the existence of “supporters” of morally responsible agency in everyday interaction: causes of our behavior that we are often unaware of, but that would make good-enough reasons for our actions, were we made aware of them.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000851
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Collaborating agents: Values, sociality, and moral responsibility
    • Authors: John M. Doris
      Abstract: I respond to the Behavioral and Brain Sciences commentaries on my book, Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency. I defend and amend both the skeptical challenge to morally responsible agency, that is, the book's impetus, and the anti-skeptical theory I develop to address that challenge. Regarding the skeptical challenge, I argue that it must be taken more seriously than some of my sanguine commentators assert, and consider some ways its impact might be blunted, such as by appeal to individual differences and the practical efficacy of human behavior. Regarding my positive theory, I defend the role of values in morally responsible agency against numerous criticisms, and consider various suggestions for elaborating my social, “collaborativist” account of morally responsible agency. In closing, I comment on the appropriate aspirations for theorizing about moral responsibility and agency.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001935
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Why do we remember' The communicative function of episodic memory
    • Authors: Johannes B. Mahr; Gergely Csibra
      Abstract: Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, autonoetic character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken toward an event simulation. In this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in future-oriented mental time travel do justice neither to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17000012
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Retrieval is central to the distinctive function of episodic memory
    • Authors: Sara Aronowitz
      Abstract: Episodic retrieval is heavily and asymmetrically dependent on the temporal order of the remembered events. This effect, or rather the underlying structure which it reflects, is a distinctive feature missing from the account in the target article. This structure explains significant successes and failures of episodic retrieval, and it has clear consequences for the fitness of the organism extending beyond communication.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001248
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • An adaptive function of mental time travel: Motivating farsighted
    • Authors: Roland G. Benoit; Ruud M. W. J. Berkers, Philipp C. Paulus
      Abstract: The episodic memory system allows us to experience the emotions of past, counterfactual, and prospective events. We outline how this phenomenological experience can convey motivational incentives for farsighted decisions. In this way, we challenge important arguments for Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) conclusion that future-oriented mental time travel is unlikely to be a central function of episodic memory.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700125X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The dynamics of episodic memory functions
    • Authors: Dorthe Berntsen
      Abstract: There is no doubt that episodic memory serves communicative functions, but Mahr & Csibra (M&C) overlook that this is not the only function served by memories of past events. Autobiographical memory research has identified several other functions, including purely directive functions. The functionality of episodic memory is not stable across situations; it varies dynamically with the demands of the retrieval context.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001261
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Episodic memory must be grounded in reality in order to be useful in
    • Authors: Hartmut Blank
      Abstract: The primary function of episodic memory is to provide reliable information about reality that is essential for surviving and navigating in an environment. The communicative function of episodic memory “sits on top of” this basic function but does not, in itself, explain it in its totality (but may explain particular aspects such as its sensitivity to source credibility).
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001273
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Episodic memory isn't essentially autonoetic
    • Authors: Peter Carruthers
      Abstract: I argue that the function attributed to episodic memory by Mahr & Csibra (M&C) – that is, grounding one's claims to epistemic authority over past events – fails to support the essentially autonoetic character of such memories. I suggest, in contrast, that episodic event memories are sometimes purely first order, sometimes autonoetic, depending on relevance in the context.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001285
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Episodic memory is as much about communicating as it is about relating to
    • Authors: Alin Coman
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) provide extensive evidence for the communicative function of episodic memory, suggesting that the malleability of human memory is in large part due to its communicative dimension. I argue that emphasizing the relational motivations involved in communication provides a more proximal explanation for why our memories are as malleable.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001297
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Why episodic memory may not be for communication
    • Authors: Felipe De Brigard; Bryce Gessell
      Abstract: Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories. Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more parsimonious evolutionary accounts.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001303
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Remembered events are unexpected
    • Authors: Jean-Louis Dessalles
      Abstract: We remember a small proportion of our experiences as events. Are these events selected because they are useful and can be proven true, or rather because they are unexpected'
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001315
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Sleep to be social: The critical role of sleep and memory for social
    • Authors: Susanne Diekelmann; Frieder M. Paulus, Sören Krach
      Abstract: Humans are highly social animals who critically need to remember information from social episodes in order to successfully navigate future social interactions. We propose that such episodic memories about social encounters are processed during sleep, following the learning experience, with sleep abstracting and consolidating social gist knowledge (e.g., beliefs, first impressions, or stereotypes) about others that supports relationships and interpersonal communication.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001327
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Emotional memories and how your life may depend upon them
    • Authors: Tayler Eaton; Adam K. Anderson
      Abstract: In this commentary, we discuss how one's internal body state and the appraisals an individual utilizes at encoding alter later episodic memory irrespective of social discourse. We suggest that the purpose of episodic memory is originally the preservation of the self, which may have been co-opted to navigating the social world.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001546
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The communicative function of destination memory
    • Authors: Mohamad El Haj; Ralph Miller
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal that episodic memory has a role in communicative interaction is innovative. However, the model would be strengthened by the inclusion of the construct of destination memory. Destination memory refers to the ability to remember to whom one has sent information. Research has demonstrated that this ability is essential for communicative efficacy and daily interactions with others.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001339
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Episodic memory and consciousness in antisocial personality disorder and
           conduct disorder
    • Authors: Franco Fabbro; Cristiano Crescentini
      Abstract: Episodic memory is one of the most significant sources of information of humans. It entails cooperative and linguistic skills and, as Mahr & Csibra (M&C) note, the capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past. In some psychiatric disorders (antisocial personality disorder and conduct disorder), it was found that the habit of lying is associated with episodic memory and consciousness deficits.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001340
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • The sociocultural functions of episodic memory
    • Authors: Robyn Fivush
      Abstract: The functional use of episodic memories to claim epistemic truth must be placed within sociocultural contexts in which certain truths are privileged. Episodic memories are shared, evaluated, and understood within sociocultural interactions, creating both individual and group identities. These negotiated identities provide the foundation from which epistemic claims to truth can be made.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001352
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • “Truth be told” – Semantic memory as the scaffold for veridical
    • Authors: Brett K. Hayes; Siddharth Ramanan, Muireann Irish
      Abstract: Theoretical accounts placing episodic memory as central to constructive and communicative functions neglect the role of semantic memory. We argue that the decontextualized nature of semantic schemas largely supersedes the computational bottleneck and error-prone nature of episodic memory. Rather, neuroimaging and neuropsychological evidence of episodic-semantic interactions suggest that an integrative framework more accurately captures the mechanisms underpinning social communication.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001364
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Episodic memory and the witness trump card
    • Authors: Jeremy Henry; Carl Craver
      Abstract: We accept Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) causal claim that episodic memory provides humans with the means for evaluating the veracity of reports about non-occurrent events. We reject their evolutionary argument that this is the proper function of episodic memory. We explore three intriguing implications of the causal claim, for cognitive neuropsychology, comparative psychology, and philosophy.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001376
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • More to episodic memory than epistemic assertion: The role of social bonds
           and interpersonal connection
    • Authors: William Hirst; Gerald Echterhoff
      Abstract: Remembering is dynamically entangled in conversations. The communicative function of episodic memory can be epistemic, as suggested by Mahr & Csibra (M&C). However, remembering can have genuinely social functions, specifically, the creation or consolidation of interpersonal relationships. Autonoesis, a distinct feature of episodic memory, is more likely to have evolved in the service of social binding than of epistemic assertiveness.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001388
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Encoding third-person epistemic states contributes to episodic
           reconstruction of memories
    • Authors: Dora Kampis; András Keszei, Ildikó Király
      Abstract: We propose an extension to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) theory. For successful episodic memory formation, potentially relevant aspects of a situation need to be identified and encoded online and retained for prospective interactions. To be maximally convincing, the communicator not only has to encode not just any contextual detail, but also has to track information in relation to social partners.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700139X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Carving event and episodic memory at their joints
    • Authors: Nazim Keven
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) argue that event and episodic memories share the same scenario construction process. I think this way of carving up the distinction throws the baby out with the bathwater. If there is a substantive difference between event and episodic memory, it is based on a difference in the construction process and how they are organized, respectively.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001406
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Episodic memory solves both social and nonsocial problems, and evolved to
           fulfill many different functions
    • Authors: Raymond A. Mar; R. Nathan Spreng
      Abstract: The episodic memory system is flexible and complex, and likely evolved in response to a wide range of survival-relevant problems in our evolutionary past, both social and nonsocial. Episodic memory allows us to recollect and infer details that may have seemed trivial on encoding, but are now known to be relevant. This memory aids humans in navigating their uncertain environment.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001418
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Using episodic memory to gauge implicit and/or indeterminate social
    • Authors: John Michael; Marcell Székely, Wayne Christensen
      Abstract: In discussing Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) observations about the role of episodic memory in grounding social commitments, we propose that episodic memory is especially useful for gauging cases of implicit commitment and cases in which the content of a commitment is indeterminate. We conclude with some thoughts about how commitment may relate to the evolution of episodic memory.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700142X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Autonoesis and reconstruction in episodic memory: Is remembering
           systematically misleading'
    • Authors: Kourken Michaelian
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) view autonoesis as being essential to episodic memories and construction as being essential to the process of episodic remembering. These views imply that episodic memory is systematically misleading, not because it often misinforms us about the past, but rather because it often misinforms us about how it informs us about the past.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001431
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Autonoesis and dissociative identity disorder
    • Authors: John Morton
      Abstract: Dissociative identity disorder is characterised by the presence in one individual of two or more alternative personality states (alters). For such individuals, the memory representation of a particular event can have full episodic, autonoetic status for one alter, while having the status of knowledge or even being inaccessible to a second alter. This phenomenon appears to create difficulties for a purely representational theory and is presented to Mahr & Csibra (M&C) for their consideration.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001558
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self
    • Authors: Jennifer Nagel
      Abstract: The distinctive feature of episodic memory is autonoesis, the feeling that one's awareness of particular past events is grounded in firsthand experience. Autonoesis guides us in sharing our experiences of past events, not by telling us when our credibility is at stake, but by telling us what others will find informative; it also supports the sense of an enduring self.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001443
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • False memories, nonbelieved memories, and the unresolved primacy of
    • Authors: Robert A. Nash
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) make a compelling case for a communicative function of episodic remembering, but a less compelling case that this is its primary function. Questions arise on whether confirming their predictions would support their account sufficiently, on the communicative function of preserving rich, nonbelieved memories, and on the epistemic benefits of developing false memories via the acceptance of misinformation.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001455
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Developmental roots of episodic memory
    • Authors: Katherine Nelson
      Abstract: Two arguments imply that Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) functional theory is insufficient as an explanation of episodic memory: (1) The developmental course supports a different social cultural division of episodic and semantic memory, and (2) the existence of long-term autobiographical memory is not explained in the functional theory but can be seen in a broader cultural framework.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001467
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Enhanced action control as a prior function of episodic memory
    • Authors: Philipp Rau; George Botterill
      Abstract: Improved control of agency is likely to be a prior and more important function of episodic memory than the epistemic-communicative role pinpointed by Mahr & Csibra (M&C). Taking the memory trace upon which scenario construction is based to be a stored internal model produced in past perceptual processing promises to provide a better account of autonoetic character than metarepresentational embedding.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001479
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Misconceptions about adaptive function
    • Authors: Jonathan Redshaw; Thomas Suddendorf
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) fail to make the important distinction between why a trait originally evolved, why it was maintained over time, and what its current utility is. Here we point out that episodic memory may have originally evolved as a by-product of a general metarepresentational capacity, and that it may have current functions beyond the communicative domain.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001480
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Confabulation and epistemic authority
    • Authors: Sarah Robins
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) claim that episodic remembering's autonoetic character serves as an indicator of epistemic authority. This proposal is difficult to reconcile with the existence of confabulation errors – where participants fabricate memories of experiences that never happened to them. Making confabulation errors damages one's epistemic authority, but these false memories have an autonoetic character.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001492
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • What psychology and cognitive neuroscience know about the communicative
           function of memory
    • Authors: David C. Rubin
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) include interesting ideas about the nature of memory from outside of the field of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. However, the target article's inaccurate claims about those fields limit its usefulness. I briefly review the most serious omissions and distortions of the literature by the target article, including its misrepresentation of event memory, and offer suggestions for forwarding the goal of understanding the communicative function of memory.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X1700156X
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Morgan's canon is not evidence
    • Authors: Steven Samuel; Nicola Clayton
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) account of the communicative function of episodic memory relies more heavily on the case against episodic memory in nonhumans than their description suggests. Although the communicative function of episodic memory may be accurate as it pertains to human behaviour, we question whether Morgan's canon is a suitable foundation on which to build theories of supposedly human-specific traits.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001509
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Constructive episodic simulation, flexible recombination, and memory
    • Authors: Daniel L. Schacter; Alexis C. Carpenter, Aleea Devitt, Reece P. Roberts, Donna Rose Addis
      Abstract: According to Mahr & Csibra (M&C), the view that the constructive nature of episodic memory is related to its role in simulating future events has difficulty explaining why memory is often accurate. We hold this view, but disagree with their conclusion. Here we consider ideas and evidence regarding flexible recombination processes in episodic retrieval that accommodate both accuracy and distortion.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001510
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Beyond communication: Episodic memory is key to the self in time
    • Authors: Karl K. Szpunar; Jason C. K. Chan
      Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) propose that episodic memory evolved to support epistemic authority in social communication. We argue for a more parsimonious interpretation whereby episodic memory subserves a broader preparatory function for both social and non-social behavior. We conclude by highlighting that functional accounts of episodic memory may need to consider the complex interrelations between self and subjective time.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001522
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • Doing without metarepresentation: Scenario construction explains the
           epistemic generativity and privileged status of episodic memory
    • Authors: Markus Werning; Sen Cheng
      Abstract: Episodic memories are distinct from semantic memories in that they are epistemically generative and privileged. Whereas Mahr & Csibra (M&C) develop a metarepresentational account of epistemic vigilance, we propose an explanation that builds on our notion of scenario construction: The way an event of the past is presented in episodic memory recall explains the epistemic generativity and privilegedness of episodic memory.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001534
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
  • What is it to remember'
    • Authors: Johannes B. Mahr; Gergely Csibra
      Abstract: In response to the commentaries, we clarify and defend our characterization of both the nature and function of episodic memory. Regarding the nature of episodic memory, we extend the distinction between event and episodic memory and discuss the relational role of episodic memory. We also address arguments against our characterization of autonoesis and argue that, while self-referential, it needs to be distinguished from an agentive notion of self. Regarding the function of episodic memory, we review arguments about the relation between future mental time travel and memory veridicality; clarify the relation between autonoesis, veridicality, and confidence; and finally discuss the role of episodic memory in diachronic commitments.
      PubDate: 2018-01-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17001959
      Issue No: Vol. 41 (2018)
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
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Fax: +00 44 (0)131 4513327
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